The Seven Laws of Identity 250
pHatidic writes "Something strange is a brewin' at Microsoft these days. Check out this video interview with Kim Cameron, Microsoft's Architect of Identity, about Kim's Laws of Identity." From the post: "We have undertaken a project to develop a formal understanding of the dynamics causing digital identity systems to succeed or fail in various contexts, expressed as the Laws of Identity. Taken together, these laws define a unifying identity metasystem that can offer the Internet the identity layer it so obviously requires. They also provide a way for people new to the identity discussion to understand its central issues. This lets them actively join in, rather than everyone having to restart the whole discussion from scratch."
I win! (Score:5, Funny)
Bingo! [perkigoth.com]
Obviously? (Score:5, Insightful)
It obviously requires an identity layer? News to me. As a card-carrying member of the tinfoil hat brigade, I prefer anonimity.
No, but probably (Score:5, Insightful)
You're entitled to your tinfoil-wrapped opinion, of course, but as I always point out in these discussions, there would be a lot of advantages to having some form of confirmed identity connected with Internet-based activity, even if it's generally concealed or only anonymously verifiable except to suitable authorities.
If everything could ultimately be tracked back to you eventually, things like spamming, virus distribution, defamation, on-line fraud, and numerous other harmful behaviours would be dramatically reduced. You could improve a lot of people's lives here.
Of course, you also have to identify "suitable authorities" who should get the right to access this information. That might be relatively easy in the West -- we have court systems that most people would probably trust to issue such orders if and when necessary -- but the Internet is international and what's free speech to you might be illegal anti-government propaganda in certain other places.
Personally, I think most of the supposed advantages of anonymity on the Internet are illusory anyway. Does anyone really believe that all these people in China are happily speaking freely on the Internet as it stands today anyway?
Hence, on balance, a reliable identity system gets my conditional agreement, subject to the devil in the details of course.
Re:No, but probably (Score:5, Interesting)
I honestly would not trust anybody with a position of political power to have the capability of tracking back everyone's online activities - there is too much of a chance that it would eventually get used for reducing more than just the harmful activities, it could get used for reducing the amount of people in the public that have dissenting opinons.
Also, even if the capability could be introduced, it would be cracked/spoofed/worked around somehow eventually, unless there was some sort of way to prevent computers from communicating with each other in the ways that they currently do, and some sort of way to prevent people from creating their own networks.
Subject to the devil in details, agreed. The thing is, who do you think would have control over what the details are? As it stands not you or I.
Re:No, but probably (Score:2)
Really? If everyone knew everything you did online, are you so sure that your opinion would somehow go away?
Also, even if the capability could be introduced, it would be cracked/spoofed/worked around somehow eventually, unless there was some sort of way to prevent computers from communicating with each other in the ways that they currently do, and some sort of way to prevent people from creating their own net
Re:No, but probably (Score:2, Insightful)
If the wrong person found out the wrong thing about me and people like me, I'd be worried that I and the others who share my opionions might be made to "somehow go away".
Never underestimate the danger of corrupted power.
Re:No, but probably (Score:2, Insightful)
You're wrong there. (Score:2)
Spamming and virus distribution can already be tracked back to a certain degree. Both are done by zombies and no identity system will solve that.
As for defamation, that can, also, be easily tracked by legally requesting the logs of the server involved.
Fra
Some part of the way to a good idea (Score:2)
At the moment, we have the certificate authorities who have self-appointed themselves as the arbiters of what is legitimate, and what is not. Unfortunately, they are driven by money, being commercial bodies, so the bad guys only need to provide enough cash to appear as legitimate.
Also, at the moment, we have a strong need for anonymity, for whistle blowers, and other people who can not speak publicly for fear of backlash (e.g. Deep Throat). That is almost achieved with the massive amounts of network traf
Re:No, but probably (Score:2)
There'd be a lot of advantages to ubiqutuous telescreens too. Doesn't make them any less dystopian.
