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More E-voting Problems in California 276

thefultonhow writes "Wired News is running a story about Napa County, CA's problems with their new E-voting system. Not only did an optical scanning machine fail to record absentee ballots properly, necessitating a recount of 13,000 ballots, but now Registrar of Voters John Tuteur is saying that the machine used in precincts failed to count 6,692 votes. The incumbent Napa County Supervisor had originally lost his bid for reelection by only 50 votes (the recount of absentee ballots bumped that up to 107 votes), so with nearly 7,000 votes gone AWOL, this is a big deal." The first Wired link above shows that the discovery of the problem was apparently mostly chance: if none of the 10 (ten!) ballots picked for rescanning had exhibited the problem, they might not have figured it out. It also suggests a new strategy for rigging the vote: pass out pens of a certain type in districts unfavorable to your candidate, then calibrate the machine not to read that type of ink.
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More E-voting Problems in California

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  • Testing procedures? (Score:5, Interesting)

    by bagel2ooo ( 106312 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:28AM (#8609976)
    I don't recall seeing something that extensively mentions what all testing procedures were done before this was put in place? Seeing statements about at least some of these errors being caught almost purely by chance is very disconcerting. I know that poor testing procedures is a definite trend in development unfortunately. Could someone who is in the know post information that is permissible on some of the testing procedures of this system or systems like this?
    • Every time I fill in an electronically read form we are told to use pencils because ink is too prone to mis-reads. Who forgot to read the manual?
      • by arivanov ( 12034 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @11:33AM (#8610831) Homepage
        Ahem. This has been the case since the first such tests came out in the late 80-es. Nothing has changed ever since. This is also the reason why we used to be issued pencils along with the test papers for some classes in college 15 years ago. Actually the type of pensil also matters. It should be 2B. F and H can be misread as well.
    • by Ungrounded Lightning ( 62228 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @12:13PM (#8611378) Journal
      "Seeing statements about at least some of these errors being caught almost purely by chance is very disconcerting."

      Seeing statistical sampling characterized as "found the errors purely by chance" in order to create FUD is more than disconcerting. It's appalling. And it's a prime example of "how to lie with statistics".

      Yes, it's technically accurate, since chance was carefully DESIGNED INto the procedure. But the characterization uses a different meaning of "chance" to imply that the discovery of the errors was a lucky accident.

      This is using a pun to tell a lie. In fact the procedure did EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS SUPPOSED TO DO - discover that there was a problem, and drive further investigation to characterize the problem and correct it, both in this and in future elections.

      This event:

      - Shows one reason a paper trail is needed. (It doesn't directly address deliberate software or database tampering.)

      - Provides a counter-argument to claims that optically-scanned paper ballots are an acceptable substitute for machine-printed paper trail ballots. (An optically-marked ballot may look just fine but scan incorrectly.)

      Touch-screen machines that print a voter-readable paper trail currently appear to be the most reliable solution for error-resistant and cheat-resistant elections.
  • by Anonymous Coward
    It also suggests a new strategy for rigging the vote: pass out pens of a certain type in districts unfavorable to your candidate, then calibrate the machine not to read that type of ink.

    Welcome to the party!

    Paranoia is fun!

    • Re:New to paranoia? (Score:3, Interesting)

      by markhb ( 11721 )
      Except that the machine (is supposed to) keep a count of the number of pieces of paper inserted into its craw (LEDs on the front so the voter can see that their ballot was registered). If the number of paper ballots counted don't match the number on the LEDs, the ballot workers must start counting. There are all sorts of safeguards possible when a paper trail exists.
    • Re:New to paranoia? (Score:3, Interesting)

      by johnnyb ( 4816 )
      Actually, in Oklahoma we have a much better way of rigging the vote - we don't require any form of identification to vote. In addition, we don't do any particular kind of checking to register a voter. In a district where the incumbent won by only three votes, there have been at least 5 empty lots that had never been inhabited found who were registered voters and voted in that election. Our governor was elected by less than 3 votes per precinct.

      Scary, huh?
  • by goldspider ( 445116 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:29AM (#8609989) Homepage
    This is a story about machines not being able to read a certain kind of ink.

    The fact that the ballots are 'counted' by a machine doesn't make this an "e-voting" story.

    This problem has been around for YEARS! Nothing to see here, folks. Take off your tinfoil hats and move along.

    • by meringuoid ( 568297 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:32AM (#8610027)
      Optical scanning by a computer sounds like e-voting to me. OK, it's not the full-on Diebold 'touch the screen and trust us' kind of democracy, but it's not far off.

      As far as I'm concerned, any form of voting where I have to trust somebody else's electronic black box to behave itself is subject to the same concerns.

      • "Optical scanning by a computer sounds like e-voting to me."

        The scanning of paper ballots with a machine has been done for years, and it wasn't called "e-voting" back then. The fact that an optical scanner is now used for the same task doesn't change the nature of the counting method.

