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Electronic Voting in the News 320

Posted by michael from the getting-it-right dept.
heymarcel writes "After a negative review of the Diebold voting machines by the State Gaming Control Board, it looks like Nevada has gone with a competitor for the upcoming election. And Secretary of State Dean Heller is requiring paper receipts. According to the Associated Press story, Nevada is the first state to do so." There's another story about Nevada voting machines as well. zapf writes "It appears that the major e-Voting machine vendors have banded together to form the 'Election Technology Council.'" Reader SemperUbi writes: "Demand for a voter-verified audit trail is really gaining momentum these days. The Voter Verification Act, introduced yesterday by Senator Bob Graham (D-Florida), would require a voter-verified paper audit trail, ban the use of 'undisclosed' software and wireless communications for voting machines, and require mandatory surprise recounts -- all in time for the November 2004 election. Rep. Holt's HR2239 in the House requires much the same thing. Resistance to both bills may focus on the aggressive timetable, but the effort is worth it -- as Warren Slocum once said, democracy ain't cheap. Take that, Diebold!" And finally, a Maryland newspaper dredges up an internal Diebold email that recommends gouging Maryland if the state wants paper printouts for its Diebold voting system.
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Electronic Voting in the News More

Electronic Voting in the News

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  • Who says geeks can't make a difference? (Score:2, Funny)

    by Anonymous Coward
    Geeks 1.
    Diebold 0.

    We did it.

    • Re:Who says geeks can't make a difference? (Score:5, Funny)

      by BabyDave ( 575083 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:40PM (#7691151)

      Unfortunately they used Diebold machines for the scoring system, so this came out as

      Geeks: -16305
      Diebold: 463563541

    • Re:Who says geeks can't make a difference? (Score:5, Interesting)

      by belmolis ( 702863 ) <billposer@alum. m i t.edu> on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:57PM (#7691327) Homepage

      I'm surprised that the response has been so tame, actually. Given what is in the leaked email, I would think that the jurisdictions that had dealt with Diebold would be suing for breach of contract, demanding their money back and terminating existing contracts. And I wonder if some of the activity disclosed doesn't warrant criminal charges. Isn't screwing around with what is supposed to be a frozen, certified system election fraud?

      In a similar vein, is Maryland really locked in to its deal with Diebold the way the Diebold people seem to think it is? If the system was secured as advertised and if Diebold screwed around with it in Maryland as they apparently did in some places, I would think that Maryland could easily void the contract.

      • What is it with America's love of voting machines? They don't use them virtually anywhere else.

        Haven't you bloody Americans learnt the KISS system - Keep It Simple Stupid.

        This means no bloody machines, period !!! If Australia (& also virtually the rest of the democratic world) can do hand counted paper ballots, then so can the US.

        The only reason they use machine systems in the US is to cut costs, but the simple fact is they arn't as good (they invalidate more votes then hand counts do, they intimidat

    • Re:Who says geeks can't make a difference? (Score:4, Funny)

      by Kenja ( 541830 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:59PM (#7691343)
      Riigghhtt....

      I'm sure the mafia types running Nevada State Gaming Control Board had their opinions swayed by reading slashdot.

      Mafioso Boss: Ok den, we's gona use dis Diebold system for all future voting right?
      Mafioso Thug: But Gino, it says here on Slashdot that Diebold is BAD!
      Mafioso Boss: WHAT? Dem guys at Diebold where trying to make a fool outa me? Get some cement galoshes.

  • Why did this happen? (Score:4, Funny)

    by Hackie_Chan ( 678203 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:38PM (#7691136)
    What happened to the goons that were supposed to hush this under the rug? They failed?
    • They didn't get the memo.

      Well, actually they got the memo, along with anybody else who was curious enough to read those misplaced emails.

    • Re:Why did this happen? (Score:2, Insightful)

      by Anonymous Coward
      Maybe because there wasn't any grand conspiracy to begin with...

      Nah, better to deny that, wouldn't want your safe cozy little paranoid worldview to be shattered.

      • Until it is actually fixed, ... (Score:5, Interesting)

        by burgburgburg ( 574866 ) <splisken06.email@com> on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:05PM (#7691402)
        I'll stick with the paranoid world view.

        Especially since I haven't heard one remotely reasonable explanation why companies (like Diebold) that make a large number of electronic transaction devices (ATMs, food/entry access, etc.) all of which have/require paper trails and full auditability suddenly found themselves incapable of providing paper trails and auditability to something as important and potentially controversial as elections.

