Follow Slashdot stories on Twitter

 



Forgot your password?
typodupeerror
×
The Courts Government News

Computers, Court, and Fingerprints 313

Degrees writes "Should Law Enforcement be allowed to Photoshop fingerprints? That is the question posed in this article in the South Florida Sun-Sentinel. The suspect is charged with murder, and the evidence was circumstantial before the fingerprint enhancment. At the end, the crime scene investigators say they want encrypted cameras. The implication is they want DRM-enabled digital cameras with software for full audit-trail capability. Would that make the Photoshoping more credible? Would DRM cameras be a good thing for Joe Citizen?"
This discussion has been archived. No new comments can be posted.

Computers, Court, and Fingerprints

Comments Filter:
  • by russotto ( 537200 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:31PM (#4925220) Journal
    They've tried this with audio before, notably in the Waco cases. The court rejected it then. Hopefully they will keep rejecting it. Such digital enhancement might be useful for getting leads, but the result isn't evidence; it's just a computer-assisted guess.
    • by sacherjj ( 7595 )
      Can't you look at the enhanced and unenhanced and verify that it is the same print? To me, enhancement can be considered part of the collecting, sort of like a filter that may exist in an audio recorder. If new ridges were not drawn, is this truly "doctoring" the print? I agree that it is a slippery slope and the determination has to be the level of enhancement. Can it still be considered a cleaned up version of the original, or did the enhancement add new ridges, etc. to the print?
    • Spot on! I don't mind if the police use this kind of thing for leads, but this shouldn't be considered "hard" evidence.

    • by CaseyB ( 1105 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @04:47PM (#4925908)
      Such digital enhancement might be useful for getting leads, but the result isn't evidence; it's just a computer-assisted guess.

      Applying, say, a contrast filter to a digital image to bring out details is no different from the subjective treatment that a conventional photograph gets when developed in a darkroom.

      I imagine that the various tests that forensic scientists perform are rigorously standardized. There's no reason that digital processes couldn't be similarly regulated. I supposed what is called for is the certification of "official" digital filters, that are analyzed and confirmed to manipulate the image in an "unbiased" fashion.

    • the result isn't evidence; it's just a computer-assisted guess.

      Nonsense. I've seen with my own eyes how a fuzzy security camera or satellite photograph clearly show faces or license plate numbers using sophisticated software in several major Hollywood movies.

    • by Alsee ( 515537 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @09:20PM (#4927486) Homepage
      but the result isn't evidence; it's just a computer-assisted guess.

      It seems real simple to me. Give someone the evidence to enhance all they want in absolutely any manner they like. Just don't give the person doing it a copy of the suspect's fingerprint, image, voiceprint, whatever.

      If the result matches the suspect and does not match anybody else then it sounds like solid evidence to me. There is no way you can photoshop someone's fingerprint into an image if you don't know what his fingerprint looks like.

      Even better make it a seperate person who checks for a match. Even better give that seperate person a dozen random fingerprints and don't tell him which one is the suspect's. If he says there is a definite match AND he says it to the print that happens to be the suspect then you have a pretty damn bulletproof system. It would be pretty serious event if the expert ever reported a "definite match" to one of the extra random prints he's given.

      At that point I don't care if the image was "enhanced" by a chimpanzee twiddling an etch-a-sketch.

      -
  • NO WAY (Score:4, Funny)

    by QuantumRiff ( 120817 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:31PM (#4925223)
    I don't want them tracing those nude pictures of my 17 year old girlfriend back to me... I prefer to just put them out on gnutella for all to see anonymously! ;)
  • by Anonymous Butthead ( 523905 ) <gerrynjr@ne t s c a p e .net> on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:31PM (#4925234) Homepage
    Wait... so they can crack the encryption?
    Nothing is flawless, any form of encryption can be cracked.... all you need is time.

    It would give the community a false sense of security. Just becasue id has DRm doesn't mean anything. Evidence should not be tampered with.... PERIOD
    • Zero Post ?? (Score:3, Informative)

      That's funny, I posted a link to the appropriate info yesterday [slashdot.org], here it is again

      Here is a good article that covers a lot of this
      The "Authenticity Crisis" In Real Evidence [lewisandroca.com]
      Scientific Evidence Review
      10.1.2001

      You might also be interested in the KODAK Picture Authentication Module [kodak.com] [kodak.com] which uses PKI in a camera.

      If I post before the story goes up is that a "Zero Post "?

      Having been involved in traditional analogue photography for 30 years, I can tell you that I'd trust one of those Kodak cameras more that say a 35 mm Ektachrome Transparency, or worse yet, a color print. A while back Polaroid was blowing out a digital printer that output on spectra film for 30 bucks. I considered buying it for all sort of practical jokes and parking ticket disputes.
    • by outlier ( 64928 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @04:00PM (#4925489)
      I think what they're actually talking about is digitally signing the original or computing some type of checksum to maintain an auditable chain of custody and to track versions of the data.

      So, ideally, an officer takes a photo and it is automatically digitally signed in some form of read only storage. The image and the signature are then transferred to an electronic "vault." Any 'enhancements' would also be signed and stored in the vault. When the case goes to court, the defense is given access to all versions of the picture, and all the images are matched with their signatures to ensure that they haven't been tampered with. This way, the defense can have their own experts evaluate the 'enhancements' that the police made.

      In this scenario, you never deal with concerns that encrypted images may be decrypted. You have to have confidence in the vault -- I'm guessing that a physically secured, tamper evident device with easily auditable features could be implemented (e.g, in the same manner as the FBI carnivore machines are secured at ISP sites).
  • The glove didn't fit (Score:3, Interesting)

    by CrazyDwarf ( 529428 ) <michael.rodman@gmail.com> on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:32PM (#4925238) Homepage
    I've always wondered about cases where digital evidence was envolved. We have no way of knowing if the files are tampered with or otherwise altered, and I really doubt they'd let us compare (in this case with actual fingerprints.)
    I think that guy that was on trial recently for the disappearance of that girl didn't surf for child porn, the cops did... then changed the dates on the files to cover their own butts.
    • This is nothing new; many Photoshop-style transformations are easy to do with traditional photographic print methods (dodge and burn, editing out objects you don't want to be there, blurring, cropping, etc).

    • I've always wondered about cases where digital evidence was envolved. We have no way of knowing if the files are tampered with or otherwise altered

      *Ahem*. So you wouldn't believe what you'd see on the tape if I captured video of bigfoot on a digital camera, but if it's captured on film it must be real?

      And you'd put faith in a 35MM film photo of nessie, but not one taken on a digital camera?

      Just because most people can do basic manipulation doesn't mean that anyone can do a convincing forgery that would convince the experts.

      I think that guy that was on trial recently for the disappearance of that girl didn't surf for child porn, the cops did... then changed the dates on the files to cover their own butts.

      Well, all it takes is a computer forenics expert to analyze the hard drive, and he can definitively tell you if that was the case.

