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Dutch Gov't Has No Idea How To Delete Tapped Calls 186

McDutchie writes "The law in the Netherlands says that intercepted phone calls between attorneys and their clients must be destroyed. But the Dutch government has been keeping under wraps for years that no one has the foggiest clue how to delete them (Google translation). Now, an email (PDF) from the National Police Services Agency (KLPD) has surfaced, revealing that the working of the technology in question is a NetApp trade secret. The Dutch police are now trying to get their Israeli supplier Verint to tell them how to delete tapped calls and comply with the law. Meanwhile, attorneys in the Netherlands remain afraid to use their phones."
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Dutch Gov't Has No Idea How To Delete Tapped Calls

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  • by Finallyjoined!!! ( 1158431 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @03:46AM (#29843667)
    Absolutely superb.
    • by rvw ( 755107 )

      Absolutely superb.

      It's called a Dutch Delete. It helps deleting the case by messing up the evidence.

      • Re: (Score:2, Funny)

        by ZeRu ( 1486391 )
        "Meanwhile, attorneys in the Netherlands remain afraid to use their phones." Apparently they need some Dutch courage.
        • Re: (Score:2, Insightful)

          by MrNaz ( 730548 ) *

          Dutch courage eh? /me hands the Dutch legal fraternity a nice, cold glass of encryption.

          Seriously, why don't we all just move to encrypted SIP clients? It's not like there aren't a pile of open source ones out there.Yes, it'll never be mass market, but it's now easy enough for anyone clued up enough to know that they need to be using it.

          Failing that, there's always encrypted email. Thunderbird + Enigmail is a no-brainer.

          • by ae1294 ( 1547521 )

            Seriously, why don't we all just move to encrypted SIP clients? It's not like there aren't a pile of open source ones out there.Yes, it'll never be mass market, but it's now easy enough for anyone clued up enough to know that they need to be using it.

            But then how would big brother monitor our phone calls to protect us from ourselves???

    • by Nossie ( 753694 )

      And in related news...

      "The law in America says that file sharing hosts and their clients/files must be destroyed. But [what] the Dutch ISP Nforce has been keeping under wraps for years [is] that no one has the foggiest clue how to delete them"

      So many levels....

  • not afraid (Score:5, Interesting)

    by Djinh ( 92332 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @04:01AM (#29843725)

    Lawyers aren't afraid at all to use the phone: If a tapped conversation between them and their client turns up later in court, their client usually walks.

    • Re:not afraid (Score:5, Insightful)

      by ledow ( 319597 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @04:05AM (#29843747) Homepage

      I think you're only looking at the simple case. What about: I find out the intimate details of what you and your client were talking about on the phone and then use those details to dig deeper and find evidence I never would have without that phone call? Then I turn up in court, destroy your case, have nothing but hard evidence and you have no way of knowing that I used your taped conversation to do so (and probably couldn't prove it even if you thought that).

      It'd be immoral and illegal but it *would* destroy your case outright and the chances of me getting caught are probably quite low if I'm someone with intelligence and knowledge of legal workings like, say, another lawyer?

      • But you would need a plausible reason for finding that other evidence or your case would fall apart. Probably not difficult to manage but you would need to cover your back.
      • It'd be immoral and illegal

        Is it really immoral if you're trying to pin someone down for harm done to society? (The potential for abuse is high which is why it's illegal, but illegal doesn't automatically mean immoral.)

        • Yes. Knowing that the prosecution might be listening, the defendant will be afraid to speak frankly to his lawyer. This will result in inadequate defense and consequently to the conviction of innocent people.

        • by ibbey ( 27873 )

          You may not have been paying attention, but your mother probbly answered your question when you were a child and she said "two wrongs don't make a right".

        • It'd be immoral and illegal

          Is it really immoral if you're trying to pin someone down for harm done to society? (The potential for abuse is high which is why it's illegal, but illegal doesn't automatically mean immoral.)

          Yes. The rules are in place to ensure an adequate defense. The whole idea that the ends justify the means is corrosive to a free society.

      • Immoral? You must be a lawyer. Destroying the defense against a case of a guilty man is not immoral, letting him walk because a law designed to protect the innocent is.

        Of course, throwing an innocent man in jail because someone overheard something that misleads others into thinking he's guilty is immoral too.

