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RIAA v. Barker Showdown Slated for January

Posted by Hemos on Mon Dec 04, '06 08:55 AM
from the waging-the-war dept.
NewYorkCountryLawyer writes "Judge Kenneth M. Karas has set Friday, January 26, 2007, at 2:15 P.M., as the oral argument date for Tenise Barker's motion to dismiss complaint, in Elektra v. Barker, in federal court in Manhattan. The argument will take place at the newer federal court house, located at 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York, in courtroom 21D on the 21st Floor. Proceedings are open to the public. This is the case in which amicus briefs were filed by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the U.S. Internet Industry Association (USIIA) and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), and a Statement of Interest was filed by the U.S. Department of Justice (USDJ). Defendant Tenise Barker moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that neither downloading nor uploading had been alleged sufficiently to give her notice of what she was being accused of, and on the further ground that merely "making available for distribution" was not a copyright infringement at all. The RIAA and MPAA argued that merely "making available" was indeed a copyright infringement. Defendant, CCIA, and USIIA argued that it was not. EFF argued that intangible computer network transmissions cannot be "distributions" within the meaning of the Copyright Act. USDJ argued that they can be. Defendant refrained from taking a position on that issue here and here. The DOJ refrained from taking a position on the "making available" argument, indicating that it had never prosecuted anyone for "making available". See page 5, footnote 3."

Related Stories

[+] Is "Making Available" Copyright Infringement? 320 comments
NewYorkCountryLawyer updates us now that the legal issue — is it copyright infringement merely to "make available" a copyrighted work? — has been argued by the attorneys in Elektra v. Barker (on January 26). Whichever way the ruling goes it will have a large impact across the Internet. Appeal seems likely either way. No ruling has issued yet but "a friend" has made the 58-page transcript "available" (PDF here).
[+] RIAA Complaint Dismissed as "Boilerplate" 194 comments
NewYorkCountryLawyer writes "The decision many lawyers had been expecting — that the RIAA's 'boilerplate' complaint fails to state a claim for relief under the Copyright Act — has indeed come down, but from an unlikely source. While the legal community has been looking towards a Manhattan case (Elektra v. Barker) for guidance, the decision instead came from Senior District Court Judge Rudi M. Brewster of the US District Court for the Southern District of California. The decision handed down denied a default judgment (i.e. the defendant had not even appeared in the action). Judge Brewster not only denied the default judgment motion but dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Echoing the words of Judge Karas at the oral argument in Barker , Judge Brewster held (pdf) that 'Plaintiff here must present at least some facts to show the plausibility of their allegations of copyright infringement against the Defendant. However, other than the bare conclusory statement that on "information and belief" Defendant has downloaded, distributed and/or made available for distribution to the public copyrighted works, Plaintiffs have presented no facts that would indicate that this allegation is anything more than speculation.'"
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  • Best of luck to her... looks like this one might be quite important for setting precedents!
  • "Making available"

    (Score:5, Interesting)
    by splutty (43475) on Monday December 04, @09:16AM (#17098066)
    I wonder..

    If I leave a stack of copied CDs (ones I own myself) that I made for backup purposes (since my CDs quite easilly scratch) accidentily on a table in a foodcourt and someone takes them with them, would I be sueable for infringement of copyright?

    And if I did it on purpose?

    And how do we decide whether it's on purpose or not?

    Splut.
    • Re:"Making available" by Anonymous Coward (Score:1) Monday December 04, @09:21AM
    • Re:"Making available" by Pig Hogger (Score:2) Monday December 04, @09:37AM
    • Re:"Making available" by 91degrees (Score:1) Monday December 04, @09:39AM
    • Re:"Making available" by 4solarisinfo (Score:1) Monday December 04, @09:42AM
    • Re:"Making available" by voice_of_all_reason (Score:2) Monday December 04, @09:45AM
    • Re:"Making available" by radarjd (Score:2) Monday December 04, @10:03AM
    • Re:"Making available"

      (Score:5, Interesting)
      by hey! (33014) on Monday December 04, @10:49AM (#17098870)
      (http://kamthaka.blogspot.com/ | Last Journal: Wednesday March 30, @04:18PM)

      If I leave a stack of copied CDs (ones I own myself) that I made for backup purposes (since my CDs quite easilly scratch) accidentily on a table in a foodcourt and someone takes them with them, would I be sueable for infringement of copyright?


