Ex-TEPCO Officials To Be Indicted Over Fukushima 76
AmiMoJo writes: Three former executives of Tokyo Electric Power Company will face mandatory indictment over the March 2011 nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. The prosecution inquest panel of randomly-selected citizens voted for the indictment on Friday, for professional negligence resulting in death and injury. "Tokyo prosecutors in January rejected the panel's judgment that the three should be charged, citing insufficient evidence. But the 11 unidentified citizens on the panel forced the indictment after a second vote, which makes an indictment mandatory. The three are former chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata, 75, and former executives Sakae Muto, 65, and Ichiro Takekuro, 69. Citizens' panels, made up of residents selected by lottery, are a rarely used but high-profile feature of Japan's legal system introduced after World War Two to curb bureaucratic overreach."
better late than never (Score:3)
The evidence is pretty clear that a lax attitude and cozy government-corporate-regulatory environment made this disaster much worse than it had to be. I am sure that they will all get off without any significant penalties or jail time, but at least they are going to have to go through the court system.
Re:better late than never (Score:5, Insightful)
You gonna charge them with crating a Tsunami? One that exceeded estimates by Government Officials?
Seems they have Witch Hunts in Japan too...
The idea isn't to charge them with the cause of the disaster, but with more than a little incompetence that they displayed afterwards - not to mention the often blatant lies they told to the public during the aftermath. Examples include publicly chewing out the Daiichi site supervisor for using seawater to keep the surviving reactors cooled down when that was pretty much all he had to use (given the alternative? Yeah, I'd piss on the things if it helped). Other examples include sending needed cooling water to the Daini site... in drinking water bottles. There's a whole host of other bork-ups, and the blame for the vast majority of them lies squarely on the execs in Tokyo.
Besides, I do respect one thing about the Japanese - when the shit hits the fan, the leaders are the first to take blame, and go out of their way to not pass the blame downhill unnecessarily. Up and down the chain, folks take responsibility for what they do (or don't do). Wouldn't hurt to see some of that attitude on this side of the Pacific...
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The idea isn't to charge them with the cause of the disaster, but with more than a little incompetence that they displayed afterwards - not to mention the often blatant lies they told to the public during the aftermath. Examples include publicly chewing out the Daiichi site supervisor for using seawater to keep the surviving reactors cooled down when that was pretty much all he had to use (given the alternative? Yeah, I'd piss on the things if it helped). Other examples include sending needed cooling water to the Daini site... in drinking water bottles. There's a whole host of other bork-ups, and the blame for the vast majority of them lies squarely on the execs in Tokyo.
So what? What's so special about your accusations that the level of "blame" rises to that of public humiliation? I think instead we see here a prime example of why the culture of responsibility, that Japan is or perhaps was famous for, has such a hard time taking root on "this side of this Pacific". Namely, that a certain culture is far more interested in assigning blame even to the point of blowing minor missteps out of proportion such as you do above, than in taking responsibility or respecting those who
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I'll just leave this right here... [rt.com]
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Re: better late than never (Score:1)
The examples given are not minor missteps in any way. When operating reactors of this type and a cooling failure leaves you with only the option of killing the reactor permanently (boron injection, sea water, or any other last-ditch effort that will damage the reactor beyond repair), it is of absolute importance that the operators in charge have the authority to do this. There must be no question about who has that authority. The threshold is high enough as it is, since the operators know that they will suf
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Do you know anything about what happened in the months after the Tsunami?
Yes. For example, I know about the huge rush to judgment. I also know that the accident was successfully contained.
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For varying definitions of successfully contained given all the radiation that poured into the ocean and polluted soil for miles around the plant. Let us also not forget that they were warned to raise their generators higher off the ground. The new specifications would have prevent the failure in the first place and we'd still have a nuclear power pant if they had spent the money when it mattered.
"Warned" by who? And how credible were these warnings? I know you think you know the difference between foresight and hindsight. But you don't. You have to understand when people knew what and how fast a very conservative bureaucracy responds to newly exposed risks.
Here's my understanding of the timeline for the tsunami risk assessment. From previous discussions on Slashdot, I gather it was realized before the earthquake that the risk of much higher tsunami had been underestimated. But this risk wasn't
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But it does create a bunch of opportunity for the government to shut down your business on grounds of not taking legally sufficient precautions against underage access. It's a balancing act of liability for credit card fraud vs. liability for fines for noncompliance.
No, it didn't. From Wikipedia, the highest operating estimate is 800 PBq versus 5200 PBq. Further, 80% of that radiation is thought to have fallen in the ocean. So that looks like less than 1/30th the release of Chernobyl on land.
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In short, they were warned by scientists, and failed to take action.
