Report: Boeing Official Expected to Face Criminal Charges Over Fatal Boeing 737 Max Issues (cbsnews.com) 99
"Federal prosecutors plan to criminally charge a former Boeing Co. pilot they suspect of misleading aviation regulators about safety issues blamed for two fatal crashes of the 737 Max," reports the Wall Street Journal, citing "people familiar with the matter."
Mark Forkner, who was Boeing's 737 Max chief technical pilot during the aircraft's development, is likely to face prosecution in the coming weeks, these people said... Boeing BA, admitted in a criminal settlement reached with prosecutors earlier this year that two of its employees — unnamed in that agreement — conspired to defraud the FAA about 737 Max training issues in order to benefit themselves and the company.
CBS News offers more details: It would, says the Journal, "be the first attempt to hold a Boeing employee accountable" for conduct before the two crashes. [Forkner] was the lead contact between the aviation giant and the Federal Aviation Administration over how pilots should be trained to fly the planes, the Journal said. According to documents published in early 2020, Forkner withheld details about the planes' faulty flight handling system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS — later blamed for both crashes — from regulators.
The Journal said it wasn't clear what charges Forkner would face... A lawyer for Forkner, David Gerger, didn't respond to requests for comment Thursday from the Journal. Gerger has said in the past that Forkner, a pilot and Air Force veteran, wouldn't put pilots or passengers in danger.
Mark Forkner, who was Boeing's 737 Max chief technical pilot during the aircraft's development, is likely to face prosecution in the coming weeks, these people said... Boeing BA, admitted in a criminal settlement reached with prosecutors earlier this year that two of its employees — unnamed in that agreement — conspired to defraud the FAA about 737 Max training issues in order to benefit themselves and the company.
CBS News offers more details: It would, says the Journal, "be the first attempt to hold a Boeing employee accountable" for conduct before the two crashes. [Forkner] was the lead contact between the aviation giant and the Federal Aviation Administration over how pilots should be trained to fly the planes, the Journal said. According to documents published in early 2020, Forkner withheld details about the planes' faulty flight handling system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS — later blamed for both crashes — from regulators.
The Journal said it wasn't clear what charges Forkner would face... A lawyer for Forkner, David Gerger, didn't respond to requests for comment Thursday from the Journal. Gerger has said in the past that Forkner, a pilot and Air Force veteran, wouldn't put pilots or passengers in danger.
Sacrificial Lamb (Score:3)
Re:Sacrificial Lamb (Score:4, Insightful)
I hope that some news reporter keeps an eye on this guy's family - watches to see if their standard of living shifts perceptibly upward after this.
Re: Sacrificial Lamb (Score:3)
The whole board of directors at that time should face a capital punishment for intentionally providing an extremely dangerous product.
Re: (Score:1)
The whole board of directors at that time should face a capital punishment for intentionally providing an extremely dangerous product.
The end result of that would be to push smart people out of corporate management, leading to even more incompetence in the future.
Re: (Score:1)
Punishment needs to done selectively and accurately - somewhere, some of Boeing's management need to be crucified for mass homicide for financial gain.
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:1)
" a lack of ethics"
When I was in school (BSEE), long, long ago, there was no mention of ethics. A few years after I graduated, I was fired for refusing to certify a thermocouple module for MTBF. Similar burned-out modules may have contributed to the Fermi reactor meltdown.
I don't to this day know why I did something so obviously against my short-term interest.
Re: (Score:2)
The only smart people in management are the ones who set other people up to take the fall for them.
Re: (Score:2)
"Training issues"??? No mention of the dipshit who decided a single AoA sensor which can override pilot input didn't require any redundancy or plausibility checking? Fuck off.
Re: (Score:2)
Re: Sacrificial Lamb (Score:1)
"wouldn't put pilots or passengers in danger" (Score:2)
So the strategy is lying? Because he clearly did. Repeatedly. Then continued to do it after a lot of people died.
Re: "wouldn't put pilots or passengers in danger" (Score:2)
By order from the board of directors most likely.