        It can go both ways, but don't paint it as one cut and dried picture. You may think its okay to let someone walk on a technicality or lack of evidence in order to protect the innocent, I however thin

    • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

      by Anonymous Coward

      The police wouldn't be dumb enough to use that as evidence.

      What they are more concerned about is the police hearing "Oh, you did do it? Right, this is how we'll get you off..."

      Once they know you did it, even if they can't use that recording, you can bet your bottom dollar they will put every resource to use in finding the proof you did it, where without that taped call they may see no surface evidence and move on to the next suspect.

      • by Kupfernigk ( 1190345 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @04:51AM (#29843913)
        I don't know if the law is different in the Netherlands, but in the UK if the client tells the lawyer that he did do it, he has to either find a new lawyer or agree to plead guilty and present mitigating circumstances. A lawyer is not allowed to tell actual lies in court.I doubt it is different elsewhere in the EU.
        • Re: (Score:2, Informative)

          by Hognoxious ( 631665 )

          I don't know if the law is different in the Netherlands

          Since most of mainland Europe uses the Napoleonic legal system then yes, it is.

          A lawyer is not allowed to tell actual lies in court.

          Apart from summing up[1], lawyers[2] ask questions which by definition are neither true nor false. It's witnesses who answer them, under oath.

          [1] And from what I've seen, they always talk in a strange indirect manner - "we have shown that...", "if foo then you must acquit", "witness X's testimony is unreliable" etc. They

          • Since most of mainland Europe uses the Napoleonic legal system then yes, it is

            You must be French, or from Louisiana.

            The official definition of the mainstream European legal system is either "Roman Law" or "Romano-Germanic". As the WTO describes it,

            Comparative lawyers have identified the following main legal families: Romano-Germanic Law, Common Law, Socialist Law, Hindu Law, Muslim Law, Laws of the Far East, Black Africa and Malagasy Law.

            I would remind you that the Netherlands has signed up to the Treaty o

            • It might not be "official", but I think the mainstream European system of law is usually referred to as "civil law".

        • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

          by brillow ( 917507 )
          Lawyers in the US cannot lie either, nor can they knowingly prompt clients to lie. They cannot allow clients to testify information they know to be false. There are ways around this however, as only the client and lawyer know about the lie, its easy to hide and I imagine its done all the time. The client can also recant the truth they made to the lawyer and the lawyer can then claim they believed it (though if they end up in front of a bar they will have to be pretty persuasive in why they beleived the 2
        • Re: (Score:2, Informative)

          by Bredero ( 1154131 )
          Well obviously the law is different since it is a different country. In the Netherlands talks between clients and their lawyers are private (dutch: beroepsgeheim; lit. professional secret). This obligates lawyers to secrecy and they do not have to incriminate their clients even in court. This means that the defendant, their next of kin and his or her lawyer do not have to testify. A similar secrecy obligation applies to healthcare professionals for obvious reasons.
      • The police wouldn't be dumb enough to use that as evidence.

        Ha! You obviously don't know about the utter cluelesness of the Dutch authorities. In actuality, these phone calls have found their way to court in numerous occasions, even to the point that a 3 year investigation of the Hell's Angels was thrown out of court as their evidence consisted of the perps talking to their lawyers.

        You see, in the Netherlands the police is stupid, and the prosecuters are worse. The only reason anybody gets locked up at

      • by sjames ( 1099 )

        The real problem is if the client tells his lawyer he DIDN'T do it (the police/prosecutor will never believe that) and then tells him about something he withheld from police because it would look really damning.

        Then investigators can work backwards from the fact to some plausible way they could have stumbled onto it.

    • Re:not afraid (Score:4, Insightful)

      by Anonymous Coward on Friday October 23, 2009 @04:10AM (#29843767)

      That may be true, but if the police / the prosecution is smart, they don't use the tapped calls themselves as evidence, but simply use them during their own investigation, and to better prepare their rebuttal to the defense attorney's arguments.

      Regardless of lawyers' feelings, this is a major violation of a basic right to have a private conversation with your defense attorney. The fact that these calls are tapped at all is outrageous. If those calls were occasionally accidentally stored that would be even more outrageous. But if they are not only recorded but even impossible to delete, ... well I can't think of a word.

      • Re:not afraid (Score:4, Informative)

        by dajak ( 662256 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @05:44AM (#29844113)

        The conversation between lawyer and client may be confidential, but the extent of the protective perimeter you set up around it is a practical matter.

