Seeking The Source For Ireland's E-Voting System 291
WeeBull writes "Michael Cunningham from p45.net tried to request 'the source code of the electronic voting system first used in Ireland's May 2002 general election, plus any supporting technical documentation supplied to the Department of Environment and Local Government including the functional specifications' under Ireland's Freedom of Information legislation. The result wasn't what he expected ..."
Expectations (Score:5, Funny)
You mean he got everything he asked for, overnight, with no questions asked?
Re:Expectations (Score:5, Informative)
What he expected was that a) the government would hand over the source code or b) the government would find some excuse (e.g. security through obscurity) to not reveal the source. Well, it turns out the government doesn't have the source code: "The source code is held by the Nedap/Powervote [sic] and is not available in the Department of the Environment and Local Government."
Re:Expectations (Score:5, Insightful)
Given that there is a problem with such a system, how about shipping all of the votes off to a secret black box designed and built by a company in the Netherlands, which phones up a central computer and tells us who won the election?
There's a reason that votes are counted in public, and it's not just the entertainment value.
Re:Expectations (Score:4, Insightful)
There's a reason that votes are counted in public, and it's not just the entertainment value.
Sssh, you'll give them an idea for the next "reality TV" program.
Re:Expectations (Score:4, Informative)
Just before the last general election, I mentioned this to a party worker of the then Attorney General (he is now minister for justice), and was brushed aside. I also mentioned this to a friend of mine who is a labour party activist and normally acts as an election agent for some prominent TD's. He was more interested but when he queried HQ he was brushed aside.
So the solution is this, run as a TD or councillor (or president), and then demand the source code before counting proceeds. If you don't get it bring them to the high court. I know of a few barristers who are very unhappy with e-voting, for constitutional reasons, who could help you out.
By the way, currently many smaller parties run candidates in areas the know they will lose in simply to inspect the voting process. This is so they can gain data as to what areas are voting for what party, What the spoiled votes are saying etc.
JJ
Voters aren't interested parties? (Score:2)
I worked as a vote counter in Sweden a few timees, and I believe anyone has the right to go look at the process and control count the votes there. And, perhaps as a result, nobody ever does...
Re:Expectations (Score:3, Insightful)
Because many people, ignoring the evidence on their desktops, make the argument "it's a computer therefore it can't fail"
Many people (technical readers excluded) would be shocked at the idea of trusting one company to count votes, yet would see no problem with allowing a computer programmed by that company to count votes. They've been brought-up to believe that software is something yo
Re:Expectations (Score:2)
When I read that, I was stunned at the sheer stupidity of that. They're laying themselves open to all sorts of charges for breach of process.
One good thing (since I'm an Australian citizen) I didn't know before, however is that the electoral commission in ACT has provided the source to their voting system. Quite unusually enlightened for Australia. Here in Western Australia, e-voting hasn't been implemented, so I never thought to look...
in other news (Score:5, Funny)
In an unrelated matter, Bill Gates is now President despite not even being present on the ballot or this being an election year. George Bush was called a "sore loser" by the media; why can't he just accept that the recount clearly shows Gates ahead by 8 million votes?
Intel Voting (Score:2)
Due to the usage of voting machines with Intel Pentium microprocessors, the vote total was actually 520,000,000.996556 votes.
Re:Expectations (Score:2)
"And what? that's it? It wasn't expected and here's a million dollars...or It wasn't expected and here's your own space ship? I mean what the f"
Now that's creepy. (Score:5, Insightful)
Doesn't that mean that IF there was any fraud during the elections, that it is now impossible to prove whether or not it had to do with the software? Since the government doesn't have the actual code, any code they get from the authors in the future cannot be proven to be the code used in the election...
What a mess.
Re:Now that's creepy. (Score:5, Insightful)
Even more problems... (Score:4, Insightful)
I'd have to quit my job immediately (probabally not tell my employer that I'm quitting either, just not show up to work), grab my family, max my credit cards/home equity loans, donate my household furnishings to charity (like Salvation Army), and move to a non-extraditable country in a real hurry.
Really. I can't even imagine the legal BS you'd have to go under if something like this came up after an election was contested by powerful interests. If something like this had happened in Florida during the last U.S. Presidential election, people would have gone to jail, even if they had been completely honest and just "doing their job".
