E-Voting Done Right - In Australia 485
tehanu writes "After all the furor over e-voting in America, Wired News has an article about e-voting done right in Australia. An important factor is that all of the software is open-source. The company responsible actually seems to have given consideration to the integrity of the democratic process, too - from the lead engineer: 'Why on earth should (voters) have to trust me -- someone with a vested interest in the project's success? A voter-verified audit trail is the only way to 'prove' the system's integrity to the vast majority of electors, who after all, own the democracy.' They also have scathing words for Diebold: 'The only possible motive I can see for disabling some of the security mechanisms and features in their system is to be able to rig elections. It is, at best, bad programming; at worst, the system has been designed to rig an election.' In general they are 'gob-smacked' by the whole situation with electronic voting machines in the US right now."
Open source? (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Funny)
*cough* Florida *cough* *cough*
Re:Open source? (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:Open source? (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Funny)
Re:florida (Score:3, Insightful)
Disposing of hundreds / thousands / tends of thousands of paper votes is a bit trickier if you don't want to be discovered.
Paper is good because we have centuries of experience in knowing how to secure a paper audit trail. Experience that probably shouldn't be thrown out (baby with the bathwater
Re:Open source? (Score:2)
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Funny)
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Funny)
Right, but LA OGRE was not a candidate....
Wait, maybe he was!
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Funny)
Re:Open source? (Score:5, Insightful)
In another note, voting receipts is nice, no question about that.
Re:Open source? (Score:5, Insightful)
I'm not one for playing the mindless patriotism card, but I really do feel that (for the Americans out there) it is our duty to do something about this.
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Insightful)
That is a pretty scary statement in of itself...
Correct (Score:4, Insightful)
Mindless patriots support the government, while real patriots support the people, and challenge the government to do what's right for everyone. The implementation Diebold has come up with is not good for any of us, and is not right.
Not just americans... (Score:4, Insightful)
In australia (and the rest of the world) we are extremely sensitive to the american political decisions, especially those relating to foreign trade and policy.
The concept of a closed source system, developed by people who openly pledge to "deliver votes to the president" (you don't need references, it's all over the /. front page), can covertly apply patches and allegedly have back-doors, seems pure insanity to me.
Just my AU$0.02...
Q.
Re:Open source? (Score:5, Insightful)
Only if the binary that runs on the machine is compiled from the same copy of the source that you've analyzed just before you cast your vote. Oh, and you'll need to analyze the source code for the compiler that the voting machine's binaries is compiled on, to make sure that hasn't been compromised. And then you'll need to check the source of the program used to view the source code of the other programs...
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Open source? (Score:4, Insightful)
Don't kid yourself: open source is nice, but it doesn't guarantee a fault-proof or secure voting system (suppose somebody installs wrong or malicious software on one of the machines?).
[/quote]
True, but with an open system, anyone can see what is going on. If the process is completely open, there is a greater likelyhood that any funny-business will be seen and dealt with before it is too late (*ahem* Florida).
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Informative)
But with all the people who have a vested interest in it being done right, it's MORE likely that somethign stupid does NOT slip by. If this type of tech were around years ago, we could have a "why" a miscount would have happened and could have fixed it. If nothing has changed, last years (proverbial tech) is still being used.
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Open source? (Score:2)
You verify the paper trail by spot-checking precincts--eg. exit pools showed this precinct with 600 voters voted 52% for candidate Foo, yet the voting system showed only 45% for candidate Foo. Invite all supporters of candidate Foo to bring in their PKI signed paper voting receipts, when you get to 46% receipts for candidate Foo, you know you have a problem.
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Insightful)
This would rarely be a practical way to verify a problem. Take your example with the precinct of 600 people.
Let's assume the exit polls are 100% accurate and 52% of voters indeed voted for Foo. Let's also assume that 10% voted for various third party candidates and the remaining 38% voted for candidate Bar. These would be the actual vote to
Re:Open source? (Score:2)
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Insightful)
And you've destoyed the idea of the anonymous ballot.