      • It is quite different: If there is a vote on paper you can always have the original paper recounted by humans. Touchscreens can't be recounted.
      • by NineNine ( 235196 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:45AM (#8610189)
        Have you *ever* voted? This has been around for many, many years. Fill out a "scantron", and stick it in the machine to be counted. This technology has been around for many, many years.

        Besides, you always have to trust someone or something to count votes, unless you're physically going to do the entire process yourself. Put your tin foil hat back on!
      • by tambo ( 310170 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:57AM (#8610343)
        You know, I noticed something this weekend. My KeyBank ATM has a Diebold brand label on it.

        These are the same ATMs that ask if you want a receipt, and if you hit the No button, the next screen reads: "Thank you! Please take your card and receipt." So you don't want or expect to get a receipt, but you have to wait around anyway to see if it spits one out that might list your account info and balance.

        These are also the ATMs that give you time to prepare your deposit envelope ("press this button when your deposit is ready.") But when you push the button, the ATM then reads, "Please wait," and makes you wait for 3-4 seconds. It's like it's spiteful.

        These are also the ATMs that occasionally spit out more money than you requested. In addition to having heard many stories of this, I've seen it happen to both a coworker and a relative (via two different ATMs.)

        I weep for the future of our voting rights...

        - David Stein

      • ... the quality of their ATM machine software also leaves much to be desired [midnightspaghetti.com] :^)

        ([ASIDE] To be fair (though why I should, I don't know!), I believe their ATM division is a purchased company.)

      • Optical scanning by a computer sounds like e-voting to me. OK, it's not the full-on Diebold 'touch the screen and trust us' kind of democracy, but it's not far off.

        This is Scantron technology that has been around for a VERY long time (remember when you used to take tests in school using #2 pencil?) and is pretty much the most reliable voting mechanism out there right now--it's accuracy is second only to hand counting.

        It isn't E-voting.

    • The first part of the story is about e-voting:

      First paragraph:

      "After recounting more than 13,000 absentee paper ballots, Northern California's Napa County reported Thursday that an electronic voting machine used in the March 2 primary election missed more than 6,000 votes."
    • Just because it's "been happening for years" (which I'm uncertain of as you didn't cite any sources) doesn't mean we should ignore it, or that unscrupulous people might exploit it to further their political agenda. This is another flaw in Diebold's supposedly "secure" voting technology that needs to be publicized and fixed.
    • To defend my articles: look at the other Wired story in the posting (the one that the whole thing was about). That one deals with problems with actual e-voting machines in precincts.
    • MOD PARENT UP UP UP!!

      E-voting and the optical scanning of traditionally cast ballots are not the same thing. Isn't this similar to a machine being unable to determine if a window in a punched card is punched or not.
      The story is still significant
    • I'd say that the implications for e-voting have more to do with the procedures with which we select and certify voting equipment. The problem in Napa County was discovered through a state mandated manual recount.

      1) Many paperless e-voting machines in CA currently don't allow for this sort of legally required manual recount.

      2) Other states don't require manual recount that can uncover technical problems that lead to missed votes.

      Your point is well taken though that the tinfoil hatters are distracti
    • This 'un here [slashdot.org] talks about a county in Pennsylvania that is going to be retesting due to problems.
    • In an e-voting system the paper absentee ballots would be thrown away after being entered into the system.

      "If the problem had occurred with their electronic ballots or with the tabulation software (that sits on the county server) they would have been hard pressed to reconstruct their election," she said. "Or they might not have ever known there was a problem at all. If they were doing the manual count on the electronic ballots there would be no record to look at to determine what the accurate vote count s
  • by _Sharp'r_ ( 649297 ) <sharper@NOsPaM.booksunderreview.com> on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:29AM (#8610000) Homepage Journal
    Now that voting problems have actually had a big enough affect on an election to probably change the outcome, maybe some more attention will be paid in the press and the courts to ensuring that the voting methods used actually create easily auditable results.

    The past problems have tended to be of the "well, it really didn't affect any final outcomes, so no big deal" type, which makes it all seem like a minor issue.
    • by subjectstorm ( 708637 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @11:02AM (#8610419) Journal
      in the vein of easily auditable results -

      one thing that's always bothered me about these machines is that, if they can't make a vote out (can't even see the ink maybe?), they tend to simply discard it. in this case, there were nearly 7K ballots that were not counted (if i understand the article).

      why couldn't the database on the back end be configured to flag any ballots that seemed irregular for inspection? for instance, if the counting machine recorded ballot #41768 as being entirely blank, this could be flagged and brought to the attention of poll workers, who would then read the ballot and adjust the results accordingly (under intense supervision, with data noting who did the changes, and a saved copy of the original results).

      this requires a paper-based ballot system. but totally electronic voting with no hard copies is a really bad idea in the first place
      • by Ungrounded Lightning ( 62228 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @12:21PM (#8611481) Journal
        why couldn't the database on the back end be configured to flag any ballots that seemed irregular for inspection? for instance, if the counting machine recorded ballot #41768 as being entirely blank, this could be flagged [...]

