Diebold Admits ATMs Are More Robust Than Voting Machines 230
An anonymous reader points out a story in the Huffington Post about the status of funding for election voting systems. It contains an interesting section in which Chris Riggall, a spokesman for Premier (formerly Diebold) acknowledged that less money is spent making an electronic voting machine than on a typical ATM. The ironically named Riggall also notes that security could indeed be improved, but at a higher price than most election administrators would care to pay. Also quoted in the article is Ed Felten, who has recently found some inconsistencies in New Jersey voting machines. From the Post:
"'An ATM is significantly a more expensive device than a voting terminal...' said Riggall. 'Were you to develop something that was as robust as an ATM, both in terms of the physical engineering of it and all aspects, clearly that would be something that the average jurisdiction cannot afford.' Perhaps cost has something to do with the fact that a couple of years ago, every single Diebold AccuVote TS could be opened with a standard key also used for some cabinets and mini-bars and available for purchase over the Internet."
Best Parallel Ever! (Score:3, Funny)
Re:Best Parallel Ever! (Score:5, Insightful)
So the banks are more impportant than the ballots here. But it's what one would expect in a plutocracy.
Tne bankers and stockbrokers know what's important in America, and it isn't your vote. What's important ios the campaign "contribution" bribery to both major party candidates.
Not the same people (Score:4, Insightful)
I'm not sure this is a valid conclusion. The same people aren't making decisions in each case. And while we like to think we place a high value on the integrity of our voting system, it's hard to put a dollar figure on that, which is what the people running the budget need.
Banks, on the other hand, can easily place a dollar figure on the value of their ATMs' security, and show their decision-makers that X dollars spent on securing them will easily pay for itself.
I'm not happy with the situation, but I don't think you've got a single set of people saying "transactions are more important than votes."
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Banks, on the other hand, can easily place a dollar figure on the value of their ATMs' security, and show their decision-makers that X dollars spent on securing them will easily pay for itself.
Then why don't they do this for credit card fraud ? Europe has had chips with private/public key exchange for a good 20 years while the US still relies on the megnetic strip + signature leading to widespread faud.
Right, one way or another the money comes out of somebody's pocket (yours or the store's) and the CC company benefits along the way. Crooks.
Re:Not the same people (Score:4, Informative)
so in reality.. the CC has to do a few more transactions and alittle leg work.. (what my 50$ covers) and the company selling stuff gets nothing but lost inventory and the fraud guy makes off with the stuff..
untill the CC companies here in the US are held accountable for the transactions then they have zero incentive on putting together more expenisve and effective security into the cards/transactions.. because it doesn't effect their bottom line..
and the reatail places are screwed because their only option is to stop accepting CC's.. and if you do that in the US you might as well clsoe your doors as most of the population doesn't cary cash any more.. and sadly most of them don't have the cash to cary.
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now either A.. they have managed to get barly litterate minimum wage people that can read barcodes nativly OR they just don't give a shit..
Re:Not the same people (Score:4, Interesting)
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Re:Best Parallel Ever! (Score:4, Informative)
I do. every time I buy something I pay state and local sales tax. Every time I earn a paycheck I pay income tax. Every time I buy beer I pay an excise tax.
I'm paying for the ATMs, too. The bank gets its money from me when it charges me fees and invests my checking account money for their profit.
I expect my elected officials to do their damned jobs without my nagging. It's their responsibility under the state constitution to ensure a secure vote.