      Forge a signature, forge a timestamp, either may pass at first glance, but won't pass close scrutiny by an expert. It's the case with digital, as well as analog. In fact, computers can more effeciently analyze digital sources, so digital may be even harder to convincingly forge, than analog.
  • I saw this on tv (Score:5, Interesting)

    by LennyDotCom ( 26658 ) <Lenny@lenny.com> on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:32PM (#4925240) Homepage Journal
    I saw this on the discovery channnel I think they showed how all the cop did was enhance the image with photoshop. All he did was apply a custum filter to enhance the image he didn't add anything to it or change it just brought out what was there by filtering out the background. I was very obvious if you saw the show that it should be perfectly legal .

    • Re:I saw this on tv (Score:3, Informative)

      by Ibag ( 101144 )
      I don't think that the question is whether this should be legal. The question is if evidence gathered in this way should be admissable in court. While this isn't the same as the cops taking evidence from your house without a warrent, you do have to worry about the accuracy of the technique and whether it should be allowed in court. They mention in the article about going in and digitally removing "interference" like weaves of fibre. Who is to say that the removal technique is good enough to recover the fingerprint exactly? What if the removal process adds/subtracts features from the fingerprint itself to the point that it appears to be a match but might not be?

      It seems to be a useful technique for gathering evidence to find a suspect, but I'm not sure that I'd want it to be key evidence for a conviction.
    • I saw the show, and no it should not be perfectly legal. The resultant image will be different based upon how the user conducts his technique. That means its more art than science.

      Its not prosecution or defence quality evidence. Only investigative.
    • by IceDiver ( 321368 )
      I saw this on the discovery channnel I think they showed how all the cop did was enhance the image with photoshop. All he did was apply a custum filter to enhance the image he didn't add anything to it or change it just brought out what was there by filtering out the background. I was very obvious if you saw the show that it should be perfectly legal.

      So it should, as an investigative technique. But to be admissable in court it needs to be shown that no other changes were made. To do this would require an in court demonstration. Something like:

      "Here's the original fingerprint. We will now scan the fingerprint."

      "As you can see (shows jury), the scan matches the original."

      "I will now open and install this original copy of Photoshop. (Installs). I have a representative from Adobe here to verify that this is, in fact, an unaltered copy of Photoshop. (Adobe rep verifies installation.)"

      "Now you may observe as I use the following standard technique to clarify the scanned image. (Uses big screen so entire jury can observe.) As you can see, the enhanced image matches the accused's fingerprint."

      Using this method, the fingerprint can be entered into evidence, and the jury can be reasonably certain that no underhanded alterations were made during the process. However, the defense can also attack the evidence in a number of ways: arranging expert witnesses to attack the reliability of the method, demonstrating an alternative clarification technique that provides a different but equally convincing result, and so on. In this way, the prosecution can present their real evidence, but the jury is given proper opportunity to weigh its reliability and relevance.

      IceDiver.
      Politically Incorrect - and Proud!


    • That's right. The kind of enhancement they're talking about is apparently just a bit of unsharp masking and contrast adjustment. The same sort of stuff many digital photographers do routinely. And if they were doing it in a darkroom with a film negative no one would even raise the issue.

      Of course there is the opportunity for abuse or falsification, but that's the case with any kind of evidence. Unless the defense is claiming some kind of deliberate tampering with the fingerprints then they're just taking advantage of people's ignorance.
    • In the book "Airframe" by Michael Crichton there is one part where they have really blurred footage of an accident aboard a plane and the main character requests an enhanced version of it. The technician suggests some techniques that would be based on taking educated guesses, but she refuses and tells him to only perform totally computer based enhancements to it. They end up running the frames at high speed and taking "snapshots" of the composite result, which greatly enhances the details.

      So, what's that got to do with anything? The use of enhancing techniques CAN be abused. By selectively enhancing a section of a print against another one you can manipulate the outcome. It is very different to increase visibility on the whole print than to darken some parts, blur others. If there is a human element, it is not to be trusted. Allow me to explain (and sorry for the long rant):

      Some time ago I attended a Data Mining Seminar. Many people here will be familiar with the techniques that are used in that area. What's the point of using a computer algorithm to find patterns when we are so good at it naturally, you ask? Why, exactly that. Humans are extremely good at finding patterns. We even tend to see them where they're not, and ignore the extra evidence that may point in different directions. A computer works on the data and does not have prejudice for/against it. Before the AC's jump and say that algorithms can be manipulated too, let me just say that they can be audited for soundness and logical mistakes/mathematically analized, etc. They are much more reliable than a human. There have been numerous instances when a correlation between factors was suspected, and data mining was used to prove/disprove the correlation or give a score to it.

      So what's the right way to go here, you ask? I think that an image you can get from running an algorithm against the source is valid and can be considered an objective derivative of the original. Tools that allow to selectively retouch pictures should be out of the question. There are many techniques that can be applied to images to enhance them and that are wholly based on what's already there.
      --

    • Re:I saw this on tv (Score:3, Informative)

      by Reziac ( 43301 )
      Well, that depends. The customized filter could be rigged to only enhance certain traits that are known to be part of, but NOT EXCLUSIVE TO, say, fingerprint ridges. So you run the image thru the filter and suddenly, because the existing data fell into the trigger range, pixels get enhanced that shouldn't have been.

      Having amused myself by mixing filters and data in all sorts of weird ways, I can tell you that often the results are not simply enhancement. Data disappears, artifacts appear, either of which could create spurious fingerprint ridges. So aside from the possibility of simple pixel painting, it is open to abuse.

      I don't think the principle is bad, but rigorous standards would have to be developed and applied, including a complete audit trail (and incremental files) for each image.

  • woah! (Score:3, Informative)

    by RyLaN ( 608672 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:33PM (#4925249)
    I could to that!! Get a print of my enemy, photoshop it and presto, we've got a conviction! Do the judges have any idea what can be done with Photoshop in the hands of someone who has used it before?
    • Stupid really. Has anyone seen those videos where they tween one face to another?

      What's to stop law enforcement from doing this to a fingerprint?

      Remember we have the LAPD (planting guns/drugs), NYPD (broomhandle, Central Park Rapist(s)), ...

      When a DA is freaking out and the public is wanting someone caught, the stresses of these situations generally lead to bad things for innocent people. Plus if you're a minority it's significantly more likely that you'll number one, be convicted and number 2, face a significantly harsher sentence than a white/anglo counterpart.

      • Of course, you don't need Photoshop to fabricate evidence. It's just another tool that can be used.

        A lot of people have complained that who knows what the authorities might do with Photoshop -- enhancing evidence and such. That's a valid point but you should take a step back and realize how scientifically flawed fingerprinting is in the first place. (In my opinion, of course.)

        Fingerprinting came about around the turn of the twentieth century as a replacement for a failed biometrics system, in which certain mesaurements of a person (size of head, length of arm, stuff like that) were being tabulated, and recorded to make a database of known criminals. Problem is, two people could have the same measurements.

        Likewise, there is no "guarantee" that two individuals have the same fingerprints. Observation has shown that two people probably don't have the same prints, but that's no guarantee. I don't believe the medical community even really understands what makes fingerprints "grow" in the first place.