A "suitable authority" which makes the rules and to whom your actions are 100% accountable to is your master, no bones about it. Once they can not only make all the rules but enforce them too
Re:No, but probably (Score:2)
Identiy systems are the wrong solution to legitimate problems.. Spam and viruses are technology problems and thus can be fixed by technology. (My spam filter eliminates about 99.5% of junk and I don't deal with viruses on Linux or OSX machines) Defamation can already be handled through the same legal me
Re:No, but probably (Score:2)
Sure, there will always be loopholes, but today, it seems like a significant amount of the really damaging stuff is done by script kiddies who don't really know anything, just because they can by downloading some tool from astalavista.
Something like this has been on the cards for e-mail for a long time. Ultimately, to get
Re:No, but probably (Score:2)
"Sure, you can still get a spammer signing up for a new account, doing it once, and then going away, but at least you can shut them down quickly and effectively. You could almost automate it: if x% of recipients of mail from verified address spammer@spammers.com click the "I think this is spam" button in their mail client within a brief period, the system just shuts down any further propagation of mail from that address. (That naive an approach is probably unworkable, but you get the idea.)"
Yes, it is a n
Re:No, but probably (Score:2)
And how exactly is any of tha
Re:No, but probably (Score:2)
"And how exactly is any of that going to happen under anything remotely resembling the idea I described, if you weren't sending that stuff in e-mails to people who didn't want it?"
Sorry, I didn't mean to imply that this would be an intended use of the system. I was trying to suggest that it would be trivial to game such a system e.g. forward the original message as an attachment to all of the members of your {group|clique|cabal|whatever} and have them reject it independantly. Heck, the whole thing could b
Re:No, but probably (Score:2)
Back in the horse and buggy days, people generally lived in one town their whole lives. As such, everyone knew everyone and no credentialism was needed. But with the rise of transportation technology, communities suddenly became very fluid and schools were created to act as a middleman and supply credentials. These schools weren't especially g
Re:Obviously? (Score:5, Insightful)
You can have both, i.e. you can have strong identity and strong anonymity at the same time. For example, your television and coffee maker can have an identity without comprosing your personal anonymity. Furthermore, identity is only a record of your actions. You can create a record of your actions without actually tying that record to yourself. This way you give your anonymous speech more credibility without compromising your privacy.
Re:Obviously? (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:Obviously? (Score:2)
Re:Obviously? (Score:2)
Re:Obviously? (Score:2)
What was your point again?
Re:Obviously? (Score:2)
There are two problems with this statement. First, even if this identity is not tied to yourself, it is possible to have investments in it, and thus you place some worth in it, for instance credit history. Second, if a singular identity system becomes standard on the internet, I would not be surprised in the least if the government passes legislation forcing internet identities to be tied to "real" identities. Even
Re:Obviously? (Score:2)
Re:Obviously? (Score:2)
Anonymity (Score:5, Informative)
As a card-carrying member of the tinfoil hat brigade, I prefer anonimity
Here are the seven principles, in abbreviated form [if anyone could make voodoo dolls of the creators of the PDF format, and stick pins in their - ah - whatevers, I'd be most grateful]:
I'm with you: Any WWW/Internet-ish global identity management system is gonna need a principle zero: With the understanding that the subsequent rules 1-7 apply only to those users who chose to forgo their principle zero rights.Re:Anonymity (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Anonymity (Score:5, Funny)
Actually, rule zero is really that there is no global identity management system.
I thought the first rule of identity is you do not talk about the global identity system.
Principle zero (Score:2)
That's a one-sided bargain. You're always free not to use any service on the Internet and to retain your anonymity. Whether you should be able to retain your anonymity and still use the service is a different principle entirely.
OT note: Is Slashdot really allowing ads with pop-ups now? Firefox just told me it blocked a pop-up for some survey company, which matche
First off... (Score:2)
Re:Anonymity (Score:2)
Still, imagine if everyone would have a voting ID/password, and in the next election you could vote with it, whether from your home computer, or walking to a public terminal and using the ID there. It would be different from your social security number, and only you, and the government would know which voting ID corresponds to which registered voter/SS number. Unique assignmen
Re:Anonymity (Score:2)
At least
Mycroft
Re:Obviously? (Score:2)
It obviously requires an identity layer? News to me. As a card-carrying member of the tinfoil hat brigade, I prefer anonimity.
