Who's Blocking Verified E-Voting? 447
ClarkEvans writes "The NY Times has a great editorial today calling out the League of Women Voters for their counter-productive lobbying against verified voting. The article states that Diebold voting systems has given lots of dough to these opposition groups." There's an AP story about the issue as well.
As Joe Stalin said (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:As Joe Stalin said (Score:2)
i don't know if it's me getting older and wiser (heh), for if things really are getting worse and worse as to how much of politics is run by good, old family fortunes and a very elite few. Not sure.
Re:As Joe Stalin said (Score:5, Insightful)
If Communists commenting on democracy are making sense, you know something's screwed up.
Re:As Joe Stalin said (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:As Joe Stalin said (Score:3, Interesting)
I think you have a point, but I also think you miss the original posters' point. The quote attributed to Stali
What really matters: (Score:3, Insightful)
After they saturate the market, they'll grab their foreheads and say "oh, these machines need to be replaced with ones that provide a paper trail" we must avoid recount debacles like 2000 and 2004... so we propose... like... OUR NEW MODEL! Buy buy buy! It's only tax money!
In the meanwhile, they might well steal another election for Bush, which might do wonders for their bottom line.
Women voters? (Score:4, Funny)
- Prohibition
- The Great Depression
- Nuclear weapons
- The Cuban Missile Crisis
- The assassination of JFK
- The Vietnam War
It's time to stop the madness! Repeal womens' suffrage now!
reminds me... (Score:5, Funny)
Re:reminds me... (Score:5, Funny)
Re:reminds me... (Score:5, Informative)
Well... (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Well... (Score:4, Insightful)
As to the number of women who don't know what "women's suffrage" means, it would be kind of fun to do this to men -- see how many are willing to sign a petition to end "men's suffrage". I'm sure that would resonate about equally with them. (Hey, what do you know ... maybe enough would sign to take away their right to vote. )
I hesitate to be so sexist... (Score:5, Insightful)
It's not that women are less knowledgable, but they're less likely to admit it, and risk looking stupid. Sad thing is that it usually backfires as there's few things stupider looking than being highly confident in one's ignorance.
I figure women do this is because of all the pressure for an intelligent woman to prove she's not ignorant. But really the smartest people are quick to ask questions and admit when they don't know something. How else would they learn so much?
Kinda sad that it works out that way.
Cheers.
Re:Well... (Score:5, Insightful)
Good point.
Where is the League of Slashdot Voters? Sure, I contribute to the EFF, but if you could go to your local political candidate and say "I represent 10,000 voters in this state, and over 250,000 nation wide, and we want you to fix the DMCA" or what ever, they might actually take notice.
Re:reminds me... (Score:2)
Jeez. (Score:3, Interesting)
--
GNAA [www.gnaa.us]
Re:Jeez. (Score:4, Insightful)
Ain't astroturf. (Score:4, Informative)
This is a case of Diebold buying the president of a nonprofit, and the members becoming outraged that their views aren't represented. Luckily, they can change that, and that's just what they're doing now.
--grendel drago
Re:Jeez. (Score:5, Funny)
What?? (Score:5, Insightful)
Who says we can't have a simple solution? Printing out a piece of paper most certainly WILL address all of the security concerns. At a stroke it allows voter verification, recounts, and auditing to find both corruption and machine errors.
She's obviously not an engineer. Often, the simplest solutions are best.
Re:What?? (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:What?? (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:What?? (Score:5, Insightful)
The argument seems to be that the disabled will be unable to verify that their printed receipt will match the intended ballot. This may be true. It may also be true that a certain percentage of (non-disabled) voters will be too lazy to double check their printed receipt. But this is fine.
No one says that each vote must be verified - it is simply sufficient that each vote be verifiable. Since no one knows who will verify their vote and who won't, they can't afford to try and cheat the system. So, unless the implementors of the voting systems know who the disabled voters are (and therefore who's vote they might get away with changing), it's not really a problem.
In my opinion democracy is too precious to trust to an unverifiable voting system.
Re:What?? (Score:3, Insightful)
As everyone has equal rights to vote, everyone's rights must be protected equally. At the same time, everyone has an equal privilege to the privacy of the vote. If a blind person can't read the receipt, he has to choose either less privacy (by having someone verify it) or less protection (by not doing
Re:What?? (Score:4, Funny)
Use GhostScript [wisc.edu] to process the printed ballot?
Re:What?? (Score:3, Interesting)
If enough people (a majority of voters, I think -- never happens) decline the ballot (vs just not showing up), that particular election is void and they have to do it over. Roughly the equivalent of vot
Re:What?? (Score:5, Insightful)
I've hammered on this in several other posts - a receipt which the voter can take out of the polling area opens many doors to new abuses. Imagine the scenario of "show your voting receipt to your union foreman if you ever want another raise in your career." It would never be that obvious, but word would get around. Once there are verifiable voting receipts, your vote can be coerced after the fact.
Voting must be anonymous, even from the voter himself (once he leaves the voting booth). For that reason, no completely electronic solution will ever be acceptable to me, and that's saying something for someone who has more PC's than children (5 vs. 4). I like machines to count the paper ballots, and it would be nice to have a "ballot verifier" in a private booth just before the ballot box, but I want the option to have humans re-count, and if we're only talking about bits, then that option is lost. Think of it as an "off site" backup.
