Raided For Running a Tor Exit Node 325
An anonymous reader writes "A Tor Exit node owner is being prosecuted in Austria. As part of the prosecution, all of his electronics have been held by the authorities, including over 20 computers, his cell phone and hard disks. 'During interview with police later on Wednesday, Weber said there was a "more friendly environment" once investigators understood the Polish server that transmitted the illegal images was used by Tor participants rather than by Weber himself. But he said he still faces the possibility of serious criminal penalties and the possibility of a precedent that Tor operators can be held liable if he's convicted.' This brings up the question: What backup plan, if any, should the average nerd have for something like this?"
Store your data someplace else (Score:5, Funny)
Cloud storage, and make the exit node a leech off your neighbors wifi.
Re:Store your data someplace else (Score:4, Insightful)
You suggest pumping 30 terabytes of data per day through your neighbors wifi?
Re:Store your data someplace else (Score:5, Funny)
Sounds good to me :-)
Re: (Score:2)
At least it will pump less spam.
What? If he cannot secure his WiFi, chances are his computers are just as insecure and been used as spamsluggers for ages.
Re:Store your data someplace else (Score:5, Funny)
Load balanced across the 40 unconfigured routers all named "linksys" I can see from here will work nicely.
Re:Store your data someplace else (Score:5, Insightful)
The original question was how does a Tor-running geek prepare for a computer seizure by authorities. One answer is to backup your data to the cloud, so even after they have your computers, you can at least go buy a new beige box and keep working. That's what the GP was getting at.
Comment removed (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Store your data someplace else (Score:5, Informative)
The original question was how does a Tor-running geek prepare for a computer seizure by authorities. One answer is to backup your data to the cloud, so even after they have your computers, you can at least go buy a new beige box and keep working. That's what the GP was getting at.
Actually, the question had to do with running a Tor Exit Node...essentially, how to protect yourself in this situation.
The other technical problem is this: your node will be seen as the point of origination for any traffic that goes to the Internet. You don't control that traffic, and don't have any insight into it before it arrives where you are. You're giving up control of your network, to some degree, to parties unknown with reason to hide. In some cases they have reason to hide because other people are bad, and in some cases they themselves are bad, which is why they want to hide. But you can't tell the difference without actually inspecting the content...all of it. (And if you have a way to do that reliably in a situation with no context please do let me know. I know a few VCs who will gladly fund you, because that level of automated content classification on-the-fly on a network is the holy grail of several aspects of information security.) There is no easy way to detect with any level of certainty that you are not actually involved in the activity you're facilitating without seizing your computers and validating that you're not actually running the software behind the traffic or storing the data that was sent to/from your node.
But you know what? None of that matters...because the problem is about running the exit node, not being the one with something to hide. It's not your traffic that got their attention, just the fact that you're the only person they could find who was associated with it. So your options are to take the risk, or don't be an exit node. And again, this is something the article pretty much states outright, so if you've read it, you'd know that.
Re:Nerds? (Score:4, Interesting)
20 computers isn't that much. WIth my family of 5, we have 3 home theater PCs, a server, 3 laptops, and 3 tablets that just have easily could have been additional laptops. That's 10 "computers" right there and I don't consider myself particularly nerdy anymore.
From one of the links the guys says that those 20 computers were mainly "barebone PCs, HP storage microservers, and thin clients". And it doesn't state if those were even functional computers. Over the years I've collected and scavenged from many old PCs that were going to be thrown out or were no longer wanted.
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Really? Geez...I've downsized with moves post Katrina, but I've easily had 20 or more computers in my house on various projects...resurrecting some older servers I bought on the cheap, laptops in every room (being replaced in some cases with tablets), mac workstations, freeNAS set up, an old desktop for learning and running IPtables to run from ISP into an old cisco switch I bought...etc.
You can easily have a lot of projects going on if you like getting your geek on with
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and if any forensics investigators under the age of 40 do end up combing my equipment....all the incriminating data is on the old looking machine in the basement labeled "VT100". Keep looking, I am sure you will find where its hidden.
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Well, if the VPS is being paid for in a way that's traceable back to you, I suspect you would be just as easy to arrest and prosecute.