        Better yet - why is the mark read as "yes/no" rather than "yes/no/maybe" by the optics?

        Back in 1966(!) I had a job that included operating an IBM optical mark reader. It did exactly that, grading each potential mark as black/grey/white. If there was a single mark on the paper that it considered grey, it could be programmed to kick the sheet out into a separate hopper for correction and reentry.

        Of course for an election the stack in the separate hopper would be set aside for manual examination (to see if the "grey" marks were a light vote, an erased change, or a paper flaw) and manual tabulation.

        Here we are 39 years later and the technology has gone BACKWARD on its way to incorporation into what is arguably the most important tabulation job in the country.
  • ohh (Score:3, Funny)

    by grungefade ( 748722 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:30AM (#8610004)
    So now I understand the Arnold governor thing.
  • Headline in Slashdot 2012:
    "More E-voting Problems Everywhere"

    I don't see these e-voting problems going away until geeks start running these kinds of companies.
    • Re:In the future... (Score:4, Interesting)

      by samjam ( 256347 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:39AM (#8610116) Homepage Journal
      Is that black-hat geeks?
      or white-hat geeks?
      Or tinfoil-hat geeks?

      Or will the geeks that run e-voting machines wear different colour hats at home and work?

      Will these be the same geeks that write spamming software?

      How will you know?

      It's all about trust, and right now someone else is making the decision about who we can trust.

      Sam
      • Do you know anyone who falls into just one of those categories?

        If you're not at least a little tinfoil-hat, you're naive and probably not worth doing business with.

        Just like I won't buy gas from the station down the street that prints my credit card number, expiration date, and my name on the receipt.
        • Thats the point. Thats why I said "will their wear different colour hats at work and home" and "how will you know".

          Parent indicated that e-voting would be fine when geeks run the show because geeks understand the system properly.

          But as you know, it aint neccessarily so and it aint neccessarily any better even if they do know what they are doing.

          Sam

    • "I don't see these e-voting problems going away until geeks start running these kinds of companies.

      At which point Natalie Portman, Yoda and the cast of Farscape will unexpectedly sweep the national elections.

  • And if you want to bring it into the new millenium, then put a touch screen kiosk in there with a 'printer' which after you make your selections, it punches the holes for you and spits the ballot out. You then review it, put it in the privacy sleeve and walk it to the ballot box. Or you feed it back into the 'printer', where it's destroyed and you try again.

    Why is this concept so hard?
    • by Anonymous Coward
      Well said. I think the problem here though is that Diebold et al are trying *so* hard to come up with a technological solution to something that (for the most part) already works, and works well, probably in an attempt to make a lot of money and justify their own existence in this new market/monopoly. A solution such as the one you've suggested would still allow for early tallying to be used instead of exit polls (via the kiosks) thereby keeping people happy by giving them a speedy, more reliable estimati
    • "Or you feed it back into the 'printer', where it's destroyed and you try again."

      The printout would need advanced and numerous forgery protection measures (like the ones in modern bank notes). Otherwise, what's to stop someone voting, getting their printout and then feeding a slip of paper of the same size back in so they can vote again without destroying their original.

      • The printout would need advanced and numerous forgery protection measures (like the ones in modern bank notes).

        No it wouldn't.

        Otherwise, what's to stop someone voting, getting their printout and then feeding a slip of paper of the same size back in so they can vote again without destroying their original.

        Err, how about a barcode? You know, unique, random, generated when the ballot is printed, scanned and verified if the user wishes to destroy the ballot and start again...
    • We've use E-voting for the last few years in Belgium.
      The process is simple:
      * First you get to wait a long time in a long line. (unless you spend the night in a disco, come home around 7h30 and then leave immediatly for voting. The line is a lot shorter then and you make a good impression on the elder people who think you got up early)

      * Then you hand your ID card to one of the victims of democracy (citizens who get the "honor" of spending a whole sunday working for free in a voting office) and you recei
    • by laird ( 2705 ) <lairdp@gm a i l.com> on Friday March 19, 2004 @12:02PM (#8611238) Journal
      That's exactly what the Open Voting Consortium's system does. Check out http://evm2003.sf.net for the software. They've even got an online demo of the system so that you can see what the ballot looks like.

      The process is:
      - Use a touchscreen (or audio for blind voters) station to enter your votes. This prints out a human readable ballot.
      - If you want, take your ballot to a verification station that will read your ballot back to you. This is a stand-alone system, so it can't "cheat" coordinating with the voting station.
      - Bring your ballot to a poll worker, who will scan it, and store your ballot in a locked box.

      For an audit, you can count the physical ballots and match them against the electronic vote tallies, and of course the physical ballot "wins" if there's any discrepancy.