        Fingerprinting is not a "science" in the way physics, chemistry, etc. are. (Legally, this is called the Daubert Test.) Where is the peer review? If fingerprinting were truly a science, as American courts have determined science to be, the national fingerprint database should be publicly accessible. It is not. The formula/algorithm by which fingerprint examinters determine a "match" would be public. The method that the computer uses to match fingerprints would be public knowledge, but it is not.

        I'm not trying to say that fingerprinting doesn't provide valuable evidence, and I certainly do believe that fingerprint evidence is a good indicator that somebody touched something. But is it iron-clad proof? No. And worse than that, is is a closed-source, proprietary system.

        Were fingerprinting evidence to be invented today, the courts would probably not allow it. It has not withstood (likely it cannot withstand) the same sort of scientific scrutiny that DNA identification has. However, they have significant enough momentum behind them that even though they may not be an "exact science" they are good enough for the purposes of the criminal justice system.

        Here are some good links:
        Federal Judge Slams Fingerprint "Science" [insightmag.com]
        Cornell News: Fingerprint Study [cornell.edu]
        Latent Print Examination [onin.com] disagrees with most of what I say...Click the Ressam link...if you don't support fingerprint evidence, then you support terrorism!
    • As far as the general public goes, they generally tend to over-dramatize the amount of "evil" that technology is responsible for. That being said, I'm sure that judges and legal panel have been made *well aware* about the true nature and uses of this technology before it is able to be used in a court of law.

      That's not to say that the jury still won't have the ability to throw such evidence out. They are members of the "general public" still, and as far as lawyers go, the dumber the jury is, the better. ;)
  • DRM is like an SUV... it isn't by definition a bad thing. Only current implementations.

    DRM is bad because it causes problems with fair use and long term archiving.

    SUV's are bad because people use them for the wrong tasks (people moving) and manufacturers prefer huge profit margins to efficient vehicles.

    May they have certain (albeit limited) acceptable uses? Of course!
  • by L. VeGas ( 580015 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:34PM (#4925260) Homepage Journal
    Photoshop the fingerprints so the ridges and whorls are real big.

    Like double D's or so.
  • Sure... (Score:5, Funny)

    by Grip3n ( 470031 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:34PM (#4925265) Homepage
    ...just as long as they don't go effect happy and start making lens flares and drop shadows and start saying "l00k 47 my 31337 gr4ph1x" during court room proceedings.
  • Enhanced... (Score:2, Insightful)

    by Wyatt Earp ( 1029 )
    No way.

    Remeber, LAPD *may* have tried that with OJ, Time "enhanced" OJ's picture to the tune of a big dollar lawsuit.

    Someone else mentioned Waco, yea, "enhanced" evidence is bullshit evidence.

    Someone can "enhance" anything, even some yokel atop WTC with a 757 in the background.

    Secure digital cameras, photoshoping fingerprints, no way.

    Even with a "secure" digital camera, there will be wiggle-room to screw with pixels.
  • This is NOT DRM (Score:5, Informative)

    by ChaosDiscord ( 4913 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:36PM (#4925277) Homepage Journal

    DRM is about taking options away from users. This is about providing users with a new option: a strong audit trail. You can make a copy of the image using non-auditing software, but that copy of the image would lose it's "seal of approval." The original would remain valid. The end result: cops can make any copies and image manipulations they want that may help them solve a case. But in court they'll only be able to present images with the valid audit trail, ensuring that the image was never mishandled and clearly showing what manipulations were done to it. It sounds like a great idea and I strongly support this option for users. (I am suspicious that it may not be possible... but I'm happy to let people try.)

    • DRM is about taking options away from users.

      Uh, no. This is an extremely popular misconception by some people, and an extremely popular knowing lie by other people.

      DRM is about preserving the rights of content creators. Period.

      Now, unfortunately, taking options away from users is a side-effect of most of the DRM schemes out there. But that is a side-effect, not a first effect. People advocating DRM are not evil boogeymen who derive pleasure from your pain like some music industry vampire. They care about preserving their rights in the face of rampant, out of control copyright violations.

      Put it this way: if DRM existed that preserved your fair-use rights while taking away your non-right to mass distribute copyrighted material, they would fine with it.

      Don't get me wrong. I don't particularly want my fair-use rights watered down, buy lying about these people's motivations just makes everyone looked like thieves in the eyes of lawmakers, and ultimately hurts the cause.

      • You're more right than ChaosDiscord was, but you're not 100% right either.

        DRM is about managing rights, both those of the user and those of the creator. "Managing" is a very fuzzy word. It can mean anything from enforcing access controls with encryption and digital signatures all the way down to simply providing a way to store information about rights electronically.

        A system that stores rights information-- who is allowed to use the media, and how, and when-- in a database with a link to the content file itself is a DRM system. It doesn't prevent anybody from doing anything; it doesn't force anybody to do anything. But it does provide users with a facility to help them manage rights and clearances. My former employer made and sold systems like this, calling them "DRM systems" the whole time, and nobody was ever confused about what was meant by that.

        DRM is a very generic term for an entire class of technology products, like "spreadsheet" or "browser." Saying-- or even implying-- that DRM is inherently either good or bad is just about as meaningful as saying that FTP is inherently good or bad.
      • taking options away from users is a side-effect of most of the DRM schemes out there

        It's not a side effect - it's the main effect. The point of most DRM is to prevent the copying of material; whether or not that copying is illegal, it's still an option of the user.
      • You may define DRM by it's purported purpose. I define it by it's obvious effects.

        I can't know the real purposes of something that is being proposed. I can only know what effects I can reasonably predict it will have. Thus, that's what my definition is based on.

        The one you are proposing is based on assuming that what a pr guy tells you is true. I find that at best dubious. At best.
        • I can't know the real purposes of something that is being proposed. I can only know what effects I can reasonably predict it will have. Thus, that's what my definition is based on.

          Well then, don't be surprised when the opinions of you and those like you are ignored as ignorant by the people who make the laws. Anyway who walks up to a lawmaker and says "The purpose of DRM is to take away my rights!" is going to be ignored.

          Just for the record, the proper statement is "The music industry is well within their rights to try and prevent rampant copyright violations. But I believe that DRM as currently implemented infringes too heavily on the fair-use rights of consumers. The solution is for anonymous distribution to be illegal (which it already is), perhaps even with criminal implications in extreme cases. Most cases should probably be civil."

      • DRM is not only about preserving rights of content creators, because it enables the creation of additional rights for content creators that did not previously exist. Copyright law does not give a content creator the right to control private use of a work, only copying or the distribution of derivative works. But DRM lets the creator control use.

      • Let me try:

        In this case, DRM means "this file is evidence, and thou shalt not tamper with it, nor allow others to tamper with it". There is no issue of rights (or lack thereof), but rather of data integrity and provenance. This, IMO, is a rightful use of DRM.

        Would YOU want to be on trial based on an image that had received an uncertain amount of twiddling by persons unknown? Of course not. You'd want to know that the image was correct, untampered, and that no one with an agenda (for OR against the defendant) had ever had access to it.