Backup Plan (Score:5, Insightful)
do like McAfee... (Score:4, Funny)
bury yourself in your yard with a cardboard box above your head for air when the police come to question you because you know you're innocent!
http://betabeat.com/2012/11/murder-suspect-and-bath-salts-enthusiast-john-mcafee-claims-hes-innocent/ [betabeat.com]
Re:Backup Plan (Score:5, Interesting)
Instead of trying to run a TOR server yourself, and needing to defend yourself, let a charity [noisebridge.net] take care of it for you. Your money will end up being pre-tax dollars and will then go farther, and if you really want to be more hands-on you could probably volunteer.
For EU residents, there is a tax-deductible German [torservers.net] charity of the same ilk.
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What? Why? All it does is concentrate money and talent. They don't need to have a single, huge, exit node. Don't you think that an entire organization set up to run TOR exit nodes might have thought of that?
Re:Backup Plan (Score:5, Funny)
I can see this. The investigators turn up to take his servers, only to be met with a massive impenetrable container made of steel and lead. It humms menacingly at them with intermittent whirrs and bleeps, no obvious way to even begin dismantling the plating of this computational hulk. They quickly locate the power supply in the form of a firehose-sized cable leading directly into the floor and from there to the power main, multiple secondary cables extending from the same hermetically sealed orifice. They ask the power company to cut the power, which immediately makes this horror of technology fall silent. While they begin to ponder how to move this monstrosity it suddenly begins to make clunking sounds that quickly escalate in both speed and volume. A heavy "chunk-chunk-chunk-chunk" begin to dominate the soundscape, while the outer plating begins to vibrate almost imperceptibly. The power company calls them to inform them of a massive spike in their grid as the outlet seem to be receiving power equivalent to that of a minor power plant. Meanwhile the servers have begin to relocate digitally, jumping IPs and updating them on various shady sites.
Three hours later the nukes begin to fall.
There is no preparation for this. (Score:4, Insightful)
Look at Kim Dotcom.
Re:There is no preparation for this. (Score:4, Interesting)
Look at Kim Dotcom.
I think Kim is, a definite lesson here. What he was doing is really similar to running a Tor exit node but his attitude to it was almost guaranteed to get him into trouble. If you do plan to run one, you want to do a bunch of things differently from the way he does it. Here are some ideas, but remember that some of them might be a really bad idea in one place and a fine idea in a different one. Talk to not just a lawyer, but a lawyer who is actually working for you (more later).
Make sure you, yourself are squeaky clean. Don't break other laws even if you disagree with them. For example, I'm deeply opposed to the media industry (RIAA & MPAA) but I don't consider it a terrible life threatening hardship to go without their products. Thus, if I actually for some sick reason or other found myself wanting to listen to Lady Gaga I would go out and buy a DRM free CD. I would rip it, however that is legal where I live so it's not a legal risk. Make sure that all your media, software etc. is 100% legal.
Secondly; Kim seems to have been setting out to tweak the whiskers of big media. His moral case was never very strong. Make very sure that the reason that you are involved is strongly about protected free speech. Make your views clear; make sure that they are openly registered somewhere.
Thirdly; People in Kim's organisation seem to have been caught supporting piracy and so on. You might want to see when you can identify pirating connections and block them. Nice is to show a little page telling them you identified them (e.g. from the identifiers in their traffic) and explaining why they are overloading the system. You want to be really active in blocking or even hunting down users that are invovled in things like child pornography. This is a bit difficult; merely reporting something might make you of interest; however if you are active in combatting child pornographers this makes it difficult to accuse you of supporting them.
Forthly; Kim was trying to make a profitable service; this makes it easy to portray him as greedy sponger. Make sure you don't accept any money for your work; not even expenses.
Fifthly; where Kim was all about personality and basically painted a big target sign on himself, consider hiding behind an association. Get together as a group of people who believe in tor, and have a leadership of people who are not actively involved in any way in the day to day running of the service (best if they have no practical knowledge of where the servers are and who owns them. )
Having an association will also allow you to do a bunch of legal things; e.g. hiring a lawyer as a group; which would be difficult otherwise. You will be able to talk to the government as a group. If they say that what you are doing is illegal, you will be able to take them to court without any particular individual having to risk taking the stand for what they are already doing.