Re:Best Parallel Ever! (Score:4, Insightful)
But I CAN do without them. Things I can do without:
- marijuana laws and their enforcement
- prostitution laws and their enforcement
- gambling laws and their enforcement
- airport "security"
- courtroom metal detectors
- metal detectors where I have to go for license plates
- "no smoking in bars and casinos" laws and their enforcement
- Airplanes to fly Milorad Blagojevich [wikipedia.org] from Chicago to Springfield and back
- Upkeep on the Governor's mansion the Governor refuses to live in despite the Illinois Constitution
- Department of Homeland Security
- PATRIOT act and its enforcement
- DMCA and its enforcement
- ATF
And so on. I note with amusement that the ever-changing quote at the bottom of the page here says "The state law of Pennsylvania prohibits singing in the bathtub". Your tax dollars at work. Or as a couple of slashdotters' sigs note, "oh look, my tax dollars at work coming to arrest me!"Re: (Score:2)
It should be abundantly clear at this point to all concerned that unchecked capitalism (whether libertarian or conservative) is harmful to life on Earth. I mean, we've privatized prisons in this country, providing still more incentive to incarcerate people (as if we didn't already have various financial incentives along those lines.)
Re:Best Parallel Ever! (Score:4, Insightful)
Really? Or that lawmakers will say "If I make this law, more people will go to jail, which means more money for my buddy's company which means, he'll have another one of those bitchin parties again this year" ? Do you really think that?
Not trying to disagree with your unchecked captialism point but your proof stinks.
Re:Best Parallel Ever! (Score:4, Interesting)
This seems like a fun game. Do you think its company's X strong moral fiber that will keep it from donating to PACs and paying lobbyists to argue for longer minimum sentences for crimes that pose relatively small dangers to society, when it will clearly benefit them financially? Do you think the lawmaker will say, "No I cannot accept your campaign contribution, because your positions are detrimental to my constituents"? Do you really think that?
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Really? Or that lawmakers will say "If I make this law, more people will go to jail, which means more money for my buddy's company which means, he'll have another one of those bitchin parties again this year" ? Do you really think that?
Yes. (Except for the part about the party.)
Do you think the number of speeding tickets issued is affected by the potential income through fines? Do you think the propensity for police to confiscate property is affected by the ability to then auction off that property?
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Yes.
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Re:Best Parallel Ever! (Score:4, Informative)
More info here at the FEC website [fec.gov].
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Re:Best Parallel Ever! (Score:4, Interesting)
Re:Best Parallel Ever! (Score:5, Informative)
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In other words (Score:2)
Voting is important, the security of the vote is important, unless that money can be used to buy votes elsewhere. It also becomes a great issue to underfund so when a politician loses they can blame voting machines for it because no one wants to admit they lost a popularity contest
Re:In other words (Score:4, Interesting)
The candidate doesn't matter; HE'S the one for sale. The scandal isn't the buying of votes, it's the buying of legislators. When you've donated ten million to the Democrat and another ten million to the Republican, it doesn't matter who loses, you win.
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And voters want more expensive services but refuse to pay higher taxes to pay for them. Bad combo.
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You've got it backwards. No one really cares what the loser says.
The point is, the winner won't have any incentive to fix the system that got them elected. Maybe it was an honest win, maybe it was rigged without their knowledge, or maybe they know damn well that they were elected because the machines are manipulable; in every case the
So? (Score:5, Insightful)
Of course, their voting products do suck, although I don't think that cost has terribly much to do with it.
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The voting booths have nothing to do their mainline business.
This a bit like AM General admitting that their LSSVs aren't as robust
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Once they have high-tech for ATM, all they need to do is downgrade it into a workable trustful voting machine - they don't have to do much R&D for that! The whole China is doing it... so can they.
Re:So? (Score:4, Insightful)
I can't "downgrade" a 747 into a vending machine, even though the 747 is the more complex bit of machinery and has proven to be extremely reliable.
They're two separate things entirely. Granted, yes, Diebold's experience with ATMs does make them appear more qualified to build voting machines, though there are still several important fundamental differences present.
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In case of Diebold, they want money for making something "more secure" (which actually, is just "secure"), while they already have that technology. May be "downgrade" is not the right word, but still I don't see why they would need more money to do something
Re:So? (Score:5, Funny)
Of course you can:
1: Pull 747 up to gate.
2: Allow cockpit crew to leave, keep flight attendants.
3: Cancel engine maintenance contract, keep galley contracts.