-paul
Re:What?? (Score:2)
Re:What?? (Score:4, Insightful)
If there's any questions about the authenticy of the electric versions of the votes coming out, go to the paper trail (that supposedly everyone that used the booth verified by looking at). Or heck, just use the paper version as the official version. It aliviates the hanging chad issue without worrying about any kind of vote verification problems like you mention.
Re:What?? (Score:5, Insightful)
(after all, if they were, wouldn't they be kind of useless for a recount?)
Re:What?? (Score:5, Informative)
This is not the same as advocating a receipt that the voter takes home with them and later uses to verify their vote was counted correctly. As you correctly realized, this makes vote coersion possible, and was already realized to be a BAD IDEA. That doesn't keep some people from advocating it anyway.
Re:What?? (Score:3, Insightful)
When I vote, I can't see the holes that I made until I remove the ballot anyway.
What makes electronic voting less secure?? (Score:5, Insightful)
People act as if this issue (and, for that matter every other issue) has a clear solution. As if any reasonable or intelligent person can't debate the causes of the problem and the proposed solution! This is kinda arrogant. Most issues in politics are very complicated; simplifying them usually only helps the politicians and does not make a simple solution more desirable.
For instance, I wonder how many of those paper receipts could be dusted for fingerprints. Wouldn't that make it easier to figure out who voted for whom? Is it easier or harder to backtrack the voters than traditional paper ballots? And what about all those methods for electronic security. What makes a computerized voting system easier to fraud? If I wanted to fix a traditional election, all I'd do is replace ballot box with an identical one with my votes. Digital results can be harder to fake (md5 sums, multiple copies transported, and even quantum encryption could identify interception of the results by a third party).
Really, what's the difference between not knowing how a computer stores its information verses ignorance of how a box of ballots are handled? They both are vulnerable.
Re:What?? (Score:5, Insightful)
The machine prints a paper receipt.
The machine shows a summary of your vote on its screen, which you can check against your receipt.
You put the receipt into a locked ballot box.
You do not leave with the receipt! In fact, it is illegal to take the receipt away from the polling station. What would be the point of letting you leave with it, anyhow?
In case of a recount, the paper receipts are counted by hand, as the final arbiter.
Random voting stations will count the paper receipts to verify that the electronic counts are accurate.
Re:What?? (Score:3, Interesting)
It's even simpler. Simply do not use voting machines at all!
What is wrong with the good old system of voting?
Am I missing something? It has been working for centuries now, why is it suddenly so outdated that it has to be abolished?!
BTW: I'm writing this as a E.U. citizen, the same 'modernization' of the voting system was proposed here. Gladly, most of the parties who demanded such a system are now opposing - Thanks to the diebold scandal...
[It is an issue noone talks about any longer -
Absentee ballots (Score:3, Insightful)
The same thing could be done much more easily now with absentee ballots. "You better register for an absentee ballot and bring it to the shop/church/nursing-home/whatever so your boss/pastor/spouse/doctor/parent can make sure you vote correctly".
I think going to a polling place to vote, where you can vote without anyone's interference, should be pretty much required - and the absentee thing should just be for really unusual circumstances, and not at all encouraged without a good reason.
Santayana speaks (Score:3, Insightful)
Imagine the scenario of "show your voting receipt to your union foreman if you ever want another raise in your career." It would never be that obvious, but word would get around.
It would be that obvious, and it was that obvious. Chicago ward captains were famous for it during the Daley pere regime. So were company stores in Southern textile towns during union-accreditation voting. Any time one's vote can be observed or reverse-engineered, it can and will be coerced.
Cryptography 101 (Score:3, Interesting)
Yes, there is potential to have someone else read the barcode, but there a
Re:What?? (Score:3, Informative)
The paper ballot is printed, the voter reads it, confirms it is correct. Then they turn it in.
Nobody goes home with the paperwork from voting. You go home with one of this "I voted" stickers.
The machine counts up the votes. In the event of an error or challenge to the electronic vote the paper ballots are then the authority. Since they are, in theory, verified by the voters themselves their authority really can't be questioned.
If a voter can't verify
Re:What?? (Score:5, Insightful)
It can address the concerns, but not necessarily.
First, a quick clarification for a lot of posters: voters will not leave the polling station with their receipt. They are supposed to check it for accuracy and then drop it into a secured box so it is available for recounts and verification of the electronic results.
But when should polling stations do a paper recount? At random, say 1% of stations? Whenever a race is tight? How do they know the thresholds they are setting are sufficient to stop cheating? In an electoral system where a few dozen votes could determine the presidency there are simply too many ways things could go wrong. What guarantee is there that voters will correctly verify their ballots? Remember that the reason people love electronic voting is because paper ballots are "too hard". I see too many ways Diebold could be extremely clever by just flipping a few votes in certain situations to swing things. Think about it. Really thing about it. If you had access to these machines, what are the strategies you might use to influence the results? If you aren't terrified you aren't thinking hard enough (or just plain aren't devious enough).