        When this is actually fixed, maybe I'll be less cynical. Maybe.

      • Maybe because there wasn't any grand conspiracy to begin with...

        I seriously doubt that there was a grand conspiracy. The problem with the Diebold scandal was that the company simply did not understand the standard they would be held to or why they would be held to it.

        If Diebold was really up to no good their CEO would not have been blabbing about it in GOP fundraising letters. The GOP is arrogant but they are not that stupid. Of course one does wonder about the sense of a CEO who makes that type of sta

  • Vote logging (Score:3, Informative)

    by stanmann ( 602645 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:39PM (#7691142) Journal
    Must be anonymous and verifiable...

    the best Scheme(method) I have heard involves a unique key assigned to each vote and given to each voter... Each voter can then check up on that vote at any time to ensure that it is counted... Further, the list of votes could even be published and publicly browseable... such that each citizen or perhaps restricted to voters could identify and verify the vote.

    • Re:Vote logging (Score:5, Insightful)

      by Dr. Evil ( 3501 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:43PM (#7691179)

      There's only one horrible horrible problem with that system:

      The guy buying your vote, threatening your family, or blackmailing you can also verify your vote.

      • Not if you name is not next to the vote...

        The idea would be that you'd hit the button for the person you wanted to vote for and this is what would happen.

        1. A unique key would be generated
        2. This key and your vote would be printed onto a spool inside the machine.
        3. This key and your voite would be printed on a receipt and ejected from the machine.
        4. The vote would be encrypted using PKE and sent over a link using something like SSL to a database server. Or stored locally and sent as a batch.

        Also, that i

        • Re:Vote logging (Score:4, Interesting)

          by IthnkImParanoid ( 410494 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:03PM (#7691376)
          The problem is not that someone is going to break into the database and look for your name, or use your name to find out how you voted. The problem is that someone is going to come over to your house, take your receipt, sit down with you, and see which way you voted.

          We're talking about Mafia-like tactics here, not some 14 year old script kiddie invading your privacy.

          • Mafia-type tactics would be difficult to pull off on a scale large enough to shift an important election. One of the guys you'd try to coerce will turn out to be a loon with poor impulse control who will blow away your enforcer and bring your scheme to the attention of the authorities. It's not practical.

            Far more practical to coerce the politicians who get elected, or just pay them off. Then you only need a single point of leverage to thwart the people's will.

    • Re:Vote logging (Score:4, Interesting)

      by dafoomie ( 521507 ) <[moc.liamtoh] [ta] [eimoofad]> on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:50PM (#7691249) Homepage
      The problem with that is, you have a way to prove who you voted for outside of the voting station, so it makes bribery possible. What I'd do is have two counts, an electronic count, and a paper count. You make the selection on the screen, it prints the paper ballot, which you can verify is correct, then it is deposited into the box. The two counts are made, and if there is a discrepancy, the paper ballot can be hand counted.

    • Re:Vote logging (Score:5, Insightful)

      by bs_02_06_02 ( 670476 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:50PM (#7691252)
      Yes, sounds good. But, how about printer problems? Have you ever been to a polling place? The level of technological help is not high. Personally, I'd put any government office at a higher technological level than a polling station.

      Spare printers, printer cartridges, etc, will need to be onhand. In fact, I'd make sure that the "receipt" be capable of displaying on a screen so that people could write it down with a pen and paper. People trained to print the little receipt will need to be on hand. Anything that can go wrong will.

      Lastly, none of this stops voter fraud. In many states, it's very easy to vote. Show up with a Drivers' License or a neighbor to vouch, and you're in. You only need to be a resident for 30 days. If you don't have a neighbor, or a drivers' license, you can show up in Minnesota with a utility bill in your name, and that's enough to vote.
      • I believe that the intent is not to give the voter a carry away reciept, but to have a printed record of what is being electronically tallied in order to enable effective recounts (this would prevent electronic tampering in both the voting machine and in the tallying system). I would hope that the process be designed so as to be mostly user-transparent for the generation of the record, and require only a single response (yes/no buttons) for voter verification and acceptance of the recorded vote.

        I don't be

      • Re:Vote logging (Score:5, Funny)

        by commodoresloat ( 172735 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:40PM (#7691809)
        Have you ever been to a polling place?

        "I'm not a voter but I play one on slashdot."