Then why are you posting as Atlantis-Rising and not as Anonymous Coward?
Identity and anonymity are not mutually exclusive. Slashdot has identified you as Atlantis-Rising. They need to identify you in order to provide you with your karma bonus, your custom homepage, and so on.
So long as an identity system is not required to link an identity to a particular real-world perso
Anonymous identity is actually easier (Score:2)
The hard part is linking abstract bits to offline identity. And I agree, every use of that I can imagine is at best unnecessarily nosy for the sake of mere convenience, at worst a platform for discriminatory censorship, DRM, panoptic tracking, and intrusive data-mini
Seven is 5 too many (Score:4, Insightful)
1. Any corporation can find out whatever they want to about you for whatever reason, and use that information for any purpose they see fit.
2. Rule number 1 also applies to city/state/federal governments
I wish I was joking, but I'm not.
Rule 3 (Score:2)
Re:Grammar Police (Score:2)
say what (Score:3, Interesting)
Says who? How can something that is inanimate require anything? People create requirements. Maybe M$ needs the internet to have an identity layer, I say, tough noogies for them. I don't require the internet to have an "identity layer." And since I have spent this entire weekend in the "total proportion vortex," I know that my opinion is more important than M$'s.
Re:say what (Score:5, Insightful)
On the other hand, the Internet is sorely lacking in appropriate identity verification measures for the sorts of e-commerce being done by people who don't grasp the concept of spyware (despite it having a firm grasp on them).
The problem in this case is, who gets to implement such a standard? The list of laws [identityblog.com] sounds good on paper, but once corporations or governments start trying to implement it, any concept of user privacy goes out the window. And as commercialized as the Internet has become, it's becoming incredibly difficult for benevolent users [wikipedia.org] to set these standards and have them perpetuated without abuse [wikipedia.org] or wanton modification [wikipedia.org].
Re:say what (Score:3, Informative)
In posting your comment, you had to assert an identity Dachannien (617929). We all assert identity all the time when we present a username password pair. We all have a large number of accounts to manage, which is just one set of identity assertions.
The username/password pair is an identity, usable with one web s
Re:say what (Score:2)
Heh.. very aptly named (Score:3, Funny)
Not Found Very apropriate..... heheheheh
Re:Heh.. very aptly named (Score:2)
No.
Wait, that's wrong.
One step closer... (Score:5, Interesting)
This just makes me feel like I am one step closer to the personalized advertising (think minority report?) where every site I visit is bombarding me personally (instead of anonymously) with ads for stuff I recently looked at or purchased.
If I know who I am connected to, we're only a step away from advertisers and companies knowing who is connected to them.
I don't see scams online being any worse than over the phone or anything else. I could get a call from some random person and see "out of area" on my caller id, and they could try to sell me some product, eventually acquiring my credit card number, or some other personal information. It's no less anonymous than online really, IMHO.
Re:One step closer... (Score:2)
Re:One step closer... (Score:2)
Yes, and the gold box thing was one of the best reasons not to log in until checkout. It must work on some people, but on me they are wasting their time.
Re: (Score:2)
Other way around (Score:4, Interesting)
So really your feeling of your lack privacy loss comes from not having enough identity, and not the other way around.
Re:Other way around (Score:2)
I agree with you that this idea could be used to improve privacy, but I think your example is unfortunate: lawful authorities are always going to want to confirm who money in a bank account belongs to for legitimate reasons, such as to validate a tax return or to enforce a court order for damages. Hence it's likely that in your particular example, real world identity would be required.
Re:Other way around (Score:2)
Re:Other way around (Score:2)
This imposes a large burden on government, though: to avoid your bank ever seeing your information, or linking you with anything other than the bank's own activities, the government would have to issue separate identity numbers with verified real world identities for every service that any citizen signed up to where government access might also be required. Now you've got a single point of failure, which is one of the big dangers of a system like this.