The best possible outcome in something like this is that the developer would be made the sacrificial lamb in the following witch hunt, given a felony criminal record, and serving a year or two in jail.
Well, the best outcome would be that the government would admit that it screwed up, and the company that made the elecion equipment would back the software developer throughout the whole legal mess that would still mean a couple of years of being a legal assistant rather than a software developer.
Maybe I'm just being paranoid, but I think with some of the past employers that I've had I would have been dumped immediately and the blame fixed straight on me. I've had to deal with lawyers as it is because of contract disputs, and I can't even imagine what it would be like in a public firestorm where this would really be an issue.
This DID happen in Florida elections - read Palast (Score:2, Informative)
See Greg Palast's site http://gregpalast.com/ It's in his book and you can download the relevant chapter CHAPTER 1. JIM CROW IN CYBERSPACE: The Unreported Story of How They Fixed the Vote in Florida at http://www.gregpalast.com/bestdemocracymoneycanbu y chapter1.pdf
His conclusions? The polititions are lining up to do
Source version control (Score:2)
I don't get the problem. This can be pretty easily accomplished with any number of
Re:Now that's creepy. (Score:2)
It could be different to the code used in the actual election.
Re:Now that's creepy. (Score:3, Funny)
Re:Now that's creepy. (Score:5, Informative)
this was the govt's response to a series of questions in the Dail
Security and integrity have been paramount in the design, testing and implementation of the electronic voting and counting system. Original tender submissions were assessed and the successful solution selected on the basis of, inter alia, functionality and product quality including hardware and software security and application of the count rules as in the case of a paper ballot. Detailed functional specifications, likewise, made extensive reference to security aspects of the system. The testing programme has been thorough and involved independent examination of the voting machine and voting machine software by a number of recognised international test institutes and private companies. The voting machine hardware and software has been tested by PTB, the National Institute for Science and Technology in Germany. Separate reports have been prepared by two test institutes in the Netherlands: TNO subjected the voting machine to a range of environmental tests and KEMA Quality BV tested the machine for compliance with international safety standards. An Irish company, PMI Software Ltd. carried out an architectural and code review of the system software. My Department also engaged the Electoral Reform Society in the UK, which has extensive experience of STV election counts, to test the software against its database of over 300 elections. The count software was, in addition, tested for functionality and accuracy both by my Department and a number of Dáil returning officers. Finally, in relation to vote counting, the system can produce, after the votes are mixed, vote tables to enable progress of the count to be monitored and also to trace a vote at any stage of the count. If necessary, following a High Court order in an election petition case, the system can also produce a ballot paper, with preferences, to allow a manual count to be carried out. At the general election and referendum pilots in 2002, the software was used under license from the supplier and at present, the source code is not available to the public. The software is currently being modified for use at the European and local elections in June 2004 and when this work has been completed and tested, I will give careful consideration to the making of the source code available. The Zerflow report, which was the subject of recent media reporting, was commissioned by my Department as an addition to the principal reports to which I have referred. The company was requested to carry out a security assessment of the procedures to be applied in the use of voting machines in polling stations to ensure that procedures proposed by the Department were adequate. The issues raised by the Zerflow report, which dealt mainly with possible threats to the external physical features of the voting machine, were assessed by my Department and by Nedap/Powervote - the machine manufacturers. The assessment by both was that the main scenario identified was implausible and that the likelihood of its occurrence without detection was extremely remote. I should emphasise that the version of the voting machine used in this country has more security features than the versions used in the Netherlands and Germany where the issues raised by Zerflow have not been identified in any risk assessments. In addition, the integrity of the Irish voting process is protected on polling day by a set of protocols operated by polling staff and the Gardai under the supervision of the returning officer. My Department will continue to keep these arrangements under review and will update advice provided to returning officers, as necessary, including advice in relation to the presence of audio, video or
In Belgium we have source code... so what? (Score:5, Informative)
In 1991 nobody except private company had the code.
In 1999 official expert asked for the state to own the code and suggest publishing it.
In 2000 they published partial code and documentation with most important security part removed.
