Marriott Discloses Missing Data Files 162
An anonymous reader writes "Marriott International has admitted that it is missing backup computer tapes containing credit card account information and the Social Security numbers of about 206,000 time-share owners and customers, as well as employees of the company." From the Washington Post story: "Officials at Marriott Vacation Club International said it is not clear whether the tapes, missing since mid-November, were stolen from the company's Orlando headquarters or whether they were simply lost. An internal investigation produced no clear answer. The company notified the Secret Service over the past two weeks, and has also told credit card companies and other financial institutions about the loss of the tapes."
why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:5, Interesting)
Time-share owners, maybe, employees definately, but customers? Why?
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:5, Funny)
Look, they're just making sure you don't steal any towels. Towel theft is a big deal.
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:2, Funny)
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:5, Informative)
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:3, Informative)
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:4, Interesting)
Well, even if so...why did they keep the numbers? I've run into things where people wanted my SSN....which I pretty much refuse to give to anyone not associated with ssn taxes....but, to get around it...I just give a deposit in lieu of SSN.
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:3, Informative)
In most cases, when you take out a loan with somebody, your data is likely being shared with everybody they do business with related to the servicing of the loan... especially if you're a "high risk" customer (e.g., low credit score).
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:3, Informative)
As far as loans, they keep the numbers because if a person defaults on the loan that's the only data they have that's unique to the person who defaulted. For example, if the debt gets sold cheaply to a debt collection agency, the collection agency needs that number t
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:5, Informative)
As far as keeping your credit card number, they could be requiring it to cover maintenance fees or it's possible customers are automatically having their loan payments charged to their credit card. I do that with a couple of my monthly expenses so I don't have to write a check. (having both electronic withdrawals and automatic billing to credit cards, I prefer the latter)
While I suppose you can get around these by buying the timeshare outright, and prepaying maintenance fees, most customers do not want to do that.
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:2, Informative)
Maybe in your world it's okay for SSN's to be routinely dancing around in credit agency computers to prevent 'simple name collisions' but not in mine.
They're in big trouble if the only 'tag' they have to distinguish between customers is the SSN. There aren't that many cases where people with a common street address have the same exact name. They can use Zipcode+4 if they really have that shaky a system that they need
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:2)
Because we all know people don't move. Ever.
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:2)
Zipcode +4 doesn't necessarily distinguish a unique street address. Address comparisons are notoriously unreliable. My address for instance is on a Drive. It could be spelled out or abbreviated DR. It could be left off, or it could be confused with a nearby Lane or LN. All of which would
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:2, Informative)
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:2)
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:5, Insightful)
I think that you're asking the wrong question here. Shouldn't you be asking "why does it matter if they keep your SSN?" Our whole system of using SSNs to identify people is broken, and if Congress would get off their lazy duffs and fix the problem then maybe it wouldn't matter if someone had my SSN number or not. A simple change to credit reporting laws that would require a second level of verification of the identity of a consumer before granting credit, like what happens when you put a fraud alert on your credit report, would go a long way toward fixing this problem. But those who issue credit are afraid that if you got rid of easy credit then their market would collapse. I'll agree that some people would be inconvenienced by such a system (like those who move around a lot), but it sure would reduce fraud. At the very least, I should have the option of making a fraud alert permanent, and to have complete control over who can view my credit history. Then maybe it wouldn't make such a difference if someone got my personal information.
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:4, Insightful)
I could be wrong about this, but here's another reason to think of. Hashing the SSN's in the database doesn't raise the bar much for ID thieves. There are 1G possible SSN's. According to my calculations (and the output of "openssl speed md5"), calculating and storing the MD5 of all of them would take my computer about 30 minutes and would take up about 20GB of drive space. After which, looking up an ssn from the hash would be fairly easy.
My first thought was "add some salt", but SSN's aren't passwords (although they're used like passwords fairly often), they're indexes. So if I've got info on my John Doe, and want to see what info you have on that same John Doe, unless we happened to use the same salt we're screwed.