Re:Other way around (Score:2)
Actually, that was just an example. In reality we will more likely have identity brokers that we trust with our information, and we will tell them who gets to see what. For example, see 2idi [2idi.com]. Also, it is important to remember that we won't have just one identity but MANY identities which will each be used in their appropriate contexts. For example a financial identity, a personal identity, a business identity,
Re:Other way around (Score:2)
"Identity" means "being you." "Privacy" means that information about you is unavailable to others. If everyone played nice, then sufficient identity would guarantee privacy. Unfortunately, commercial interests encourage others to share my info with the unwashed masses of retailers.
I'm still me, and I've never been confused with anyone else, so I have plenty of identity ... but no privacy.
Re:Other way around (Score:3, Insightful)
Secondly, a lot of times people confuse privacy with power. For example, if my personally identifying information is leaked by a company then this is more of a power issue than a privacy one. Big companies are able to harass me, but I'm not able to harass them back proportionately. I actually publish all my personal info on my website, but when
Re:One step closer... (Score:2)
Too bad that does not mean that if I throw away enough "Get 'Drogs' from us" or "Mr Umbootoo Rabboonni want to share billions of $$$ with you" or "You w.ant our 2.nd mort.gage" ads that I stop getting them.
Oops Microsoft, you don't know your own identity! (Score:5, Funny)
Browser report is 404 Not Found. Doh!
Passport's failure is not a question of "context" (Score:3, Interesting)
That's the problem. It was shit. Shit doesn't shine in any context. I'm still listening, but my impression so far is that of a pseudointellectual who needs a reality check.
Re:Passport's failure is not a question of "contex (Score:4, Insightful)
Who will trust Microsoft. (Score:2)
Who will trust Microsoft to maintain that?
Who will trust Microsoft to SECURE that? Including the implementations and protocols used to access it.
As you say, Microsoft wants an early lock-in on something that they still haven't convinced people they really need.
An "identity" system means a single point to attack to get EVERYONE'S identify (everyone who has joined it).
And it
Huh... (Score:2)
Microsoft's Architect of Identity (Score:4, Interesting)
All this architect shit is just a bunch of marketing crap that is foisted on folks in lieu of salary.
I don't know about Microsoft, but at Bank of America, when the "architects" join the conference calls, that's my cue that it's about to get thick and smelly.
Please. Stop. (Score:4, Interesting)
Please. Stop. You are hurting people. You are the problem, and you should please cease and desist, and go away. I am fine with my identity, and the rights therof under the laws of my land. If you were actually LIABLE for your crappy software, then you wouldn't have the time to create this faux intellectual crap. Just because you lable it a law does not make it so....
Yes, please stop! (Score:4, Insightful)
This isn't from Microsoft PR, it's from one of their research groups, who are generally very clever people looking at technologies that might be used some way into the future. This isn't the next MS Passport, or something they'll put as bullet point on Longhorn/Vista/whatever it's called today.
It's fascinating that the parent AC supports the law of their land, and wants Microsoft to be held liable for their "crappy software". At the same time, the parent AC obviously opposes these ideas, which might mean many people who abuse the Internet's anonymity to break those same laws could be held liable for their actions, or be denied the ability to perform those actions in the first place if they didn't wish to accept that liability. That position is logically inconsistent...
A couple more links (Score:2)
Anyway this is an important issue so I highly recommend that people RTFA on this one. Basically, what it comes down to is that identity services should follow the same rules as your local S&M club: Sane, Safe, and Consensual.
One more thing (Score:5, Interesting)
"Something strange is a brewin' at Microsoft these days. To see what I mean, check out this video interview [msdn.com] with Kim Cameron [identityblog.com], Microsoft's Architect of Identity, about Kim's now famous now famous Laws of Identity [identityblog.com]. Personally, I was so schocked to see Micrsoft come down this hard on the side of open standards and corporate responsibility that I almost choked on my tinfoil hat. Is this the beginning of a new Microsoft? But more importantly, now is the time to start an open and ongoing discussion about the future of digital identity. Is Kim's vision [identityblog.com] something the Slashdot community could get behind?"