Re: (Score:2)
By order from the board of directors most likely.
Agreed. But there are orders you must refuse in civilian life.
Re: (Score:2)
Agreed. But there are orders you must refuse in civilian life.
Absolutely. And also document, log, record, report, get witnesses, whistleblow, etc.
Re: (Score:2)
Agreed. But there are orders you must refuse in civilian life.
Absolutely. And also document, log, record, report, get witnesses, whistleblow, etc.
Quite so. And if you do not, you become complicit.
Re: "wouldn't put pilots or passengers in danger" (Score:2)
But be careful how you do it [informationweek.com]. Everything created on company property is considered proprietary information. Even your own notes.
Re: (Score:2)
But be careful how you do it [informationweek.com]. Everything created on company property is considered proprietary information. Even your own notes.
Interesting. Given what we know now, especially about the complicity of higher Boeing management, which means they had no alternative through official complaints processes, I'd say that these employees should perhaps qualify for whistleblower protection. If would be really interesting for some lawyer to revisit cases like this and see if they could perhaps get a huge settlement out of Boeing.
Re: (Score:2)
qualify for whistleblower protection
The way I understand this case: Eastman originally took his concerns to the FAA. The FAA wasn't interested in investigating. So he tried to put together some evidence for the media. But media coverage doesn't qualify as whistleblowing in the eyes of the law. And if the department with oversight isn't interested, then you aren't a whistleblower and basically left swinging in the wind.
Re: (Score:1)
By order from the board of directors most likely.
Why would the BOD be involved in an operational decision?
BODs don't normally "order" anyone to do anything.
Re: (Score:2)
Why would the BOD be involved in an operational decision?
BODs don't normally "order" anyone to do anything.
The BOD might become involved in operational decisions in an attempt to illegally cut costs. Mostly this would happen indirectly by hearing about things that they should intervene in and then closing their ears and pretending they didn't hear it or didn't understand. In this case they almost certainly heard that approval was increasing costs and failed to ask enough questions about what was being done to ensure the operational engineers didn't come under pressure to cut corners.
Specifically important, her
Under-view. (Score:2)
For when pilots meet a bus.
Re: (Score:3)
Jesus you're not kidding.
"Boeing BA, admitted in a criminal settlement reached with prosecutors earlier this year that two of its employees â" unnamed in that agreement â" conspired to defraud the FAA about 737 Max training issues in order to benefit themselves and the company."
They found their scapegoats, just like VW did wit emissions cheating. Mysteriously one or two mid-level employees with no stock options to cash in just had to do this for themselves, all alone with zero involvement from exe
Re: Under-view. (Score:1)
Re: (Score:2)
Would you mind staying on topic? I'm happy to engage with your delusions in the original thread.
Re: Under-view. (Score:1)
just doing his job (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
In the present case, the law was changed to allow the airlines to self regulate. It was on the regulators
Re: (Score:1)
we have only prosecuted low level street dealers, the pill mill doctors.
The Sackler family paid over $4B in fines. That is not "low level".
law was changed to allow the airlines to self regulate.
Boeing is not an airline. They are a manufacturer.
I doubt if American deregulation caused the accidents in Indonesia and Ethiopia.
Re:just doing his job (Score:5, Insightful)
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
we have only prosecuted low level street dealers, the pill mill doctors.
The Sackler family paid over $4B in fines. That is not "low level".
4 billion is a drop in the bucket to them. We should put them in jail and take all their money so their grand kids have to work for a living.
Criminal charges (Score:2)
Good
Not the CEO ? (Score:5, Insightful)
So they've found a low level scapegoat to take the fall.
When things go good = bonuses for the skillful executive team's wonderful leadership.
When things go bad = All the fault of that pleb over there who mislead the skillful executive team.
The pleb has now been fired/prosecuted so move along, nothing to see here.
Re:Not the CEO ? (Score:4, Insightful)
"Chief Technical Pilot" is not quite a 'minion'. But I hope this is the start, and not the finish. The judicial legal decision on the shareholder lawsuit laid down a pretty strong case for Boeing executives misleading and lying to the board.