        This is really no different than maintaining the integrity and provenance of physical evidence. Say you're arrested for drug trafficking, but in fact you only had a bag of sugar. Naturally, you'd want to be completely certain this very same bag of sugar is the one brought into evidence and presented in court, and you'd want to be equally sure that no naughty persons had dropped a spoonful of coke into the bag while no one was watching.

        Think of the image file as the bag of sugar, and all should become clear.

  • by mustangdavis ( 583344 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:36PM (#4925284) Homepage Journal
    This kind of technology sounds kinda scarey ... just like in the (horrible) movie, Judge Dread. Yes, the technology could help police and law enforcement to solve crimes that would otherwise possibl be unsolvible, BUT is it worth it? I see the opportunity for a very hatefull person to set up someone for a crime they didn't commit ... and for the evidence to be used against them in court! Yes, this does exist today, but atleast there is a CHANCE that the person falsifying the evidence COULD get caught. How could this person get caught if he is permitted to MAKE evidence?

    Its a good idea, but this DEFINATELY leaves a resonable doubt as to whether the evidence is real and legit ... which could also be used AGAINST the prosecution in what would have otherwise been a solid case ....

    Bottom line: too much risk for too little benifit.

  • Comment removed based on user account deletion
  • by IdleTime ( 561841 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:38PM (#4925299) Journal
    It's not the tools I'm concerned about, but the people who use them. I have no problem with the police using tools to enhance fingerprints in order to catch sickos. The problem I have is with the people who use them. I'm pretty sure that some would be tempted to "adjust" a little bit here and a little bit there in order to frame someone they really wanna go down.

    As we all know, it is almost impossible to prove that a forgery has been done if it's done the right way. Besides, a normal court do not haev the knowledge to decide if it has been tampered with or not.

    Bottom line is, make tools that can perform single tasks and not be used to alter anything. Make a bianry filter that can be run against the print and enhance. Make different binary filters for different tasks. By doing so, it should not be an issue wheter the print has been tampered with or not.
  • by Spydr ( 90990 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:38PM (#4925302) Homepage
    Using "dodge and burn," Knoerlein can take parts of the image and make the ridges and valleys of a fingerprint appear darker in places where they are too light, or lighter in places where they are too dark. As if by magic, print details appear and can be used by a fingerprint expert to compare against a suspect's prints to see if they match.


    dodge and burn only lighten and darken areas of an image.


    if this is all they are doing, how is it different from using a computer to enhance a video image from a bank camera?

    • I can dodge and burn a top down image of the saharra desert. By doing so I can move dunes, increase shadows, and, if I wanted to, make a face in the sand---something that would resemble the "face" image at Cydonia on Mars.

      At what point did I stop darkening/lightening and start manipulating for the sake of tricking someone? After all, I'm only using the dodge/burn tool.
    • A year or so ago I had to take a label off of the picture of a dog's face in closeup. The original area was just missing, so I copied some fur from a different area, rotated it a bit, adjusted the brightness and color balance to compensate for different illumination. And came up with a really convincing image.

      Now I admit that an expert couldn have looked at the shadows, and proved that tampering had been done. So? In the first place, I wasn't trying to prevent that, and in the second place, this was a really complex image. Fingerprints are, comparatively, simple. I'm quite sure that an essentially undetectable forgery could be made with decent graphic imagery tools, if you took a bit of time over it. Now I'm not a graphics professional, so I don't know the capabilities of PhotoShop. I was using Deneba Canvas, as when I work with images it is generally with documents that blend object images and bit-map images. (What I really need is a CAD program that has good bit map tools. At a decent price.) But I really doubt that PhotoShop is that inferior to Canvas.

      If you're going to allow this as evidence at all (a bad move on my opinion), then you MUST restrict the tools that can be used. Unfortunately, there is no standard tool that will work as needed. You need a tool that will keep a COMPLETE chain of undos (and redos), all the way back to the original image. So that you can demonstrate each step that was used along the way. This lets out every bit map file format that I am aware of.
      And each image that it prints must be signed with a key that combines not only the image, but also all of the operations performed on it. (This still won't prevent a fake being produced on a different piece of software and then scanned in as if it were the original.)

      Also, software that cannot be audited, cannot be trusted. The only way that we can be sure that it's doing what it claims is if we can check the code.

      Too many holes here. This is just a bad idea.
    • dodge and burn only lighten and darken areas of an image.
      if this is all they are doing, how is it different from using a computer to enhance a video image from a bank camera?

      Well.. dodge and burn is a tool that is manually controlled and could possibly be used to actually draw things that weren't really there by "enhancing" artifacts.

      Despite that, the defense attorney's claims are beyond ridiculous. Fist of all, she claims "I think it's very suspicious that you have something that is of no value and suddenly you enhance it and it becomes of value." Even someone with a very small background in digital imagery can tell you that there are a lot of things that the human eye cannot see that are captured in a digital photograph. In fact, I have most recently been working on a consumer application [truview.com] bringing multiscale retinex image enhancement to the masses. For those not familiar with MSR, it is an idea originally proposed by Edwin Land (of Polaroid fame) which accounts for human vision by working on each pixel individually unlike an (auto)levels, curves or other colormap modifications.

      To top that off, the ignorant reporter (is there any other type?) spits out claims like "The software used to enhance the print is the same that some tabloid newspapers use to create seamless 'photographs' of space aliens hanging out with celebrities." and "Time magazine used a similar program to alter a police mug shot of O.J. Simpson and make his complexion appear darker on its front page in 1994." Gee.. do you think maybe you use an image manipulation program to do various different image manipulations? Nah.. couldn't be.

      Then there's the choice quote from a medical examiner turned defense attorney "They call it science, but the hallmark of science is the ability to reproduce the same result. If a scientist in Fort Lauderdale and a scientist in California can get the same outcome from the same raw materials, that is science." Well, I do have to agree with that, and I certainly invite the prosecution to have another independent technician perform the process. I suspect an independent technician will probably come up with something that at least looks similar to (though obviously won't be exactly like) what the first technician came up with. It is certainly true that there's a bit of human error involved, and certainly the best way to minimize the error is to repeat the experiment several times. Indeed, if only one technician can produce this result then I'd call it an anomaly, but if multiple technicians can arrive at this result, then I think the evidence will be rather damming to the defense.

      Remember, a defense attorney can argue (nearly) anything she wants. One hopes that 12 people will decide that she's full of shit.

      Now, as far as the "DRM cameras" goes, I think it is another case of sensationalism on Slashdot. The submitter obviously figured it would be more likely to be posted if it mentioned a few loaded words here and there.

      In reality, I think a watermark scheme for digital cameras would be a great idea! With watermarking for DRM, you are trying to make sure people cannot remove the watermark. However, in this case you are trying to make sure that the camera and ONLY that camera can sign images to certify that they were indeed taken by that specific camera. Really all you would need is basic public key cryptography and a unique key pair for each camera. The private key would be stored on the camera in such a way that it is inaccessible for reading, but can be used to sign data. Ideally it would be physically impossible to get the private key out of the camera. If that is not possible then perhaps it could be made in such a way that it will be obvious if the camera has been tampered with to obtain its key. For instance, if it requires physically taking the camera, opening it up, and cutting away at the chip until you can see the pertinent data with an electron microscope, then it would call in to question any image supposedly signed by the camera.