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Interesting)
Whatever the reader, it has to be a commonly understood format, or else someone could hack the format. If it's a barcode to be machine readable, you can still sell your vote to the guy outside t
Re:Open source? (Score:4, Insightful)
Now, if the receipt the voter takes home contains a *signature* of the data on receipt they dropped in the box (such that it can't be used to determine who they voted for but can be used to determine that their vote hasn't been tampered with), that's a different story.
Personally, though, I think that's overkill -- putting a chain-signed receipt into a lockbox is Good Enough For Me.
(chaining digital signatures, fyi, is a way to make it very hard to modify just one -- because the next receipt also happens to contain a signature of the previous one).
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Insightful)
Is this web form something they can access from outside the physical polling place?
If so, that means they can use it to prove who they voted to to a third party, and thus their vote can be bought or coerced.
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Insightful)
If the voter can show someone else proof of how they voted, 2 things can happen:
- voter gets paid if they can show they voted for a particular line item
- voter can be threatened to vote for a particular line item or have bad things happen
Re:Open source? (Score:5, Insightful)
I'm sorry, that's not insightful - it's total bollocks. Of course it's possible to tamper with paper ballots, but to do so on a large scale (e.g. large enough to affect statewide or national elections) would inevitably attract attention because one would need to gain access to, and modify or destroy, literally tons of paper.
Electronic voting systems may be tampered with without any heavy lifting, by few people, and the only access problem is electronic, not physical - do you trust that the home or office PC of the supervisor of elections in your county is secure? Having done computer work for municipal governments in the past, I certainly do not.
-Isaac
But you know how to watch the paper trail (Score:2)
Sure you can tamper with the paper trail. However the election judges in my hometown are smart enough to watch for trouble, and have a sense of what might go wrong. You can get around them, but they are far more likely to notice you attemptm since a physical presense is required on the day of the election. I understand computers, and I have no clue how I could be sure someone didn't crack electronic only machines the night before, and hide their tracks. (I have to sleep, and any alarm I put on can by b
Re:Open source? (Score:3)
I believe that Quinn is correct in saying, 'A voter-verified audit trail is the only way to 'prove' the system's integrity to the vast majority of electors, who after all, own the democracy.' However I don't believe that means we have to do away with the secret ballot.
I would like to see a system where what prints out after you vote is a GUID, globally unique identification number.
Re:Open source? (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:To encourage competitors? (Score:3, Insightful)
Frankly, for the verification and transparancy of election systems process NOT to be open seems like a "kick me" sign for trouble.
Until now, the voting system and how votes were tabulated and kept were open. You could see the machines, the process and review it all.
The new electronic systems just presenent you with a total in essence, with no real transparancy in the system.
If this is the result of reform, I'd much rather pay 10X
Re:Open source? (Score:3, Insightful)
If you alternate through 3 spools of paper at random, or skip back and forth on the paper, there's no way to connect a voter with a vote after the fact. However, it IS impossible for software (closed source, open source, or polkadotted source) to change th
Australian voting system (Score:2)
Re:Australian voting system (Score:2)
Re:Australian voting system (Score:5, Informative)
The Austrailian ballot is where candidates (for all elections) are listed entirely on one ballot and you get to choose which candidate you want regardless of party.
It may bewilder some people that before the 1920's when you went to vote, a member of the Republican or Democratic party stood outside your polling in place and handed you a "Republican" or "Democratic" ballot. Said ballot would have only the party nominations for President, Senator, House Representatives, State Governor, State Senator, etc. As a result you "voted the party line."
The Austrailian ballot was introduced between the 1920s and 1940s in the US (different municipalities adopted it at different times). It changed US politics because now people could vote for a Democratic President but a Republican Senator. One major result is that since WWII there have been very few times when the party of the president coincided with the majority party of Congress. In fact the Bush administration which has had a Republican Congress for most of the three years it has been in office is an exception not a norm.
Not exactly mandatory... (Score:3, Informative)
Once you reach voting age (or are naturalised as an australian) you are eligible to "register to vote". Once you complete this process you will then be expected to vote in ALL future elections for your area. If you do not register to vote you will not be allowed to vote in any elections.