DERs (https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_delegations/individual_designees/der/) have specific legal responsibilities and obligations to the FAA with respect to safety. The people who signed off on the incomplete hazard analysis and the mitigation strategies that depended on a single part (that failed) have a whole lot of 'splaining to do (under oath, I hope.)
Re: (Score:1)
You're not kidding. I had to hire a DER for my plane. There was a problem with a wing and an undocumented repair. He blew that off and said that he was far more concerned with another problem in the wing. He came up with drawings and the repair was made. The original problem - two guys, two hours and it was done. I thought he was amazing with his knowledge. His fix was a lot more complicated. They found a woman that could get into the space to help with the new bucking of rivets. Took about a day.
Someone fr
Re: (Score:2)
Doesn't Chief Technical Pilot report to CEO?
As a CEO it's super easy to shift blame (Score:4, Interesting)
Re: (Score:2)
A cautionary tale for all us engineers. If this happens to you start looking for a new job, while collecting evidence to cover your arse and maybe blow the whistle.
Make sure you email you boss that it's not safe and ask them to confirm the work, and keep a copy.
Re: (Score:2)
Privatized profits, socialized blame.
What's the over/under? (Score:2)
Taking bets on one year. What say you? Over or under?
That's a relief (Score:5, Insightful)
I'm glad they found the one single person to point the finger at. Not a scapegoat at all.
They need to be looking as high up the management chain as would be expected to know about the risks of signing off on the non-redundant safety system.
Oh for fuck sake (Score:1)
Everyone knows that some test pilot wasn't the one responsible.. we all know he was ordered to do it by Boeing higher-ups. Jesus Christ some things should be obvious to anyone with a pulse.
Re: Oh for fuck sake (Score:4, Interesting)
Remember VW's early defense during the dieselgate scandal was "a small group of engineers introduced cheating in engine's software without notifying anyone".
Re: Oh for fuck sake (Score:4, Informative)
Which was a stupid defense, because who was chief engineer when that software was written? Martin Winterkorn. Who was CEO when the scandal broke? Martin Winterkorn. He pointed the finger at the department he ran, during the years he ran it.
Re: (Score:2)
Probably he was promoted to CEO due to his great performance as chief engineer. And why was his performance so great? Because he cheated of course.
Come to think of it, there is a similar effect in scientific/medical research. On average, the higher the effect size a paper reports, the less likely it is to be reproducible. The most dramatic reported results are also the most likely to be false, either through fraud or through some accidental error.
Re: (Score:3)
The problem is proving it to the level needed in a court of law in the US.
I know that smell (Score:5, Informative)
Re: (Score:2)
Low level employees do not make decisions about campaign contributions.
So how was 737 Max fixed? (Score:2)
Is there somewhere a summary of how the 737 Max was certified again to fly? Was this just a software fix, or a hardware fix? Did they make second sensor standard? Are pilots required to attend additional training?
Re: (Score:2)
I was wondering the same thing. It appeared based on original reports at the time of the crahses that Boeing had made some aspects of the safety system optional, and that the airlnes that suffered crashes had not purchased these optional aspects. And I don't just mean the angle of attack sensor, but something went so far as how the aircraft reported to the pilots various conditions.
It would not be a surprise if, in addition to requiring redundancies in the sensor suite, they also required this optional st
Re: (Score:3)
All the planes already had a second sensor. The system was upgraded to use it, and input from other non-AOA sensors as well. The MCAS system is also no longer allowed to override pilot input, and does not re-engage itself.
Pilots are also required to complete training for the MAX. The actual requirements vary by regulatory agency, but they include simulator time.
Re: (Score:2)
The "you're holding it wrong" defense?
Re: (Score:2)
I assume you're attempting some kind of clever post.
Re: (Score:3)
Yes, and he succeeded.
Boeing gets away with making mainly software fixes to their franken-plane (with its airframe design from decades past). They should have been compelled to scrap and rework.