      And, of course, since the software is open source, anyone can read the code, or set up their own test system.
  • by Tassach ( 137772 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:32AM (#8610036)
    E-Voting is a solution looking for a problem (Or more accurately, a product looking for a market).

    Up until the recent primary, my home state (Maryland) had used a pretty foolproof ballot system -- basically you connected two dots next to the name of the candidate you wanted to vote for. The completed ballots were put into an electronic scanner which gave counts, making it efficient, but there was an indisputable hardcopy record to go back to if you needed to do a recount.

    Come on, pen and paper has lasted for 5000+ years as a way of recording information. Sometimes the best tool for the job is the simplest one.

    • The problem with paper and pen is not the paper or the pen - it's the person that reads what you wrote (interpreting your choice if you didn't make it clear or legible enough) and then counts them up (also error-prone).

      The human factor is the problem... from the design of the system (I couldn't tell how to vote for so and so) to the tallying of the results (were they picking Bush or Kerry... I dunno, I'll just pick for them). It's extreme, but it's also the major source of the problem.

      They're hanging chad
      • It's a machine, not a person reading what you wrote, except possibly in a recount. Oklahoma has a similar system, and it has always worked well. If it isn't broke, why fix it?
        • here in France, we don't use no pen (in fact, writing on the ballot nullifies it).
          you just select one out of a handful of papers and put that one in an envelope. simple and to the point, there's no way to cheat, nothing to interpret
      • I think you missed the part about the ballots being scanned electronically.

        Our system uses bubbles that you fill in with a marker, just like the tests you used to take in school.

        The system he mentioned has something like "President --------" on the left and "-------- Bush" and "------- Kerry" on the right. You connect the stubby line next to president with the stubby line next to the candidate you want to vote for. Then the result is scanned. Seems pretty simple to me.
    • by Hiro Antagonist ( 310179 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:44AM (#8610184) Journal
      No, E-Voting is a big problem looking for smaller problems to forcibly mate with. At least, E-Voting without a paper trail is.

      Despite hanging chads or bad ink, giving a receipt to the voter, along with keeping a paper copy for the polls, is the only way to insure that voting is handled properly. Of course, the Diebold machines don't produce a paper trail, primarily because it's harder to stage a respectable coup that way (rimshot!).

      On top of that, most, if not all, of the commercial voting systems are needlessly complex, and have insane operating procedures -- they suffer from a horrible case of Second-System Effect, and it shows in how inaccurate they are.

      All you need is a simple storage device, a receipt printer, and a bin to collect hard-copies of said receipts should a recount be needed. Some simple encryption on top of that should keep the data reasonably secure, and a bit of random sampling out of the pile of receipts can be used to ensure that the electronic copies of the votes are, in fact, good.

      A competent coder could write this system in a day, and then a team of coders could spend a month pouring over it to make sure that the code is good. Open-sourcing said code so that programmers in the general population could find additional problems would be even better, and the government could offer a small reward for those that track down and report bugs. Sort of like software bounty-hunting.

      On the flip side, this wouldn't jive with Diebold, because the CEO has already promised the next election to His Favorite Candidate. And, before the Rabid Right flames me for being pissed at the CEO of Diebold, remember -- I'm mad because it's a conflict of interest, not because he's a Republican. I'd be screaming murder if the Democrats, who I don't like much either, tried to pull the same crap.
      • "giving a receipt to the voter"

        A thousand times no! You're talking about eliminating the secrecy of voting. Once other people can see who you voted for, democracy comes to an end. Vote buying and voter intimidation are possible if others can see who you voted for. This is not a hypothetical flaw; it is a very real one that has been exploited in many countries, including the United States. Why do you think Saddam Hussein received 99% of the votes in his last election?

        It does no good to say that the voter c
    • by DABANSHEE ( 154661 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @11:07AM (#8610482)
      Good ole papper ballets are best, as in 'tick the box' next to the candidate of your choice (or 'number the boxes in order of preferance', in regards preferential elections).

      Then one just orginises for the election to occure on Saturday so thousands of public servents & teachers are available all weekend to get some good penalty rate dosh counting votes. Ontop of which it means thousand of party voluenteers are also available to hand scrutineer the count (IOW, in regards the US, each hand counter has a democrat & GOP scrutineer looking over his/her shoulders)

      This is the way it's done in most countries, without any problems, including Australia, & there's no reason it shouldn't scale up to the US. Afterall scale wise a US election would be no different than Oz, New Zealand, Canada, the UK & half a dozen other European countries all having their general elections together on the same day.

      Here in Oz it's rare for us not to know who's won by Saturday night, or the end of the weekend at the latest. Usraelly the number of seats that are undecided by monday can be counted on one hand.

      Fact is the only reason the US uses their boody stupid machines is because they vote on Tuesday for some stupid reason & it's cheaper, but they just arn't as good.