This is analogous to a "one-way" opt-in process. You can choose not to vote until you so desire, but once you register there is no way to de-register yourself (excludi
Enginnering ethics... (Score:3, Insightful)
Mod This Up; I Won't Get Karma (Boo Hoo) (Score:3, Informative)
Story location: http://www.wired.com/news/ebiz/0,1272,61045,00.htm l
02:00 AM Nov. 03, 2003 PT
While critics in the United States grow more concerned each day about the insecurity of electronic voting machines, Australians designed a system two years ago that addressed and eased most of those concerns: They chose to make the software running their system completely open to public scrutiny.
Although a private Australian company designed the system, it was based on specifications set by independent election officials, who posted the code on the Internet for all to see and evaluate. What's more, it was accomplished from concept to product in six months. It went through a trial run in a state election in 2001.
Critics say the development process is a model for how electronic voting machines should be made in the United States.
Called eVACS, or Electronic Voting and Counting System, the system was created by a company called Software Improvements to run on Linux, an open-source operating system available on the Internet.
Election officials in the Australian Capital Territory, one of eight states and territories in the country, turned to electronic voting for the same reason the United States did -- a close election in 1998 exposed errors in the state's hand-counting system. Two candidates were separated by only three or four votes, said Phillip Green, electoral commissioner for the territory. After recounting, officials discovered that out of 80,000 ballots, they had made about 100 mistakes. They decided to investigate other voting methods.
In 1999, the Australian Capital Territory Electoral Commission put out a public call for e-vote proposals to see if an electronic option was viable. Over 15 proposals came in, but only one offered an open-source solution. Two companies proposed the plan in partnership after extensive consultation with academics at Australian National University. But one of the companies later dropped out of the project, leaving Software Improvements to build the system.
Green said that going the open-source route was an obvious choice.
"We'd been watching what had happened in America (in 2000), and we were wary of using propriety software that no one was allowed to see," he said. "We were very keen for the whole process to be transparent so that everyone -- particularly the political parties and the candidates, but also the world at large -- could be satisfied that the software was actually doing what it was meant to be doing."
It took another year for changes in Australian law to allow electronic voting to go forward. Then in April 2001, Software Improvements contracted to build the system for the state's October election.
Software Improvement's Matt Quinn, the lead engineer on the product, said the commission called all the shots.
"They, as the customer, dictated requirements including security and functionality, (and they) were involved at every step of the development process, from requirements to testing," Quinn said. "They proofed every document we produced."
The commission posted drafts as well as the finished software code on the Internet for the public to review.
The reaction was very positive.
"The fact that the source code had been published really deflected criticism," Quinn said.
A few people wrote in to report bugs, including an academic at the Australian National University who found the most serious problem.
"It wasn't a functional or a security issue but was a mistake nonetheless, and one that we were glad to have flagged for us," said Quinn.
In addition to the public review, the commission hired an independent verification and validation company to audit the code, "specifically to prevent us, as a developer, from having any election-subverting code in there," Quinn said.
"We were concerned that it wouldn't be secure enough," said Green, the electoral commissioner. The audit
Re:Mod This Up; I Won't Get Karma (Boo Hoo) (Score:2)
I'm not sure why the Diebold source isn't availabl (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:I'm not sure why the Diebold source isn't avail (Score:3, Informative)
FOIA is a federal act, and while most states have equivalent acts, FOIA requests can not be made to a state. For example, New Jersey's equivalent law is called the Open Public Records Act. With FOIA, and with OPRA, requests can be made to any executive branch agency. The Division of Elections would fall under this in New Jersey. I cannot speculate as to whether or not they would
Re:I'm not sure why the Diebold source isn't avail (Score:2)
I can. The FOIA, OPRA, or any other open records act is non-applicable. The source code is not produced by the government and is not a "record" of any form that would be applicable under the various laws. The voting machines and software are being produced by independant contractors -- not by a government agency. You could request the records related to the bidding process (although all but the winning bid may be
Re:I'm not sure why the Diebold source isn't avail (Score:5, Informative)
*(Legal Reason) Because of the way the electoral college operates, the presidential election is technically a state level election. When you vote for president, you are actually voting for your state's electoral college members, who will then vote for their party's choice for president when the electoral college vote formally takes place in January. The constitution mandates that states shall select electoral college members in ways that the respective state legislatures shall establish. Obviously, for all states, this method is popular vote. In most states, the winner of the popular vote takes all the electoral votes, but there are a few states where the electoral votes are proportional to the popular vote (Maine and I think one other that I just cant recall right now). Anyway, because of that clause in the constitution (Amendment.. 12? or 16?), the states are essentially responsible for the presidential election.