Be prepared for the concequences (Score:5, Informative)
If you're running Tor, or FreeNet, or anything else with the possibility of pissing off the man - be prepared for the concequences. The authorities repsonse here is pretty standard across the board.
Any Freenet nodes get raided? That's a good test for how secure the system is.
Re:Be prepared for the concequences (Score:5, Interesting)
Freenet should be safe, as it has no gateway functionality to the wider internet. It's self-contained.
Re:Be prepared for the concequences (Score:5, Insightful)
As usual, the global population spans the entire spectrum from massive government censorship and oppression and from relatively free communication. Tor enables those in free countries to operate exit nodes for the benefit of those in oppressed areas. Those operators are basically modern-day information Robin Hoods.
That your government is willing to raid you is a sign that you live in one of those oppressed areas and should not be running an exit node. So, you should prepare to face the consequences if the reach of The Man can grab you.
ISPs as well? (Score:5, Insightful)
If a TOR exit node can be prosecuted for traffic passing through it, should the ISP and backbone router owners not also be held responsible for traffic passing through their nodes? If the ISP and network operators are not held responsible then neither should the TOR node owner.
Re:ISPs as well? (Score:4, Insightful)
Just like the mail service can be held responsible if they deliver a package with drugs in it? It's basically the same thing as bringing a bag full of drugs that a stranger gave you while on holidays... right?
No.
Common Carrier vs Doing a Favour for a Stranger.
Totally different.
Re:ISPs as well? (Score:4, Interesting)
Re:ISPs as well? (Score:4, Funny)
ISP will work with law enforcement to identify the person who sent the packet. That is why they are not prosecuted. The Tor exit node operator can not do that. The tech is designed to prevent it.
Well then, the Tor exit node operator can cooperate fully.
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Deliberately making resources available to anonymous parties to do anything they like sounds like a great way to be charged with some form of criminal negligence, and probably held liable (to some degree, at least) in civil proceedings, too.
I'm having trouble thinking of a real-world analogy for it where you wouldn't be held responsible for that, in fact.
Re:ISPs as well? (Score:5, Insightful)
Since you asked. Real-world analogies where you wouldn't be held responsible:
You deliberately have no fence around your yard so that anyone who likes can walk across it from one side to the other. You will not be charged if someone flees from the police through your yard.
You and your neighbors pool various gardening tools and keep them in an unlocked tool shed so that anyone can use them with a policy being that you trust people to bring the tools back. You will not be charged if someone steal a shovel and uses it to kill someone.
You are zip car. Someone uses one to commit any of the ten million crimes you can commit with cars. You will not be charged.
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Re:ISPs as well? (Score:4, Interesting)
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How come? An ISP router shuffles packets from one layer 1/2 protocol to another (ATM, Ethernet, ...), completely changing their encapsulation but not affecting the actual content. A TOR node shuffles packets from an encapsulated form to another, not affecting the content. What's the difference?
Re:ISPs as well? (Score:5, Insightful)
Well, here's a couple of differences....
Your ISP has an acceptable use policy that you are required to agree to in order to get service from them, which most likely states that you're not allowed to do anything illegal, and that if you do use their network to do something illegal, you agree that you are wholly responsible for it. It also keeps records, so that it can cooperate with the authorities in tracking down people who are using their network for illegal purposes.
A Tor operator, on the other hand, by design does not know who is using their connection, and thus, cannot enforce that their users must agree to any policy. Further, and again by design, a Tor node does not keep any records that can be used to help authorities track down people using that connection for illegal purposes.
Much of the law operates on the basis of what a 'reasonable person' would understand. A reasonable person would understand that, given their policies and practices, a typical ISP is not attempting to shield people performing illegal activities. On the other hand, a reasonable person who knows what a Tor exit node is and sets one up should understand that there is a high chance that there will be illegal activities being funneled through their node.
So, from a legal point of view, there's a big difference. Now, ethics and morals... those are different things. But honestly, if you're not willing to go to jail to defend the principle that people should be able to anonymously use the Internet, then maybe operating a Tor exit node isn't something you should be doing.