      Especially when every 2nd county or state uses different types of bloody machines, meaning a almost infinit variety of weird ballot styles & machine interfaces.

      It's almost as if the US govt wants having about the lowest voter turnout in the western world. Get rid of the machines & replace them with simple hand counted 'tick the box' paper ballots & I bet the turnout increases at least 10%, then change the vote to saturday & I bet turnout increases at least another 10%.
      • I agree with you, but one small correction:

        In the UK, votes are counted by volunteers, for free. And there's like a big race to see which polling stations can get thier results in first.
  • It's amazing... (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:33AM (#8610053)
    I can get a receipt when I pump gas, buy groceries, even when I go to the ATM just to get some money. Yet voting for what is unarguably the most important position in the entire world doesn't rate enough to have a hard copy printout of my registered vote? Something smells fishy around here. Hmm...maybe the fact that Diebold pumped huge amounts of money into the Republican party has something to do with it. Naaaah....
  • We need receipts (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Chip Wilson ( 255114 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:35AM (#8610072)
    I don't understand why there is so much resistance to voting machines that print receipts for each voter. Combining this with a simple mechanism for correcting votes that were recorded inaccurately would provide all the necessary feedback and correction required to ensure that a vote was at least correctly cast and counted by the polling machine. Is this a privacy issue of some kind?

    Another potential benefit of this simple mechanism would be more accurate exit polls. If the voter isn't willing to show the exit poller their receipt, then they aren't counted in the exit poll. This would eliminate the common practice of voters lying to exit pollers.
    • by PhxBlue ( 562201 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:39AM (#8610119) Homepage Journal

      Another potential benefit of this simple mechanism would be more accurate exit polls. If the voter isn't willing to show the exit poller their receipt, then they aren't counted in the exit poll. This would eliminate the common practice of voters lying to exit pollers.

      I would rather voters lie to exit pollers than lose their right to a secret ballot.

      • by foofboy ( 7823 ) *
        If you're concerned about your right to a secret ballot, perhaps simply not answering the exit poll would be a better strategy.

        I think if you answer the exit poll question, you're kind of already waving your right to a secret ballot.
        • -1 Completely Clueless.

          As it stands now, nobody can force you to vote for a particular candidate. You leave the polling place, and are immediately accosted by two large thugs who pull you into their car. "Did you vote for our candidate?" "Yeah," you lie. They have no way to know if you're telling the truth. This is a good thing.

          If you can prove your vote to exit pollers, you can be forced to prove your vote to Big Louie's hired goons.
      • by jsac ( 71558 )
        Receipts which exit pollsters can use to verify a vote could also be used by vote-buyers. We need a cryptographically secure receipt system.
    • Re:We need receipts (Score:5, Informative)

      by bigpat ( 158134 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:46AM (#8610201)
      "I don't understand why there is so much resistance to voting machines that print receipts for each voter."

      'Show me your receipt or else your daughter loses a finger, you better have voted for the guy we told you to vote for'

      Understand now?

      I don't understand people that don't undertand.

    • Re:We need receipts (Score:5, Interesting)

      by NineNine ( 235196 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:48AM (#8610222)
      Exit polls are a BAD thing. They should be illegal. People who have not yet voted are influenced by people who voted previously. Decisions are made like "This guy's not gonna win, so I'm not gonna vote for him" which is NOT how voting is supposed to work! People should vote for the person that they think is the best for the job, regardless of how other people vote. "Exit polls" is what keeps the 2 party system entrenched in this country.
      • "Exit polls" is what keeps the 2 party system entrenched in this country.

        I agree with your points about exit polls, but this is sheer lunacy. The two party system is the result of the consolidation of power. When the 2nd and 3rd parties have small enough support that neither stands a chance to defeat the majority, the only sensible option is that they consolidate their power and attack the majority together.

        Ralph Nader and the Green Party are a perfect example of this. They don't stand a snowball's ch

      • If I thought that an election was in the bag for a candidate, it would make me *more* likely to vote for a third party candidate. If it is a close election, then I will restrict my voting to the two major candidates. If I don't know if the race is close, then I stick with the two major candidates. Thus, only when an exit poll tells me that one of the major party candidates is going to win handily will I consider voting for a third party candidate.

        There are a lot of reasons why the 2 party system is entr
    • If the voter isn't willing to show the exit poller their receipt....

      I thought the whole point of voting machine receipts was that they were kept so that the votes could be recounted.
    • I don't understand why there is so much resistance to voting machines that print receipts for each voter.

      If by 'receipt' you mean just a slip indicating your voted, with a timestamp and some number which can be traced back to the machine, then fine.

      However, by 'more accurate exit polls' you obviously want the person's choice to also be printed on the receipt.

      Historically this has not been done because it's presumed to encourage vote-buying: as you say, the receipt serves as proof you voted a certain way
    • There is a reason why we have secret balloting. Otherwise you could easily be forced by your job, or other person/entity to vote for the candidates they want because now they know who you vote for.