Re:One more thing (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:One more thing (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:One more thing (Score:3, Interesting)
Which is surprising, given that Zonk is a suspected XBox (and therefore Microsoft) shill.
Seems quite a reasonable article (Score:4, Interesting)
Having skimmed the article (the PDF works fine for all you 404 moaners...) it seems to make a lot of reasonable arguments. The title isn't entirely clear: we're basically talking about prerequisites for an effective identity framework to exist. In this respect, it's good to be up-front in acknowledging principles like the first law:
Any hint of subterfuge will immediately harm any information-based system's credibility, so we might as well start by ruling out the most serious form.
I also like the claim-based approach. A claim needn't be "I am John Doe of 16 Some Street, Someville." It can be much more general, e.g., "I am a member of Group X, and therefore entitled to access Service Y." I think this sort of framework is far more likely to gain user acceptance and trust, and with good reason. The author clearly realises this as well; the second law is:
All in all, given my stated views about complete anonymity on the Internet, this sort of research seems like useful progress, and a better compromise and basis for further research than much that I've seen before.
You didn't read it right. (Score:2)
Yes, it seems to, until you start thinking about them.
Why? Isn't it understood that there will be websites out there that will use subterfuge in an attempt to get identity data from the system?
Re:You didn't read it right. (Score:2)
Of course it is. But how is an untrustworthy web site going to convince you that it's really your bank when your browser pops up a flashing red warning sign all over your screen the the claimed identity can't be verified the instant you visit it? The identity concept cuts both ways.
At least read the article you're defending. (Score:2)
No. That is a function of the browser and how it displays the name/address of the site. That has been covered before.
If the browser allows the site to hide the actual address and display a different one, then the identify authentication method has been circumve
Re:At least read the article you're defending. (Score:2)
I'm not quite sure what you think the article was proposing, but obviously we've read it different ways. My understanding was that the article wasn't proposing concrete measures, but rather a set of constraints that any concrete measure will probably have to satisfy in order to become successful.
As for Slashdot, please don't put words into my fingers. I didn't say Slashdot's approach was universally good; in fact, I specifically noted that it was possible for someone to fake being me by grabbing my passwo
Again, read the article. (Score:2)
Look up what "pernicious" means.
Again, the article refers to the current situation (which includes /.) as "pe
Re:Again, read the article. (Score:2)
OK, so let me get this straight. You won't do business with an online company that delegates some of its business functions to another business, because to you that means it has "a non-existant security model." And at the same time, here you are arguing against the security model.
Let me giv
Does the internet really need an identity layer? (Score:3, Interesting)
Given the fact that the TSA just got caught trying to continue TIA [blindmindseye.com], I think that this is the last thing we need. It starts out very innocently. The industry adds something like this and pretty soon we have followup laws that begin to gradually force software to make full use of any sort of identity layer. Anonymity becomes nearly impossible, and for many countries that means that the Internet loses its alleged immunity to censorship.
One of the things that disturbs me about this sort of thing is that extreme rendition can work both ways. The Syrian government might want their back scratched for a change and Uncle Sam then turns over a few names held on US soil using USA PATRIOT Act powers to secret get the information. If our government is willing to ship people to get tortured, what makes anyone think that it's not immoral enough to scratch another, more abusive government's back a little by helping them clamp down on dissent?
Biometric information tied to your credit card would go a very long way toward solving many of these crimes. What we need are open standards for communicating and storing biometrics information. I should be able to look into a webcam with a retina scanner and it should be able to tell Amazon.com that I'm the person who owns the credit card being used. The problem with this system is that it'll end up making something like TIA more realistic because it'll be accompanied by laws that force software developers to make good use of it.
This is a logical fallacy (Score:2)
The problem with your statement though is that it applies to everything. By the same logic, we shouldn't put seatbelts in cars because people might drive faster. And we shouldn't give children vaccinations because it encourages them to not wash their hands before d
Re:This is a logical fallacy (Score:2)
The Zero-th law (Score:3, Funny)
(unless you are in my phonebook)
The Rules According to Kim (Score:2, Informative)
Re:The Rules According to Kim (Score:3, Insightful)
The issue is not that nobody has ever thought of these things. This is pretty much old hat. The thing is, big business keeps itching for a way to get people to store their data in a central location, then log in from application to application without re-authenticating.