    • Re:Vote logging (Score:4, Insightful)

      by Tin Foil Hat ( 705308 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:51PM (#7691259)
      This is a horrible idea because it destroys anonymity. Giving the voters something to take away from the polling place that identifies them with a particular vote simply paves the way to voting abuse. Think of thugs standing outside a poor district's voting place demanding to see the identifying key in your example. The people watching this may decide to cast votes according to the perceived wishes of the thugs rather than risk abuse.

      Yes, this is an extreme example, but don't think it could never happen. History plainly shows that if a voting process can be corrupted in any way, it will be. Strong-arm tactics included.

      A paper trail is a good idea, just not one that the voter carries away with him. Ideally, the voting machine would print out a receipt which the voter would then place into a ballot box for safe keeping in case it is needed for a recount.

  • I want a microsoft voting machine (Score:5, Funny)

    by Anonymous Coward on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:39PM (#7691144)
    "The candidate you are about to choose is not supported by us and may cause instablity in your state: Are you sure you want to continue?"

  • Absolutely amazing (Score:5, Insightful)

    by TWX ( 665546 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:39PM (#7691147)
    I'm amazed that companies whose sole purpose is to provide secure, reliable data management (ATMs, and now voting machines) would be so incredibly stupid regarding security and integrity of systems. Diebold's attitudes toward their voting machines make me wonder about their ATMs, and if they are as insecure and poorly implemented as the voting machines were demonstrated to be.

    This is one place where we should definitely push for open source software with peer review. Otherwise we'll have elections under control of a few people without any recourse.

    • Re:Absolutely amazing (Score:5, Informative)

      by badasscat ( 563442 ) <basscadet75NO@SPAMyahoo.com> on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:51PM (#7691266)
      Diebold's attitudes toward their voting machines make me wonder about their ATMs, and if they are as insecure and poorly implemented as the voting machines were demonstrated to be.

      Now why would you worry about Diebold ATM's [com.com]?

    • Re:Absolutely amazing (Score:5, Informative)

      by frankie ( 91710 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:55PM (#7691301) Journal
      make me wonder about their ATMs, and if they are as insecure and poorly implemented as the voting machines

      Oh, you mean the Diebold ATMs that got infected [slashdot.org] earlier this year? No, don't worry, they're completely secure [google.com]. Just like their voting machines [blackboxvoting.com].

    • Incompetent? Or something else... (Score:5, Informative)

      by meldroc ( 21783 ) <meldroc@NoSpAM.frii.com> on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:17PM (#7691542) Homepage Journal

      You make a very valid point here. Robert Cringely makes this same point another way in I, Cringely:

      Now against this backdrop of failure, I can't help but make one technical observation that I think has been missed by most of the other people covering this story. One of the key issues in touch screen voting is the presence or absence of a so-called paper trail. There doesn't seem to be any way in these systems to verify that the numbers coming out are the numbers that went in. There is no print-out from the machine, no receipt given to the voter, no way of auditing the election at all. This is what bugs the conspiracy theorists, that we just have to trust the voting machine developers -- folks whose actions strongly suggest that they haven't been worthy of our trust.

      So who decided that these voting machines wouldn't create a paper trail and so couldn't be audited? Did the U.S. Elections Commission or some other government agency specifically require that the machines NOT be auditable? Or did the vendors come up with that wrinkle all by themselves? The answer to this question is crucial, so crucial that I am eager for one of my readers to enlighten me. If you know the answer for a fact, please get in touch.

      Having the voting machines not be auditable seems to have been a bad move on somebody's part, whoever that somebody is.

      Now here's the really interesting part. Forgetting for a moment Diebold's voting machines, let's look at the other equipment they make. Diebold makes a lot of ATM machines. They make machines that sell tickets for trains and subways. They make store checkout scanners, including self-service scanners. They make machines that allow access to buildings for people with magnetic cards. They make machines that use magnetic cards for payment in closed systems like university dining rooms. All of these are machines that involve data input that results in a transaction, just like a voting machine. But unlike a voting machine, every one of these other kinds of Diebold machines -- EVERY ONE -- creates a paper trail and can be audited. Would Citibank have it any other way? Would Home Depot? Would the CIA? Of course not. These machines affect the livelihood of their owners. If they can't be audited they can't be trusted. If they can't be trusted they won't be used.

      Now back to those voting machines. If EVERY OTHER kind of machine you make includes an auditable paper trail, wouldn't it seem logical to include such a capability in the voting machines, too? Given that what you are doing is adapting existing technology to a new purpose, wouldn't it be logical to carry over to voting machines this capability that is so important in every other kind of transaction device?