In May 2003 they published full code (but no doc) of new system (AES added).
Feel free to download analyse and report problem to us [wiki.ael.be]
We have no way to check if that code was really in use. Because they use the same floppy disk to boot the system and to save the result, we have no way to make sure what was on the floppy at the begining of the election day. This is explained here [wiki.ael.be] but only in french.
But having the code is not enough... actually Richard Stallman had something to say [wiki.ael.be] about Free Software not being enough.
Now if you are Belgian and unhappy about the status of our election system, you can join or contact PourEVA [poureva.be].
I personally believe that if we want to reduce the repetitive task of counting the ballot, we could use optical scanning (and make test manual recount). But we should never put a computer between our vote and the expression of our vote. Paper and Pen rules.
Voting Machines in America (Score:4, Interesting)
http://www.americanfreepress.net/11_10_02/Secre
http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html
http://pub103.ezboard.com/fsoldiervoicefrm4.sho
Re:Voting Machines in America (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Voting Machines in America (clickable html) (Score:5, Informative)
Secret Group Manipulates Vote Machines [americanfreepress.net] - The widespread use of electronic voting machines has severely undermined the integrity of elections in the United States. Behind the companies that make the voting machines is a small and secretive group of men, including a well-known U.S. senator.
Voting machine companies: Ownership disclosure, "private" vote-counting codes, potential for manipulation [talion.com] - This is an article about just three things: disclosure, conflict of interest and potential for manipulation. It is not a conspiracy theory or a political point of view. I think you'll agree with me: We don't care who wins the election, as long as it's who was VOTED FOR.
Senator Hagel campaign treasurer owns voting machine co. [ezboard.com] - Election Systems & Software, the firm whose machines were involved in the 2002 flubbed Florida primary election(4)-- and the recent huge flub in Dallas, where early voting had to be shut down when machines kept registering Democratic votes as Republican (See the 31 mistakes link, top of page) and the company that now makes the voting machines for most of America--is a private company that does not like to tell the public who owns it.
Hagel (Score:2)
Even scarier - when President Bush was here a couple weeks ago, he and Hagel were total buddies.
I'd say we should expect Bush to 'win' the next election too. After all, Hagel's machines run Florida too and I doubt the Florida governor (Bush's brother) will call for much investigation into this severe breach of democratic trust.
Fuckin scary is all I think. I'll probably 'disappear' now, after posting
New U.S. House bill to require paper trail (Score:2)
U.S. House Bill to Require All Voting Machines To Produce A Voter-Verified Paper Trail [underreported.com]
Wow.. this is unusual (Score:5, Funny)
What kind of world are we living in?
Re:Wow.. this is unusual (Score:4, Insightful)
It needs to be auditable. It needs to be verifyable. To the full extent.
Look at the mess in Florida in the last US presidential elections. The system there worked as everything was on paper, so they just needed to go through all the ballot notes and re-count and re-evaluate them. After the extensive re-counts and press and public auditing of the result, it was found to be correct.
How can you do that audit if you don't know the system? And the only way to know a computer based system is to have all the information about it available, including source code.
Re:Wow.. this is unusual (Score:3, Interesting)
Whether or not the result was 'correct' is still open to debate in many parts. But that aside I recall the recount as being a lot more involved than just a simple recounting of ballots. Have we al
Re:Wow.. this is unusual (Score:3, Insightful)
If the voting machine prints out a piece of paper that says unambiguously in black and white (in text, and maybe a cryptographically signed barcode) exactly whose vote it represents, then you can't have that kind of situation unless the voting machine is tampered with or broken (and since the voter can look at the piece of paper it prints before they put it in the ballot box, they can verify that it's (at last in plain text) givi
Re:Wow.. this is unusual (Score:2)
My impression (partially garnered from Michael Moore's 'stupid white men', a biased source) is that the recounting was stopped. either by court-order or by Al Gore's request - can't remember which.
Re:Wow.. this is unusual (Score:2, Flamebait)
Re:Wow.. this is unusual (Score:2)
After the extensive re-counts and press and public misunderstanding of the problem, a judge friend of Bush's ordered that they stop bothering and declare Bush the winner, ignoring overwhelming public
Paper and Pencil (Score:5, Interesting)
imagineable. Paper and pencil. Votes are counted by hand, with peer
review, faxed in and published in detail in the newspapers.