        You may declare prison and law office phones sacred altogether in order to make sure you don't record such conversations, missing a lot of useful conversations, but if you don't, you will have to listen to the conversations to establish, firstly, that it is a confidential conversation, and secondly, that the recording doesn't contain parts you presumably may use (for instance the lawyer dictating something to a secretary in the background).

        Dutch practice is that you may not use or store it in principle but you may listen to the recording and store it until you did. After that, you have to destroy it, and the suspicion is now that the system only deletes it.

        Having said that, this whole thing became an issue after it was discovered confidential phone conversations were actually copied to DVD by the police in one high profile case, which is indeed outrageous.

      • ``That may be true, but if the police / the prosecution is smart, they don't use the tapped calls themselves as evidence, but simply use them during their own investigation, and to better prepare their rebuttal to the defense attorney's arguments.''

        Heh. The whole reason they are actually finally looking into this is that many defendants are acquitted because of mistakes made by the prosecution - in this case, not deleting recordings. I hope this shakes things up so that other data retention issues are looke

    • It's not as simple as that.

      The phone call is never going to appear in court. What could happen is that the police listen to the call and then have a better idea where to look to find evidence that will help them with their case. This evidence will be presented to court, will be solid evidence that proves the accused guilt, and there is no way you could prove it was obtained as a result of tapping a privilidged phone call.

  • Easy (Score:3, Funny)

    by L4t3r4lu5 ( 1216702 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @04:03AM (#29843737)
    Take media with recorded conversations, place in a pile, load it up with a half-tonne of aluminium filings and iron oxide, and apply a high temperature heat source.

    You might want to wear safety goggles.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday October 23, 2009 @04:08AM (#29843755)

    ... and tell them that there's no way they could ever delete anything. Trust me, they'll find a way.

  • So many telcos (Score:4, Informative)

    by AHuxley ( 892839 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @04:17AM (#29843799) Journal
    Use Israeli telco supply firms for outsourced backend billing and interception.
    Fox new did a report on it
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kle7ZgmFcpQ [youtube.com] (pt 1)
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZeaXlrldqwo [youtube.com] (pt 2)
    Why or how so many national telcos let interception drift away from core in house responsibilities is just strange.
    If your an attorney and your client is literate, buy a note pad, write out your work, read and then destroy (with a few pages under the written page too).
    With fusion centres in the US and any suspect now a "terrorist" most of the attorney client privilege protection is getting blurred.
    • Conspiracy theory (Score:5, Interesting)

      by chrb ( 1083577 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @06:02AM (#29844195)

      It's a well-known conspiracy theory: that Mossad has created Telco front companies throughout the world to spy on other nations. See The Israeli Spy Ring [whatreallyhappened.com], which talks about the Fox News articles, and another typical story [counterpunch.org]. Of course, a conspiracy theory doesn't make it true...

    • >>...revealing that the working of the technology in question is a NetApp trade secret

      Apparently, there IS an app for that.

      >>With fusion centres in the US and any suspect now a "terrorist" most of the attorney client privilege protection is getting blurred.

      Well, I certainly hope they keep those terrorists away from the fusion centres!!

      • by AHuxley ( 892839 )
        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_center [wikipedia.org]
        Sort of like NSA meets army meets FBI meets NYPD meets you and your lawyer.
        Under section 802 its "any action that endangers human life that is a violation of any Federal or State law" and the full force of the the US gov starts to warm up around you and your lawyer ;)
        • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_center
          Sort of like NSA meets army meets FBI meets NYPD meets you and your lawyer.
          Under section 802 its "any action that endangers human life that is a violation of any Federal or State law" and the full force of the the US gov starts to warm up around you and your lawyer ;)

          Whoosh. Fusion Center:
          http://www.psfc.mit.edu/research/alcator/intro/info.html [mit.edu]

    • by chill ( 34294 )

      Last time I worked on it, Verint only made the front-end software. That is, the software that you entered the warrant and details on. It then passed the tap information on to the actual telecom system, which in the case I was dealing with was developed by Chinese and Indian programmers.