Re:better late than never (Score:5, Interesting)
Actually the points of contention here are:
1. Emergency pumps were marked as checked, but were not actually checked.
2. Diesel backup generators were probably not checked as they experienced a cascade failure when powered on.
3. Post could have been dealt with better (though this is likely more the fault of former P.M. Kann).
4. Company may have mis-used disaster management emergency funds / officials did not act in a responsible manner (EG officials did not take pay cuts / officials did not start working extra hours / generally officials did not show enough responsibility).
Particularly #4 should be looked at as there have been accidents at nuclear plants before - all previous cases had officials immediately responding to the issues ON SITE and seeing the solutions to completion personally. Companies like Touhoku Electric and Chubu Electric have shown extremely responsible oversight to the point of their CEO's taking extreme personal risks to remedy any problems and constantly going beyond government requirements for all safety measures. TEPCO on the other hand seems to be run by greedy d-bags.
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When Japanese prosecutors bring charges on their own initiative, they win convictions more than 99 percent of the time, but cases forced on them by citizens’ review panels are different. Almost by definition, they involve charges that prosecutors saw little hope of proving.
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Re:better late than never (Score:5, Interesting)
I do kind of wonder about one thing, though... why are the engineers who designed that beast not being indicted? After all, nearly all of the vital pumps and generators were in the basements of both the Daiichi and Daini sites, with much of the critical equipment right next to the water, instead of uphill where they should have been (and at least not in basements... WTH, people?)
The Daini site lucked out big-time, with a monumental effort by the crews there to run enough cable from the few generators they still had working to the pumps which needed the juice - something like 2 miles of cable had to be scrounged and tied together.
BTW, props to the operators and supervisors onsite - for instance, the idea of scrounging car batteries and tying them together with inverters so that they could get the control panels back up was pretty genius. Same with having a special firefighting team from Tokyo come in to keep the storage pools full of water. At both sites they were stuck with having to come up with creative ways to avoid things from getting as bad as they could have.
I think that with a couple of design changes (both to the reactors and to the rest of the plant) they could have survived much better off than they were.
All that said, I don't think anyone could have predicted the size and scope of the tsunami that hit them. The TEPCO execs should still have to face a bit of music though (for instance, one site operator asking for 4,000 liters of water for a cooling pool and getting 4,000 bottles of drinking water instead? Damn, y'all...)
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Thanks for the infos. More details in the following article:
"How the Other Fukushima Plant Survived"
https://hbr.org/2014/07/how-the-other-fukushima-plant-survived/ar/1
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All nukes need to be near water. All (or almost) all sources of water can overflow their normal height. Ergo putting generators in the basement is never a good idea.
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I do kind of wonder about one thing, though... why are the engineers who designed that beast not being indicted? After all, nearly all of the vital pumps and generators were in the basements of both the Daiichi and Daini sites,
Yeah, now go research what area residents thought about putting generators on pylons, where they would have had to be in order to be useful in this incident. They didn't want them there. Wonder how they feel now?
The truth is that engineers will always say "this is what we need to do" and then bean counters or executives or lawyers get involved and say "well this is what we're doing so work it out" and then you can either feed your family or quit and maintain your principles and oh by the way, about that rec
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Putting generators on pylons is a tremendous oversimplification of what would be needed to design to withstand a tsunami. Generators are useless when all the distribution and control systems are also deluged. Placing large heavy generators on pylons makes them more susceptible to earthquakes. How high do you go?
Plants are designed for floods up to a certain level. It is up to the siting analysis to determine where you can place the plant and auxiliaries,
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Putting generators on pylons is a tremendous oversimplification of what would be needed to design to withstand a tsunami.
In this case, it probably would have done the job; emergency power would have been available to keep things running.
Plants are designed for floods up to a certain level. It is up to the siting analysis to determine where you can place the plant and auxiliaries
You know the site was actually lowered substantially to make construction cheaper, right?
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In this case, it probably would have done the job; emergency power would have been available to keep things running.
Like I said, you don't depend on 'probably'. And you don't know if the pylons would have held up to a tsunami if you didn't postulate it to begin with. If you did postulate it, you simply don't put the pant there.
You know the site was actually lowered substantially to make construction cheaper, right?
Which is part of the siting and site analysis process that failed to keep a plant that was not designed to be hit by a tsunami out of the path of a tsunami.
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Which is part of the siting and site analysis process that failed to keep a plant that was not designed to be hit by a tsunami out of the path of a tsunami.
It's the post-bean-counter phase of design. Engineers find a site which will work, bean counters fuck it all up, just like I said.
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It's the post-bean-counter phase of design. Engineers find a site which will work, bean counters fuck it all up, just like I said.
Was it bean counters, or design engineers, or environmental engineers, or geologists, that underestimated the tsunami potential?