      Imagine in the future, being forced to show your voting reciept to your CVO(chief voting officer).

  • Keep it simple (Score:5, Insightful)

    by twinpot ( 40956 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:39AM (#8610110)
    Like a few others, I can't see where the win is with electronic voting.

    Keep it simple: paper and marker pen. Used in many countries, simple to understand, no real hardware required, biggest equipment failure is a pen not working, no hanging chads.

    In the New Zealand elections I've voted in it's really easy - a check mark next to the local candidate and another next to the party use. Simple. Results are known a few hours after polling closes. Easy to do recounts, even without any fancy technology, scales easily too.

    If speed is the real issue, then vote using the paper and pen, then count them electronically. Count them twice using two different machines, and if the amounts are out by some pre-determined margin, then hand-count. That way you get quick results, while having no reliance on any complicated, error prone bit of technology. You can still recount manually if required.

    • Re:Keep it simple (Score:5, Informative)

      by TrollBridge ( 550878 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:44AM (#8610173) Homepage Journal
      "Keep it simple: paper and marker pen."

      RTFA - this IS about paper and pen ballots, and a machine's inability to properly record it. This has NOTHING to do with people voting on computers.

      • Re:Keep it simple (Score:3, Interesting)

        by lavalyn ( 649886 )
        Why do people keep trying to put machines into the mix here? The simple tried and true method scales linearly.

        What method is this? Checkmark next to name, counted by a representative of the Electoral Office, watched over by volunteer supporters of each candidate in the riding/precinct. Use a telephone to call the riding head office, saying "35 foo, 135 bar, 18 quux..."

        Paper trail everywhere. Scrutiny everywhere. There was a reason why Canada had no difficulties at all in the 2000 Federal Elections, result
    • Re:Keep it simple (Score:3, Interesting)

      by Blimey85 ( 609949 )
      The problem here as I understand it was the machines inability to detect a certain type of ink that was used on some of the ballots. If they had used your idea, to use two machines and check to make sure the counts match, the counts would have matched. Both machines would have missed the same number of ballots due to the ink problem. Before you do a recount, you need a reason to do one. I think beyond just using two machines, you also need a count on how many total ballots you have and check that count aga
      • Re:Keep it simple (Score:3, Informative)

        by TMB ( 70166 )
        But don't these people test the damn machines with the pens they are handing out? Or did someone bring their own pen or something?

        These were absentee ballots. Unless they send out mandatory pens along with the absentee ballot (which I guess they don't, since this problem arose... might not be a bad idea), there's no control over what kind of pen the voters use.

        [TMB]

    • Re:Keep it simple (Score:2, Insightful)

      by Big_Al_B ( 743369 )
      I think the driving vision is that eventually online e-voting will be viable. Behind that vision is a dubious assumption that low voter turnout would be improved if everyone could vote via browser.

      Whether or not this is a good idea is left to the reader....

    • There are a few reasons why e-voting advocates offer it as superior to paper and pencil. Speed of reporting and ability to do recounts usually aren't the selling factors, rather:

      1) Lower cost in the long run over printing paper ballots. This resonates particularly well with election managers who are forced to *reprint* a bunch of ballots because of a mistake or change in the race.

      2)Electronic voting systems can be used to accommodate voters with special needs. Electronic voting machines can often d
  • not evoting problem (Score:4, Interesting)

    by bigpat ( 158134 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:41AM (#8610142)
    I'll be the first to criticize the unauditability of purely e-voting machines, but this story is not about that.

    "If the problem had occurred with their electronic ballots or with the tabulation software (that sits on the county server) they would have been hard pressed to reconstruct their election," she said. "Or they might not have ever known there was a problem at all. If they were doing the manual count on the electronic ballots there would be no record to look at to determine what the accurate vote count should be."

    In this case they could audit the results because there was a direct physical record of the vote, if this were a story about e-voting, then the author would only be speculating that votes weren't counted because there would be no record of the votes anyplace. This is a story which affirms that having a paper trail is a good thing.
  • by Anonymous Custard ( 587661 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:42AM (#8610143) Homepage Journal
    Regardless of which US Presidential candidate you favor for 2004, don't you want your vote to be counted?

    Anyone who opposes full auditable paper trails from e-voting machines has something devious in mind. There are ZERO drawbacks and limitless benefits. If price were a factor, they wouldn't have upgraded from their old voting machines in the first place.
  • Sharpies (Score:4, Funny)

    by jeffy210 ( 214759 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:42AM (#8610150)
    Damnit, now they're really going to outlaw Sharpies... first CDs now ballots.
  • In re Hunt (Score:4, Interesting)

    by pdcryan ( 748847 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:44AM (#8610170) Homepage
    The New Jersey standard to set aside an election is simply for it to be "rendered doubtful" (see In re Hunt). I'm not sure of the standard here, but I'm sure it's something similar. With these electronic voting machines, I cannot see how any close election could not be "rendered doubtful" - since there is very little physical evidence to actually look at, or recount.