      This confuses me. I'd love to know who said to leave the feature out and why?

      I, Cringely linkage... [pbs.org]

      Seeing the story of Diebold wanting to gouge Maryland for adding printers & an audit trail to their voting systems makes me think that Diebold did not just forget to put in a printed audit trail, but they deliberately do not want one.

      I'm all for your suggestion. REQUIRED open source software in voting machines, with an extensive audit trail, not just of the machines, but the servers, protocols, etc. Competent crypto should be used extensively to protect the systems' integrity.

  • In the US... (Score:5, Insightful)

    by Pig Hogger ( 10379 ) <pig DOT hogger AT gmail DOT com> on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:40PM (#7691148) Journal
    In the US, you get the best democracy money can buy!!!
    • like Dennis Kucinich, who really started the ball rolling on the Diebold situation by publishing links to the memos on his Congressional website.

      You want democracy? Then vote for politicians who have made a career of fighting corporate power.....like Dennis Kucinich....

  • Source code to the people! (Score:5, Insightful)

    by tuxette ( 731067 ) * <tuxette@@@gmail...com> on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:40PM (#7691154) Homepage Journal
    While paper trails are nice and all, I find it appalling that the public is not allowed access to the source code to the software that runs these e-voting devices. If it's truly an election by the people for the people, then I don't see why this should be such a problem. Voters have the right to make sure their elections are carried out correctly and lawfully. And if this means checking software code to make sure everything is the way it should be, so be it. Elections are far too serious a matter to be allowed to whine "trade secrets." (Maybe the trade secret is setting things up in favor of one candidate or another? Hmm?)

    Not to shamelessly promote EFF [eff.org] or anything, but they have some really good information on e-voting [eff.org] on their website. Here's a pre-made letter to your senator [eff.org] (for those living in the US) asking him/her for support in the fight for secure elections.


    • I agree...counting isn't rocket science. You'd think they discovered how to add 1+1 for the first time.
    • There's not much less interesting to a politician that a zillion copies of the same letter. It just plain smells.

      Write your own! If you want, look at the EFF letter as a model. But don't just rephrase it. Use those parts which get your dander up more than the rest, and write your own words as to why it pisses you off so much.
    • I find it appalling that the public is not allowed access to the source code to the software that runs these e-voting devices.

      I find it appalling that there is software that runs these e-voting devices. You're talking about, in the simplest form, maybe what, a 4 state device? Why in the hell are they using an embedded system for something that would make a very good undergraduate EE project? C'mon, two flipflops and a bunch of EEPROMs containing pretty images would be good enough!

      I don't want to check so

      • Re:Source code to the people! (Score:5, Interesting)

        by thrillseeker ( 518224 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:38PM (#7691777)
        That's the only way e-voting should work. No bugs, no problems, just hardware.

        How about this? The hardware is really simple - you have a piece or thin cardboard that has these spots that are easy to punch out - you provide a simple jig that lines this card up with a printed list of names - you take the simplest of tools - a sharp object - and poke a hole in the cardboard next to the name you want. When you're done, you look at the piece of cardboard and if it looks ok you put it into a box where another simple machine is used to count it.

        Why, these actions are so simple I believe a monkey could do them, being simple tool users themselves. Anyone who can't probably shouldn't be casting a vote in the first place.

    • If you have a paper trail, along with surprise reviews of the paper trails, you've cut costs and increased efficiency without compromising the integrity of the election.

      I would rather have a closed-source voting machine with a paper trail than an open-source voting machine without a paper trail.

      An open-source voting machine is best (I like OSS too), but if we concern ourselves with the integrity of the election, the above described measures are sufficient.

    • Re:Source code to the people! (Score:5, Informative)

      by sandyjensen ( 46158 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:06PM (#7691414)
      Actually, Graham's Voter Verification Act [senate.gov] requires openly available software. from the pdf [senate.gov] of the proposed legislation:

      Sec. 4:
      (C) SOFTWARE AND MODEMS.
      (i) No voting system shall at any time contain or use undisclosed software. Any voting system containing or using software shall disclose the source code of that software to the Commission, and the Commission shall make that source code available for inspection upon request to any citizen.

  • So what's the difference? (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Patrik_AKA_RedX ( 624423 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:40PM (#7691157) Journal
    We used to vote with paper and a pencil. Then we got those computers to vote with, because it was cheaper and more efficent. Now those PC need to print your vote on a piece of paper.