      Telecom software is usually run by code from companies like Ericson, Siemens, Nortel, Motorola or Alcatel-Lucent. The Verint stuff is just the GUI and passes the instructions on to the actual system that does the work. Ca

      • by AHuxley ( 892839 )
        "passed the tap information on to the actual telecom system" and "just the GUI and passes the instructions" is the best stuff.
        You can have all the local "heavily restricted" you want.
        If the entered data is going around the world, whats at the other end?
        Who wrote the back end or hardware side is fixed and set in place.
        The tap information shows who your interested in, why and who else might be connected.
        Its show the officer/s and department and type of tap.
        One person, one state or roving, friends too?
        T
        • by chill ( 34294 )

          Well, the entered data isn't going around the world. The data entry consoles are restricted as well, though nowhere near as tightly as the actual hardware. The data is usually entered by a law enforcement officer on a terminal in their station. Connections for everything are IPSec tunnels, so no snooping.

          Still, it would be about as secure as the criminal record check or license plate check computers. That is to say, only officers, friends, friends of friends, connected PIs and lawyers, family, friends o

  • Israels IT industry is world champion in wiretapping everything.

    And I am not sure if they are interested in having tapped calls deleted

    I mean really deleted!

    • Ya know those "call may be monitored and recorded for quality blah blah" announcements you always hear when calling pretty much any company?
      Most of that is done by Nice recording company, based in Israel (they sell the machines; they don't do the actual recording themselves.)
      Every air traffic controller in the WORLD is recorded on Nice machines. They are HUGE.

      So, yeah, Israelis know a thing or two about recording a phone call.
  • ....the system is probably a piece of shit built by incompetents. What are the odds they can even find them after 3 years?

    On the other hand perhaps they can delete them but they're claiming not to be able to so they can hang onto them.

    Either way police that don't comply with the law, or incompetent fools - not good.

  • No joke, it's hard (Score:5, Insightful)

    by Odo ( 109839 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @04:24AM (#29843815)

    Deleting data is really really hard. If one is storing large amounts of data it is difficult to put a system in place which can prove that every copy in your posession has been deleted. Think about the work of sifting through thousands of write-once offline backups, be it tapes or CDs or whatever, locating the data, copying the original minus the data and destroying the originals. If that's not hard enough, what about data that's not in discrete files. Say there's a PostgreSQL database that's zipped and spans a thousand peices of physical media. The only way to delete a record is to load the whole database then redump it. And don't forget about regenerating all the index files. And dealing with obsolete file formats.

    This sounds like a stupid problem, but in reality it is really tough to delete something and be certain that you've got it all.

    • by petrossa ( 792314 ) <petrossa&msn,com> on Friday October 23, 2009 @05:02AM (#29843945)
      And, the Netherlands have about the most all encompassing citizens database on the globe. So all data is cross referenced all over the place amongst databases of all civil governmental and semi-governmental agencies . It's so vast that indeed it's not only hard, but virtually impossible to remove data completely. As an example: The colour, structure and density of pubescent children is stored. All this data is directly accessible via the misnomed 'Citizen Service Number'. We dutch tend to call it the 'Citizens Spying Number'.
    • by Sycraft-fu ( 314770 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @05:04AM (#29843947)

      I think what it is easy to forget as geeks is just how hard everything works to keep data. All our technology is designed around the assumption that you never want to lose any data. Thus completely removing it gets harder all the time.

      As another example snapshot backups are now real common. NetApps can be configured, and often are, to take periodic snapshots of your data. That way, if something is accidentally deleted or modified, there are point in time shots to go back to. Likewise Windows Vista and 7 now keep revisions of files automatically. If you change a file, a new version is written and the old one is kept, by default, so long as there's free space on the drive.

      Now none of this is stuff you can't turn off or remove but it is all stuff that adds to the complexity. Just deleting the file, and even overwriting it, doesn't necessarily do it. The computer may still have a copy. It is designed such to try and keep you from losing your data accidentally.

      None of this is to excuse the government, if they have a requirement to delete these things they need to work out a way to do so, however that doesn't mean I don't sympathize with the problem. It isn't trivial to ensure all copies have been delete and have been done so in a provable fashion.

      This is why when we surplus old computers, the harddrives never go with. They are taken to be wiped and/or destroyed later. We are just not interested in screwing around with making sure the data is gone and then screwing that up. Instead a simple visual inspection tells you there is no data (since there are no drives).

      • So for things like snapshots and file versions, you obviously need a way to delete this data. I'm curious, though, if copies of the data only exist on tapes or discs stored in some large warehouse where it would take 5 years to find the specific data (i.e. longer than a trial would last), is that close enough? If the data might exist somewhere, but there's no reasonable way to get it, is it considered effectively deleted?
      • Zuh? Why in the world would you go to the effort of copying all files from a tape drive except what you want deleted to somewhere else, and then destroy the physical tape the 'to be deleted' file is on?