    Don't be surprised if the set-aside elections are then resolved with the old tried and true paper ballots of lever machines. I think a lot of e-voting is going to turn into re-voting.
  • by jhines ( 82154 ) <john@jhines.org> on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:44AM (#8610181) Homepage
    There should be a test vote answer, which for which the voter is required to vote, for their ballot to be valid.

    This would check that the machine is properly calibrated, because if it didn't read a check mark in the test vote, reject the ballot right then and there, so the voter can fill in the box(es) such that the machine reads it.


    • I was thinking the exact same thing, but the problem I kept running into is what exactly could you test? Voting has to remain relatively ubiquitous. You can't ask "Which is the red dot?" because that would discriminate against the color blind. "1 + 1 = ?" is out, etc. The only thing you could ask would be personal information like voter ID or name, but you obviously can't do that either.

      What question could you ask that 100% of all eligible voters could answer correctly and remain anonymous?
      • How about asking:
        Are you a US citizen?
        or
        Are you entitled to vote?
      • The darkness of the oval, how much of it is filled in.

        The problem I heard of, was that machines were not calibrated to use "gel pens", but only "carbon pens", and wouldn't read the votes make by the wrong pen.

        It seems better than just recording a ballot with no votes, which is perfectly valid vote, if that is what the voter wanted.
  • by Omega1045 ( 584264 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:49AM (#8610248)
    ...would be one requiring that all electronic voting systems be open source to ensure accountability. Let Diebold sell the equipment, and let us write the software.
  • by 1HandClapping ( 720027 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:50AM (#8610259) Journal
    Look every system has a margin of error. Even asking people who they just voted for is pron to some margin of error. Voting laws should take statistical ties into account. If the tally is within the margin of error, it is a tie. It should be treated a such.
  • by stecoop ( 759508 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:50AM (#8610267) Journal
    Everyone knows that miscounted votes are more political than technical or even malicious. If the public demanded a machine to vote with that was 100% accurate than there isn't a machine that can do it in terms of politics. Technically we can produce checksums that stream over the internet billions of bits and very few get corrupted or cause bad downloads.

    Checksums could be incorporated in some kind of punch card/electronic tally machine but you can never stop a registered voter from smoking banana peels and hitting the wrong keys.
  • the real problem (Score:4, Insightful)

    by target ( 97212 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @10:59AM (#8610369) Homepage
    The problem is not that the machine got some things wrong. Missing ballots is bad, not counting the abesntee ballots is bad, but every kind of machine will make mistakes. Is this any worse than the various chad issues we learned about in Florida and elsewhere? No.

    The problem is that these issues are so uncatchable. In the older systems, we would know that there was a problem, and have some way to address it. The real problem here is that it's so damn hard to even figure out that there is a problem. One was found serendipitously this time, but how many are out there that nobody noticed?

    That's the issue. And it's going to require a fundamental change in the thinking of the people in charge of these machines, both the makers of the machines, but also the consumers of them.

    All of which means... contact your politician, and make yourself heard. It's how these things get changed.
  • by GeorgeH ( 5469 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @11:02AM (#8610417) Homepage Journal
    Texas Safe Voting [safevoting.org] has a video on their site of election workers talking to a Diebold sales rep. It shows just how bad off we are with current evoting initatives. My favorite quote is "I just want to make sure this machine can add. Remember, we've had machines recently that didn't add."
  • bad done (Score:2, Informative)

    by protomala ( 551662 )
    This is just too much votes, you see, the last election in Brazil had just 0.2% of problems with out electronic voting machines, most of them where replace by backup-machines, and we aren't a advance tech country like USA. Maybe simply there is something wrong with the concept here, if the house foundation is bad...
  • by innerweb ( 721995 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @11:07AM (#8610481)

    Voting issues have been becoming more and more prevalent in the past decade. In the past election (2000), many issues came into the open about voter registration fraud that for one reason or another the current administration has snuffed. Florida removing people from the ballots was a huge one. When watching the flow of money with these issues, they tend to resolve to the same small group of elites, thought not necessarily the same person, company or political alignment.

