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Voting Machines Banned by Dutch Minister
Posted by
Zonk
on Tue Oct 31, 2006 10:20 AM
from the no-business-here-go-screw-up-belgium dept.
from the no-business-here-go-screw-up-belgium dept.
5heep writes "Dutch Government Renewal Minister Atzo Nicolai has banned the use of one type of computer voting machine in national elections next month. The turnabout came after a group called We Don't Trust Voting Computers protested the vulnerability of electronic voting to fraud or manipulation. The reason for this ban is the radio signals emitted by the machines which can be used to peek at a voters' choice from several dozen meters away."
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IT: Dutch Blackbox Voting Pwned 353 comments
An anonymous reader writes, "In a just-published report (PDF, in English, cached here), the Dutch we-don't-trust-voting-computers foundation (Dutch and English) details how it converted a Nedap voting machine, of a type used in Holland and France, to steal a pre-determined percentage of votes and reassign them to another party. The paper describes in great detail how 'anyone, when given brief access to the devices at any time before the election, can gain complete and virtually undetectable control over the election results.' As a funny bonus, responding to an earlier challenge by the manufacturer, the researchers reflashed a voting machine to play chess. The news was on national television (Dutch) last night and is growing into a major scandal. 90% of the votes in the Netherlands are cast on these machines and national elections will be held in a month." Please create mirrors for the 8.1-MB PDF and post their URLs. You might also try John Graham-Cumming's l8r.org service to tell you when the slashdot effect subsides from any of the mirrors.
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Politics: Dutch Securing E-voting After Being Pwned 269 comments
An anonymous reader writes, "After the Dutch we-don't-trust-voting-computers foundation demonstrated glaring security holes in Dutch voting computers last week, the Dutch government has ordered (Dutch) all software to be replaced, all hardware to be checked, unflashable firmware to be installed, and an iron seal to be placed on voting machines. A certification institute will double-check all measures, and on election day will cull random machines to check them for accuracy. The Dutch intelligence service AIVD has been approached to consult on the radio emissions issue. Furthermore, foreign observers will monitor the upcoming elections on November 22nd. But the action group is still not confident (Dutch) that all problems are solved." US elections are controlled at the local level, so unfortunately such a nationwide fix would not be workable here.
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Politics: Deathblow To a Voting Machine 140 comments
SiggyRadiation writes "According to their newsletter (my English translation here), the Dutch group that 'doesn't trust the voting computers' has won a round against the industry and the civil servants that seem hell-bent on reintroducing voting machines — NewVote, made by SDU — that the Dutch minister of the interior has suspended. Apparently SDU provided 5 slightly different samples of its machine to the Dutch version of the NSA (well... the very humble Dutch version anyway) for testing purposes. Of those five, four machines emitted radiation in such a way that the votes cast could be monitored. SDU's NewVote received its final deathblow when it became clear that the one machine that stayed within the radiation limits used a green-on-red color-scheme for its screen. And that would be a small problem for the 4% of all men that cannot distinguish between red and green."
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Hey Slashdot (Score:3, Insightful)
Better late than never, I guess... (Score:5, Informative)
Give me something I can Count! (Score:5, Informative)
Computer Ballots don't leave the average Joe with any sense that they can be verified.
Too much potential for problems with Electronic voting from a voter perception perspective.
I like putting my little X on the ballot.
Re: (Score:2, Interesting)
It ain't so hard:
- Enter voting office
- Receive a "voting paper"
- Enter voting booth
- Insert voting paper into machine
- Push the button for the candidate you want. (Machine's critical components are covered in faraday cage, to stop any readable transmissions)
- Vote is printed on paper
- Check the print and fold the paper along the prefolded line, so text is no longer visible
- Publicaly put it in the urn (where they just fall in a disorder
Re:Give me something I can Count! (Score:5, Insightful)
But, in fact, there is no reason to reduce cost in this process. Cost shouldn't matter here, since secret, equal, free elections are a crucial process within democratic systems. Besides that, the pen and paper method is the most simple method you have, everybody understands it. In fact it's so simple, everyone can audit the whole process. Contrary to that, audits of computer-based systems can only be done by a few experts (and a complete audit goes from a security audit of the software down to as far as checking the hardware for possible modifications).
Parent
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And once again (Score:2)
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Nah. It's just that the Dutch actually value their democracy.
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What's the big deal adding a paper trail? (Score:2, Interesting)
It would not add substantially to the cost, and the small rolls of paper that resulted would be perfect in cases where a recount was demanded or required
Re:What's the big deal adding a paper trail? (Score:4, Insightful)
Any electronic voting machine should print a ballot that you stuff in a box. Electronic tabulation of votes could be used for preliminary results, but the printed ballot that the voter can read and verify should be the final word.
Parent
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Van Eck Freaking (Score:2)
Is this flaw only present in E-voting? (Score:2)
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It's not ALL voting computers, just one type, which makes up about 10% of their machines (according to TFA). And that's just for the next election, which comes in 3 weeks. You can't redesign a machine & get it certified & redeployed in that kind of time frame, so banning it makes sense.
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Think about it. Your examples revolve around money or human life. The manufacturers of those machines __must__ get them right, or there is immediate finantial fallout.
Those examples do not produce hidde
Re: (Score:2)
First, they are banning one type of machine, not electronic voting.
And it's different because voting fraud can potentially have worse consequences than those, and one of the fraudsters could be the guy that organizes the event, the governing party, with all the power available.
Plus, voting machines are everyday proved insecure. Of cou
There is no "fix" for voting machines... (Score:3, Interesting)
One solution often presented is the XBOX-type of security - encrypted links between hardware, redundancy etc etc - but as *we* know this type of security is breakable. You only have to do this once to break the security of all voting machines.
Apart from this, some people mention the use of a paper trail. This trail itself has to be counted fully then, irrespectful of the
Re:In a related story ... (Score:5, Insightful)
This last point is a little fuzzy, because I'm sure electronic voting machines are better than poorly-designed punch-card ballots, and maybe some other flawed mechanisms. But the best system available right now is optical-scan paper ballots that can easily be hand-audited and hand-recounted. They are easy to use, require only a very circumscribed use of technology, and can easily be verified by people if there are any problems or a very close result.
Sure -- I don't think anyone is saying we should never use computers for voting. Fix the problems, and then use them for voting. Advocates of electronic voting seem to be saying we should do it the other way around, which is insane.
The current round of voting machines are insultingly under-engineered, considering the problems I listed above. There are many types of threats to the integrity of voting machines, and Diebold et. al. aren't interested in addressing them. They're more interested in shutting down debate and research about them, in fact, which is very worrying to me.
-Esme
Parent
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Unfortunately, there is only one party which has a non-standard character in it's full name (an 'è'), so when the noise frequency changes, you know the voter chose that particular party.
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Conclusion: illiteracy is absolutely not an excuse for not having correct voting procedures.