    In short we succeeded in replacing a cheap pencil by an expensive computer with totaly no advantages.
    • If everything goes right, its easier to have a machine count it- they are usually much better and less error prone than humans (thus, the improvement over pen/pencil).

      But if they are just as prone to hacking as humans are ("count this in favor of John Steed or your family gets hurt!") , then there is no advantage.

      It comes down to convenience vs. auditability. I don't trust people not to cheat. I want that auditability.
    • The implied advantage is in tabulating the results. By printing the results you retain the advantages of the paper/pencil system, but the computer can do the heavy lifting when it comes to counting votes. You could even still have a manual count to verify the computer has the correct result as a redundancy measure, if the software was at all suspect. Not possible without a hard copy tho.
    • A few questions: How fast can you read forty million pieces of paper? Can you ensure me that you could read them accurately every time? If I asked for a recount, how fast could you do that?

      At some point with every successful product or process, it passes a point that makes it less simple and/or less efficient. Whether it's enhancements to the product or economies of scale issues with distribution and logistics, something invariably makes it less perfect than it was before. That's where innovation has

    • No advantages, except for the fact that no one will have to decipher what the computer 'meant.'

      "Well, first it filled in this circle, but then looks like it erased it an drew a frowny face over the candidate's name and penciled in 'L4M3r'..."

    • shh, don't let the secret out.
    • The poster has obviously not kept up with the Diebold debates.

      There are two goals in voting. Quickly and accuratly counting votes, and making sure no one cheets. Paper and pencle voting were great for the later. All that was needed was good physical security and oversight. Computers are supurb for the former. Press the button and out pups the reuslts. It is finding a system where both goals, Accountibility and Efficiency, are met that is the issue.

      Computer data, as has been shown on slashdot overe a

  • And in related news... (Score:5, Funny)

    by FunWithHeadlines ( 644929 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:41PM (#7691163) Homepage
    And in related news, all news reports about the call for paper receipts vanished from news servers today. Spokespersons for all major news services refused comment on the alleged disappearance. A spokesperson for Diebold said, "What reports? Paper receipts? Nobody has asked for that. Can you point to any news stories that allege this? Thought you couldn't."

    It is reported that the American people are very happy to have receiptless electronic voting machines. No dissenting reports can be found...

  • A very interesting point (Score:5, Insightful)

    by downix ( 84795 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:41PM (#7691164) Homepage
    A state that needs total accountability for its main industry (gambling) requires the same in the voting process. Right now, in Florida where I live, there is no accountability for fraudulent voting practices so long as you vote for the party in power. I almost want to move to Vegas now.

  • for more information (Score:5, Informative)

    by The Mad Hawk ( 16167 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:42PM (#7691170) Homepage
    For a good source on the electronic voting issue in general and the push for Rep. HR2239 in particular, see Verified Voting [verifiedvoting.org].

  • E-voting Haiku (Score:4, Funny)

    by southpolesammy ( 150094 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:43PM (#7691184) Journal
    E-Voting machines.
    Big business hides the memos,
    Congress wants answers...

  • Damn! (Score:3, Funny)

    by Savatte ( 111615 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:43PM (#7691188) Homepage Journal
    I had $500 on Diebold!

  • Now if people only kept their receipts. (Score:4, Funny)

    by Valar ( 167606 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:48PM (#7691231)
    Even if you do produce a paper receipt, most people won't even look at it. Even those who do look at it will probably just toss it in the trash bin on the way out. We're such a consumer culture, the average american tosses printed receipts several times a day.

    Now if we printed out a decorative "Don't blame me, I voted for so-and-so" certifiate people could use to impress their friends (seeing as voting is for the most part a social event nowadays for a lot of people, so they can discuss politics at cocktail parties)...
    • Even if you do produce a paper receipt, most people won't even look at it. Even those who do look at it will probably just toss it in the trash bin on the way out. We're such a consumer culture, the average american tosses printed receipts several times a day.

      ...bear in mind that the store gets a receipt, too, and they don't chuck theirs in the wastepaper bin.

      A paper receipt would be retained by the polling station and used to verify the electronic results. There are a number of ways they could implem

    • The voter doesn't get to keep the receipt (Score:4, Informative)

      by brokeninside ( 34168 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:02PM (#7691367)
      The receipt goes into a locked box (similar to a ballot box) in case that particular district is selected at random for one of the audits required by both of the bills currently before congress.

      If people got to keep their receipt, it would do away with the secret ballot system that American democracy is founded on. Others posters have mentioned the practical consequences of eliminating the secret ballot system.

