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The Courts Government Your Rights Online News

Eldred Wins... in Mock Trial 15

anewsome writes "Yale Law School students conducted a mock Eldred v. Ashcroft trial, heard before judges Hugh Bownes on the First Circuit, John Walker Jr. on the Second, and Morris Arnold on the Eighth. Surprise: Eldred Won. Check out the full story here. In related news, here's a terrific Recorder piece on the debate over the IP section of ABA taking sides in the case."
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Eldred Wins... in Mock Trial

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  • ...to see how the real decision turns out. I actually think the retroactive portion of the law will be declared unconstitutional, but if not I'm very interested in seeing how the decision is phrased to justify the "promote the progress of science and the useful arts" clause.
  • precedent (Score:4, Informative)

    by anthony_dipierro ( 543308 ) on Wednesday May 08, 2002 @10:17PM (#3488486) Journal

    Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said it in Feist v. Rural Telephone [bitlaw.com], and 5 of the current Supreme Court Justices (Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter) joined:

    The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."

    Justice Stevens said it in the majority opinion of SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. [cornell.edu], and the current Supreme Court Justice O'Connor joined:

    The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.

    Even the dissent of Sony Corp. v. Universal City Sutdios, Inc., to which Justice Renquist joined, echos:

    The purpose of copyright protection, in the words of the Constitution, is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in `Science and the useful Arts.'" Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S., at 156 ; Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 -128 (1932); see H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909).

    There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to promote. An obvious example is the researcher or scholar whose own work depends on the ability to refer to and to quote the work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could create a new work if he were first required to repeat the research of every author who had gone before him. 28 The scholar, like the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain with each copyright owner for permission to quote from or refer to prior works. But there is a crucial difference between the scholar and the ordinary user. When the ordinary user decides that the owner's price is too high, and forgoes use of the work, only the individual is the loser. When the scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own [464 U.S. 417, 478] work suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to knowledge. The scholar's work, in other words, produces external benefits from which everyone profits. In such a case, the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy - albeit at the first author's expense - to permit the second author to make limited use of the first author's work for the public good. See Latman Fair Use Study 31; Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982). [....] I recognize, nevertheless, that there are situations where permitting even an unproductive use would have no effect on the author's incentive to create, that is, where the use would not affect the value of, or the market for, the author's work. Photocopying an old newspaper clipping to send to a friend [464 U.S. 417, 482] may be an example; pinning a quotation on one's bulletin board may be another. In each of these cases, the effect on the author is truly de minimis. Thus, even though these uses provide no benefit to the public at large, no purpose is served by preserving the author's monopoly, and the use may be regarded as fair.

    Now someone, please, explain to me how extending the monopoly granted on an already created work promotes the progress of science and the useful arts.

  • by akb ( 39826 )
    I was surprised that the ABA would take a position on a political issue like this. I could understand if the ABA would take a position about a law being good or bad as it effected the practice of the law. The only effect longer copyright has on the practice of law is more fees for IP lawyers. That the article essentially admitted this lays stark the raw greed that motivated the Mickey Mouse Protection Act.

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