So far we didn't have any real problems with fraud, ambiguous votes or
anything like that. And the results are usually in by the evening or the next
day.We have like 70 million inhabitants and I don't see a reason why this
shouldn't scale up.
So is there any real reason to replace that with a system that is not
transparent and where you have to blindly trust some tech companies?
I suggest a minor change (Score:4, Funny)
See, the source code for Germany's voting system is open source, and I quickly saw a potential problem and proposed a solution.
Re:I suggest a minor change (Score:2)
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2, Funny)
Of course: because we all know that "The computer doesn't lie.
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:4, Informative)
So looks like its already in use in Germany dude...sorry
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:4, Funny)
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2, Interesting)
A 5-years old child must fully understand a vote system.
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:3, Informative)
There were two people in the row before me and both were having problems using the new system. Maybe it's the panic of computer-illerate people which does arise as soon as they are put in front of a screen. The first person did just seem to be unsure with the instructions and needed several questions to the voting o
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
transparent and where you have to blindly trust some tech companies?
One reason might be to reduce the cost of voting so that you could afford more votes - closer to "people power". Another would be to allow more sophisticated voting systems. The Irish voting system, as I understand it, involves some complicated arithmetic on reallocating "surplus" votes after a candidate has reached the threshold for election. The sort of thing which is
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
imagineable. Paper and pencil. Votes are counted by hand, with peer
review, faxed in and published in detail in the newspapers.
The only reason this is still done in most parts of the country is the inability of Germans to go with the time and finaly get a decent voting machine do the work. No, as long as one can get voluntary helpers who have nothing to do than to count thousands of ballots in the night to the next monday everything is jus
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
All that verifies is what you punched in. It does nothing to verify that there has been no skullduggery prior to announcement of the result. The counting of votes is supposed to be a public process.
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
However I do think Kohl's endorsement of a German cookbook was a good idea (mmm, calories!)
Vote volume (Score:2)
I worked in the similiar Swedish vote counting system a few times, and it works very well producing results that are almost certainly exactly correct, and verifiably so. But it is a lot of work. And we only do exactly three elections every four years.
Bear in mind that the typical American voter can have 50 or more elections to vote in every single year, and you start to see the problem. Plus that at that voting volume, you have to cons
50 elections !?! (Score:2)
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2, Informative)
A few weeks later, the NSDAP got the Ermächtigungsgesetz (authorization bill) through the Reichstag: The parliament decided
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
The President (powers pretty much symbolic, but he could ask a party to try and form a government) thought he could work with Hitler.
With the economy in that mess, some of the other parties also thought that they could, and even went along with emergency legislation to kick the Communists (16.4 %) and the Social Democrats (19.9 %) out.
Now the extreme right had the majority. Game o
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
Actually, it were the Communists (I think they merged with Social Democrats) who formed the government with NSDAP. Some time later, when the Reichstag burned down, Hitler accused Communists for setting it on fire and got rid of them.
As for reasons why the Communists went in the same boat with NSDAP, Vikt
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
Actually, it were the Communists (I think they merged with Social Democrats) who formed the government with NSDAP.
Either my history-book is telling enormous whoppers on that front, or both assertions are without foundation.
Some time later, when the Reichstag burned down, Hitler accused Communists
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
(Insert something about /. and checking facts here)
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
Re:Paper and Pencil (Score:2)
No, both statements are wrong. The coalition was formed with the DNVP, and the SPD never merged voluntarily with the Communists.
What you may be thinking of is the so-called "negative coalition", which described the situation when the government was democratic (SPD + Zentrum), but didn't have enough votes in the Reichstag to pass laws. Together NSDAP and KPD (=Communists) would block everythi
Re:no (Score:2)
this gets claimed regularly here (Slashdot), it is not true.
I just tried to put the results up here, but the Slashdot Lameness Filter killed every attempt, tables are not accepted and an unordered list contained too many spaces.