      It is not necessary to allow the encryption to be turned off since the signature could always be removed later on a computer. The key here is that you absolutely must not allow the signature to be added by anything except for that one specific camera. All in all I'd say doing this is a great idea.

  • Useful... possibly (Score:4, Interesting)

    by rworne ( 538610 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:39PM (#4925311) Homepage
    The only way this can be seen as useful is if the person who is "cleaning up" the fingerprint has no idea who the print belongs to and where the print came from. Considering all the prints the law enforcement must deal with, it would be hard to assume the print a tech is working on is for a high profile murder suspect or a car thief.

    That way it removes the ability to "doctor" prints to match what the cops want, and it adds a valuable tool to the investigative process.

    If this process involves the tech working on a print, with the "target suspect" print available to him, I'd cry foul in an instant.
    • --The only way this can be seen as useful is if the person who is "cleaning up" the fingerprint has no idea who the print belongs to and where the print came from.--

      Someone MOD that man up. That would be the only safeguard that would work.
    • The only way this can be seen as useful is if the person who is "cleaning up" the fingerprint has no idea who the print belongs to and where the print came from.

      Or, you could RTFA.
      "I don't think I could recreate a fingerprint," said Knoerlein, pointing out that he never sees the suspect's fingerprints. The system might be more vulnerable where print examiners have both sets of prints and also are responsible for enhancing the prints, he said.
  • This not DRM at all, what they want is a system whereby they can say that a digital photograph has not been altered. So yes, this is very important. Imagine you're on trial for a crime you did not commit yet the prosecuting team has altered a similar fingerprint (but not similar enough for conclusive evidence) to make it more like yours.

    DRM is an important fight, but keep the boundaries clear or you'll muddle your argument. These are separate technologies.
    • Well, that's easy enough; make 'digital film.'

      By that, I mean write-once PROMs that can be popped into a digital camera; they can hold x number of pictures, and when you click the button, the picture gets burned right into the PROM.

      Burn in a checksum or something as well, and you can tell if bits were removed. Build it so that it's not random access, and you can't swap bits around or anything.

      Sure, you'd need another system if you WERE doing enhancements or changes or anything, but the ability to pull out a PROM chip and say 'here is the original photo, guarenteed unaltered' would be good.

  • ...and I'm far from liking DRM in most cases. But with digital images so easy to manipulate, I need a trackable, reliable image for: a) Insurance claims -- So the insurance company won't declare that I hacked the 60" plasma TV onto that blank wall, then claimed it was stolen b) Reliably submitting news/crimestopper photos, so that they can't be debunked c) Plagiarized photos can be tracked to their sources This isn't a panacea, and I would certainly want to be able to not mark some images. The audio environment currently has issues where you can't dup your own personal recordings -- this is wrong. But I should be able to fingerprint my own media, and declare its copyright.
  • by dacarr ( 562277 )
    Fingerprints are unique per person. Any subtle change could incriminate the wrong person.
  • by Brightest Light ( 552357 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:48PM (#4925399) Journal

    One of the biggest questions about the new technology is: Could a skillful technician create or copy a suspect's fingerprint and frame someone by making it look like that fingerprint was at a crime scene?

    Here's an idea: Get a copy of the print image, find somebody with Photoshop skill, get them to alter the image to show judge's/prosecuting attorney's/etc's print; evidince (hopefully) supressed when the judge realizes how easy it is to fake 'evidince' that way.

    • Let's not get our collective panties into a bunch, people. 'Framing people' existed long before Vic Mackey picked up the local Yellow Pages to interrogate a suspect and Jack Bauer found another use for a bowling bag.

      This is case of a another facet of technology that can be used by a Corrupt Offical For Nefarious Gains[TM]. If it exists, it will be used. And it will be allowed only when those in judgement allow it to be used.

  • The DRM should be not be on the cameras, but on the subject ! According to the LAMAA (Landscapes And Monuments Association of America), five billion pictures of copyrighted monuments and landscapes are illicitly taken each year. (actually it's three billion pictures, but some of them are printed on posters, and Monument Valley counts as two, being a monument AND a landscape).

    No royalties are ever paid for these pictures. Some hippies are claiming "fair use" because they paid the entrance fees to the park/monument.

    A big part of them are shot with a "friend" in front of the monument/landscape. By the use of such circumvention devices, the photonic pirates claim they are creating a new work, supposedly protected itself, in fact pure piracy. Such a circumvention device should be outlawed.

    Therefore, the LAMAA (Landscapes And Monuments Association of America) demands that the SSSCA be amended to make DRM on new monuments and landscape mandatories. Such a device would render all but these so-called "friends" black on the photographic device and thus encourage the fine LAMAA members into providing exciting new monuments and landscapes, like the upcoming Senator Hollings Memorial, the Shores of Montana (thanks to our president's Kyoto enforcement), or the new World Trade Center.
  • by stratjakt ( 596332 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:53PM (#4925436) Journal
    Thats why the term is 'reasonable doubt'. The DNA technician can lie. The blood can be planted. You can doctor an analog photo just as easily.

    I've mentioned before that I design, write, and support police records software. I know how important audit trailing is to them, I was up until 3 AM last night debugging some of it.

    We've even been approached with this very idea, audit trailing and securly storing digital photos. (Not just fingerprints)

    This is about showing a factual list of who had access to the photo, exactly what they changed, and when. If pixels were added, it'd be on the trail. If it was lightened, darkened, it'd be on the trail.

    The reason is simple. The jackass lawyers who think the constitution spells out their job as 'get the client off, no matter what it takes'. Another rant entirely, but rigorous defence doesnt mean knowingly lying and misleading a jury.

    Police are constantly accused of lying, tampering with evidence, planting evidence, in stupid cases like misdemeanor posession of pot.

    So when Mr Defense gets up in front of the jury, with Mr Cop on the stand, and says "Isn't it true that anyone could have altered those photos?", "Mr Cop can say, here's an itemized list of every enhancement, change, and view of the photos since they were taken.".

    If Mr. Defense is stupid enough to continue, they can present sworn depositions from people like me (who created the system) testifying to the authenticity of the data.

    Of course - it'd go both ways. If Mr Defense truly thinks BeatCop O'Malley doctored the photos, someone like me could likely prove the when and how.

    This isn't a bad thing, or about stripping rights. It's about helping to secure the right to a fair trial.
  • Even when you print negatives with a standard darkroom enlarger, you adjust contrast/ exposure / color. You can highlight details, darken/lighten areas etc. You can do alot with standard darkroom equipment.. (waterfalls down escalators etc.)
    Even printing slide film involves adjustments.

    With the computer and photoshop its even easier to "adjust" photos.

    Digital watermarking of images already exists. I don't know how effective it. If images by cameras are watermarked this may image authenticity. But will watermarks those survive jpeg converstion, they can be faked too. Many jpegs from digital cameras already have information about camera/time/exposure imbeded in them.