The fundamental problem is that the votes are obfuscated from the voters. All the paper receipts in the world will not change this. What you type into the machine does not count. What is on the paper does not count. The only thing that counts is the number the box spits out.
The true solution is the simplest. Go back to paper ballots. What is your vote? Whatever you marked on the paper with a pen. No chance of anything changing your vote. Count the ballots by hand, with an observer from each party watching every vote get counted. No chance to drop any votes to swing a close result. Isn't this the true geek way? Ultimate transparency? Many eyeballs making the problem shallow?
This is how we do it in Canada. It's not sexy, it's not instantaneous (takes a few hours after polls close) but it works.
Re:What?? (Score:3, Insightful)
If the numbers don't match for a particular booth by more than some margin of error (again a trade off of time and effort and chance of missing) - the margin could be 0 if the paper receipts are able to be reliably counted (they are machine generated after all, so there shouldn't be the problems with pencil and paper ballots of tic
Re:What?? (Score:5, Insightful)
1. When a legally set threshold is met.
2. At random to keep the system honest.
3. When there is suspicion of fraud and the challenger can convince a court to order a recount.
4. Whenever the results are challenged, provided the challenger pays expenses if he still loses.
I am amazed at the apparent bias of this article. (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:I am amazed at the apparent bias of this articl (Score:5, Interesting)
Diabold (Score:3, Funny)
- Diabolical
- Diablo
Are you trying to draw a parallel?Point by Point Rebuttal -- No Response (Score:5, Informative)
years of experience. I was pointed to your position paper on VVPT.
Please accept my comments on your position paper.
Electronic Voting Machines and Voter-Verified Paper Trails (VVPT)
League of Women Voters
http://www.lwv.org/join/electionshava_dre- vvpt.htm l
The League of Women Voters strongly supports full and equal
voting rights for all eligible Americans, including persons with disabilities. The League also supports voter verification of ballots, including the requirement in the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) whereby the voter verifies the ballot before it is cast and counted. However, the League does not support proposals for a new requirement for paper-based voter verification - the voter-verified paper trail (VVPT) system that would require Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines to provide an individual paper confirmation for each ballot for each voter to verify.
A VVPT requirement undermines voting access for people with disabilities or limited English proficiency, raises costs, fails to guarantee security, unnecessarily complicates the voting process, undermines federal certification standards, and slows the replacement of outdated voting machines.
To be clear, VVPT would require DRE equipment to print out a physical paper receipt that the voter could review and then stuff in the ballot box. These printed ballots would then be the official record of the election.
These printed ballots would:
- be printed out when the user has completed selecting all
of their choices via the DRE's touch screen interface
- would only print out the individuals selected, and thus
is very simple to understand and uncluttered
- would be printed in the language used by the DRM machine,
cross-language support on paper is quite easy
- be in large font for reading impaired and could be handed
to an election worker to read for those who are blind
- would have an encoded version of the votes via a bar-code to
make scanning in the votes for semi-automated recounts easy
- would be printed on card stock using your average laser
or inket printer; thermal paper does not last long enough
To be more concrete about this, and to make it absolutely clear what
we are discussing, there is an open source application [1] with an
on-line demo [2] that produces this sort of printed receipt [3]. Be
advised that the user interface for making the selections is not
important to this discussion, the only thing that is salient is the
final receipt printed.
[1] http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/
[2] http://gyaku.pair.com/~vote/ballot2.html
[3] http://clarkevans.com/tmp/ballot-receipt.pdf
With this background, let me address your specific concerns. Before
you continue with this statements, I ask you to download the
referenced PDF file above and print this so that you can see exactly
what is being requested by the VVPT community.
* The voter-verified paper trail requirement undermines voting access. DREs make it possible, for the first time, for persons with visual disabilities or limited manual dexterity to cast secret and independent ballots.
The VVPT does not replace DREs. People would still use touch screens
to make their choices. The printed 'receipt' would be in the
individual's language and printed in a large enough font so that it is
absolutely clear.
Because DREs can be programmed in multiple languages, voters with limited English proficiency can participate fully and equally. The millions of Americans who face literacy challenges also can take advantage of the audio features of DREs to cast independent votes without embarrassment.
There is no reason why the printed receipt cannot print out results in
the voter's choice of language. During an official manual recount, it
wou
Re:Point by Point Rebuttal -- No Response (Score:4, Interesting)
This past Tuesday, Virginia held a primary election, and the city of Alexandria used the eSlate voting system. When I inquired to the election board as to why a voting system was in place without a VVPT, even though the eSlate was technically capable of such a provision, here is part of the response I got from the Alexandria election board (HAVA=Help America Vote Act):
This is in clear conflict with the alexandriavoter.org website:
In other words, the eSlate may be technically capable of providing a paper trail, but current state and federal law does not allow the paper trail to be created as it does not meet HAVA standards.
The statement made by the website is therefore false and misleading--the eSlate can NOT be retrofitted to provide a paper audit trail. Whether the inability to create a paper audit trail is caused by technical or (in this case) administrative restrictions, the end result is the same: the eSlate CANNOT be reliably audited.