    • No, the idea is that the machine would spool the printed votes through a small window, so you could see a hard-copy of your vote, then it would be spooled up ad stored if there needs to be a recount. It wouldn't give YOU the reciept, that's not auditable on a massive-scale. Maybe it should keep one paper AND give you a copy?

  • The Lesser Evil? (Score:5, Interesting)

    by RobertB-DC ( 622190 ) * on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:49PM (#7691238) Homepage Journal
    According to news reports, a hacker broke into the Ohio company's servers using an employee's ID number and copied a 1.8-gigabyte file of company announcements, software bulletins and internal e-mails dating back to January 1999.

    I'm sure the subject has been discussed before, but what if the original hacker is caught? It's clear that the information "stolen" is of critical importance in the debate over the trustworthiness of Diebold, and electronic voting in general. But will that hacker be able to use the importance of his/her discovery as a mitigating factor in court?

    It seems like a parallel situation would be this: My neighbor has a tall fence, topped with electrified razor wire, plastered with "NO TRESPASSING" signs, and a tiger prowling the grounds for added security. I suspect that he is planning to commit a crime on his property -- say I've heard he's planning to kill his wife for the insurance money. If I ignore the signs, scale the wall, avoid the tiger, and take pictures of his detailed murder plans (which he conveniently leaves on his dining room table), I may prevent Ms. Neighbor's untimely demise.

    Am I guilty of trespassing? And even if I am, was it worth it? I'd say yes -- I'd commit a small crime to prevent a much larger one. Was the Diebold hacker thinking along those lines? Or were they just out for a walk with the tiger?

  • Generic voting machines (Score:2, Interesting)

    by Anonymous Coward
    Buying voting machines at $3,500 a pop is just plain silly. Why don't some of you code monkeys quickly gen up some software that will:
    1. Interface a generic touch-screen monitor
    2. Run on FreeDOS (linux is overkill for this one)
    3. Allow the Supervisor of Elections to load a database with the election particulars
    4. Allow any old cheap PC to read the election database and arbitrate an election via the touch-screen.
    5. Print out a ballot which the voter then verifies and drops into a box for later counting by h

  • receipts = trash (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Doc Ruby ( 173196 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:51PM (#7691260) Homepage Journal
    These paper receipts are a poison placebo, that will keep us screwable at the voting booth. What are we supposed to do with a receipt? They merely give the false illusion of security, while papering over the same insecurity problems. We should just inspect the pretty-printed "receipt", and drop it into a slot if we like it enough to cast it as a ballot, before leaving the booth. Optical scanners can get an early sanctioned count at the close of polls, but the official record must be the actual cast ballots. In the current fraud climate, any candidate requesting a recount, by human hands, if necessary, should be accommodated, no questions asked.

    The paper ballot should never leave the booth. Many voters might be intimidated by buyers/threats into bringing the receipt to a vote controller, even if there are easy ways to vote differently from a receipt. By settling for a paper receipt, we're handed the illusion that there's a paper trail, so the pressure's off. But the fraud will continue unabated.

  • Still don't really see the need (Score:5, Interesting)

    by Space cowboy ( 13680 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:51PM (#7691267) Journal
    for electronic voting. Sure, it's "modern" to have a computer-driven thing, but the old-fashioned way seems to have far less problems in theory. I'll grant that the implementations have sometimes been poor (I now have a new phrase 'hanging chads', which sounds rather unfortunate), but if you're going to spend this much money, why not simply make a good implementation of a normal system ?

    In the UK (about 1/6th the population stuffed into 1/50th the area, so our voter-density is far higher, and hence counts will be higher) there has never been much of a problem. Sure, it takes 12 hours or so for the tallies to come in from all around the country, but how else to deploy the 'swingometer' :-)

    Simple system. Pencil. Anonymous paper. big dirty cross in the box for the candidate you want. Big separation between the candidates. 2 crosses or ambiguity means a spoiled vote (effectively "none of the above"). Count them all (done by volunteers) and you're done.

    Sure, we get some recounts, but the system is so simple it's hard to justify flipping a vote from one candidate to another.

    Just seems like it's a mountain out of a molehill ...

    Simon. (dons flameproof suit :-)

  • One simple question... (Score:5, Insightful)

    by nacturation ( 646836 ) <nacturation@gma[ ]com ['il.' in gap]> on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:52PM (#7691269) Journal

    What is the actual benefit of voting electronically? Many countries use the tried and true method of voting using paper and pen -- just mark your X in the square next to the name. Volunteers tally up the votes at the end of the voting day and, within hours of closing, you get your results.