        I mean, I'm not a programmer by profession (although I have dabbled in it for years), but I can't imagine it would be that hard to make a program that writes over the data of X file with zeroes. *BAM*, problem solved, no wasted time or items.

        Isn't there even a contest of some sort in which a hard drive is o

    • by noundi ( 1044080 )

      Deleting data is really really hard. If one is storing large amounts of data it is difficult to put a system in place which can prove that every copy in your posession has been deleted. Think about the work of sifting through thousands of write-once offline backups, be it tapes or CDs or whatever, locating the data, copying the original minus the data and destroying the originals. If that's not hard enough, what about data that's not in discrete files. Say there's a PostgreSQL database that's zipped and spans a thousand peices of physical media. The only way to delete a record is to load the whole database then redump it. And don't forget about regenerating all the index files. And dealing with obsolete file formats.

      This sounds like a stupid problem, but in reality it is really tough to delete something and be certain that you've got it all.

      Which makes them look even more dumb for not asking how difficult/expensive the task is in the first place.

      • by RMH101 ( 636144 )
        They may have bought this app *deliberately* to stop deletion of data, and maintain an audit trail: say for example they wanted to ensure that no-one could run a tap, then delete the evidence that it'd been done - this might even have been a legal requirement.
        If the law has changed since then, changing the requirements, then sure they need to go back to the vendor and ask what can be done about it. To be honest, if the alternative is that an operator can casually alter the audit trail and delete records,
    • by dissy ( 172727 )

      This sounds like a stupid problem, but in reality it is really tough to delete something and be certain that you've got it all.

      I really can't believe I'm saying this, but this sounds like a technical problem that really does need a legal solution.

      You are quite right regarding how difficult it can be to delete every copy of a piece of data, on the technical side.

      Instead of all of that, it might be easier to enact an actual law saying a recording of a conversation is only legally valid for that time. Or at the least, have both. Then if one side fails you, the other hopefully will help pick up the slack.

      No calls recorded before that

      • > No calls recorded before that time would be admissible in court...

        Recordings of lawyer-client conversations are already inadmissible. The problem is that there are plenty of ways for the prosecution to use them that do not involve producing them in court or even admitting that they exist.

    • Would it be possible to encrypt all the mediafiles and keep the keys in a separate database? That way one could just delete the keys to make the data impossible to recover without actually going through all the tapes. Of course, you'd keep a backup of the keys, but that would be much easier to keep track of.

      • There are many possible solutions, but they all involve actually thinking through the the problem rather than blindly purchasing an off-the-shelf "solution" from the vendor with the smoothest salesman.

  • by Veneratio ( 935302 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @04:32AM (#29843849)

    But im not, really. Having worked for the Dutch police twice now, I can safely say that the majority of their IT staff are completely clueless. A few years ago they "outsourced" their IT to a seperate entity to handle all their IT, but this entity was staffed mostly with the people they already had, so there wasn't any actual increase of knowledge (as far as I could tell). They got a nice fat bag of money and an unclear manifest, all paid for by us - the Dutch taxpayer - and this is what we get.

    The Netherlands: No privacy, no competence and instead of capable beatcops we get highway robbery in the form of a cop with a lasergun having his daylong break sitting behind a bush next to our highways. And they wonder why the populace is starting to hate law enforcement.

    Do yourself a favor and do a search on Google for "C2000", another one of the Dutch police success stories.

    I could weep. Or well....puke really.

    • ..but are just a few years behind. You need to get up to speed on sucking up to the American DHS and spying on your citizens. Could I make you an offer? We will soon have an Administration that is surplus to requirements. Why don't you take it over?

      After all, in 1688 we acquired our Government from the Netherlands and it was a big success story. Now it's time to return the favor. Gordon Brown is not quite as glamorous as William of Orange, but I'm sure we'd let you have him and his Cabinet for free.

      We also

    • by MrMr ( 219533 )
      Somehow I think things could get worse:
      Imagine the same attitude and objectives, but now with competent staff...
  • That is the question.

    Call Tom Dickson.

  • by blavallee ( 729704 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @05:07AM (#29843959) Journal

    For those who are offering commands to get rid of the data, you need to understand the why they will not work.