      The short answer: probably not.

      Using this as an analogy for P2P sharing ignores two important ethical and legal factors: (i) what you intent was, and (ii) what results are reasonably foreseeable consequences of your actions.

      If somebody picks up your backup CDs that you have accidentally left on the food court table, you clearly have no intent to enable copyright infringement. But if you leave the backup CD's at a kiosk somebody has labelled "CD Swap", a reasonable person might infer you intended to give a third party access.

      As for forseeability and its relationship to responsibility, let me give you a true example. My nephew leant his college roommate his laptop to do a last minute paper. The roommate left the laptop open on the floor and went to bed. My nephew came in late at night, and very considerately did not turn on the light. As a result he stumbled over his laptop and broke the screen. The roommtate contended he wasn't at fault, because it was my nephew who stepped on his own laptop.

      This story illustrates several valuable points, not the least of which is "neither a borrower nor a lender be." But the key one for us is that we are responsible for the reasonably forseeable cosequences of our actions. A reasonable person would predict that a laptop left open on the floor in a darkened room probably would come to harm. This means that the roommate has a duty not to put it there, and by breaching that duty makes himself responsible for the consequences.

      Applying this principle to your analogy, a reasonable person does not expect that carrying backups around will lead to their being stolen; it might happen, but it is not likely. The degree of probability matters; people carry things that are valuable to them around all the time, and sometimes lose them. But I think you're in good shape if you can show that the care you took with the copies is no different from the care a reasonable person takes with property that is his own and in which he places considerable value.

      Personally, I'm pro music sharing. But there's no consistent way to argue that copying music on P2P is a copyright infringement but that sharing music on P2P is not. Every right, whether fundamental or statutory, imposes corresponding duties on others to respect that right. The duties aren't limited to direct violations of the right, but extend to taking reasonable care that the right not be violated as a predictable result of our actions.

      A good example of the duty of reasonable care is the recent spate of stories about databases of personal information being stolen because they were on laptops or removable media. The argument that absolves P2P sharers from responsiblity for forseeable copying would also absolve the agencies in these cases from responsibility for forseeable identity theft.

      There are only three logically possible ways to argue that P2P sharing is not a copyright violation. The first and best would be to argue that P2P downloading is not a copyright violation at all, but somehow falls under the heading of fair use. The second would be to show that the kinds of copying done as a result of sharing would not reasonably forseeably include copyright violations. The last way would be to show that you took reasonable steps to guard against improper copying.

      The last two arguments are not as attractive as they might seem. A mistaken belief that an act is legal doesn't absolve you of your duty not to aid it, any more than believing that the person who steps on the laptop is responsible makes it OK to leave the laptop on the floor. It's the forseeability of the act that matters, not the foreeability of the act's legality.
      [ Parent ]
    • That's about it. The RIAA argues yes. You made them available. That makes you a distributor.

      If they would read the statute (copyright Act section 106) they'd feel differently, but they don't feel they have to do stuff like that.
      [ Parent ]
    • Re:"Making available" by Wolfger (Score:2) Monday December 04, @04:17PM
  • "Making Available"..

    (Score:5, Insightful)
    by aero2600-5 (797736) on Monday December 04, @10:11AM (#17098498)
    She's in trouble for "Making available"? FUCK! Quickly! Close down all those public libraries! They're "making available" all those copyrighted books! Anyone could take one home and photocopy it, scan it, or even copy it by hand.

    This argument is full of holes.