This idea would be a boon to businesses, but in practical application, it only works on small networks. It's not the technology. It's that peo
Re:The Rules According to Kim (Score:3, Informative)
For those having a hard time getting to the PDF, here are the 7 Rules of Identity according to Kim. I've removed the text for brevity.
1. User Control and Consent: Technical identity systems must only reveal information identifying a user with the user's consent.
2. Minimal Disclosure for a Constrained Use: The solution which discloses the least amount of identifying information and best limits its use is the most stable long term solution.
3. Justifiable Parties: Digi
Laws of identity? (Score:2)
You mean there's more than one? I thought it was just x = x . . .
On another note, a system of identity on the internet is a good idea as outlined in TFA, but I think that Microsoft's approach---undoubtedly, to hold all of the information in one central repository, probably controlled by itself, and just be expected to be on its best behavior and not take a peek for marketing or other reasons---isn't the correct one. If there's a system of persistent identity, it'll need to be decentralized, and it'll nee
A simple answer... (Score:2, Informative)
IP ban (Score:2)
A lot of services that need some sort of idenity block the IP address of every known Tor proxy. For example, Slashdot has the pink screen of death [ocworkbench.com].
Load of Fluff (Score:4, Insightful)
I think, "why is it a metasystem?"
Isn't it just a "system"? If I compose some systems, I just have a bigger system, right? I thought a "metasystem" was something different -- e.g. a system of rules for analyzing or processing systems (like a metaprogram -- a program that processes programs).
When I see people using words like "metasystem", but without using some sort of formal definitions or formal notation (aka "math"), I get a bit nervous, because it starts to sound like a bunch of marketroid speak. Then I figure it is a pile of shit, being built by a bunch of shitheads (who want to sound important by using fancy made up words), and I don't pay any attention.
And maybe a few years later I read about its total failure.
All you have to do is stay with Microsoft (Score:2)
Ontologies (Score:3, Interesting)
Hello? Public Key Cryptography? (Score:3, Insightful)
There are nice email frontends for PGP, and the web of trust makes damn good sense. It's flexible, and it makes sure that nobody's got you by the balls.
This sounds like MS trying to reinvent something that's already working just fine, and making it horribly complicated and broken.
Golden Rule (Score:3, Interesting)
Kim's 7 deadly assumptions (Score:2, Insightful)
There is nothing here that provides any layer of protection for the construction of an online identity. None of this contributes to the level of identity assurance to enable voting online.
Re:Kim's 7 deadly assumptions (Score:2)
These are morals, not laws (Score:2)
what's that buzzing sound? (Score:2)
That sounds more an obituary than something to get excited about.
It would be a bit more compelling if the ideas could be traced back to some theoretical basis (where's Butler Lampson's name? Mike Schroeder? C'mon, these guys work for MSR), the discussion was focussed instead of "wide-ranging", and took place anywhere oth
Transcript of Cameron's interview... (Score:2)
What about Novell? (Score:2, Insightful)
Microsoft *could* do the right thing; will they? (Score:2)
Thank God (or whoever you pray to) for Tor... (Score:2, Funny)
I thought it said... (Score:3, Funny)
I could have sworn it said "the idenitiy lawyer it so obviously requires."
Sounds about right.
Law Eight (Score:4, Insightful)
I want my key!
NO KEY, NO SALE!
If a computer comes with a boobytrapped self destructing chip that forbids you to know your own key and keeps secrets from you and restricts your ability to control your own computer then refuse to accept it.
The "seven laws of identity" are just a public relations gimmic to help sell the well documented Trusted Computing system. Microsoft's own website [microsoft.com] documents that the Security Support Component of their upcoming operating system release *is* the Trusted Computing Group's Trusted Platform Module, and the Trusted Computing Group's technical specifications cover the identity system in detail. I have read this documentation, hundreds of pages of technical specifications.