I have a letter here, containing this plus a few other paragraphs, that I'm sending to the board, plus the state and federal representatives and senators.
Re:technology will do 97% though (Score:3, Interesting)
Some work would be required to make them both human and computer readable, but there are many very talented font creators out there who would be glad to do the job at a reasonable salary.
Re:I am amazed at the apparent bias of this articl (Score:5, Insightful)
My favorite argument against paper trails is how insanely expensive these machines would become. Really? I didn't know that the corner Kwik-e-Mart had one of these "expensive" machines to print a receipt for my $0.50 pack of gum. As far as I know, all ATM's have paper trails. How is it feasible to record a $20 ATM withdrawal but not a vote for supreme emperor of the earth for 4 years?
What needs to happen... (Score:4, Funny)
take one for the team!
Re:What needs to happen... (Score:5, Informative)
GA is, you will recall, 100% Diebold voting machines. Which is why the loss of Max Cleland is suspecious. Leading in the immediate pre-election polls, but lost the electronic vote.
Reality check (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Reality check (Score:2, Informative)
Re:Reality check (Score:3, Informative)
By including a tangible confirmation mechanism that's not electronic (like a paper confirmation), then the system can still be audited "by hand".
It's the same reason that financial companies are still required by the SEC to keep paper records of a lot of their activities
Re:Reality check (Score:2)
Re:Reality check (Score:5, Informative)
The nice thing with a paper ballot or vote record is that the voter can verify that their vote has been recorded correctly and we know how to secure those ballots to prevent tampering so that if there is a need for a recount it can be done.
Re:Reality check (Score:2)
Re:Reality check (Score:3, Insightful)
Secret ballot:
Louie McFingers: "Youz vote for Pepsoco, or I breakz yer legs."
You: Um, ok.
You vote for Bipzi instead.
Louie *doesn't know*.
Online-verifiable receipt:
Louie McFingers: "Youz vote for Pepsoco, or I breakz yer legs. And bring yer receipt."
You: Um, ok.
You vote for Bipzi instead.
Louie checks your receipt online and *breaks your legs*. Or, if you "forgot"
Interesting Article (Score:5, Insightful)
"What's even more troubling is that the group has accepted a $1 million gift for a new training institute from Diebold, the machines' manufacturer, which put the testimonial on its Web site."
The author is right there is no need to choose between "accessible voting and verifiable voting".
Without paper verification evoting has no future here.
Re:Interesting Article (Score:2)
Without paper verification evoting has no future here.
Agreed. However, I'm opposed to anything that might allow some party goon to verify how I personally voted. In other words, the paper verification ought to be human readable "backup ballots" and NOT (for example) something that I can take away from the polling place.
"Vote for X or I'll kill your family. Oh, and you can't fool me because I'll also kill your family if you don't bring me your vote verification slip."
An extreme example, but you get the i
An interesting discussion about verified voting... (Score:4, Interesting)
Here's a link to the realaudio stream [wamu.org] of the radio show I refered to.
In our state our governor, Jeb Bush, is against the whole verified voting idea. Suprising considering the whole fiasco here in Florida last time.
Just goes to show... (Score:2, Funny)
unplublished letters to NY Times Editor (Score:5, Interesting)
Date: Fri, 7 May 2004 19:41:29 -0400
To: letters@nytimes.com
Subject: Secure Voting Techology
May 3rd's article "Who Hacked the Voting System?" begs the question:
why must these complicated voting systems be all encompassing?
Imagine a process where selecting candidates and tallying choices is
distinct. The voter enters a booth, uses a complicated touch-screen
machine, and emerges with a human-readable card clearly stating
their candidate. Then, the voter walks over to a brightly lit
election desk, feeds this card into the tallying machine, and
deposits their card into the ballot box.
Security is straight-forward. Voters will tell you when a
touch-screen system make an error. This leaves the tallying machine
to secure. Luckily, it is in plain sight and its operation is
simple. Further, if the tally is questioned, some or all of the
ballots can be reviewed by human eyes.
Candidate selecting technology is complicated. Card tallying ain't.
Let's keep them separate.
-----
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 11:19:17 -0400
To: letters@nytimes.com
Subject: Demand Grows to Require Paper Trails for Electronic Votes
In the article Demand Grows to Require Paper Trails for Electronic
Voting, published May 23, 2004, Doug Chapin from the Pew Charitable
Trust said: "You can either build a fence around a cliff or put an
ambulance in the valley
valley. Certifying the machines and testing them in the first place to
make sure they are secure is the fence around the cliff."
I think Mr. Chapin's analogy is poor, it is not an either/or, one would
properly do both. However, if he insists with this analogy, I suggest
Verified Voting is more analogous with the ability to ensure that the
fence around the cliff is actually working. The only way to detect that
a voting technology reflects voter intent is to complement touch screens
with a simple print-out listing the canidates the voter has chosen. Then
the voter can review their choices and stuff this print-out into the
ballot box so random or challenge recounts can happen. Lacking this
ability to verify voter intent, we are left with only one way to ensure
that our democracy is working -- trust a for-profit corporation.