Sign the HR2239 petition. (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Sign the HR2239 petition. (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
Re:Sign the HR2239 petition. (Score:2, Interesting)
Otherwise the vote-changers will leave the known test districts alone and only change votes in those districts not
being re-counted.
When I was in California, the voter's pamphlet had a grid on the first page with all the punch locations (a grid of numbers) I marked that while examining the issues and voted acording to that in the booth. There is a take home record for anyone who wants it.
Re:Sign the HR2239 petition. (Score:3, Interesting)
This is traditionally called the sample ballot. It will look different in every district, depending on your voting equipment. In my district, the sample ballot is the same exact sheet you see in the (electronic) voting machine, and is the same sheet u
My goodness! (Score:5, Insightful)
That just makes... sense.
Re:My goodness! (Score:5, Funny)
- they could vote twice, once with each method
- that one was just a practice vote and the other was one that counted
- are confused that there are two voting methods and don't know what to do, so don't vote at all
- paper discriminates against tree huggers and caters to the logging community
- electronic voting discriminates against technology luddites and caters to the techno-savvy
In other words. . . (Score:4, Insightful)
The company responsible (namely Software Improvements) is clearly pushing to pick up a contract for machine development in the U.S., and saying All The Right Things (tm) to get it.
Don't blame them really, Diebold left themselves wide open - should be easy pickins.
---
Re:In other words. . . (Score:2, Informative)
I second that observation, wholeheartedly. It's incredibly refreshing to hear a vendor speak in plain, honest sentences when describing their work and/or their product. It's saying, in effect, "Look at our work and judge for yourself." No hand-waving, no market-speak, no smoke and mirrors.
Amazing.
I also like the idea of bringing these guys into the US market, ASAP. Let them compete with the likes of Diebold. If the majority of the people evaluating the vo
Obstacles to US adoption of SI system (Score:5, Insightful)
1) Imagine the outcry from Americans when they learn they're contracting a foreign company to handle their voting system. Oddly enough they won't have cared that Diebold's being all secretive and evasive about their own flaws while SI is open and honest and better suited to uphold the fair democratic system the US claims to cherish. To them I'd say ditch the NIH (not invented here) syndrome--if it works better than what you have, either make a competing product that's truly better or shut up about it.
2) Diebold will use MS' tactics, calling SI's system "un-American". Again, double meaning, but this time I mean because it's open source.
3) Watch Diebold play points 1 and 2 to the hilt, calling on its political ties to ensure SI never gets a foothold in the US. In so doing they pull a two-fer, by simultaneously kicking out a leg from under the democratic underpinnings of the US, as well as another leg from the "capitalist" system the US also claims to be, e.g. where companies compete based on the merits of the product and marketing, without political interference.
Incidentally, the Australian system requires you by law to vote. Maybe that's something the US ought to consider importing too. Argue if you want about being free to NOT vote, but voting is a duty, not just a right, and you should be compelled to do it. Just like you are to report to training if you get drafted, or filing a tax return--you're not free to refuse either of those without legal consequences, right?
What's sad about my writing this is that I have no influence in US politics, being a Canadian, but I seem to have more interest in your politics than the majority of voting Americans, who don't even bother to go to the polls.