Re:ISPs as well? (Score:4, Insightful)
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No. Your ISP probably does little more than route traffic properly to the next router. A TOR exit node is an actual entity distributing data to others. A good analogy would be, your ISP is a self checkout line, and the TOR exit node is a physical employee walking the transaction through to completion. One is dumb, one is not
Hahaha.
Wow, I haven't read something this bad in a long time.
Re:ISPs as well? (Score:4, Insightful)
For the police it is pretty clear that an ISP almost exclusively forwards traffic, so it makes sense to contact them to get connection details for specific illegal activities. There is no way to know from the outside whether a home line is used by a person or is forwarding someone elses requests like Tor (rare). So you have to hold that person, in the first step, accountable for the traffic that comes from his place.
Then in the process of the allegations, you can show plausible deniability, e.g. you are well-known to run a Tor exit node / participate in the Tor community, and the raid did not turn up any illegal material stored on your drives.
While it is extremely annoying to the guy, I do understand the taken measures (except perhaps the power-cord ripping). It really depends on the judge now though, hopefully they don't decide something silly. The question is really whether it is your responsibility to check each forwarded request (ISPs must not read content, or store anything beyond what is needed for forwarding and billing), and whether you may allow anonymous forwarding (ISPs don't I believe, not sure what the law says there).
Re:ISPs as well? (Score:5, Interesting)
I just read up the law (TKG, should be similar to the European law). I learned two things
- Anyone can become a ISP/telecom. You have to register, but the gov doesn't stop you.
- Participants have the right to taken into records (written or electronic, to be made available to other ISPs/telecoms+gov) of each participant: Family name, name, academic title, address, ID, and, if the participant wants, occupation. (18 p1-1, 69 p3)
But apparently, this is only a right of the participants, so it does not say anywhere that you are not allowed to provide anonymous services. In fact, participants have the right to have their records deleted too.
Solution: Register your Tor exit node as a communication service. If records are requested, say that your participants all don't want their records stored.
Caveat: You have to provide your services to anyone, and people who insist on having their names stored have a right on that. Why anyone would want to use Tor and be identified is beyond me though.
Finally, you may have to comply with data retention laws, i.e. store connection data (not records) for 6 months. Since nobody will be able to use this data anyways, with Tor nodes overseas, that's not a killer.
Safe Harbor Only For Telecoms And ISPs (Score:2, Informative)
If a TOR exit node can be prosecuted for traffic passing through it, should the ISP and backbone router owners not also be held responsible for traffic passing through their nodes? If the ISP and network operators are not held responsible then neither should the TOR node owner.
Your ISP has a legally established "safe harbor" exclusion. In the U.S. you establish yourself as an ISP when you register your company with the FCC as a telecommunications provider/ISP.
Individuals running TOR exit nodes enjoy no similar protections and will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Those that are not prosecuted for the illegal act itself will be prosecuted for facilitating/aiding and abetting the criminal activity.
Re:ISPs as well? (Score:4, Insightful)
We (including the very smart lawyers at the EFF) believe Tor nodes qualify as transmission providers under DMCA 512(a), not 512(c). This makes them exempt from "notice and takedown" procedures, including the need to issue "putback" responses. The EFF has even prepared a template response for improper DMCA 512(c) takedown notices.
Question: What are the criteria a service provider must satisfy in order to qualify for safe harbor protection under Subsection 512(a) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act?
Answer: Subsection 512(a) provides a safe harbor for service providers in regard to communications that do not reside on the service provider?s system or network, but merely pass ?through? the system or network. Any copies of the communications on the system must be temporary, i.e., ?intermediate or transient.?
A service provider must satisfy the following critical elements in order to qualify for the ?safe harbor? or protection from liability provided by subsection 512(a) (note that subsection 512(k)(1)(A) defines ?service provider? as used in subsection 512(a)):
(a) The service provider is an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications [512(k)(1)(A)];
(b) The service provider did not initiated the transmission of the material [512(a)(1)]
(b) The transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out by an automatic technical process [512(a)(2)];
(c) The Internet user, not the service provider, must select the origination and destination points of the communication [512(a)(3) and 512(k)(1)(A)];
(e) The service provider must not modify the communication selected by the Internet user [512(a)(5)];
(f) The communication is transmitted ?through? the system or network of the service provider [512(a)(2)];
(f) No copy of the communication is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients [512(a)(4)]; and
(g) No copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, and provision of connections [512(a)(4)].
https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-dmca-response.html
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Don't run an exit node. (Score:4, Insightful)
Run a dark net.