-------
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2004 10:09:04 -0400
To: letters@nytimes.com
Subject: The Disability Lobby and Voting
I am so happy to see the NY Times call-out the League of Weoman Voters
for their counter-productive stand; also, I can't believe that despite
my calls, Senator Dodd has joined this nonsense.
An optical scan solution can offer the best of both worlds. A
disabled-persons friendly touch screen or audio-system can be used to
generate the ballot; while the actual counting of the optical ballots
can be done with a much simpler optical reader.
By breaking the problem of filling-out and counting ballots, we get the
best of both worlds; the intermediate ballot provides the paper trail.
It is also easier to test optical scanners for compliance -- there is
less code to review, and deterministic inputs/outputs allow testing to
be automated. Further, since only one optical scanner is needed per
district, and can be closely monitored. Let user-friendly voting
machines thrive, but make sure they don't do the counting.
Unfair election aspect #3 - Equal coverage (Score:5, Interesting)
There is a third requirement for fair elections, and that is balanced coverage. Forget the liberal bias, or the conservative bias, the truth in the US is that there is a 2 party bias. 3rd parties are ignored, and given short coverage in the guide of 'to be fair'.... In Europe, 3rd parties quickly gain recognition due to the mix of ballot variety (lots of parties to consider), election style (more representive focused) and the coverage they get. Here in the US, if you aren't a Republicrat, or a Demopublican, you have to fight for coverage. People with a true shot, ie enough ballots that they could win, or will likely affect the course of the election should be coveraged with EQUAL access
I'm voting for Michael Badnarik [badnarik.org] Libertarian, who is also on almost all of the ballots
and so should you, if you think Government is out of control. Kush and Berry won't change that, and you're just voting for the lesser of 2 evils.
Vote for Good, vote Badnarik!
Re:Unfair election aspect #3 - Equal coverage (Score:4, Insightful)
I did that last time, but not this time... (Score:5, Insightful)
But, now I know just how evil Bush is, so voting for a third party will just have to wait until 2008. Right now it's more important to make sure we're not down to one party by the time 2008 rolls around.
Re:I did that last time, but not this time... (Score:3, Insightful)
we (the US) hopefully have learned our lesson. we've grown up a bit. the world is NOT the peter-pan ideal place we are taught, as kids, it is. voting for the lessor of two evils IS a valid stance to take.
principles are great - if you can afford them. we cannot now, since we know what the last 4 years got us and its urgent that we not let fascism creap along any more than it already has.
nader should be put out of his misery. he's so counter-productive, its unreal. I like the guy, overa
Re:Unfair election aspect #3 - Equal coverage (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Unfair election aspect #3 - Equal coverage (Score:3)
Roads, electricity & utility regulation, environmental & health regulation.. there are literally tens of thousands of benefits the American people get from government that they have come to expect, that the Libertarians don't want to address. Th
If.. (Score:2, Insightful)
If they don't feel verification is necessary for anyone, then why would they feel deprived if their members can't verify their vote by reading the paper its printed on.
Login-free links courtesy of Google News (Score:4, Informative)
The real problem with Diebold (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:The real problem with Diebold (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:The real problem with Diebold (Score:3, Insightful)
Since the paper can't be changed after it has been handed in, if there's any discrepancy between the electronic and paper results, the paper result is used. The electronic vote is merely for speedy results.
And some of the schemes I've seen make it mandatory to have a manual recount of randomly chosen districts, again to make sure. If you have a huge discrepancy in those, you can e
Re:The real problem with Diebold (Score:4, Informative)
But getting a verifiable receipt that shows how you voted, and when its put in an old fashioned ballot box its priceless. You can then go back and do a manual recount of the paper and establish if the machine count was accurate or not.
As long as there are truly random recounts of at least a percentage of all votes cast you will most probably catch rigging or machine errors. I don't care how careful you are in making sure the machines are certified and locked, a paper trail is the only way to make them reliable.
I read an interesting observation the other day. It does appear the Bush administration has a life or death reason to make sure they win the next election, both the White House and the Congress.
It appears the Bush administration has, at the highest level, violated the Geneva conventions and U.S. law against torture, perhaps not against Al Qaeda since they are in a legal gray area but most certainly they tortured people in Iraq who were under Geneva protections.
It is extremely important to the Bush administration that they win the election so they can white wash the investigation. If someone truly independent did the investigation and found them guilty and it appears there is a pretty big paper trail and a lot of people involved, both in recently unveiled memos in which the DOJ and the Pentagon were engaged in a failed attempt to give a legal basis for torture and in revelations about Copper Green [newsday.com] which suggest this program of torture was approved at the highest levels by Bush, Rumsfeld and his deputy Cambone.
Today it was revealed that dog handlers who were used in Iraq to scare prisoners were in fact doing so under orders from military intelligence officers which debunks the Bush administration's BS that the torture was just a bunch of rogue army reservists. If the investigation isn't a sham its nearly certain the torture will be traced to the Pentagon and the White House. It simply was a war crime to authorize to the Bush administration has a life or death reason to make sure they win the next election at all cost.