4: PROFIT!! (not really, but couldn't resist)
To use:
1: Walk down jetway into 747, take a seat.
2: Push flight attendant button.
3: Flight attendant wheels cart to your seat, prepared to dispense peanuts, mini-pretzels, or soda.
4: Take you peanuts, mini-pretzels, or soda and exit the aircraft.
I didn't say that a downgraded 747 made a very good, convenient, or profitable vending machine, but with a few organic parts, (the flight attendants and ground service for the galley) it can make one. Perhaps a parallel for Diebold voting machines.
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Ah, but if only they'd reveal their source code and engineering drawings they'd get a few thousand people doing a thorough security audit gratis. But no, that would give away vital "trade secrets".
I'm not even talking GPL here. Or any license to use the designs or code for anything other than auditing them
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Of course, their voting products do suck, although I don't think that cost has terribly much to do with it.
I agree. It is bad design if the basic security measures taken for ATMs are not also implemented in voting machines.
Diebold's expertise in serving the banks with ATM machines should translate nicely into serving the gov't with voting machines (much of the security, hardware, and software is similar between the two devices).
Thus, the argument that it is a "cost issue" is bullcrap. The fact that the case in NJ proves that THE DAMNED THINGS DO NOT COUNT RELIABLY is further evidence that the issues with
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Re:So? (Score:4, Insightful)
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For the money that Diebold were paid they didn't come close to implementing a secure system and it had very little to do with fundamental reasons that indicated that it couldn't be done for the specified cost. Good security is more expensive but bad design is most expensive.
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A customer wants to pay a small amount of money for an insecure and poorly built product of theirs. Do they:
A) Not sell them that product.
or
B) Sell them the product they are requesting.
While I hate to be a Diebold apologist, this would NOT have happened if their customers (our various governments) had clearly and contractually stipulated what these machines were required to do. I haven't heard much in the way of Diebold ser
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What is Our Democracy Worth? (Score:3)
Re:What is Our Democracy Worth? (Score:4, Informative)
A fundamental change is needed, one that will either have the states ceding power tot he federal government to develop "the one true" voting machine used in all districts *or* we get off this technology merry-go-round and use paper ballots - as a bonus it will give the losing politicans more time to round-up lawyers to challenge their loss...
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Hopefully people manage to remember the ongoing debacle in New Jersey for at least an election cycle or two.
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But the aren't Federal elections... (Score:2)
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There, fixed that for you.
India has affordable/ secure voting machines (Score:5, Informative)
A simple machine, that has been tested and verify can be sealed with stickers with signatures of election officials.
A machine (think diabold) with all kinds of inputs (think keyboard plugs) and complexity (think OS, DB etc...) cannot be easily sealed and verified by election officials.
I found two interesting articles about India's EVM
The two things I found interesting:
1) EVM cost = $230 (hard to tamper with, and relies on election officials to keep secure)
2) Diebold cost = $3300 (easier to tamper with, and relies on election officials to keep secure)
This points out two things: voting systems don't have to be complicated or expensive to work well, and that security depends both on the machine and the voting process.
Just like with paper ballots the election officials need to ensure security of the voting and counting process.
In Canada we have some electronic voting at the municipal level in some cities (mostly optical scan machines).
A comparison of EVM and Diebold
http://techaos.blogspot.com/2004/05/indian-evm-compared-with-diebold.html [blogspot.com]
Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Voting_Machines [wikipedia.org]
The issue is not about cost. The issue is crappy design, and politics in the selection of voting machine vendors.
Ironically named? (Score:5, Funny)
This makes perfect sense (Score:2)
He's (somewhat) correct. (Score:2)
That being said, there's no reason that over time a voting system cannot have a similar level of security and accuracy. Open code review and structure review of the devices will allow security experts to
Is this a joke? (Score:2)
Cost isn't the issue (Score:4, Interesting)
It's science -- bad science -- of two types:
1. Bad application of technology, including massive security holes.
2. Bad management science, leading to sloppy security and confused product design.
An ATM should be more expensive than a voting machine; the ATM has to dispense cash and be used 24-7 to do so.