In the critical election, the Nazis got 32.2 %, down from 37.8 % (a loss of around 2 Million votes). Another extreme right party rose from 6.1 % to 8.6 %. Forget the
Re:no (Score:2)
On 5 March 1933, the NSDAP-DNVP coalition [holocaust-education.dk] gained an absolute majority in the Reichstag (43.9% and 8.0% respectively). You can find the NSDAP's election results [wikipedia.org] at Wikipedia.
Re:no (Score:2)
The figures I have are based on the number of seats each party had in the Reichstag - not the votes. My percent figures are actually higher than yours in each case - the Nazis had 44.5 % of the seats with (your links say) 43.9 % of the vote.
Yes - I should have loo
uselections2004.c (Score:4, Funny)
#include <bomb_iraq.h>
#include <freeoil.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int bushvotes;
int othervotes;
int vote*;
main(){
if(vote* == othervotes++){
printf("Vote VOID");
othervotes--;
bushvotes++;
}
for (florida_votes; florida_votes<bushvotes(florida))
othervotes--
}
}
Re:uselections2004.c (Score:4, Funny)
Dude, get over it already! He won the election! It's been THREE YEARS!
Re:uselections2004.c (Score:3, Insightful)
Never Worked For Me (Score:5, Funny)
It didn't give me the expected result either....
Re:Never Worked For Me (Score:2)
I've known some pretty manly CS women, some pretty womanly CS men, and a lot that fall somewhere in between... but none were at such an extreme to deserve the "it" pronoun.
Or maybe you're just bitter. =)
Why is this such a surprise? (Score:5, Interesting)
And I wonder what software they use in the Dail to record the proceedings?
This is why we need free software. It's not just for fun after all.
Re:Why is this such a surprise? (Score:2)
The site www.irlgov.ie is running Microsoft-IIS/5.0 on Windows 2000
And guess what - they reboot it every day! See the graph...
Minutes of Selection Committee choosing e-voting (Score:5, Interesting)
Interesting quote: "The integrity of the electoral process will be assured for both the electorate and candidates"
Not all of the electorate it would seem.
Further on in the document
[emphasis mine]
"(2) No equipment may be approved for the purposes of subsection (1) unless a full technical description of the said equipment (including all source code and information regarding independent testing and verification relating thereto) has been laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas and a resolution approving a draft of the order approving the said equipment has been passed by each such House.".
Intesting hey?
Thats just one of the committee's opinion - and it looks like they got slapped down - but if I was Irish, I'd be finding out who this Mr Gilmore was & voting for him.
Re:Minutes of Selection Committee choosing e-votin (Score:4, Interesting)
Hopefully (I am too cynical to say "presumably") the source will be made available on the pruchase of the full system. While this is less than ideal, it's a start. Incidentally, the relevant quote about making the source public is given in one of the posts above.
My gripe with this system is the choice of underlying system that is being used. I shit you not, it is a custom Windows embedded, and the database is a modified Access one. That thought does not fill me with confidence
Re:Minutes of Selection Committee choosing e-votin (Score:2)
Quoting from the article I linked before:
Mr. Gilmore: I move amendment No. 39:
In page 33, between lines 15 and 16, to insert the following subsection:
"(2) No equipment may be approved for the purposes of subsection (1) unless a full technical description of the said equipment (including all source code and information regarding independent testing and verification relating thereto) has been laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas and a resolution approving a d
Re:Minutes of Selection Committee choosing e-votin (Score:2)
software used in belgians elections (Score:5, Interesting)
http://www.verkiezingen.fgov.be/Nouveau/NieuwNl/D
(clik on one of the three software systems and then on 'Hier')
Re:software used in belgians elections (Score:2, Insightful)
Check the code for yourself [wiki.ael.be]
Let's spare time... (Score:2, Funny)
It would be as in the XVIIth century with the King choosen by God. Easy and cheap!
Then we can proceed to the next logical step: the revolution.
our new king (Score:2, Funny)
last week's voting in .BE: source was available (Score:4, Informative)
Re:last week's voting in .BE: source was available (Score:2, Interesting)
But 9 peaples can not verify a lot... and when they make advice to modify the existing system, they are not followed. Here is an analyse of the rapport of year 2000 [wiki.ael.be]
My mother is not an expert... who should she trust to control the election?