If you want to see the latest thing in torture look here [af.mil].ts Its the U.S. military's Active Denial System developed by Raytheon scheduled to start trials this fall. Its a millimeter wave beam weapon designed for non lethal crowd "control". Volunteers at Raytheon subjected to it described it as "unbearably painful, saying they felt as though their bodies were on fire". It should put an end to any unauthorized demonstrations against the U.S. or any of its allies. Its not entirely clear what happens to your eyes if you take the beam in the face at close range, or if it will cause cancer long term. I'm wondering if they are working on an indoor version since it is a perfect tool for torture, it leaves no marks. The victim wouldn't even know what was happening to them. It appears I now have a good reason to where a tin foil hat, or really a full body suit like everyone keeps telling me I should when I propose the possibility that the Bush administration is, in fact, on a fast track to dictatorship.
Re:The real problem with Diebold (Score:3, Insightful)
WTF are you talking about?!
You completely miss the point here:
Paper-trail e-voting is THE solution. It's fuckin HARD to tamper with a piece of paper inside a locked metal box that is only opened in front of mu
Why, exactly? (Score:5, Interesting)
Yes, indeed. And even after reading every linked article I still don't understand how, exactly, that requiring paper trails for electronic voting machines could in any way impede equal access to polls (for the disabled or anyone.) A little help here -- please?
The issue is whether electronic voting machines should provide a "paper trail" -- receipts that could be checked by voters and used in recounts. There has been a rising demand around the country for this critical safeguard, but the move to provide paper trails is being fought by a handful of influential advocates for the disabled, who complain that requiring verifiable paper records will slow the adoption of accessible electronic voting machines.
OK, here's a stab at it -- "requiring verifiable paper records will slow the adoption of accessible electronic voting machines." But, er, why would it slow anything? And, if it does, can't we just use the "old way" (traditional polls) until the "new way" (electronic polls) is made more reliable and secure? I'll try again:
Leaders said paperless terminals, which about 30 percent of the electorate will use in the November election, were reliable.
Er, OK, but this is both tangential and arguable. I still don't see how requiring verifyable paper trails impedes anyone's access to the polls.
They had "no reason to believe" computer terminals would "steal your vote," the league said officially.
Well, there is some reason to believe that they'll make a mistake or be susceptible to fraud. See linked articles. Again, why do paper trails impede the disabled from voting? I'f I'm in the League of Women voters, it seems that, not only am I not going to get a straight answer to that, but I must support the position publicly (or at least not oppose it) -- yikes!:
League bylaws stipulate that local chapters must act "in conformity" with the national organization's stances. Individuals who take contrary positions cannot identify themselves publicly as league members.
League president Kay Maxwell says paperless computers, which can be equipped with headsets and programmed in multiple languages, make voting easier for the blind and illiterate, and for people who don't speak English.
OK, most computers are "paperless." Generally, it's the printers that have the paper in them. And, in my experience, most (all?) computers may have a printer connected without much trouble. Kay seems to imply that connecting a printer will break headset or multilanguage support -- wha? I'm still confused.
Furthermore, she said, demanding a paper trail so close to the presidential election would require hundreds of counties that have installed electronic systems to spend millions of dollars on printers, paper and technical upgrades at the last minute.
Well, I guess they should have done a little more due dilligence before sinking time and money into an insecure voting system. Why should we all have to pay for that stupidity?
For current members, Maxwell said, voter registration problems and dismal turnout -- particularly among minorities -- should be bigger worries than potential hackers.
These aims are not opposing -- it's possible to address security without impeding the ability of minorities to vote. I can't even see how the issues are related. Sounds like smoke and mirrors to misdirect attention away from the payola they're taking in from Diebold. Sad, really.
"From a voting rights perspective, we care a great deal about the openness of the system and access to the system, tha
This Is Making News (Score:2, Informative)
Not wanting to register to read the New York Times editorial, I searched on Google to see what I could find. I was surprised to find many news articles about how this is a real issue withing the League Of Women Voters. [google.com] [google.com]
gifts (Score:3, Funny)
Suck my cock a fucking gift! Oh i see its a gift when i slip a 50 to the traffic cop who just pulled me over. Of course its a gift when i ask the jury if they would like their new cars in red or blue and its certainly a fucking gift when presidents get donations from group x and then their policies and actions just happen to benifit group x.
VOTE WITH PAPER (Score:5, Insightful)
Now everyone is talking about printing out a paper receipt for recounts etc. So now we are using at least as much paper as paper votes.
You *know* the first time these machines are used in any contested election, one of the parties will cry foul. And there will be a recount. Which will take just as much time with paper votes.
So why the *hell* not just use paper votes in the first place? Empty boxes, you mark an X. We have been doing this in Canada forever, and we are still doing it this year. Why? Cause it is cheap, and it works. There's no hanging chaffes, no computer error, no security issues, it's totally transparent to the public.
Re:VOTE WITH PAPER (Score:3, Interesting)
Because in the U.S. we have a government that is on a fast track to dictatorship and global empire. The people in power very much want to be able to rig elections so they cane be sure they get the right answer. They also want to sucker the American people into thinking that they still live in a democracy, and that their vote counts for something (when it doesn't). They don't want the little people to get upset about living in this new form
Re:saves time and effort; should be more accurate (Score:5, Insightful)
Why is it so damn important that results be known RIGHT NOW? Less than half the people in your country vote, and therefore don't care. For those that do your TV networks are projecting winners the second polls close. Up here we know the results before we go to bed. By morning most of the counts are official. Within days MPs are being sworn in.