A voting machine however should be secure, have an audit trail, and a clear interface so the average person can understand what they're voting for.
Re:Cost isn't the issue (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Cost isn't the issue (Score:5, Insightful)
It's science -- bad science -- of two types:
1. Bad application of technology, including massive security holes.
2. Bad management science, leading to sloppy security and confused product design.
Engineering is all about making compromises - the old adage "good, fast, cheap, pick two" holds true today just as much as it always did, even if the three options in the list change occasionally.
In this case, I'd argue that the three options are "Simple, reliable, cheap, pick two".
Simple - any fool can use it, it's really not complicated.
Reliable - Verifiably correct, very hard to mess around with without it being immediately obvious.
Cheap - Pretty self-explanatory.
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The problem is not that your votes aren't counted if you're "too dumb to figure it out". The problem is they can be MIS-counted, affecting the reliability of an election.
Unless you want to make it a reliable intelligence test + analysis + voting machine... in which case I think you'll lose the 'cheap' part.
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Exactly Right (Score:2)
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Cheap is relative in that menu. The simple and reliable voting machine indeed costs more than the reliable and cheap or simple and cheap one, but none of those need cost as much as an ATM given an appropriate design.
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Yeah, right. (Score:4, Insightful)
Comment removed (Score:3, Insightful)
Explain away engineering defects (Score:2, Interesting)
And shoddy/insecure design... As something they can't afford to do without?
I call BS. The customer has an expectation of the manufacturer doing a good job of designing their devices and not selling defective product lines: there would be no sale if the manufacturer were honest and told the product was not robust. There can be no excuse for letting a generic key open the device, when individualized locks are easily purchased.
The customer would keep going until they found a vendor that told them the
too expensive to be secure? (Score:2)
ATMs as voting machines (Score:5, Funny)
ATMs Are More Robust Than Voting Machines (Score:2)
Well, of course! Money always seems to be more important than democracy so it's not a big surprise where the companies like Diebold put their best engineering effort.
This is utter bullshit (Score:2)
paper trail (Score:2)
I can check with the bank statement.
Rubbish excuse (Score:2)
Voting machine - ATM combo (Score:2)
Obviously, some people are not going to want to or be able to identify themselves with a swipe card. That doesn't exclude the election commission from operating centrally located polli
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Re:Voting machine - ATM combo (Score:4, Insightful)
This just in: the sun rose again today (Score:2)
Diebold's voting machines have a deservedly bad reputation for bad security as well as major screwups (not necessarily security-related) but I don't recall anyone claiming they were built to be as
Malda means nerd en espanol (Score:2)
Crappy overly expensive underachieving design (Score:4, Interesting)
Voting machines most certainly do NOT have to cost as much as an ATM to be appropriatly secure!
An ATM must be tamper proof. That implies heavy steel construction all around. It has to be larger because it has to hold a store of cash. That sort of construction is where bug costs come in. They are generally unattended for most of the day and they contain cash!
A voting machine just has to be tamper evident. Heavy ABS plastic construction (for durability) with unique keys would be adequate there. They are generally either secured away or attended by election officials. They contain nothing all that valuable to someone who would break in. (the only value to be had requires breaking in without leaving visible evidence) Tamper evident design is quite sufficient.
The card readers on those things are just plain excessive. You'll note when you push the card in, there's a rather solid clunk as it locks in. That speaks of a heavy mechanism with an oversized solinoid and spring. That in turn implies heavy relays and a big power supply. A mechanism more like the floppy drives on an old Mac would have been more appropriate to the problem and considerably cheaper.
Those savings could have gone towards uniquely keyed locks, better software, and perhaps a POS style receipt printer.
well, duh (Score:2)
Voting machines are generally used for one day a year, indoors, surrounded by people, and are not full of a delicious currency filling.
I'm not saying security shouldn't be a priority, I'm just saying that you have to plan security practically around each application.
