I'm going to lose precious karma with this post, but...
It's true that the USA-PATRIOT Act has a number of provisions that are of questionable Constitutionality and dubious value to the War Against Terror (TM, Pat. Pending). However, this article (gratuitous link [ctnow.com])is nothing more than gross conjecture without evidence. As we say down here in Texas, he's sellin' a whole lotta bull and not much steak.
It is illegal for a wiretap or datatap to be undertaken without judicial oversight and authorization (see United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), holding "Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch."). The expanded tap provisions of USA-PATRIOT allow for a greater level of secrecy to surround specific wire- or datataps (specifically, those approved by the special FISA court for national security issues), but federal law enforcement does not have carte blanche to go around randomly listening in to our conversations. In order for a tap to pass Constitutional muster, it has to be narrowly drawn. Setting up a general-purpose dragnet to pull in data from all library patrons, the vast majority of whom cannot legally be targeted by a FISA tap order, would get drop-kicked out of the most deferential judge's chambers. (Orrin Hatch's statement on FISA taps under USA-PATRIOT is here [fas.org], and the ALA's interpretation of the Act is here [ala.org]).
The FBI does have expanded powers to grab library records, for purposes of domestic law enforcement as well as international espionage and terror investigations, but that's very different -- if no less disturbing -- than ongoing monitoring, and would be sufficient to trigger the librarians' circumspection. It certainly doesn't mean that the Feds slapped a Carnivore underneath the public terminal carousel.
Fear ... uncertainty ... denial. (Score:3, Informative)
It's true that the USA-PATRIOT Act has a number of provisions that are of questionable Constitutionality and dubious value to the War Against Terror (TM, Pat. Pending). However, this article (gratuitous link [ctnow.com])is nothing more than gross conjecture without evidence. As we say down here in Texas, he's sellin' a whole lotta bull and not much steak.
It is illegal for a wiretap or datatap to be undertaken without judicial oversight and authorization (see United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), holding "Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch."). The expanded tap provisions of USA-PATRIOT allow for a greater level of secrecy to surround specific wire- or datataps (specifically, those approved by the special FISA court for national security issues), but federal law enforcement does not have carte blanche to go around randomly listening in to our conversations. In order for a tap to pass Constitutional muster, it has to be narrowly drawn. Setting up a general-purpose dragnet to pull in data from all library patrons, the vast majority of whom cannot legally be targeted by a FISA tap order, would get drop-kicked out of the most deferential judge's chambers. (Orrin Hatch's statement on FISA taps under USA-PATRIOT is here [fas.org], and the ALA's interpretation of the Act is here [ala.org]).
The FBI does have expanded powers to grab library records, for purposes of domestic law enforcement as well as international espionage and terror investigations, but that's very different -- if no less disturbing -- than ongoing monitoring, and would be sufficient to trigger the librarians' circumspection. It certainly doesn't mean that the Feds slapped a Carnivore underneath the public terminal carousel.