Someone said the lower elevation was safe. In the end, it came down to mischaracterization of the tsunami threat. Either way, the plant should have never been sited where it was.
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How do you prosecute people for not forseeing a double-whammy overcoming triple redundancy?
Japan is known for both earthquakes and tsunami, I hardly think the event was unanticipated. They merely decided that a lower level of protection was cheaper and they'd probably be long gone from that organization before any negative events occurred. Hurrah for focusing on quarterly profits over safety!
Re:better late than never (Score:5, Informative)
Actually, the generators being under was not the problem. You can run generators underwater, provided you have a source for fuel and air above water and can keep it reasonably water tight.
The real problem was the distribution gear got flooded.
As in the electrical panels. Once the tsunami flooded the panels, they shorted out. The generators were running just fine with the water level, and even then, the generators were a backup to a backup.
The first thing is if the reactors go offline, the power station draws power from the grid to run the equipment. And the plant was doing that since there was still power going in. That's the first backup. The second backup is if the grid power goes offline, then you have local generators.
All of which means diddly when your electrical distribution panels get soaked and short out your switchgear, taking with it BOTH backup mechanisms. So now it doesn't matter that the generators or grid power was available - the panel's shorted out and you can't use either system.
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Even with the loss of the generators and distribution panels there was still a backup option. They used pump trucks to inject water into the system for emergency cooling. They were in place and operating in time to avert a major disaster, but a critical valve was in the wrong position so the pumped water ended up in storage tanks instead of the reactor cooling system. The valve could not be checked because the monitoring equipment was damaged, and damage to the plant made physical inspection difficult.
The r
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Several reactors in the United States are BWR Mark I [nrc.gov] containments. Newer designs have enhanced safety measures, and there have been many upgrades since the accident, but they can operate safely for design basis accidents. The tsunami was far beyond design basis.
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Even if you can technically run generators underwater if all the stars are aligned, it's hardly what you want to plan for is it? How do you do repairs on a generator underwater?
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The answer to your question is simple. The plant rode out the initial event (earthquake) with no problem. The site's diesel generators did, in fact, start on loss of off-site power and picked up load. All systems functioned as designed post-trip. The diesels and the pumps they powered ran until the diesels were submerged and their combustion air cut off by the tsunami flood. Additionally, not only was the AC power lost when the diesels flooded but the vital DC power was also lost as the 125V DC barttery ban
Interesting (Score:5, Interesting)
Here, though, it's clear the prosecutors didn't want an indictment, and the citizens forced one anyway.
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Sweet, in addition I nominate going after bosses who shush security holes in their products and insist on adding new features instead.
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I would suspect that the problem is that jurors are selected not to know anything about the case. Then, if the prosecutor doesn't present any compelling evidence, how can there be a conviction?
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Of course, given that the prosecutors didn't want an indictment in the first place and given that the prosecutors are the ones in charge of trying to convict the defendants, one wonders what the chances of actually getting a conviction are...
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You mispelled "stupid".
Note that if the prosecutors don't have enough evidence to convict (their reason for overturning the first Grand Jury decision), all that's going to happen is a show-trial followed by an acquittal. It'll waste some time, some money (for both the hypothetical villains and the government), and otherwise do nothing meaningful.
Or are we expecting them to start fabricating evidence, just to ensure a conviction?
Indictment does not mean guilty.... (Score:2)
All this really does is cause these poor guys to face charges that prosecutors now must try to prove. Given that all the other methods of getting an indictment on these guys failed, one can easily infer that the chances they get convicted of anything is next to nil.
This is basically a political witch hunt by some PR hounds who want to make it look like the accused are somehow guilty of gross negligence because it was their plant (which satisfied the government's safety requirements) blew up and made a mes
Lying, Sheer Incompetence and Disregard for life (Score:2, Informative)
All this really does is cause these poor guys to face charges that prosecutors now must try to prove. Given that all the other methods of getting an indictment on these guys failed, one can easily infer that the chances they get convicted of anything is next to nil.
This is basically a political witch hunt by some PR hounds who want to make it look like the accused are somehow guilty of gross negligence because it was their plant (which satisfied the government's safety requirements) blew up and made a mess after some natural disaster that nobody foresaw or even considered possible happened. It's like holding the tornado shelter installer criminally liable for not protecting the occupants of the shelter from earthquake damage and chemical attacks.
Do some research [nytimes.com] before commenting. Corporate TEPCO repeatedly lied to the public and the government, was incompetent (sending water needed to cool the reactor in drinking water bottles) and obstructive to the point of disregarding human life (ordering sea-water injection to be shut off based on how the prime minister's "mood").
Terrible Idea (Score:2)
They didn't just do this to themselves... (Score:1)