-c
We are getting stuck on the machines! (Score:5, Informative)
The problem is we're stuck on machines vs. voting procedures. New York and New Jersey had voting machines that did not produce a paper trail for almost 100 years, and this was by design. The voting fraud problem in the Northeast was ballot stuffing. Voting machines, by eliminating paper ballots were designed to eliminate this type of voter fraud. The voting machines were designed around voting procedures. A voter had to register before hand. They had to sign in. Their signature was compared to their signature on their original application. The voter was handed a ticket. They handed that to a poll worker who would place the ticket in the voting machine, and pull a big lever which unlocked the machine. The voter would enter the machine, pull another lever to close the curtains and vote. When they finished, they pulled the lever to open the curtains. This cast the ballot and locked the machine. Poll watchers oversaw the whole process.
This machine/procedure combination eliminated ballot stuffing. The voter could only vote a single time before the machine locked up. The poll worker couldn't unlock the machine without the poll watchers noticing. Voter counts were taken from the machine totals, the tickets on the machines, and the sign in list. Since the voting machines were purely mechanical, they were trusted by all parties. All parties could watch the machines being setup and make sure there were no problems. Poll watchers would run tests before the polls opened to verify the machines. This didn't kill the political machines which simply switched tactics, and it didn't entirely eliminate voting fraud, but it certainly helped.
What we need to do is set a procedure up to ensure that elections are fair. Ballots must be secured and watched over by all parties. In Zimbabwe, they counted the votes locally at the polls and posted the results at each poll. This prevents the ruling party from manipulating the ballots. You could go from poll to poll, and add up the election results yourself. We also must ensure that each voter votes only once, and that each voter's vote is totaled as they intended. That was the issue in Florida with the punch card system.
So, we need to think beyond the "technology" aspect of the voting. It isn't paper ballots are simply better. It's about ensuring that we have confidence in the tabulation of the votes and whether it truly reflects the view of the populous. So, think of how you'd secure the paper ballots, how they would be counted. Who would oversee the procedure? How would the ballot boxes be protected from additional votes being added? How do we ensure that voters only vote once and not sneak in additional ballots? How do we verify the ballots? How can we ensure the entire procedure is fair?
The problem with the current Diabold style voting machines is that they are mystery boxes and we cannot tell if they tabulate the vote fairly. We would have to ensure the firmware, the software, and hardware has not been tampered with. A paper trail can help since paper is easier to verify. But, paper is easy to duplicate, toss, and manipulate which is why the Northeast went to the mechanical paperless machines to begin with.
Unless you think of the entire voting process, and ensure the voting process is easy to verify, it doesn't matter how voters cast their ballots.
I can tell you exactly why this is so (Score:2)
There's nothing like having someone over your shoulder saying things like:
"How would this look if I had to explain this to an auditor?"
"If the auditor were to ask about this, what would I say?"
Banks will pay the extra money to secure an ATM because if we don't, we get screwed. Our board of directors finds
In defense of Diebold (Score:3, Insightful)
ATMs are the target of physical attacks far more often than voting machines are. ATMs are installed in unmonitored locations. Voting machines are not. The object of an attack on an ATM is to get the money out. Leaving evidence of damage behind isn't an issue with an ATM. OTOH, voting machines can be secured with simple tamper seals.
When was the last time you saw a surveillance video of a couple of yahoos chaining a voting machine to the back bumper of a pickup truck and dragging it away?
Re:ATM's are also more secure (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:ATM's are also more secure (Score:4, Insightful)
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I've only used an e-voting system a couple of times, but in every instance I was always visible to the voting officials. They couldn't see who I was voting for but they would have certainly noticed if I did anything other than tap the touch screen.
Physical security isn't really the problem. There are always election workers and volunteers in the proximity of the voting machines. What is a problem is that smoke and mirrors are used instead of openness. I want to understand exactly how the votes will b
Re:ATM's are also more secure (Score:5, Interesting)
The problem I have with these electronic voting machines is that their internals are completely closed! Understand that the state of Nevada has more strigent controls over it's slot machines than it's voting machines...