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Sure, if you're somewhere where encryption is actually prohibited. We're not there yet. And still, there are workarounds. You can encapsulate encrypted data in HTTP.
Re:Don't run an exit node. (Score:5, Interesting)
A mesh network isn't far away. Wireless APs are becoming redundant in homes so with a bit of community spirit and recycling you can establish a darknet like that. That community spirit is most easily found in hackerspaces and the Pirate Party, and since the latter type has the ability to support the former type you can get the message into people's homes without coming off as a lunatic fringe.
A lot of people don't understand why you want to build this and assume it's for child porn. I have learned that the appropriate response to crap isn't logic nor debate since it is just lazy rhetoric, but instead instant anger or suggesting 'that's what you'd use it for, isn't it'. Then assuming an air of accepting their apology you can move on with the issue. - As a partisan you should never for any reason permit discussion of child porn in what is a discussion about freedom online. Even throwing a tantrum is much more constructive.
So quit whining and start advocating!
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So, what stops one from encapsulating the darknet traffic within a whitelisted protocol such as HTTPS?
The backup plan. (Score:5, Funny)
"What backup plan, if any, should the average nerd have for something like this?"
Select a new exit node, duh.
Don't run a TOR exit node? (Score:4, Insightful)
I think not running TOR is about all you can do.
Of course if this is something they can prosecute you for, can they also prosecute your ISP as well?
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Selective prosecution is pretty handy.
Re:Don't run a TOR exit node? (Score:4, Informative)
I think not running TOR is about all you can do.
You can run a relay. Not as valuable as an exit node, but still important. A reporter once noticed the relay I run and wrote a story [wildbee.org] about it.
thermite (Score:4, Funny)
My Backup Plan (Score:2)
Not running a Tor exit node. Really, they could say that any participant of the Tor network could have been participating in distribution of illegal materials; running an exit node just lets them prove the exit node operator in particular was doing so.
Shipping analogy (Score:5, Insightful)
If you ship contraband via FedEx, is FedEx a criminal?
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Re:Shipping analogy (Score:4, Funny)
You may write whatever you like on the content label. But you will take a risk that it's taken literally.
Like the person that sent his photos in a mail protected by a 1/2 inch aluminum plate and then wrote on the content label "bend this if you can" - it arrived to the recipient neatly bent to 90 degrees...
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No, but the authorities are very familiar with what FedEx does and it's very visible. If you ran a local package-delivery service and the authorities found that big boxes of drugs keep managing to come from your facility, you can bet that they will show up, take some of your stuff, demand a bunch of records, and ask some very pointed questions. If you really know nothing about the drug cartels shipping product through your company, you'll probably be fine.
The same goes here, though laws very dramatically by
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Oh c'mon, Western Union has been used as a mule for money laundering in ID theft cases for ages now and they weren't even required to change their policies.
What it comes down to is whether you have enough money to stand up for yourself.
Comment removed (Score:5, Insightful)
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The "word of mouth" I hear about Tor is that it's software originally developed by the U.S. government that can to help people in China and Syria and ot [torproject.org]
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Not the correct analogy (Score:2)
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If you taker packet from somebody without knowing the packet content, hide it on your person or car, then bring it discretely to somebody else, are you a criminal ? In the juridiction I know of, yes you would be seen as a complice of the crime, imagine for example that you are raided while delivering the packet and it turns out it is cocaine, good luck trying to use a defense of "but I did not knew what was inside".
It would appear that mostly people that have no fucking idea how Tor works are trying to comment on it.
Brilliant.
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No because
1. The government needs FedEx and it's too big to fail
2. Because they have money and lobbyists.
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If you ship contraband via FedEx, is FedEx a criminal?
You have to provide ID to ship, and FedEx will x-ray or otherwise examine the package. If they see what looks like contraband they'll contact the appropriate law enforcement organization (ATF etc). If a TOR operator took similar precautions they'd likely avoid prosecution as well.
Never (Score:2, Insightful)
If you want real security, you should be using a network where the data never "exits" from the secure zone. And never let other people use your network blindly for their own purposes, until something like common carrier status is established for that sort of thing.