Step one is that the system only works if you have an approved and compliant TPM chip. The TPM chip contains a secret key that you are forbidden to know, and the chip is boobytrapped to nuke itself if you attempt to read out your key or alter the system. Step two is that the chip can then cryptocgraphically identify itself to other computers over the internet. Step three is that the chip can then tell other people exactly what software you are running, and that the system only works if you are running compliant and approved software. Step four is that people can then send encrypted data and keys to your chip, and you are prohibited from reading or altering the data or keys sent to you. The chip keeps the keys and data secret and secure against the owner. The chip can then send messages and attest to your "identity" and that it has control over the system and that you cannot do anything they do not want you to be able to do. That you cannot lie about your identity or your "capabilities" to read or alter your own data. Note that this is a really bizzare use of the word "capabilities". This is that you and your computer have the "capability" to deny you the ability to read or alter your own data.
If you try to run unapproved software, or if you attempt to alter your software or data in any way, then the chip denies you access to read or modify your own files, and the chip reveals in internet communications that you have an invalid identity and that the internet communication can be refused.
If we include the Eighth Law, that people have a right to know their own keys, then everything is fine and dandy. If you are allowed to know your own keys then your computer can keep no secrets against you and truely own and control your computer. So long as you are allowed to know your own key you cannot be locked in or locked out. So long as they refuse the Eighth Law, so long as this is just a front for Trusted Computing, then this is to be rejected in the strongest terms possible.
I want my key!
NO KEY, NO SALE!
-
Build for not against human beings (Score:3, Insightful)
It seems to me both posters are completely correct in capturing the general attitudes everyday people have about this sort of thing, or would have if it was translated into a verbal explanation of what somebody was offering to do for you ("I'll make it so you can just check a box and your bank and doctor will be able to talk to each other").
My first analysis of the rules was that it boiled down to an essential conflict between "Do as little evil as possible" and "We must do some evil".
This tension is artificial and derives from the author's treatment of an assertion (that globally verifiable identity between meatspace and cyberspace is necessary) as equivalent to a philosophical or religious law, or at least a position of unanimous agreement. This position is not only false, but also makes the author suspect of ulterior motives considering his employer, notwithstanding the list of authors provided (which is what kept me reading to a point).
However if one wishes to create a viable business system on the net that reflects the (putative) sovereign status of a human being over his or her own person, the architecture should work differently.
In particular, open standards, one-way only authorization hashes, and user-initiated transactions rather than corporate-initiated transactions, would seem to be more appropriate.
As an example consider that one's social security number is both very insecure and very important to an individual. Same for a credit card number. Having a database which obviously links an individual's real world identity to such a number, and making the database available through an imperfect system to a virtually unlimited number of agents with their own motives, means that as time goes on the probability of one's identity being publically divulged approaches 1.
On the other hand, if you personally create a data structure (say an xml file) using an open standard (say for insurance claims) and encrypt it in such a way that part is only readable by one person on a given insurance company's staff, and further encrypt it so that only your doctor and yourself can see the other bits, well that sounds like an authorization based approach and I would have far less to worry about that. It would certainly make the FBI's job a bit harder but they can always get a court order to make the insurance agent and doctor talk, if it's that important.
My point is that the author's strategy is fatally contaminated by his employment by Microsoft. There are other logical constructs one could make to guide system development, for example one could try to make the net more anonymous and more user-centric, and place stronger legal liability on the corporate entities that use, store and transmit the data. Individuals are empowered to use the system as a homeowner uses his telephone and the circuit created for a call.
It is not necessary to do evil at all. The only people who think so are those who have been trained to see people as objects instead of seeing them as the kings of inviolate kingdoms whom the system must serve with sincerity and humility.
The paper makes some good points but I submit that the general agreement that identity is needed online which the author suggests exists, does not in fact exist. People need to be able to trust companies they buy things from, and assurance that they are not "fly by night" operations, i.e. that you can call the better business bureau or the police on them, is what makes commerce possible. That, or just paying cash. I think the author needs to get back to the concrete reality of just how our economy currently works, so long as he is getting around to making suggestions about underlying infrastructure, and think about whether or not people really want this kind of thing.