    I don't think there is any way to trust photographs. Look at the fakes with analog (ufo shots / Loc ness monster etc..) With digital it just gets harder to believe.
  • by Frobnicator ( 565869 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:55PM (#4925450) Journal
    After READING THE ARTICLE the suggestion that using DRM or encryption doesn't make sense. They are modifying the image by running various filters and kernels over it, trying to enhance and draw out information. Additional protections of the file does nothing to protect the image integrety. What they are having a problem with is using the enhanced versions of the prints.

    The only thing the DRM or encryption would do is provide yet another means of tracking the files -- but it sounds like they are already using safeguards there. All versions, the user, and the duration of use are tracked. Those are the same, or in some cases better, than protections of physical evidence.

    They don't need DRM cameras or higher cost encryption schemes. They need the same arguments that first allowed for fingerprints, DNA testing, and other new technologies in the courts.

    frob.

  • thoughts.. (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Dr. Awktagon ( 233360 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:55PM (#4925451) Homepage
    some thoughts..

    * Anytime you use encryption or digital signatures, it's not "DRM". It's not like these folks want to restrict copying of the pictures, or track people who see the photos, they do that by keeping the pictures within their labs. The encryption is so they can show in court that the picture was not tampered with. When you check the signature in your linux package files, that's not DRM, that's something for your own benefit.

    * I was recently looking at Canon's latest EOS-1Ds camera, which has a "Data Verification Kit" encryption module available. You put a smart card in a reader and every shot is digitally signed in the camera. So this stuff is available and hopefully the forensic photographers will begin using it. Of course a malicious photographer might change the software in the camera somehow but hopefully the module checks for that.

    * Dodge & Burn tools should probably *not* be used.. they allow you to darken/lighten specific *areas* of the photo, which could be dangerous. When enhancing evidence they should only allow *global* changes like overall brightness or contrast, etc. Or at least they should send the evidence to three or more independent labs, who don't know anything about the case, and let each version be seen in court. That way there's less of a chance that someone will doctor the evidence for a specific outcome. And of course the whole workflow needs encryption and signatures.

    * Evidence can always be tampered with. The digital signatures just make it harder, and hopefully at least as hard as it is now in the non-digital world.
  • by Bruce Perens ( 3872 ) <bruce@perens.com> on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:55PM (#4925452) Homepage Journal
    The potential to fake a photograph has existed since the earliest days of photography. The veracity of the photograph or other scientific evidence rests on the oath taken by the photographer and other technicians involved. They are not asking for DRM, but for a digital signature generated by the camera and attesting to the time and other circumstances of the photograph. Auditing the image-processing is possible, given certified software and a circumscribed list of permitted operations. Some form of "trusted computing" could be used to avoid trivial circumventions of the list of allowed operations.

    Note that this is "trusted computing" in service of the owner of the computer (in this case the police department and department of justice rather than the individual operator). The fundamental difference is that the owner of the computer is the one asking for the trusted service, rather than some other entity that does not trust the owner of the computer.

    Bruce

    • The potential to fake a photograph has existed since the earliest days of photography.

      This is certainly true and for a decent review, check out Dino A Brugioni's book, Photo Fakery: The History and Techniques of Photographic Deception and Manipulation. ISBN: 1574881663

      Dino served as one of the CIA's senior photographic interpreters and the book is a decent review.

      As far as DRM and how digital image management could work, see my other comment [slashdot.org] regarding the solution to DRM issues and certification of images.

  • by JPhule ( 170787 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @03:55PM (#4925454)

    Speaking as a member of the Law enforcement community, I see how increasingly difficult it is to get a good solid conviction.

    This is just playing with fire. The encrypted cameras sound like a good idea, but I think that you need to have more solid evidence. Video cameras in squad cars is a great example. When you can get a drunk to admit how many beers he has had on video tape while conducting a field sobriety test it is pretty easy to refute his claims in court that he was just driving home from grandma's house and got a little tired.

    The thing is, maintaining a trail of custody for the photos I think would be much harder, therefore easier to refute their validity in court. And any time you start messing with anything remotely related to being circumstantial evidence, you might as well just throw the case out the window, cause thats just what the judge is going to do.

    It is going to be hard to convince people that this is a technology with feasible use in the courtrooom after they have seen pictures of OJ wearing ducky slippers.

  • Okay seriously. The problem with digitally enhancing something is that depending on how you "enhance" it you can make it out to be almost anything.

    For example: The "face on mars." Enhanced one way and it looks like a face, enhanced another and it's just an unimpressive hill.

  • The real solution here is to create a national database for digital imagery of evidence through the FBI most likely. When you capture a digital image, that image is then sent to the central repository where the image is "fingerprinted" and registered. This way images can be certified as either original, enhanced, or tampered with when the issues come up in court.

  • I Photoshop my Photo-radar tickets, superimposing the police officer's liscence plate in place of my own. I then take the edited ticket, to the Courts, and claim that this is not my liscence plate, and the charge is thrown out.
    Photographic evidence, specifically such evidence, that has clearly had the oppertunity to be edited, should never be permissable.
  • I use to deal with a company in UK who handled remore control and transmission of real time video from security cameras and similar.

    They told me that digital material is only treated as 'evidential' by UK courts if it has not been processed digitally any way. Raw data from digital cameras is ok, but lossless compression (zip, rar etc) cannot be used before storage or transmission of data. Thus encryption is not allowed, and lossy processing like MPEG? Forget it.

    This is one reason why security recording are still largely analog - VCRs. Another reason is that VCR tapes are cheap, hold a hell of a lot of information, don't take up much room, and can be re-used.

    It is probably fairly easy to present reasonable doubt of digitized evidence unless the resolution is so that tampering would be detectable.
  • encryption != DRM (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Twirlip of the Mists ( 615030 ) <twirlipofthemists@yahoo.com> on Thursday December 19, 2002 @04:09PM (#4925561)
    Guys, encryption and DRM are not the same thing at all.

    What's needed here is a "tamper-proof" digital image format, one that can't be modified or that can't be modified without leaving a record. Think checksums and digital signatures here, comprehensively applied. The same thing will be useful not only in criminology but also in medical imaging and lots of other areas as well.

    DRM has nothing to do with "tamper-proof" data. DRM, which stands after all for "digital rights management," is simply a catch-all term for any technology that serves to capture rights as metadata, and possibly control access to media according to that metadata.

    As I've written before, DRM is most important in the commercial TV broadcast space. A TV station buys a "rights package" for a syndicated program, and has to pay a very large fine if they violate the terms of that package. (Say, if they show the program at 10:00 AM when the contract says they can only show it between noon and midnight.) DRM in that arena will be a life-saver for those kinds of folks.

    I know this is Slashdot and ungroupthink is doubleplusungood, but DRM is not a dirty word, and DRM and "tamper-proof" media are not the same thing at all.
  • by bmetzler ( 12546 )
    Law enforcement agencies need secure cameras because criminals are slimy and judges often side with criminals. If a criminal can claim that evidence should be thrown out because it wasn't secure, you bet the judge will side with him.

    We also need the right to "photoshop." Enhancing a photograph is no different then using a microscope to make the image more clear.