    Aero
  • Acronym Heaven

    (Score:1)
    by FreakyLefty (803946) on Monday December 04, @10:43AM (#17098798)
    (http://www.aburn.org.uk/)
    Is there a difference between the DOJ and the USDJ? Or is there just a lack of editing?
  • As to P2P filesharing, I'd take the probably here unpopular view that it is a plain violation of the rights of the artists and/or recording companies. That notwithstanding, I'm surprised that the complaint is even arguably sufficient. The sole paragraph that identifies the acts the defendant allegedly committed seems to me to lack sufficient specifics. That makes it all the more surprising that the RIAA would be correct, if it is when it argues that in three previous cases these specific allegations have been found to survive a motion to dismiss. http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=elek tra_barker_oppositiontomotion [ilrweb.com] - see pages 8-9. If the pleading standard is as "liberal" as the RIAA says it is, it ought not be. That having been said, it seems to me silly that this is the level at which these cases are argued. If the defendant was file sharing, the RIAA should come forth with specific allegations...and then the case can quickly get to the substance, rather than spend time - and presumably both sides' money - on procedural irrelevancy. The obvious cure to the motion to dismiss, if the RIAA has facts to back their case, is an amended complaint with more specifics. Sorry if that's less technically and more legally based than normal here.
  • Re:Bah!

    (Score:3, Informative)
    by Suzumushi (907838) on Monday December 04, @09:45AM (#17098318)
    I believe the term is "justice to the highest bidder." And I have to agree, sadly...

    Best of luck to those intrepid souls who are doing their best to defend our interests though. Who knows, maybe we'll get lucky. There's always an outside chance that the judge will be an honest one who actually understands technology.

    [ Parent ]
  • Re:Feh!

    (Score:2, Interesting)
    by Anonymous Coward on Monday December 04, @10:06AM (#17098458)
    Not to mention that the U.S. Department of Justice has decided to get involved on the plaintiff's (The MPAA's) side. What. The. Fuck.

    If you are a U.S. citizen, your Federal tax dollars are being used to help the MPAA wage its civil lawsuit here. You knowm, if I filed a civil lawsuit against someone, it sure would be nice if the Federal government decided to get involved and backed up my postion. But it sure would not be fair.
    [ Parent ]
    • Re:Feh! by NewYorkCountryLawyer (Score:3) Monday December 04, @10:40AM
      • Re:Feh! by Overzeetop (Score:2) Monday December 04, @11:13AM
        • Re:Feh!

          (Score:5, Informative)
          In a "statement of interest" the US has to say why it has "an interest" in the case. DOJ said the reason it had an interest in the argument EFF was making -- that ephemeral transmissions could never implicate the "distribution" right as opposed to reproduction and performance rights -- was that it if accepted it could jeopardize ~100 former prosecutions and ~100 pending prosecutions of "pirates". The argument EFF was making was not related to the "making available" claim advanced by the RIAA, and the US was just making it clear that the only issue they were addressing or "interested" in was EFF's argument, an argument which the defendant -- Ms. Barker -- had not made and did not feel was necessary for the Court to reach.
          [ Parent ]
          • by DeadCatX2 (950953) on Monday December 04, @11:47AM (#17099650)
            (Last Journal: Tuesday September 19, @02:23PM)
            That's a very neat question right there.

            Is YouTube distributing the videos, or reproducing/performing them for the public?

            In a way, the only real difference is scale. Public performance is limited by the size of the arena, which largest venues are still orders of magnitude smaller than YouTube's possible audience. YouTube can be used by anyone in the world with a connection to the Internet and a reasonable PC.

            So, YouTube could potentially target more people more easily than a public performance. But a public performance is guaranteed to impact a number of people (all those within hearing or seeing distance), whereas a YouTube video might never be watched by anyone.
            [ Parent ]
    • Re:Feh! by Anonymous Coward (Score:1) Monday December 04, @11:39AM
  • 2 replies beneath your current threshold.