    It's something everybody understands. The paper waste is minimal compared to the paper output of election-related things -- government paperwork, campaign signs, and flyers in your mailbox and everywhere else. You absolutely don't get hanging chads, broken levers, or some other malfunctioning convoluted contraption. Recounts and verifications are simple -- get those same volunteers to count 'em again.

    Geek factor aside, where's the benefit of going electronic?

  • Diebold is evil.. but.. (Score:5, Insightful)

    by mindstrm ( 20013 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:52PM (#7691271)
    Let's remember something else.. the state puts out the contract for these, and ACCEPTED them.. they were the ones responsible for spending the money wisely, NOT Diebold.

    If the state failed to insist on a paper trail, how can you scream at Diebold for not providing one?

  • Hasn't someone stepped up? (Score:3, Interesting)

    by msimm ( 580077 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @12:56PM (#7691317) Homepage
    To code an OSS solution? Or someone at least funding an OSS voting system? Seems like there would be a lot of prestige, not to mention publicity. How about one of the colleges? It makes since to have big business in a lot of things, but not our ballot boxes.

  • What does e-voting buy? (Score:4, Insightful)

    by milgr ( 726027 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:00PM (#7691351)
    For the last decade, when I vote, I fill in circles on a sheet - sort of like filling out the SATs. When I am done, I feed my ballot into some box/machine.

    I don't know where or when the ballots are counted, but we have long had machines which could read these ballots. There is a paper trail. Every time an idiot plays the lottery, he also practices filling out a ballot (as the lottery tickets use a similar method).

    Obviously, this must spend lots of money getting fancier systems which are no more acurate, and for now leave no paper trail.

  • Security is goes beyond the voting machines (Score:3, Insightful)

    by randall_burns ( 108052 ) <randall_burns&hotmail,com> on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:00PM (#7691352)
    Dead people can vote. Paper ballots can be forged/spoiled.


    I think the idea of the paper trail is mainly important so there is a record folks can understand-but with good encryption it shouldn't be necessary. What _is_ necessary is better means of monitoring low tech vote fraud-and that probably means cameras at the polling places-and _never_ allowing ballots or media out of the view of a camera--and good encryption on those records.

    • Bzzt! Sorry, but I doubt a dead person will ever show up for an e-vote. The paper printout for use as a hard, long-term copy/record is secure. As secure as e-voting can possibly get.


      If a "dead" person can vote via punch card ballot or any other paper type ballot, they can certainly vote just as well on an e-voting machine. You must actually USE the e-voting machine to get the printout.

      • Bzzt! Sorry, but I doubt a dead person will ever show up for an e-vote. The paper printout for use as a hard, long-term copy/record is secure. As secure as e-voting can possibly get.

        A "dead" person votes by either:

        1) falsification of of records(say by a corrupt county clerk)

        2) someone showing up with the dead persons voter
        registration card and using it(along with
        supplementary ID).

        3) in areas that use vote by mail, by diversion of the mail records

        I don't see that e-voting solves any of these except

  • Citing poor security, Ohio has canceled plans for installing e-voting systems for use in 2004. They are going to use punch cards instead.

    link here. [wired.com]
  • "...is requiring paper receipts. According to the Associated Press story, Nevada is the first state to do so." Actually, AP says that Nevada is the first state requiring paper receipts "in time for the 2004 elections." Previously (in November) California's Secretary of State Kevin Shelley "ordered that all new machines purchased after 1 July 2005 must have the functionality, and existing machines must be retrofitted by 1 July 2006." (from the Register article, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/34
  • What prevents a paper-receipt from being abused?

    Things like, all union members must show their receipt to prove they voted for canidate x. Or an abusive husband controlling the voting his wife. Or a wife withholding sex from her husband because he didn't vote for a canidate.

    We can pass a law against it, but having a verifiable receipt will really change things.

    • You don't keep the receipt. The receipt is there for you to verify that what you thought you were voting for is what the machine tallied (or at least printed out). After you verify that the printout is correct, it is deposited in a secure box and held as a record. If a recount is called for (either random check or a full recount in contested election) then the secured box with the receipts in it is used for the final tally.

      You don't get to keep the receipt, thus you don't get to be punished for your vo

    • The issue isn't a recipt for the voter, it'a a paper copy of the vote in case the count from the machine is challenged. You as a voter would check it to make sure it had printing out the correct information for your votes and then turn it in.