Re:Obstacles to US adoption of SI system(Note: OT) (Score:3, Interesting)
On the draft issue--Canada also doesn't have a draft, and the couple times it came up in our history (WWI and II) it was such
Re:Obstacles to US adoption of SI system(Note: OT) (Score:3, Informative)
We don't have this problem. Everyone aged 18 years or older must vote, meaning they get checked off on the electoral roll and are given a ballot paper that they must place into the ballot box.
There is nothing in the system that states that the vote must be valid. If you want, you can put a blank ballot paper into the ballot box, or write an essay on the evils of the preferential voting system, or whatev
In the US the voters no longer own the democracy.. (Score:3, Insightful)
It's so true it's not even a troll (Score:5, Insightful)
Election Systems and Software, the other major electronic voting company, is also, coincidentally, run by a big Repub' contributor. Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska has a stake in that company. Can you imagine that? A sitting senator with financial interests in a company responsible for counting votes? Unbelievable.
Sort of makes me think about how incredibly brazen Halliburton's role is in Iraq now. These people don't even attempt to maintain the illusion of impartiality. So, see, you're right -- this Australian company's ideas about the proper way to ensure confidence, they just don't apply. As long as our Repubs can fly under the radar, they don't care whether it's right or not.
Re:It's so true it's not even a troll (Score:2)
Re:In the US the voters no longer own the democrac (Score:2)
Why should there be any differences?
Who checks what happens with "poll votes" underway?
Who funds the polls?
Who is the management of companies that conduct the polls?
We have elections instead of polls only because polls are considered highly unreliable comparing to elections. And their reliability is not only affected by statistical errors, but by many other "behind the scenes" factors too.
So -
Simple solution for e-voting (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:Simple solution for e-voting (Score:4, Funny)
Re:Simple solution for e-voting (Score:2, Funny)
real democracy (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:real democracy (Score:5, Insightful)
Think of the masses voting on each and every topic.
How much does your average citizen know about foreign policy? Health care? Criminal and civil law?
A true democracy would be the worst form of government I could think of, unless you happen to have the exact same opinions as >50% of the population, you're fucked.
Realize that around 70% of Americans are christian. Now, lets vote on whether or not to allow that mosque or synagogue (sp) to open its doors on the corner, or whether gays should be allowed to parade, etc..
Re:real democracy (Score:2)
-WS
Preferential voting system (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Preferential voting system (Score:5, Informative)
The issue is that IRV works OK until a third party becomes viable - then, all bets are off. The article mentioned above quotes the following as an advantage:
It promotes a strong two-party system, ensuring stability in the parliamentary process.
Is this an advantage? I think not. The more common system, plurality or "first-past-the-post", which to be fair is even worse than IRV, does the same thing by artificially encouraging people to vote for front-runners. I would argue that any such artificial bias towards any party is a bad thing, and that the vote should reflect the true preferences of the voters as accurately as possible. IRV is an illusory fad in this regard.
Approval Voting and the Condorcet Method are much better. Condorcet is technically the best available method, but approval is (for the US anyway) also a good choice because it offers good technical compliance and ease of practical implementation.
Re:Preferential voting system (Score:3, Insightful)
The preferential system is also used in the Australian senate, where there are no boundaries within states. Here we see minority parties (Greens, Democrats, independents) getting seats and so
open source doesn't make right (Score:2, Insightful)
And here in Canada... (Score:5, Informative)
Then the magic begins: the cards are each fed, as collected, into a vote counting machine. The ballots are held in the case a recount (automated or manual), and the results are known just as soon as it takes to communicate the results from each of the machines at each polling station.
We usually have the final, _official_ results within an hour or two of the poll closing time, and you can always go back to the paper ballot to verify the count. And who the heck has a hard time with a piece of paper and a pencil?
No hanging or dimpled chads here, and this to me seems the best of both worlds - technology aiding the speed of vote-counting (isn't that what this is all about, anyway?), but with the safeguards (and transparency) of a manual voting system.
Re:And here in Canada... (Score:2)
Adding complexity to a complex system rarely if ever creates reliability. I'm pretty sure that the voting system here will stay the way it is until someone can unambiguously show that their
Open Source (Score:4, Insightful)
Get that in your damn head. Every citizen (who cares) should have the right to get a deep insight into how his vote is eletronically processed. If you're not allowed to know how your vote is processed you have no democrazy.