    This issue is that the storage system used is designed is such a way that you CAN NOT modify any data once it is written to the disk.

    Once the data is written, it can not be modified or deleted. Now, the reasoning behind this is so the police can not digitally manipulate the timestamps or data in any way. This is to protect the integrity of the data so it can withstand legal challenges.

    They are faced with a 'catch 22' situation. If they can figure out a way to delete a 'prohibited conversation' they could theoretically modify the data too. Opening up the possibility of having a criminal conversation being invalidated.

    • When I worked at fortune 500 company we had these Write Once Ream Many dive systems to record images of contracts. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Write_Once_Read_Many [wikipedia.org]

      The drive platters looked like CD recordable media in a plastic case about the size of a large pizza. Two machines would write out the data and when full the platters went into one of the jukeboxes (readers). Not a bad system, a bit slow. 90's tech.

      • Re: (Score:3, Funny)

        by alexo ( 9335 )

        When I worked at fortune 500 company we had these Write Once Ream Many [sic] dive systems to record images of contracts.

        What company was that? Goatse?

    • by JesseMcDonald ( 536341 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @11:04AM (#29846935) Homepage

      If they can figure out a way to delete a 'prohibited conversation' they could theoretically modify the data too.

      Technically there is no need to make the conversations themselves immutable. You just need to be able to verify that the recording you have is the one which was originally recorded. A one-way hash can serve this purpose. For each recording, store the conversation itself in an erasable/mutable medium, but record a hash of the conversation in append-only storage (with multiple distributed backups). If you need to show that the recording is legit, compare it with the hash. If you need to delete something, record the deletion in the append-only medium and then remove it from the mutable storage. The hash will remain, but you can't use the hash to obtain information about the conversation without the original recording.

      Bonus: You can recognize unauthorized deletions by comparing the mutable and immutable records.

    • OK, here's an idea that solves the "we can't delete it but we must be able to forget it and we can't forge it" problem.
      1. Encrypt the conversations while recording them, each with their own unique AES cypher.
      2. Store the encrypted conversations to a WORM drive and keep them forever.
      3. Store the AES keys on erasable media.
      4. If you want to delete a conversation, you permanently delete the key but leave the encrypted conversation there.
      5. If you want to *alter* a conversation, you're out of luck because the only alterable
  • The issue is the difference between destroying (in practical terms: erasing), as they are legally obliged to do, and deleting it. This pdf document [www.nrc.nl]linked from the article explains in laymen's language how the "pointer (or route) in the system to the data concerned" is removed, making 1) the data inaccessible to investigators, and 2) freeing up the space of a hard disk array for new data, and then goes on explaining that the data may theoretically still be retrieved from the disks if not yet overwritten. The

  • There is this company called "Danger".......
  • Dutch justice... (Score:4, Informative)

    by AlXtreme ( 223728 ) on Friday October 23, 2009 @05:24AM (#29844037) Homepage Journal

    Over the past few years quite a few criminal cases were lost exactly because of this problem. In Amsterdam a huge case against Hell's Angels [www.nos.nl] went south in 2007 (everyone was set free) because they didn't destroy tapped recordings with attorneys. Last year it happened again [www.nos.nl] (dutch links, sorry).

    I hope someone got canned because of this, but given our incompetent justice department I really can't see that happening. Phone tapping has reached epidemic proportions over here (highest number of taps per person in the western world), as it's much easier than actually investigating a case based on given evidence.

    Funny that this is the second article on our incapable justice system within a day on /., go us \o/

    • When people get off on a crime because of a technicality, a legal oversight, then your laws are broken. In turn that comes down to voting for, or electing politicians who vote for bad laws.

      The voters should be canned for continuing to vote in cheating politicians and voting for laws with loopholes like this.

  • Illegal tapping of newspapers in the NL:

    http://blogs.journalism.co.uk/editors/2009/07/09/nisnews-nl-dutch-newspaper-suing-state-for-phone-tapping-journalists/ [journalism.co.uk]

    http://badnewsfromthenetherlands.blogspot.com/2009/10/court-intelligence-service-illegally.html [blogspot.com]

    The Amsterdam court has determined that the General Intelligence Service AIVD broke the law of freedom of press by tapping the phones of journalists of the Telegraaf daily

  • But then we got high.

  • Comment removed based on user account deletion
  • Doesn't that violate EU "data privacy" laws?

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