This was Austria. I can't imagine the FBI or any other local jurisdiction being that much friendlier. Even if the law is technically on your side, expect to have to lose everything defending your rights.
Re:Never (Score:4, Interesting)
They have a history of doing stuff like this in Austria (Germany also). I am now aware of this happening in the US, we have fairly clear laws on the subject. I have ran a 5 mb/sec exit node unmolested, without even one single abuse complaint for 10 years. Anyone who sees the obvious tor-exit hostname in their logs knows whats up, if they are still confused the exit node notice [torproject.org] should clear things up. The EU has been trying to get some reasonable laws passed but their broken economy steels the show.
Plausible Deniability (Score:5, Insightful)
Define "average?" (Score:4, Insightful)
What average nerd runs a TOR exit node?
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i would but i cant afford the bandwidth.
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I would guess that the original poster's question is meant to be more "What backup plan should the average nerd have in case all their electronics are seized or destroyed for some reason" rather than "What backup plan should the average nerd have in case the Tor exit node they operate is taken down".
Keeping off-site copies of important data is a good plan - either backed up at a cloud storage provider, or periodically burned to DVD and put somewhere else. Having some paper records of very important thing
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Yeah, but if you RTFA, you'll see that he was pushing terabytes of data doing this. It's not a little thing, running an exit node. Yes, running one helps many people, some good, some bad. So what? It's still nowhere near something an "average" anything would do.
Wondered From Day One (Score:5, Insightful)
I've wondered, from day one, why anyone would be crazy enough to run a TOR exit node. Why would you willing serve as the front man for someone else's unknown but likely illegal activity? It's just crazy.
Running an exit node is just begging to get arrested for child porn. I'm positively amazed that it doesn't happen a LOT more often.
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You can't have all flavors of cake, the world is far more selfish and less ideological than you. There is a dream where someone can host a data agnostic service and not be responsible for policin
My cynical guess (Score:3)
Patriotic duty? (Score:3)
If I were an American nerd, I could just argue that running the exit node is my patriotic duty. After all, the NSA wants there to be a lot of tor traffic so it can send its state secrets securely.
With that logic (Score:2)
I guess they should arrest all pawn shop owners as they often facilitate the fencing of stolen goods.
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Re:With that logic (Score:5, Insightful)
No, in both cases the pawn shop owner (or Tor node operator in this case) wasn't explicitly aware that their business (or Tor node) was being used to steal goods (or illegal online activity). The pawn shop owner (or Tor node operator) is likely aware that running a pawn shop (or Tor node) carries the risk that illegal goods (or illegal online activity) will be filtered through, though predictive knowledge itself is not a crime. Rather than seeking the assistance of the business owner (or Tor node operator) in tracking down the perpetrator, the authorities chose to instead implicate the business owner (or Tor node operator) directly for the illegal activities of the perpetrator who utilized the business owner's (or Tor node operator's) property to carry out those illegal activities.
See how that analogy works there? If they arrested all pawn shop owners who had facilitated the stealing of stolen goods without explicit knowledge then likely all pawn shop owners would be arrested.
I actually have 2 plans (Score:5, Funny)
What backup plan, if any, should the average nerd have for something like this?
1. Don't run an exit node
2. if 1 fails, fly to Belize and live blog my evasion of the local police
Don't expect to get your data back. (Score:4, Insightful)
Traditional backup methods are good against media failure, or even natural disaster, but ineffective against seizure. The standard police procedure is 'if in doubt, take everything,' because it isn't practical to train frontline officers to work out what is and isn't potentially evidence. That's why they take cell phones and games consoles. That and, as the more cynical point out, the more miserable they can make the defendent the easier it is to force a plea bargin. So they'll take all your backups too.
You can forget about getting that back, too. Even if all charges are dropped. Law enforcement is well-known all around the world for their reluctance to return siezed evidence, espicially evidence that may one day go into police auction. Even if they are willing to return it, many areas have overwhelmed forensics staff and computers can sit in the locker for months before there is an expert available to poke around and declare them free of anything incriminating.