Trouble is ... (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Trouble is ... (Score:3, Informative)
From the very informative ACT FAQ [act.gov.au]
It doesn't say exactly what procedures will be in place, but AFAICT they've done everything The Right Way(TM) until now, so I suppose they'll handle this as well.
Re:Trouble is ... (Score:2, Insightful)
How could you get around the fact that the creator of the voting machine controls the software and hardware and can print out whatever MD5 number they want?
Lead Engineer (Score:2)
Come to think of it, in the Diebold hoohah, I have never seen any quotes from any of the Diebold people who actually worked on the system. I'd expect to see some -- if no more than expressions of hurt feelings because people don't trust them.
Hmm. Want to bet it's because the programmers are overseas? My bet is on Russia
Re:Lead Engineer (Score:3, Informative)
Diebold is a US company with strong (and right-wing) management. They don't allow their lower echelons to speak to the press; all contact is handled by Public Relations. See for yourself [yahoo.com].
BTW, Diebold's "programmers" are in Ohio. I use quote marks because they're mainly MCSEs who write front-ends for MS Access running on XP Tablet.Why, oh why, is there software at all? (Score:4, Interesting)
I mean, think about it. What do you really want the system to do?
State: Waiting for User
State: Present User with Options
State: Ask User to Confirm
State: Record User Choice
Four states. That's all you've got. Four states. Why, precisely, are they using cheap hardware for something that a pair of dual flip-flops could handle?
Honestly - think about this. The only reason there are "security concerns" at all is because they were too cheap to design a dedicated system, no software, just pure logic, that can be run on a logic checking system looking for races, possible vulnerabilities, etc.
Paper trail? Well, paper's not exactly THAT good (it does burn, and as Florida proved, it's not always verifiably correct). What about a write-once, read-many device? Like, I don't know, a CD-R, with packet-based writing?
Embedded systems are becoming so much more popular over discretes because hardware is cheap, and bad software is cheaper. But in a case like this, I don't understand it. An idiot could design dedicated hardware voting terminals, which don't even have the possibility of tampering. It's just incompetence.
(P.S.: Sounds like a decent business plan, doesn't it? "Tamper-proof Voting Terminals" - "No more software crashes, no more unreliable messes - works the same way, every time, guaranteed.")
Yes, I know things are a bit more complicated than I'm pointing out here. But it is still correct: E-Voting doesn't HAVE to be fundamentally flawed. It just is when they use cheap hardware. C'mon. Haven't they seen the i-Opener BBSes? Hardware based on the "limit possibilities by creative software" is screaming to be hacked.
Re:Why, oh why, is there software at all? (Score:3, Interesting)
This is all you need. Hell, the main reason embedded systems (real embedded systems, like Diebold's crap) 'look' vulnerable is because they've got all this extra crap, that people know has to be useless.
Quite frankly, people are willing to use technology because they now know that paper ballots are e
Why not pencil and paper? (Score:4, Insightful)
I just don't see why you need to use any more technology. What is the point?
Re:Why not pencil and paper? (Score:3, Interesting)
That seems like more than just one choice, and pencil and paper worked just fine, thanks.
Strangely enough I don't mind waiting the weeks it takes to determine who gets that last senate seat (proportional voting makes for lots of counting), speed isn't the issue. Accuracy and resistance to corruption are much more important.
And more people means more voters, but
No Great Surprise Here (Score:5, Interesting)
E-Voting is simply a bad idea (Score:3, Insightful)
Any technology introduced to improve the act of voting cannot make the act of counting less transparent or democracy suffers.
It is apparent that Diebold's systems (not to mention Diebold's paranoia for secrecy) render the act of counting less accountable and less transparent. Ergo, democracy suffers.
If used in a close election - where exit polling and other secondary measurements are unable to confirm the results of the counting - the wrong person might actually get elected President of the United States of America.