    Although I could compromise on the first one if the law would be strong enough to prevent evidence from being thrown out, we need a strong law to be passed allowing digital enhancing.

    -Brent
    • If a criminal can claim that evidence should be thrown out because it wasn't secure, you bet the judge will side with him.

      Right. The public defender who writes The Law is a Ass [worldfamouscomics.com] says that he's near the top of his office having got evidence thrown out twice, and that judges hate to throw out evidence just like anyone else would.

      Enhancing a photograph is no different then using a microscope to make the image more clear.

      Once you put something under the microscope, you can play with a couple knobs, but what you see is what's there. There's no such guarentee with Photoshop -- you could load it into Photoshop, erase it, and draw a new fingerprint. "Enhanced" photographs shouldn't be accepted until it's passed the scientific acceptance test (like microscopes have), and even then it's important to tell what was done to a picture.
    • ...If a criminal can claim that evidence should be thrown out because it wasn't secure, you bet the judge will side with him.

      ...Although I could compromise on the first one if the law would be strong enough to prevent evidence from being thrown out...
      Doesn't anyone read the US Constitution anymore? It is intended to LIMIT the govenment's power and ENHANCE the people's power.

      I do not see how in the world this post was modded as insightful. It is just parroting the same old tired right-wing "law and order" rhetoric. Probably the mod was some "Ditto-head" or he/she works as a cop or DA...

      Yeah, lets give our cops and DAs <insert random power here> as long as it is rigidly controlled and fair and just. Trust us, the government doesn't make mistakes.

      Look at the death penalty. The overwhelming thing that jumps out at you is that minorities are on death row disporportionate to their population percentages. There are also more poor people on death row than rich people.

      For some reason, White techies tend to be conservative, they are always dogging the liberals and espousing Republican and/or Libertarian viewpoints. Why is that?

      Look around you, it is the Republicans that are taking rights away from you. They are selling this nation down the river but as long as you White techies are making money you are content to ignore what is going on around you.

      Bah! I am getting disgusted with this country and am looking for somewhere to go. I'm thinking Costa Rica, Spain or maybe even Ireland. Anyone have any suggestions on any techie nirvanas out there?
  • Kodak has had a mod available for their cameras for a long time; at least the DC290 used to have it, several years ago. The firmware embedded a crypto fingerprint in the EXIF header, and they had a piece of software you could run to read it back and verify that the JPG, exactly as written, was created on X date in Y camera with serial number Z. It was intended for just this use.
  • DRM? (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Audacious ( 611811 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @04:14PM (#4925612) Homepage
    It doesn't (as far as I could see) mention DRM. It only talks about being able to follow who did what with the information.

    However, even the system of encryption, et al which is being proposed doesn't really do much. First, is the machine picking the randomly generated password or the person picking an easily recognizable password as in this problem [harvard.edu].

    Second, the machine (whether it be a camera, computer, or nightstick) doesn't have intelligence built into it. Thus, it would allow anyone who knew how to work the machine (and could guess the passwords) to alter the information. Even the fact that the computer is smart enough to make a copy of the original doesn't mean anything. If someone knew how the program worked - they could (and would) alter the original as well as the copy.

    Until machines become self-aware or at least are aware of what someone is trying to do to them - we will not have a "good" way to stop fraud. (I say "good" because even then we will probably have some way to circumvent/unplug the smarts from a machine which puts us back where we are currently.)

    Thoughts:

    If the police want a more fullproof method of maintaining equilibrium in the establishment of, and verification of proof. Then they will need to greatly improve how that information is handled. A network (probably made up of Linux boxes) which are attached to a central repository and to which they can send information but not retrieve information (ie: a blind send) would be a step in the right direction. Information would only be retrievable from the main console connected directly to the centralized hardware. Also, files can not be deleted from the main system until the files have been backed up to a reliable medium (such as CDs/DVDs/tape). Otherwise, the system simply allows a user to register updates and nothing else.
  • From the article [sun-sentinel.com]:
    "'I think it's very suspicious that you have something that is of no value and suddenly you enhance it and it becomes of value,' said [defense attorney] Heyer. 'It is very clear that this type of thing can be manipulated.'"

    I dislike it greatly when a person states a truth then follows it up with an obvious untruth in order to give the latter credibility. Yes, evidence can be manipulated. yes, it should be protected against. No, being able to discern something you could not discern before does not invalidate that evidence out of hand. Perhaps she's heard of DNA?

    I think just about anyone familiar with Photoshop/gimp and actual photographs will realize that details can be brought out of a picture that aren't immediately obvious. Don't believe me? Take just about any non-perfect picture off the net, open it with gimp, then:

    • right-click on the image.
    • Image > Colors > Levels
    • Tweak settings.
    • Profit! (just kidding...)

    Should it be held under the cold light of courtoom examination? Sure. Is it pseudoscience? Not on it's face.

  • I think this is a no-brainer. If law-enforcement wants this to be taken seriously as a tool (and I'm all for the theoretical good guys having better tools to make sure the bad guys stay out of the general populace despite what they'll tell you about us criminal-loving liberals), then all they need to do is demonstrate through double-blind trials that use of the tool does not lead to an increase in false-positives.

    Simple.

    As for it's potential for abuse, give me a break. Planting a print at the scene is about a kabillion times easier to do than to digitally forge one. Occams Razor, kids.
  • Keep Film Cameras (Score:3, Interesting)

    by mbstone ( 457308 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @04:21PM (#4925691)
    In the People v. O.J. Simpson case, Simpson's lawyers demanded the contact sheet from the police crime scene photos. They didn't get the contact sheet -- which conclusively reveals the order in which the photos where taken -- until the trial [walraven.org] was nearly over:

    THE COURT: The court will entertain a motion to shorten time. All right. Any other Brady issues we need to discuss?


    MR. SCHECK: There is the matter of the contact sheets.

    THE COURT: I'm sorry?

    MR. SCHECK: The contact sheets.

    THE COURT: All right.

    MR. SCHECK: We believe, your Honor, that the testimony yesterday of the other--this week of Mr. Rokahr is extremely significant. It is significant because it establishes that the picture of Detective Fuhrman pointing at the glove occurred at night, not at 7:00 in the morning or about an hour and a half after daybreak. More significantly, it puts Detective Fuhrman in an area by the evidence at a time when he is unsupervised or unobserved, I should say, by others, and it is in complete contradiction not only with his testimony, but an apparent contradiction with the testimony of other officers. The pictures speak for themselves and are extremely powerful evidence.

    Now, the problem that we've had in this case, as the court is well aware, is that we have been requesting, A, a photo log or a listing of the order and/or time that pictures were taken, or B, an opportunity--or contact sheets, or C, an opportunity to make contact sheets to the negatives. This was pursued in discovery in pretrial and it was pursued during the trial. Now, Miss Clark got up here yesterday and said that she was able to look at the photographs and see numbers on the face of the photograph and she herself had put together a stack of the photographs in order so that she knew the sequence. Well, that is something that Dr. Lee, Dr. Wolf, Dr. Baden, myself, the other lawyers on this team, could not do for a number of reasons. No. 1, there are different photographs--photographers in this case and the numbers--there were more than one, for example, picture no. 35. No. 2, as the court noted and Mr. Rokahr noted in some of these pictures, the--you can't see the number. And most important of all, your Honor, as the court noted itself yesterday, the best proof, the real proof as to what pictures were taken in what order are the numbers on the Kodak print. That is the real proof. That is the hard-core proof.