Yes, Boeing initially said the pilots were holding it wrong. Then, after fighting tooth and nail, they grudgingly delivered cheap improvements mainly in software, like Apple.
They've increasing the cognitive load on pilots to cope with the foibles of their planes. Making less cognition available for other problems tha
Re: (Score:2)
Seems like good reason to put a flight engineer in the third seat all the time, and bill the extra cost to Boeing.
Re: (Score:2)
It's funny how the Slashdot hive mind has gone from "Boeing or I'm not going" through "dirty third worlders can't even train their pilots" and ended up at "Boeing is teh evil."
Boeing has been forced to require type training, including simulator time, for the MAX, which is what they should have done originally. They've also busted MCAS back to being a non-critical system, which is how it was originally intended. And they've also given it the redundancy that's required in a critical system.
I hate to tell you,
Re: (Score:1)
If you're the sort of person who puts in a hard days work complaining of Apple's "walled garden" before loading manufacturer-approved apps on your tv or game console, sure.
Cognitive load meet cognitive dissonance. [tumblr.com] Lots of companies have made lots of phones where you are told not to "hold it wrong", but the rest weren't Apple, so it wasn't a problem. Same as it wasn't a prob
Re: (Score:1)
Boeing published a list of changes they are making. There doesn't seem to be any hardware changes being done beyond the fact that these planes have been grounded for so long there's mandatory maintenance just to get them ready to fly again.
https://www.boeing.com/737-max... [boeing.com] is where I'm getting most of my information on the new version, and I've read the report on the first MAX crash to get an idea of how things went wrong.
There were always 2 hardware AOA (Angle Of Attack) sensors, but this MCAS software at
My Latest Experience With the 737 MAX (Score:3, Informative)
The first anomaly was that, after taxiing almost all of the way toward the runway, we stopped for about five minutes. The pilot made an announcement that our stop was due to either being overweight or the weight was imbalanced, I can't remember which. I found that a little odd since that seems like something that should be checked before leaving the gate. I couldn't help but wonder if the true reason we were stopped was due to frozen angle of attack sensor(s) and the pilots were simply waiting for them to thaw, but I had no way of knowing and I assured myself that there could be many reasons why we had stopped.
The second anomaly was that about halfway up through the ascent, the plane suddenly changed its trajectory over the course of several seconds and our angle of attack decreased fairly significantly. It did that for several seconds before reverting back to a more common ascent trajectory. This was definitely not due to turbulence as the change in trajectory was very smooth and continuous whereas turbulence is obviously very sudden and the change in direction is rarely smooth and continuous for seconds at a time. Needless to say, I was muttering some extremely vulgar phrases under my breath directed at Boeing.
While none of this proves that these anomalies were due to the 737 MAX's MCAS system, it certainly didn't instill a lot of confidence in me at all and it's something I thought I'd share so you can make your own decisions about whether or not you trust this aircraft.
Re: My Latest Experience With the 737 MAX (Score:1)
I was muttering some extremely vulgar phrases under my breath directed at Boeing If i was sitting behind you, I'd have thrown you to the ground and shouted "He's got a bomb!"
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
Thanks - that's useful information !
And all it took (Score:2)
Was a few dozen people dying in two major crashes for someone to be held accountable.
Re: (Score:3)
Was a few dozen people dying in two major crashes for someone to be held accountable.
Was a few dozen people dying in two major crashes for a scapegoat to face prison time instead of the higher-ups who were ultimately responsible for the negligent homicides which Boeing committed.
FTFY
Re: (Score:1)
Anyone technical wouldn't make the choices their managements in fact did make for financial reasons (costs or marketing, like 2nd sensor activation overcharge).
So who will not be prosecuted ... (Score:5, Insightful)
All the politicians who championed "self policing by the industry", "deregulation", as panacea for everything. They go scot free.
FAA officials who just made sure there is a cover-my-ass paper from Boeing and singed off on everything without telling the public "We didn't do squat for checking anything. Cleared to fly but not certified safe by FAA". They get to hide behind that piece of paper.