With no sense of responsibility to the coutry at large, this illegitimate President might launch a series of Napoleonic wars to to compensate for his own feelings of inadequacy.
I digress into fantasy... the little blue ones I washed down with all those adult beverages must be kicking in.
Still a big security hole (Score:3, Informative)
The basis of the voting system (IMO) need to be the voter making a direct mark on some tangible and independently verifiable object. Touch screen systems fail at this, the voter touches the screen which electronically stores the vote. There is no way to verify that the vote recorded is that which was cast. It would be quite possible for a hacker to cause the machine to register one vote electronically and one vote manually.
Such a touch-screen and paper trail system seem to demand an automatic "re-count", you count the automatic system tally, then you must also count the paper trail receipts. What's going to happen when the two are not the same to within 1%? Will the electronic tally be deemed faulty, or will the paper handling system be deemed faulty?
With the single point voting systems this is not an issue. The "punch card" and "fill in the box" ballots both achieve the direct manipulation and independently verifiable tests. There have been some problems with them, but this should be taken care of with voter education, and voters actually caring about the process before the elections. You can't solve human stupidity with technology, you can only hide the symptoms.
I live in Mesa, Arizona where we use the "blacken this area" type ballot. It's easy to understand and easy to do. There's no easy way to alter my ballot without it being obvious it was tampered with. The ballot leaves my hand directly in to the electronic voting thingie. If ever there were a recount, the paper ballot if authoritative since that is what I voted.
Of course, we have our own problems here: the main one is that they don't check I.Ds at the votinc center. All you need to tell them is your name and your address. So all you need to vote multiple times is a phone book and a way to get to several voting centers.
/. Heresy (Score:4, Interesting)
I think using computers to count vote is a mis-application of technology. My reasons are:
There are lots of times that tech is part of a solution. Then there are times, like vote counting, where it is part of the problem. It may be retro and old fashioned but I think it's time we just used paper and pen again. It worked all the way up to the sixties and the country managed then. If our parents and grandparents could manage it, shouldn't we be able to hand count as well?
Re:Holy fook! (Score:2)
This company is trying to position itself to sell its own wares to the U.S. I hope they succeed too.
Re:Holy fook! (Score:2)
EVACS is free. As in both beer and speech. (Score:2)
http://www.elections.act.gov.au/evacs.tar.gz [act.gov.au]
So, if you want to get started advocating an open e-voting system for your neck of the woods or an alternative to Diebold, then you can get started now.
If you want to push printed receipts, I'm sure you can hire someone who could write an interface to a little thermal printer via the COM ports.
Re:oss software? (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Question (Score:2, Troll)
Re:Question (Score:3, Funny)
"What do you mean there's not much to be pro about? America, she's beautiful, she's rich, she's got huuuuuge.... tracts of land!'
Re:Question (Score:3, Insightful)
Here speaks someone who sounds like he has never been out of America.
You take most of the good things about America completely for granted, and that is because things are so stable, you don't realise just how lucky you are.
So speaks someone who is not American, and who knows how bad things can get.
Count your blessings, but first I suggest you figure out what they are.
I realise that I am assuming you are American or Canadian,
Re:Question (Score:4, Informative)
Re:Question (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:e-voting is not secure (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:e-voting is not secure (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:One Down, One To Go (Score:5, Interesting)
Good methods (like Condorcet) should start in small organizations and work their way up, so that people are already familiar with how good preferential voting works.
Debian, for example, has already worked out lots of kinks and unfairness in their voting system by switching to Condorcet. Some "rules of order" books now advocate using Condorcet when possible. Encouraging this is what will get good preferential voting accepted, not pointing an angry finger at the government that's using a slightly better method than everyone else but still isn't good enough.
Re:Oz... (Score:2, Interesting)
It's a good point you make, but I believe it could be expanded. I feel that any country, in order to serve its people to the best of its ability, should look to the rest of the world for examples. There are great things happening all over the planet that we can learn from and some of these are not even democracies.
Just look at Japan (democracy). For many years their motto was to "imitate and improve." Just look at their superior consumer products and high standard of living. Yes, the dictators of the