Normal citizen lost control of the election process... it this a democracy?
No need for commercial confidentiality (Score:4, Interesting)
Bit in this special cas, that doesn't apply. If every suppier of voting software has to provide the source of their system, any supplier who thinks he has lost a contract to a ripoff of his own system can obtain the source code and check it. Piracy would be trivially easy to expose, and a powerful ally (the Government) under pressure to clean up the electoral system.
So the usual excuse of Commercial Confidentiallity does not apply, and and any seller hiding behind it should be excluded from the tender.
Re:No need for commercial confidentiality (Score:3, Interesting)
It's no good proving the pr
More Details (Score:5, Informative)
For General Elections (to the Dail - main parliment) Ireland has a multiseat-Proportional Representaion election system - meaning there are more than one seats available in each constituency.
Firstly each voter can vote in order of preference for every candidate - For example say there are 10 candidates for three seats (my case last election) You can vote in order of 1 to 10.
PR works by counting first how many ballots are cast, dividing by some ammount (IIRC Number of seats + 1). This is set as the "quota". Then counting takes place. Once a candiate reaches the quota they are deemed elected. Then the amount of votes over the quota is distributed to the other candates, going on the next choice of the voters concerned.
If no one reaches the quota, the person(s) with the least votes accrued currently are eliminated, and their votes are distributed to the remaining candidates.
This is a complicated system and electronic counting would be an advantage - sometimes it can take up to a week to recount a constituncy, last time there were three recounts in one case, with the final seat going to the candidate with three more votes than the other!
Electronic voting was used last time in three places, with the results out the night of the election, rather than a day or two later. This lead to some problems when a sitting TD (equiv MP) lost her seat, and was told rather cruely, normally you get the results of each count so you are prepared for the result, long in advance of the declaration.
In my opinion, ideally Electronic voting is the way to go. However I don't trust the machines or the companies who make them, regardless of the published nature of the code. It would be very difficult to catch fraud taking place, and personally I like the current method (pen and paper). It is very satisifing putting a 10 beside the candidate who you hate
tom.
Re:More Details (Score:2)
Firstly each voter can vote in order of preference for every candidate - For example say there are 10 candidates for three seats (my case last election) You can vote in order of 1 to 10.
PR works by counting first how many ballots are cast, dividing by some ammount (IIRC Number of seats + 1). This is set as the "quota". Then counting takes place. Once a candiate reaches the quota they are deemed elected. Then the amount of votes over the quota is distributed to the other candates, going on the next choice
Re:More Details (Score:2)
"Both of these ways of fixing such an ellection would be impractical in a paper system, but quite easy in an electronic black box."
The anomaly whereby the order of the ballots can (theoretically) affect the outcome of the count does not apply in the electronic system, as far as I'm aware. This is because the computer can perform operations which are considered too time-consuming for manual counters, e.g. allocating third and subsequent preferences in proportion to all a candidate's ballots, rather than
Wisconsin Election Board decertified Touchscreens (Score:4, Interesting)
In January, 2002 the State Elections Board approved two closed source touch screen voting systems, the ES&S Votronic DRE and the GBS Accu-Touch EBS 100 DRE.
This spring I raised the system integrity issues with the Board, and persuaded them to revoke the certifications. [state.wi.us]
Not enough. (Score:3, Insightful)
Why would we want the source code in the first place? It's probably not motivated by a GPL-like desire to build on it; rather, it's an attempt to verify the validity, honesty, or security of the code involved.
But at the point where one is concerned about a grand conspiracy to rig national elections and control the government, viewing the source is not nearly enough.
Imagine that we vote electronically in ominous black boxes once per year, and the boxes tell us who our leaders are. You request the source code to these voting machines, and the government gives you some source code. As far as you can tell, it's valid. But what guarantee do you have that that code is actually running the black boxes?
As I see it, there are three main possible points of failure. The manufacturers of the boxes could distribute the machines with false election code pre-installed, the government could substitute such malware to remain in office, or a technician specializing in the repair of the machines could covertly substitute the code. The three are not equiprobable, but in any of the three cases, requesting the source code does not address the problem. Even if you mandated that the boxes themselves display their own code, quinelike, on a screen before you vote, you still have no guarantee that the code displayed is the code in operation.