So if you do have reason to worry about being raided - eg, you run an open wireless hotspot or exit node - then a sensible precaution is to keep backups of critical data somewhere out of reach, like a cloud store hosted overseas, or drives left with trusted friends for safekeeping. Making sure, of course, that no-one else knows - you don't want them to get raided too!
Also beware of another police policy. It varies by country, and even by state and district, but many departments are loathe to let any accused off without charge or found not guilty - it makes them look incompetent, wrongly arresting someone. So they will likely resort to the 'throw the book' approach, going through the evidence looking for any other, unrelated crimes they can find. Sure, you may not have actually launched that attack or trafficked those illegal files they raided you for - but if, in the process of investigating, they discover you've been involved in piracy or find chat logs of you talking about your drunken vandalism or theft of office supplies, or something which would be otherwise borderline illegal, they will happily add more charges - insurance in case you were innocent of the original accusations, and to pile on more pressure for a plea bargin. Prosecutors love guilty pleas - much more reliable than actually having to prove something beyond reasonable doubt.
You can encrypt, of course. But that just makes you look even more suspicious, plus in most countries now it's either an explicit crime to withhold keys from police or considered a form of withholding evidence, either of which gets you jailed anyway. Even if you legally wriggle free from that, good luck getting a jury to see it as anything other than a sign you are trying to hide evidence of whatever terrible act you are accused of.
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Traditional backup methods are good against media failure, or even natural disaster, but ineffective against seizure
Off-site backup is part of that.
The Simple Truth? (Score:4, Insightful)
Simply tell the prosecution / judge - "I run a TOR exit node to help preserve freedoms on the internet, especially those of people oppressed in countries like Syria and other places. If you choose to prosecute me for running a TOR exit node which, by its stated purpose and nature, is encrypted and anonymous AND which I have no control of the data flowing through it then you must also prosecute EVERY internet service provider over which the same data flowed. I do not know now, nor have I ever known, exactly what data flows over the exit node. Just like ISPs do not know what data is flowing over their networks."
DO NOTHING ELSE. Even if it makes complete sense to you (keeping an encrypted backup of all your data and computer images off-site), the prosecution will do what they can to skew that to "Why did you keep encrypted backups off-site? What are you hiding?" Fuck 'em. Don't give them any ammunition in their fear-mongering quest to rule your life. Come away clean and then lawyer up and sue the police departments, all government levels* involved, and even the prosecutor. Your aim with the lawsuits is not to get paid, it is to get all your electronics back in a timely manner if they refuse to give them back once you are cleared. Of course, if they're being dicks about it then the object is to get your equipment back and get VERY large settlements.
*Not sure how the government levels are in Austria, but here in the United States we have city government, county government, then state, then federal. Depending on who is doing the prosecution, I would start my lawsuits with that level of government and work my way down. Same with the police forces involved.
Re:The Simple Truth? (Score:5, Insightful)
You can tell them that... but they're not going to buy it. First off, ISPs operate under legally-established safe harbor provisions, which require them to do certain things. If you haven't also done those things, then you're not operating under the safe harbor provisions, and thus, the rules that apply to you aren't the same as those that apply to the ISPs. It's not simply a matter of not knowing what data goes through your network - there are other things you have to do, which include keeping certain types of records about your users... and TOR by design does not do that.
Second, prosecutors have leeway to choose which cases they will prosecute - so your "you must also prosecute" is simply not true, and the prosecution and judge both know this. So they'll simply ignore your speech, and instruct the jury to do so as well.
Now, whether these things are right is a separate question - but there are definite legal differences between an ISP and you, if you're operating a TOR node.
Not for the faint of heart (Score:2)
"Something like this?" (Score:2)
What backup plan, if any, should the average nerd have for something like this?
That depends upon what you mean by "something like this?
.
Do you mean to imply that an "average nerd" fosters possible illegal activity?
Or do you mean to imply that having a Tor node is OK?
It's in the Legal FAQ (Score:2, Informative)
This situation isn't completely unheard of. It's happened a few times before. Raids by technically-clueless police forces are an occupational hazard for TOR exit node operators. It's happened in the US, too. However, this is interesting, as several very large TOR nodes are run in Austria in major datacenters. EDIS, UPC and Silver Server in particular host some well-known, stable ones. Best of luck to this guy. Has he contacted EFF Europe already?