Why is efficiency even an issue? I care about efficiency when I order a pizza. I care about efficiency when I buy a car. For one night every four years (or so) efficiency can go to hell. When deciding who will be governing me and my country I want accuracy.
It's worth noting that in their national elections in 2000, Canada had 21 million voters and the US had 105 million. You can see why the US might be a little more obsessed with the cost and speed elements.
Ah yes, the old "That won't work here, we're special" argument.
Yes, you have an order of magnitude more voters. But that also means that you have an order of magnitude more polling stations and volunteers to count votes. In terms of voting there is no fundamental difference between a Canadian city of 1 million people and an American city of 1 million people. The fact that you have 10 times as many of those cities is irrelevant to this problem.
Computers untrustworthy? (Score:4, Interesting)
They're very much up to that task. (Score:3, Insightful)
There's one more issue you're missing: With banking, nuclear power, nuclear weapons, life support, transport and airline computers, the people who manufacture, maintain and control the computers have an interest in making sure the computer functions in the way it is advertised to function.
The people responsible for the manufacture and maintenence of the voting
we're screwed (Score:5, Interesting)
If by some chance, Kerry wins the election, I predict all our critiques and cynacism will end up being used against us, as the mainstream media will suddenly ressurrect the Diebold story and use it as fodder to throw the whole election process into question, and likely land it back on the steps of the supreme court. I know that sounds like a ridulous assertion, but so was what happened last election.
With no paper trail to verify, and the media going apeshit because Bush has been dethroned, it wouldn't be unrealistic to have yet another major election up in the air.
Re:we're screwed (Score:4, Insightful)
I think this is a good time to remind everyone that Bush's dad used to be head of the CIA.
I would be much more afraid that Bush wins (despite the "mission" being "accomplished"), with the help of some help from the same type of folks who brought us Iran-contra. [webcom.com]
I would definately not put it past a memeber of the Bush family to break the law for politcal gain, so long as they think they won't get caught.
I don't understand why ppl oppose a paper trail (Score:4, Interesting)
It's so boneheaded and stupid I can't believe it is a subject to be argued over. Unbelievable.
disabilities groups hurting themselves (Score:3, Insightful)
Beyond the damage that this does to democracy, the other sad thing here is that by focussing so narrowly on their special interests the disabilities groups are very likely hurting themselves in the long term. Presumably most of us sympathize with people with disabilities and support measures to make life easier for them. In the future, I'm going to have to look very carefully at what these organizations want to see whether it is really a good idea. I won't be able to assume that they know what is in their own interests and that it isn't going to be harmful for everybody else. Their bad judgment in this matter has made them less trustworthy.
Bad scenario (Score:3, Interesting)
Since then I've come to *really* distrust Bush and company. Besides the deceit leading up to Iraq, it seems that the Bush administration has developed a pattern of deciding that their desired policies are more important than legal and constitutional niceties like habeas corpus, trial by jury, the Geneva Conventions, etc. I can completely imagine some members of the administration deciding that "staying the course" is more important than the peculiarities of one election.
Maybe I'm over-reacting and being paranoid, but there are a lot of people like me, people who sat quiet after the 2000 election because they had faith our democracy would handle things eventually.
Now suppose the 2004 election is decided for Bush by state or two which uses a bunch of these voting machines. Then what do I do? Do I take it quietly again, when I've got no way to know if there was cheating?
Again, I'm one of many. Our democracy may not be strong enough to handle 35% of the public believing in a pattern of stolen presidential elections. After all, what do we do if voting can't change things?
What's next? Blocking voter registration efforts? (Score:3, Insightful)
Moreover, opposition to a public advocacy group such as verifiedvoting.org implies that a conflict of interest exists within LVW which pits its leadership against the very members which they are supposed to represent.
What's next? Speaking out against nonpartisan efforts to register voters?
This is a shameful time for the league.
Democracy must be seen to be done (Score:3, Insightful)
While many slashdotters may think they would be able to verify for themselves that a voting machine hasn't been tampered with, I'm sure many of us could come up with a way to ensure our tampering wouldn't be detected.
We vote, what, every couple of years? It is arguably the most important thing most of us do for our country. Is counting bits of paper really that hard?
The only way I can see that the electorate can see for themselves that democracy is being done is for ballots, once marked, to be put into transparent ballot boxes, transported to the counting station in full view and counted in full view. I can see no other way the average person can be confident the election is fair.
E-voting for the public (Score:5, Insightful)
There's this company, called Diebold, and their employees are fast counters, really fast, so fast they can count all the votes in an election almost instantaneously. The problem is they need a warehouse to do the counting in.