How is this any worse than a system of punch-cards or a mechanical voting box? Because these other mechanisms are hard-wired and validated locally before the election commences. Re-wiring them on a massive scale is not feasible. The same is not true of a more versatile solution like electronic voting; such could be rigged to behave correctly in all pre-election tests and revert to its more insidious behavior on election day during polling hours.
If you're worried about a conspiracy, requesting the source code is not nearly enough. You'd need a system designed specifically to thwart tampering, even by its creators. And even so, you can only solve for one or maybe two of the possible points of failure. Allowing electronic black box voting assumes a certain amount of trust in the system. I don't know how much trust is necessary, but if one is worried enough to request source code, one shouldn't accept the voting method to begin with.
Where's the proof? (Score:3, Interesting)
Now that's just stupid (Score:2)
Re:Where's the proof? (Score:2)
Any claim that OSS is bug-free due to its nature is horse manure.
However, I'm more inclined to believe OSS is more secure, . It's not a question of 'no bugs in the code', but rather of how fast those bugs are found, and of how many of them are discovered.
Its a matter of obfuscation vs education. (Score:2)
The problem is self made and perpetuated by history. It's the difference between a simple lever which punches a hole in a piece of paper and which anyone can see and understand, and the incredibly bull-shit filled explanations of the process that most comp-sci majors will come up with to explain the code.
Every mistake that can be made in describing the specifications, the code, the inputs or the results will be made. From anthropomorphization to bald-faced
Where to look (Score:2)
The government's own guide to the electronic voting system [environ.ie] has this to say on the source code:
will someone educate me? (Score:3, Interesting)
Are we talking about the interface software included in this count? Because last time I thought about it, it doesn't take 200,000 lines of code to place a ticket in one of several bins...
And in this country... (Score:3, Interesting)
Now recounts and audits are being barred so as not to violate the "privacy and trade secrets" of the the company whose software is used to count the votes. Check out some of the excellent commentary on this issue by "Thom Hartmann" [thomhartmann.com] at:
"If You Want To Win An Election, Just Control The Voting Machines" [commondreams.org]
"Now Your Vote Is The Property Of A Private Corporation" [commondreams.org]
An excerpt: (credit to Thomm Hartmann)
"Chuck Hagel was re-elected to his second term in the United States Senate on November 5, 2002 with 83% of the vote. That represents the biggest political victory in the history of Nebraska. What Hagel's website fails to disclose is that about 80 percent of those votes were counted by computer-controlled voting machines put in place by the company affiliated with Hagel. Built by that company. Programmed by that company.
"When Charlie Matulka (the opponent) requested a hand count of the vote in the election he lost to Hagel, his request was denied because Nebraska has a just-passed law that prohibits government-employee election workers from looking at the ballots, even in a recount. The only machines permitted to count votes in Nebraska, he said, are those made and programmed by the corporation formerly run by Hagel.
Scary?
-Scott
What I would like to see (Score:4, Insightful)
Missing the Point (Score:3, Insightful)
Australian system source code (Score:4, Interesting)
It's quite simple. Intentionally, as the ACT states in their design goals (http://www.elections.act.gov.au/EVACS.html). The source includes the client and server application components--160 files and 12739 lines of very straigtforward C. (Of course, that doesn't include the OS/libs.)
I've browsed through a fair bit of the code, and everything I've seen is GPL. Ensuring accessibility to software used for public elections is, I think, a Very Good Thing. (I wouldn't mind seeing a law that required all election software be GPL'd.)
Trustable Code (Score:3, Interesting)
I think that we in the Free/Liberated software world (and to a lesser extent the Open Source world) should come up with a way of running cryptographically signed code on our preferred operating systems. I know that most of you equate signed code with Digital Rights Management (DRM) but that is only one use and not necessarily a bad one. There are many other times when making sure the code that you are running is the code that you want to be running and not some Trojanized version.