All the pundits and analysts in finance side who relentlessly pressured Boeing into cost cutting and compromises? They get to write editorials about the fall of once great company.
Re: (Score:2)
Some Boeing managers/directors still need to be fried.
Re: (Score:2)
On anything but simple products where the consumer is well aware of all the risks and benefits, the correcting signal from the consumer will be missing. Your choice is safety through regulation or compensation through litigation.
Does anyone really want to go all libertarian and settle for litigation o
Re: (Score:2)
No, don't demand that they learn from past experience, and physics, to prevent deadly things before they happen. The holy market will weed out the weak - whether that is plane manufacturers
Re: (Score:2)
As products get complex it starts breaking down. Examples like smart phones, or TVs or laptops. For very complex products like healthcare where risk-insurance is mixed up with chronic diseases, it is impossible for Free Market to get onto to the path towards better solutions
Texas electric utility regulation, FAA regulated airlines, NHTSA regulated automobiles .... all are
Re: So who will not be prosecuted ... (Score:2)
Given the only viable competitor is Airbus who did have proper regulatory oversight that argument does not hold up. There was no race to the bottom nor was there going to be one. Boeing cut corners and the management need to do time.
Re: (Score:2)
Self-policing worked for generations.
Boeing engineers were the world experts on the planes, knew more than the FAA could hope to, and had an engineer's attitude toward safety. Back when they were allowed to do their jobs, designated engineering representatives turned out one very safe aircraft after another.
What pisses me off (Score:2)
Boeing used to be a top-notch company, but now, it is ran by MBAs that are running it into the ground, like they did GE.
I guess we know... (Score:2)
Reeks BS (Score:1)
Documents published early 2020? Did the 'feds' read this from 2019? --> https://apnews.com/article/us-... [apnews.com]
What do the 'feds' have to go by? If it's only that chat from 2016, the tone of it sounds more like the pilot was under pressure from Boeing management to lie to the FAA.
I hope for Forkner that he kept documents to back that up.
Also, why does this drag on for years? Didn't we have a right for 'swift trial' at some point?
Business as usual (Score:1)
The List Of Failures (Score:5, Informative)
1. Regulatory Capture
Before we even get to the technical failures concerning the aircraft itself, it's important to remember that even though there were in theory "FAA Safety Inspectors" following the design and development of the 737Max, the actual individuals hired were selected by Boeing, hired by Boeing, paid by Boeing and
2. Unsafe Design Decisions
The second major issue we need to consider is why the 737Max needed MCAS at all. The answer is simple... In order to keep up with its main competitor - the Airbus A320NEO, Boeing elected to fit the latest generation of engines to the airframe. The NEO - "New Engine Option" gave Airbus a massive fuel efficiency advantage over the 737Max, sufficient that had Boeing not responded, airlines would have switched to the Airbus option. But let's start with a baseline. Here [wikimedia.org] is a photograph of a "regular" Boeing 737. And here [aviationtoday.com] is a photograph of a "Max". See the difference in size, diameter and position of the engines? Fitting the newest generation of engines to the Max significantly changed the trim of the aircraft, but did it in a way that required that Boeing design and develop the MCAS system in the first place. If Boeing had been willing to follow their decision to use latest-generation engines with a series of equivalent design decisions that kept the entire airframe safe and "neutral", they would have ended up with something so radically different that they could not have sold it as a "737", which neither Boeing nor the airlines wanted to do. We'll come back to this in a moment...
3. Making Safety Equipment Optional
The 737Max sensor is fitted with not one but two "Angle of Attack Sensors" - this being a civilian airliner, you would expect this level of redundancy. However, the problem was that there was an additional piece of technology - a warning system that compared the differences in readings between the two fitted sensors, then alerted the pilots if the differences were greater than minimal. That "differences alerting" system was only fitted on the "optional extras" cockpit instrument pack - which of course no budget airline purchased. None of the aircraft that crashed were fitted with the optional equipment, which meant that if one of the AoA sensors "froze over", or was filled with debris from, say, a locust swarm [one crash in Africa], the 2 AoA sensors would give anomalous readings - but only the sensor connected to the instruments would be seen by the pilots.