Note, I'm taking this content from an awesome graphic I found on the internet... Thanks to whomever came up with it!!!
Software:
Slot Machine: State of Nevada has access to all software. Illegal to use software that is not on file
Voting Machine: Software is a trade secret.
Spot Checking:
Slot Machine: State gaming inspectors show up unannounced at casinos to compare computer chips with those on file. If there is a discrepancy, the machien is shut down and investigated.
Voting Machine: No checks are required. Election officals have no "known good" to compare against.
Background Security:
Slot Machine: Manufacturers subjected to backgroundchecks. Employees are investigated for criminal records.
Voting Machine: Citizens have no way of knowing, for example, whether programmers have been confvicted of fraud or have conflict of interest issues.
Equipment Certification:
Slot Machine: By a public agency at arm's length from manufacturers. Public questions invited.
Voting Machine: By for-profit commpanies chosen adn paid by the manufacturers. No public information on how the testing is done.
Dispute Handling:
Slot Machine: Casino must contact the Gaming Control Board, which has investigators on call around the clock. They can open up machines to inspect internal mechanisms and records of recent gambling outcomes.
Voting Machine: In most cases, a voter's only recourse is to call a number at the board of elections and lodge a complaint.
I do understand that a slot machine and an ATM works in a much more hostile environment where people are constantly working to break the system.
However, our Democracy is more important than some ATM and thus any system that's put in place that becomes an arbitrator of our Democracy's citizens to choose their elected officals should be held to even a higher standard.
Re:ATM's are also more secure (Score:5, Insightful)
A voting machine that prints off a paper ballot which the voter deposits in a lockbox still seems the best option to achieve this.
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A voting machine need only verify the integrity of the data contained therein. This is a software problem, and one which has been solved many times over the years.
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A voting machine need only verify the integrity of the data contained therein. This is a software problem, and one which has been solved many times over the years.
The problem is still unsolved, as far as I know. There is no way to make sure, that all votes are counted free and equal, and that the individual voter can make sure that his individual vote is counted correctly, without making it obvious to someone else which single vote was his.
(The same is for instance unsolved for mechanical voting machines.)
The integrity that can be achieved by publicly sealing of the voting box, by publicly putting in the votes into the box and by publicly counting the ballots after
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Scantron Sheets in NH (Score:3, Insightful)
Quite frankly I don't see the need, under any circumstance, to get more complicated than this.
Simple voting procedure, quick electronic counting, and a clear & easily verifiable paper trail.
If you wanted multiple voting reciepts, then it would be a (relatively) simple matter to hook up a printer to spit out a copy/reciept of each ballot inserted- but I don't really think that's n
Re:ATM's are also more secure (Score:4, Insightful)
BTW: By voting machine I mean one that counts your ballot, not one that prints your ballot.
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With three sets of turnstyles, some marbles and some boxes you could have a virtually bullet-proof vote. First turnstyle you go through you show/type/swipe your ID and SSN. This shows you voted, and prevents you from voting more than once. Then you pick one marble
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It also much easier to check the validity of banking transaction than a vote, especially when you consider that votes are meant to be anonymous. In a banking transaction I know what I had previously, know the factor that is changing the amount and what I should be getting once it is complete. To do so with a vote which is essentially a bloc
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Uh, what? They spend a thousand dollars on a hammer, millions on a Bridge in Florida that can't be built, and you're talking about cost effectiveness of making voting machines secure?
You must be new here. To the US, I mean.
The physical security of the voting machines is the responsibility of the election judges. The electronic security is what is in question. If you had a human-readable paper ballot come out of the machine the electronic security wouldn't be such an issu
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Not to mention acknowledging that the outcome of your deliberate inputs will be essentially random chance. The odds that what you wanted done lines up with what a well funded lobbiest wants are about the same as hitting the jackpot.
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I'm testing this by putting in a carriage return after every sentence in this post.
Let's see how well it works.