From a DRM perspective, would it be such a bad thing to have code that is signed run on a Linux machine? For the people that want to pirate movies and music this is obviously NOT a good thing; but for the rest of us it could be. The reason that we cannot watch a DVD legally on our Linux boxes is because the DVD-CCA won't allow anyone to write a player and distribute the source code. If there was a way to verify that a program was running in an unaltered state then I see no reason that the DVD-CCA would not allow us to produce a Free Software player for Linux. They could be assured that the player would only play the movie and not make an un-encrypted copy of it because the program would refuse to run if it had been modified.
Another use for such a system would be online games. Cheats have almost destroyed some of the online gaming communities by giving programmers and script kiddies an overwhelmingly unfair advantage over those that play fair.
Getting back to the topic at hand, if it were possible to run cryptograpphically signed code on Linux then it would be possible to construct an electronic voting system where ALL of the code is available. This would eliminate the possibility of an obscure bug in either Micro$aft's operating system or database server either tainting the results, or worse, being exploited to influence the results of the election. I believe what we need is an electronic voting system where:
- The source code can be audited.
- The voter is given a piece of paper confirming his/her vote.
- The paper trail is cryptographically signed so we can tell if the paper was altered.
- The paper could be fed back into a machine that could recover the votes cast thereby ensuring the voter that his/her voate was recorded correctly.
This would also have the advantage of saving the taxpayers a lot of money. Not only could we run the program on commodity hardware but we could port the program to all of the languages of the world that are used in either a Democracy or a Republic. This would enable voting to take place in many third world countries that cannot afford to produce a program for electronic voting. Further the system could be used by the illiterate as they could be presented with pictures of the candidate and simply touch their favorite.I don't know if this is even possible from a technical perspective. If I can go into the kernel code (or the device driver code) then I could probably find some way around the protections. But I still think the goal of being able to run cryptographically signed code, that is released under the GPL w/ source, would be beneficial to all of the members of the Free/Liberated software community.
Keep paper but use technology (Score:4, Interesting)
The Irish Lotto (nation Lottery) is an example of such a paper/electronic hybrid system in operation.
The current system is analogous to having our votes shipped abroad, counted using an unknown system, by persons unknown with no outside review allowed. Having all the votes shredded and then a final answer announced with no possibility for recount.
Its amazing, when it comes to technology people in general are so clueless. Even very fundamental changes in the workings of our democracy can be changed with very little resistence.
Impossible to vote RON electronically? (Score:3, Interesting)
This isn't directly related to the post, but I'm wondering whether electronic voting stops people from deliberately spoiling their ballot.
In the UK, we still use a paper voting system in general elections, and I (and a number of friends) have deliberately spoilt our ballot papers in past elections, to indicate a RON vote (Re-Open Nominations -- basically, we believe that all of the candidates listed are total wankers, and want other people to stand instead.)
It would be a damn shame if the ability to vote RON is lost, since there will be no other way for people to register their disgust with the slime presenting itself for election.
Who was it who said that the best person for King/President/Emperor was the one who didn't want the job?
that's not all... (Score:3, Informative)
Of course, this should have rendered any vote counted while the machine was on the network null and void, but the media dropped the ball and the opposition parties weren't IT-savvy enough to realise what a big deal they could have made of it.
Re:Not a surprise (Score:2)
I suppose electronic voting could make this process easier.
Please check option a or b, and every time you press b a dialog pops up 'invalid entry, please choose another option'.
Re:Not a surprise (Score:2)
Re:Not a surprise (Score:2)
"Electronic Voting (while at the same time, eliminating "exit polls" which might have shown a different picture) allowed the Irish Government to obtain large "YES" votes in heavily populated areas that typically vote the party line, though not usually in numbers large enough to outnumber the rural population"
Given that five times more money was spent by the Yes campaign than the No campaign [www.rte.ie], why bother with a conspiracy theory?
In any case, yours doesn't hold up to even the most rudimentary checking of
Re:Spending money getting it written?? (Score:2)
If you buy a car it's already built by the time you buy it. OK, so you pay back the debt they were in due to building the car, or pay for the next one to be built. Still, your argument has no merit.
Re:Bush won, Gore lost, get over it! (Score:3, Informative)
However, Job Bush systematcially attempted to 'cleanse' the voting lists, in direct contradiction of a court order (See page 34 of The Best Deomocracy Money Can Buy, by G