4. Faulty Development Process
Subsequent to the crashes, we have learned that the original design for the 737Max included various performance criteria tests to show that MCAS was working successfully. During the developmental phase of the aircraft's introduction, before and during flight tests, those "performance criterial tests" were changed. We've learned that the notification process for those changes was flawed - people who should have been told were not told. Had the full nature of the changes been communicated as per Boeing's own internal procedures require, it is possible that the design decisions [only take data from a single AoA sensor] would have been identified and corrected during flight testing.
5. Airline Greed - Differences Training
One of the major contributing factors to the crashes actually came from Boeing's commercial customers
Re: (Score:2)
My neighbor went through 737 MAX transition training. He said there was -1- mention of MCAS, in the list of acronyms.
The DER approach has worked well for quite a while (point #1 above.) I've worked with some Boeing DERs, and would trust those particular people with my life on an aircraft. But something systemic failed both at Boeing and FAA, to compromise what worked well in the past.
The core -technical failure- was an incomplete hazard analysis. This should be called out as Point 2a. If that's not rig
Re: (Score:2)
Just a quick clarification for anyone reading David's post and mine above it, regarding the fact that he and I apparently disagree over what was/was not included in "pilot training".
Pilot Training is the responsibility of the airline and not the manufacturer. The aircraft manufacturer, Boeing, would have provided comprehensive details of the aircraft to the airlines - and to be fair to Boeing, this needs to be pretty comprehensive - you need to understand the basic handling characteristics
Re: (Score:2)
I agree on all counts. But the airlines are very much dependent on the aircraft manufacturer to provide technical information and training recommendations.
If I was an airline training/safety representative, one of the checks I'd make on manufacturer provided content is to make sure that any acronym mentioned in the manufacturer documentation is not just spelled out, but is also explained somewhere.
Re: (Score:2)
1. Regulatory Capture
Before we even get to the technical failures concerning the aircraft itself, it's important to remember that even though there were in theory "FAA Safety Inspectors" following the design and development of the 737Max, the actual individuals hired were selected by Boeing, hired by Boeing, paid by Boeing and ... reported to the FAA. So where, exactly, did their loyalties lie? First heads that need to roll were the people at the FAA that made this decision, which needs to be reversed if it hasn't already happened.
While I do not doubt that was an issue, the bottom line is I find it extremely unlikely that Boeing was in compliance with their own procedures. Several people signed off on this who should not have -- I would bet a large amount of money that will prove to be true.
Whether it is an airplane or a nuclear power plant or a new automobile or a new drug or a new piece of software used in hospital coming to market, the federal gov't regulatory bodies are highly dependent on a basic level of honesty and competence
So what does a corporation get for murder? (Score:1)
Will they be allowed to express human lives in dollars again?
Very very few dollars too.
Re: (Score:2)
Peter DeFazio (Chair of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee): "You know, I've been reading about these Boeing 737Max crashes and I think we need to hold some detailed reviews with the FAA to find out what went wrong here..."
Nameless Lobbyist: "OK, Sir, we can do that. Preliminary reports suggest that you'll have to terminate a good portion of your FAA management, but that's your
Go after the CEO and Board (Score:2)
Why not go after the CEO and the Board who had much more influence on these poor decisions? Forkner is probably a "little guy" with not all that much wealth so he doesn't have the clout and power. Rich CEO and board members get off every time,. Its always the employees who pay the price
Corporate elite in America, corrupt to the core (Score:3)
In Japan, the CEO would have probably resigned and jumped off a bridge (okay, just resigned, but with huge apologies), to protect the employees and atone for how he wronged the company. In the US, the employees are offered as a human sacrifice to protect the CEOs get golden parachutes. Corporate america, corrupt as it gets.
The fall guy (Score:2)
Not the CEO or the execs of Boeing,
Wrong answer. His defense should be x,y,z told me how bad it would be if the aircraft didn't pass inspection.