    Now, I don't want to say they are trying to rig elections, but they all seem to be benefitting from the same shoddy practices. It does tend to make the paranoid in one come out, but I like to believe that net profit is the real reason behind the issues. It is cheaper up front to do less testing and coding. It is cheaper up front to not make certain that all things work as they should, or to not spend to much time thinking about the issues. Then again, maybe I am experiencing optimistic ignorance. ;-)

    InnerWeb

  • by krysith ( 648105 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @11:18AM (#8610636) Journal
    What really worries me is the attitude of the election commisioners who put these systems in place. I wrote the following letter to the local supervisor of elections:

    Dear Mr. Galey,

    I am writing to you as I am concerned about the recent suggestions by the Florida Secretary of State to institute the use of electronic touch-screen voting machines statewide. I do not know whether it is planned to use these machines in Brevard County, however, their use in any county has the potential to alter any statewide election. I do not believe these devices in their current form, as provided by the current vendors in the US market (such as ES&S and Diebold), are ready for use in a real election. I believe that this view is supported by the various anomalies and questionable election results which have occurred in many places where these machines have been used. I am comfortable with the scanned paper methods which I have used voting in precinct 32 in Indian Harbour Beach. My main objection to the use of these touch-screen devices has to do with the lack of independent verification methods for their results. I work for a company whose primary products are independent verification systems for cancer treatment irradiation. Whether the right amount of radiation has been delivered to a patient can be a matter of life or death. I feel that elections are also very important, and deserve similar verification.

    The lack of an audit trail allowing independent verification of the systems results means that if there is a mistake, we would never know. The Florida Secretary of State believes that it is ok to proceed with the use of touch-screen devices in the November elections without attaching printers, as she opined in her recent editorial in Florida Today. I believe that this basically boils down to rushing things and hoping for the best. I do not think that the best way to avoid a reoccurrence of the voting fiasco which happened during the 2000 recount is to make it impossible to have a recount at all. Hiding a problem does not make it go away.

    I do not have a problem with making elections easier and quicker using electronic systems. In fact, I am strongly for it. However, I would prefer an older, slower system which I have faith in to a new, fast one in which I do not. Until electronic touch-screen voting systems can supply a voter verified independent audit trail, I and many other voters will not trust their output.

    If you have any questions, or wish to allay my fears, please feel to contact me.

    This was his response:

    You should have no fear, the systems are secure and well managed. Do not believe the scare tactics. FRED

    Somehow, that doesn't make me feel any better. Instead of answering my objections to the unrecountability of these systems, I got a little pat on the head and a "don't worry". I realize that he's a busy guy, but when I ask why I shouldn't worry, and am told, "just don't worry about it", I worry more.

    I have now written my state and federal representatives about this. I suggest you do the same. Until people like Mr. Galey realize that lots of people are actually worried, they can get away with patting a few of us on the head and sending us on our way.

  • I understand that the electronic voting system has its flaws...but so do humans!

    When there are more than a couple hundred votes to be counted, it is very unlikely to avoid an occurence of human error. I wonder how many elections in the 'old days' could have been turned around because of human error?

    **human error meaning benevolent vote counters that inadvertently make a mistake. NOT humans making 'accidents' on purpose.
  • Electronic voting is like a slow motion train wreck. Everyone sees it coming, knows it's going to be a big mess, but it has so much momentum that we're powerless to prevent it.

    It seems like every second week we read of some precinct that discovers some troubling issue associated with their electronic vote tallying. The sinister mind might think that there is a hidden agenda and that election results are being rigged. The more generous interpretation is that the technology and procedures for using it are

  • To go back to voting with "Aye" or "Nay" and whichever side says it louder wins.

    If we could only find a stadium big enough to fit every voting citizen of the United States...

  • As we look at the problems with e-voting (which are legion and significant), let's not diminish our case by bringing into play issues that aren't related to e-voting.

    A poor optical scanner pick-up isn't an e-voting issue. Significant, yes? E-voting related, no!

    That said, I believe the e-voting issues are shinning a light on some of the significant QA problems we have in our voting system. I would like to see an audit from top to bottom, with strong QA processes put into place.

  • Describing a voting system based on cellulose-derived foil, produced by the processing of arboreal mass, that allows to cast one's vote by imprinting a graphite track on a specific part of the foil.
    The said part will be made clearly distinguishable from others by a permanent imprint of organic, chromatically-emitting chemical compounds, which, by using technology covered by previous patents, will convey a stream of information to a biological signal decoder, called eye(tm). While eye(tm)'s come in pairs, t

  • by NIN1385 ( 760712 ) on Friday March 19, 2004 @03:55PM (#8614355)
    Ok, I am going to start by saying that anyone that thinks e-polling/e-voting or any other kind of electronic voting system is accurate....you are an ignorant bastard. Politicians cheated in elections ever since the beginning of politics, all e-voting does is make it even easier to cheat. How many of you computer programmers wouldn't take a million dollars to move a decimal place over a few places? Having people count ballots is not as bad as people think it is...wouldn't you do it for a paycheck? It does not hurt anyone to have a paper ballot and people counting every single one just like they used to have to do. I have shared this website with you before, but here it is again: Black Box Voting [blackboxvoting.com] .

    I have donated money to this lady on more than one occasion. She has evidence of about seven or eight states that have FOR A FACT cheated or purposely screwed with the results and she is raising money to take every person responsible for it to court. She is what some (including me) may call a patriot. She is fighting a war that is just beginning between this power hungry government of ours and the people. There will be a new civil war some day soon, I just hope the people are on the right side and see all the facts. I bid you all good day....peace

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