If you host one, it should be clearly and completely separate
Re: (Score:3)
The node was in a datacentre in another country.
He was raided at home based on the address details the police obtained from the datacentre.
Deadman's Switch (Score:5, Interesting)
Realistically, though, I've been thinking about building inconspicuous, low-power Tor exit servers that I can dead-drop in places with open wifi. That way, exits can be operated with a minimal threat of legal ramifications for anyone (plausible deniability on the part of the wifi provider).
To that end - anybody know where I can bulk order small form factor, inexpensive low-power computers that are battery pack/solar power friendly?
Re: (Score:3)
I believe the term that applies here is.. (Score:3)
Ah, child pron (Score:3)
And as all us compliant soccer moms know, at least 30% of every populace are child pron producers and consumers!
I'm surprised Orwell didn't write more about such a powerful tool.
Re:non-destructive backup plan (Score:4, Insightful)
They likely will not turn it off when they remove it. There are products just for that purpose.
Destruction of the USB stick would get you Obstruction of Justice charges.
Re:non-destructive backup plan (Score:5, Insightful)
The problem is not the exit node, no information of any value contains there, and nothing that can incriminate you will be on the exit node.
The problem is the complete raid of everything of value you own and depend on that had no part in the exit node, no matter what is stored on the machines. Likely keeping them for months, even years depending on how far they want to go with the case.
Exact opposite of what you should do (Score:3)
Re: (Score:2)
yes and all of that same stuff can be traded o the open internet securely via ssl ssh pgp and other encryption schemes.
Re: (Score:3)
You say freedom martyr like that's a bad thing.
My co-resident at the zendo at which I reside and I have been discussing setting up a Tor exit node for a while. The arguments against, are obvious - last I checked the general recommendation was to lease a server at a facillity that was set up for the likely eventual legal problems. But we're both fairly squeaky clean, and would be happy to talk at length about why we feel this is important. (And are in situations where spending time in jail, while not fun, wo
Re: (Score:2)
My backup plan is to encrypt my Tor exit node with TrueCrypt FDE. Yes, it means I have to run Windows, since FDE support is not available for Linux yet. However, the FBI has not been able to defeat TrueCrypt [techworld.com]. They can say the traffic came from your internet connection, but they cannot prove that you viewed any of it.
that's not a backup plan. all that will do in a case like this seem that you did stash the illegal material on your own machine and drag the case on forever.
the real backup if any is keeping a log about every packet, so you can pass the blame.
Re: (Score:2)
Re:Ditch your computers and go outside (Score:4, Insightful)
Give it a while and you're back at his plan.
Quite seriously, unless you've been under a rock lately, you should have noticed that sooner or later laws have gotten to the point where the only legal thing you can do online anymore is buying crap.
Re: (Score:3)
"Ummm, don't run an exit Tor node if you aren't prepared to be sued for distributing child porn?"
How about not running an Exit node raw onto the internet. Honestly, you can run one safely. You have the exit node behind a firewall that filters out most nefarious crap.
Problem is TOR is not used for it's intended purpose... to let persecuted people in far away lands access to our yummy yummy freedom. It's mostly for Kiddie porn and Warez.
Re: (Score:3)
Problem is TOR is not used for it's intended purpose... to let persecuted people in far away lands access to our yummy yummy freedom. It's mostly for Kiddie porn and Warez.
One man's yummy yummy freedom is another man's hideous freedom porn. If the second man is an operative in the exit node's country's draconic internal security apparatus, the exit node is no less screwed just because the EFF or Amnesty International thinks the exit node is used to empower the oppressed.
On some practical level, the only c
Re:well fuck me (Score:4, Insightful)
You might want to think about that plausible deniability. First off, if the **AA sues you, the standard of proof in a lawsuit is "preponderance of the evidence", not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". Second, much law is written on the basis of what a hypothetical 'reasonable person' would do or understand. It's quite easy to argue that a reasonable person with your level of technical skill would understand that their open wifi and tor exit node would likely be used by people engaging in criminal activity. Going from there to persuading a jury that you were knowingly aiding and abetting criminal activity likely would not be hard - especially if they know that the secret service has spoken to you in the past and advised you to stop it.