    THE COURT: Frame number on the film.

    MR. SCHECK: The frame number on the negatives. Now, the problem I have, and I mentioned it to Mr. Hodgman yesterday, is that Mr. Hodgman is the lawyer and then later Mr. Yochelson, who was designated to be dealing with discovery for the Defense. And this court is aware, and Mr. Hodgman has conceded candidly with this court, that they had no photo logs, they had no ordering of pictures, that they did not believe, until we discovered this contact sheet from Bodziak, that these contact sheets could be made from the negatives, that there was no ordering. I am very, very troubled by the fact that Miss Clark is telling this court yesterday that she had a list of photographs and an ordering. Well, if she had it and they were determined--they had determined--she had determined through conversations with photographers or detectives on this case, that she knew which pictures were taken in which order, then we are being misled because we are only dealing with Mr. Hodgman and Mr. Yochelson who know of no information in the District Attorney's office or in law enforcement that contain an ordering of the photographs.

  • This article [truthinjustice.org]originally from the New York Times, has some interesting information about fingerprints. Even without photographic or electronic enhancement, fingerprint identification is being called into question. Most experts in the field are self-proclaimed and self trained. The field of fingerprint identification is completely unscientific.

  • Limited photoshop? (Score:3, Insightful)

    by gclef ( 96311 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @04:24PM (#4925720)
    Why not just create a version of Photoshop that can only do things like contrast, burn, etc? Remove the tools that allow image modification entirely, and sell it to police forces as a way to get around this problem.

    I see a software niche....
  • Enhancing Evidence (Score:3, Interesting)

    by cosyne ( 324176 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @04:27PM (#4925754) Homepage
    Image transforms do not add information to an image, they just make it easier to see the information which is there (try using Photoshop Auto-level to make an image of bill clinton shaking hands with an alien). Using dodge and burn over an entire image or a large area of it will not let you change fingerprints, just make existing ones easier to see. However, if you go into photoshop and use a one pixel burn brush you could draw lines with it. This is why it's important that the person doing the image processing isn't also doing the fingerprint analysis. It's like medical imaging- the imaging tech generates a good image, the doctor decides what it means.

    As for the 'As if by magic' and 'psuedo-science' bits in the article, those are irresponsible hype. It's like saying you expose film in a camera, develop it, and an image appears as if by magic. If you didn't know how a TV worked, you'd think that was magic too. As for the unrepeatability of results, no two people using fingerprint dust will get exactly the same results. Same with a photoshop brush. If you brushed the same areas in the same ways, you'd get the same results, otherwise not. Duh.
    This does bring up a point of repeatable, localized image processing. My guess is it wouldn't be too hard to get the GIMP to record all brush strokes. It surely stores their results for the undo option. How hard would it be to output an XML encoded series of operations along with the output image? Then if there's any question as to the usability of the results, someone can start with the original image and apply the same set of operations one at a time. Maybe add image cryptosigning, and sell linux+gimp boxen as forensics tools.
    Finally, i'm surprised there isn't a standard government issue image transform system. NIH Image [nih.gov] might be a good place to start, or just a front end to matlab's image processing toolbox which is luser-friendly and keeps usable, crypto-signable records of each transform it does. As long as there aren't any brushes, no expert witness in image processing is going to say you could doctor prints.
  • by Melantha_Bacchae ( 232402 ) on Thursday December 19, 2002 @04:33PM (#4925784)
    First off, IANAL, and IANAForensic expert of any sort. I have used photoshop for years. And I've worked on software projects requiring government certification. These are my opinions.

    That said, DRM does not apply (you are certifying the source here, not caring about end user rights). Photoshop is way too broad a tool, with too many abilities to create your own content. As for a digital file, don't put that in your mouth unless you know where all it has been.

    What you would need would be image processing (not editing) tool, preferably specific to enhancing fingerprints. The best thing would be a self contained fingerprint enhancing appliance, with scanner, printer, and built in algorithms. The fingerprint would be scanned in, enhanced, and then go back to the real world as a watermarked print that could be taken to court with the device's serial number and the original fingerprint.

    The device would of course be fully certified to do exactly what the court would admit. And that is the ticket: you need a fully controlled process that can be examined at every step with a fine tooth comb by some agency of the court to prevent forgery of evidence. You also need to link the evidence to the specific machine, so it can be hauled into court and publicly verified that it hasn't been tampered with.

    Of course, to make Slashdotters happy, the device could run embedded Linux, and use Gimp routines, as long as you could find somebody to fill out enought paperwork to keep a certifying agency happy. A few boxcars would do. ;)

    This device would not be a consumer or pro graphics device. So there is no need (or even desire) to burden the public and the pro graphics community with the requirements of forensic evidence.

    "The thousand year dragon king: King Ghidora."
    Yuri, "Godzilla, Mothra, King Ghidora: Giant Monsters All-Out Attack"

    Don't forget King Ghidora's birthday is tomorrow.
  • My favorite quote from the article:
    The software used to enhance the print is the same that some tabloid newspapers use to create seamless "photographs" of space aliens hanging out with celebrities. Time magazine used a similar program to alter a police mug shot of O.J. Simpson and make his complexion appear darker on its front page in 1994.


    Heyer said that shows the software is not a scientific tool, but an unreliable art form that could be used to misrepresent reality or simply create things.
    Lemme see if I got this straight... Since photoshop can be used to fake photographs, that means that it can never be used as a scientific tool.

    Should we make the same claim for film development equipment? What about scissors and tape?

    I'm all for more accountability when it comes to evidence. Having an audit trail for all digital processing is a wonderful solution. That way you can always verify who did what to an image, from start to finish. Heck even if an analyst uses a tool like dodge and burn that requires "painting" onto an image, you can keep a record of the trajectory of the pen stroke used. This isn't rocket science here.

    But to claim that a valuable tool of science, because it can also be used to create art, is suddenly invalid, is simply reckless and irresponsible.
  • So I guess I must BMW to work every morning, and ask my customers not to Nokia me in the middle of the night. Clever !

    Perhaps the verb you were looking for was to enhance ?

  • Anybody remember the OJ murder trial? One of the major tactics of the defense was to make it sound like every cop in L.A. county had handled---and fucked with---the evidence. In the hands of a lawyer, Photoshopping a picture to sharpen the contrast is "altering the evidence using sophisticated image-manipulation software". That doesn't sit well with a jury, good intentions or not.

    In a trial, the chain of possession on evidence must be sound. You must be able to demonstrate who has had the evidence, and what they might have done to it.

    Think of this as a tamperproof RCS for photographs: You have proof of who has touched the evidence, and what they've done to it.

We must believe that it is the darkest before the dawn of a beautiful new world. We will see it when we believe it. -- Saul Alinsky

Working...