So at all the voting stations they build themselves a warehouse. An election official come in a few months before the election and look around, lots of boxes are around, a whole bunch of different gadgets, the officials can't look over everything but it seems alright. The official remindes Diebold it's against the law to touch anything or let anyone inside before election time for security reasons. A couple days later the Diebold employee in charge goes back inside, he moves some things around and is seen driving up in moving trucks and taking boxes in and out but the election official doesn't see. One day when the Diebold employee isn't at the warehouse a guy is walking down the street and notices a door wide open, he wanders in and finds himself in the warehouse. He decides to take some pictures, windows are left open, most of the doors are unlocked or just have a piece of rope to tie them shut and their security alarm is a mute poodle. This guy shows the pictures around, security companies everywhere are just appaled, they can't believe how bad security is and are screaming it's way too unsecure to hold votes in but the government and Diebold ignore them.
So election time comes around and you have to vote. You go to the lobby at the front of the warehouse and go into your booth. There you mark your ballot as usual (except they have really nice ballots and pencils). Then instead of putting it in a box you go and give it to a person standing behnid the counter, it's supposed to be an elections official but it could also be a guy who snuck in off the street. Your ballot is out of sight for a minute as he carries it over and hands it to the Diebold employee, the Diebold employee then tells you he'll put the ballot in a box and he'll count it at the end with the others. He then goes into the warehouse and that's the last you, or anybody else but the Diebold employee, see of your ballot. After the election the Diebold employee comes out and tells everyone what he counted and who won the election, it not who most people expected and a couple people ask for a recount but the Diebold employee says that he threw out the ballots as he counted them so you just have to take his word for it. A couple of people ask why they didn't just put a photocopier and a traditional ballot box in the lobby where everyone could see it and no one could tamper with it. After marking your first ballot you would be be able to make exactly one copy of it, you could then put the second ballot in that ballot box and at the end if they wanted a recount they could just count the ballots in the traditional box. The Diebold employee (who lost a bunch of the ballots before counting them) says that his counting is good enough and that the old ballot box couldn't be trusted. Oh yeah, that Diebold employee was also campaigning for the guy who won.
Please feel free to redistribute this or give me any suggestions you might have on how to make it better. I've tried to be as factual as possible (not sure about leaving the upset in there).
I have been thinking about this for a while... (Score:3, Interesting)
Then, when the voting is actually taking place, the votes are encrypted using the Government's widely-known public key, and is digitally signed using the private individual's Private key.
This way, even the voting machine doesn't know what votes a given data stream actually contains, since the signature of the individual changes the representation of the votes. When the gov't. recieves the vote, it decodes the message using it's own private key, and then re-decodes it using the voter's known Public Key.
In other words, don't count on a machine to do the counting at the voting machine level. Assign one public, open-source machine to decode all the votes once they have been registered. There is no reason for the voting machines to do the counting themselves.
Another possible method would be to use two seperate machines for the voting. The first has a touch-screen and all the bells and whistles, and punches you a physically verifyable ballot, which is then put into the second machine, which reads the card and asks you to confirm the votes again. When you do, then a physical counter is incremented. The first machine is all or mostly electronic, and the second entirely mechanical, so there is no funny business.
Transparent Accounting is Needed (Score:3, Insightful)
The solution is to demand (and IMO require by law) these groups open their books and show where there money comes from and where it goes. IMO this isn't unreasonable since they enjoy nonprofit status unlike, say, a lobbyist group. The extra benefit would be honest nonprofit groups would grow. Honesty really is the best policy.
Any group (or church for that matter) that is not willing to show who gives them money and what they spend it on should get nothing and be treated with suspect.
Re:But... (Score:2, Insightful)
obligitory Seinfeld reference (Score:2)
"not that there's anything wrong with that"
Your comment title is HOMOPHOBIC flamebait (Score:2, Insightful)
The question that must be posed to these groups is (Score:2)
If it's the former, than we need a paper trail. If it's the latter, I'll put up a web page where they can cast their ballot. They won't know if their vote actually counted or not, but it wouldn't have been any better with a paperless electronic voting machine, and the rest of us can continue to have real elections.
Re:womEn? (Score:4, Funny)
153% Nay
-12% Yea
What machines are good at is following orders. (Score:4, Insightful)
Actually, what machines are good at is following orders. If they're ordered to count, they count. If they're orderd to fake it, they fake it.
I too trust them to do a better job of counting than people - as long as that's what their orders (the program) tells them to do. But I have no way of knowing that the code that the public examined is actually the code running on the machine - and I trust the machine to help hide what code it's running if THAT's what it's been ordered to do.
That's why I can never trust the machine to count.
Now, I CAN trust:
- the paper a machine prints to remain unchanged until the period for recounts is over.
- electors (who are paying attention) to become irate if the machine prints the wrong votes
- the partisans for MY candidates and side on ballot measures to do their best at any recount to assure that the partisans for the OTHER candidates and sides don't fake the count.
So I will trust the election if, and ONLY if, the machines are printing the TRUE ballot, which is then checked by the voters and stored in a ballot box, and the electronic count on the machines is simply an accelleration, subject to being tossed out in favor of the manual recount if there's any question.
Note that once the audit trail is in place there is much less incentive to hack the voting machines. It would be ineffectual AND it would be detected. Without the audit trail there's no way to correct such tampering, or even know it has occurred. So there's a much greater likelyhood it will be attempted.
How do you know it hasn't happened already?