      So for example in my precinct, which from the makeup of my area is easily 75% demos/greens/etc, all of the sudden a GOP candidate got 80% of the vote, I could call shenanagins and ask them to count the paper ballots.

    • A proper paper ballot system displays the paper ballot to the voter (either by having the voter fill it out directly, or by printing it out based on inputs to the electronic system and displaying it before the vote is confirmed and cast). The voter should not be permitted (and ideally should not be able) to remove the paper ballot from the polling place, for precisely the reason you describe.

      IMO, the best system is to have the votes entered electronically, printed out (in a font optimized for human and O

  • Since Diebold is trying to gouge Maryland for the installation of printers, maybe some enterprising 3rd party could try to win the contract with a better offer?

    Given the crappy security on the diebold machines, they couldn't be that hard to reverse engineer.

  • mandatory/surprise (Score:3, Funny)

    by barryfandango ( 627554 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:14PM (#7691490)

    "require mandatory surprise recounts"

    Mandated surprises tend to lose that "surprising" quality.

  • They're more than happy to charge you an arm and a leg and the valididy of your vote for it. ;)

  • OMFG (Score:2, Funny)

    by Jaysyn ( 203771 )
    Holy Shit! My Rep actually did something both intelligent & useful. Time to send the "Good Boy" fax.

    Jaysyn
  • What is the sudden obsession with "upgrading" our current voting systems by the next election regardles of whether the new systems are better that what we already have? I recently wrote a letter to my senator and state representitives and the main thing I emphasized is that we should not upgrade unless all of the below are demonstratably true:

    1) The new system must be at least as reliable in recording and talling votes as the current system.
    2) The new system must be at least as secure from fraud as the cur

  • Form a free software voting machine company (Score:5, Insightful)

    by KjetilK ( 186133 ) <kjetil&kjernsmo,net> on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:28PM (#7691676) Homepage Journal
    1. Make a free software voting machine company
    2. Show that it supports and exceeds the standards of all bills concerning verifiability and accountability
    3. ???
    4. Profit!

    I mean, seriously, with everything that has happened it is about time hackers not only whine about it, but actually steps up and creates a system that does it right. There's nobody more qualified to do it than a bunch of hackers anyway, and it should be an ideal field to show what can be created, and it should be a rock-solid business plan: You sell hardware and open code.

    Start with a prototype that does what the proposed bills say, based on a free OS. Then move up to implement the best things out there (there was this crypto proposal here a couple of weeks ago), and then strip down the OS to the bare essentials needed for the operation. That way, conducting an exhaustive review of the complete source becomes managable.

    Really, hackers should see this as a great business opportunity!

  • They're not "receipts", dammit! (Score:5, Insightful)

    by Big Jojo ( 50231 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @01:29PM (#7691699)

    A receipt would prevent anonymous voting; it's what you'd provide to -- oh, Enron -- to prove that you voted for the "right" candidate. Then they pay you. (Maybe a meal, or by not firing you, or whatever.)

    An audit trail is what's needed. And a paper, voter-verifiable copy of the ballot you just filled out is exactly the right thing there. But it must never leave the polling place,

    Let's stop having slashdot advocate that the world make it even easier to sell out to corporations and other organizations that are corrupting the political process. Stop calling them "receipts" in the stories, and get editors who stop making such mistakes. Let's try to be up-level from the Faux News Network.

  • With all the articles about these voting machines recently, wheres the complete step by step guide for a geek to give 50000 votes to CmdrTaco?
    Im sure if Rob where elected into office, the public (the politicians) would realize that they made a huge mistake somewhere...

    Please we would get a new Microsoft court case every other week to keep us entertained.

    hmm... maybe something would be done about software patents too..

  • ACLU (Score:3, Informative)

    by OYAHHH ( 322809 ) on Thursday December 11, 2003 @03:07PM (#7692673)
    In California the ACLU has been opposing a paper trail claiming it will negatively affect the experience of blind voters.

    Well, personally I don't doubt that it would probably be a negative for blind voters.

    Myself, I have a slight case of cerebral palsy and I'd certainly be upset that I had been inconvenienced at the polls, but I would at least have the fortitude to understand that I shouldn't put my one need above the needs of the many.

    I can hardly see the justification behind supporting a fairly small proportion of the popilation while causing the rest of us to suffer.

    Fix the system for the larger population and then work on it for the handicapped among us.

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