The only solution I can see would be to use deterministic salt. store the MD5 of, for instance, the person's SSN.DOB. That would make it so that the problem for the attacker is (assuming he only cares about people 18-65 years old) 17,155 times harder. So now the database is over 300 TB, and it takes a year to calculate (on my machine). But it means that everyone has to start collecting DOB (which they mostly do anyway - but it would now be necessary) and would have to agree to use MD5(SSN.DOB) as a person's identifier. Thinking about it, that might not be so bad... But it'll still take an act of God or congress to get everyone to start doing it. And I'm guessing God might be more likely.
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:2)
Since using a hash secret to change the digest is just as easy and basic, your
point is?
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:2)
From what I've heard, people placing fraud alerts can frequently find places that ignore the credit warning and give out a card with little or no checking. And if everyone had fraud alerts, finding places that don't check would be even easier. Qui
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:2)
I'm not sure how you make credit reporting agencies liable for false information since they're just reporting what other people tell them. As for making the credit vendors liable for granting credit to identity thieves, I think that you can only do this in a world where the credit vendo
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:3, Informative)
They probably don't. As the article says, the backup tapes contained credit card numbers and SSNs of workers, time share owners and customers. That reasonably means that they've lost the credit card numbers of time share owners and customers and the SSNs of time share owners and employees.
So they've lost this data, but it seems to me that they're being reactive in a positive way - they've notified the right people in government, they've contacted fi
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:3, Informative)
Re:why do they have SSNs for customers? (Score:2)
They don't [marriott.com] Credit card, yes. SSN, no. I logged 71 days in a Marriot last year, and never once have they asked for a SSN.
And THAT is why... (Score:5, Funny)
Re:And THAT is why... (Score:2)
Great. (Score:4, Informative)
Re:Great. (Score:3, Insightful)
Companies need to be held liable for the safety and security of their customer's data. The problem then will go away.
Re:Great. (Score:4, Insightful)
I'm hearing you. I think the way the SSN system works with the financial system is horribly inefficient, insecure, and pront to abuse. But you need to cover both ends. Security on the front end, and proper policing on the back end. Cutting the DHS budget certainly isn't going to help-- especially when hundreds of millions are allocated for projects like the bridge to nowhere. [usatoday.com]
Re:Great. (Score:2, Insightful)
I always vote down school tax proposals becuase our local school system has yet to manage to improve the quality of education or teaching while managing to find all sorts of things to spend money on like new toys for the administration to play with, overpriced school complexes (65 million dollars for a school that reasonably holds 3000 at best?), marketing campaigns, etc.
DHS doesn't need more money. They need to be smart. Unfortunately, bureaucrac
Re:Great. (Score:2)
Judging by your website, I'm suddenly not sure a society-wide consensus is a good thing.
Re:Great. (Score:3, Insightful)
The only group that benefits in this case is the government.
Re:Great. (Score:5, Insightful)
Given the lack of competence of DHS, eliminating their funding can only be a good thing. They only seem to make things worse, and haven't really shown any evidence of being effective at doing anything other that waste money and erode civil liberties.
Damn right (was:Great.) (Score:2)
Re:Great. (Score:5, Informative)
I'm glad the Department of Homeland Security has had their budget cut to $16 million.
That's misleading. Their RESEARCH budget for CYBERSECURITY is cut to $16 million, and that's only down 7% from last year, which means under $2 million in cuts.
You can argue it should be higher if you wish, but don't make it sound like the entire DHS--or even cybercrime enforcement in general--is funded that sparsely.
Re:Great. (Score:2)
That's misleading. Their RESEARCH budget for CYBERSECURITY is cut to $16 million, and that's only down 7% from last year, which means under $2 million in cuts.
Not only that, unless you look at the budget lines, this type of number
can be totally misleading. For instance, the previous year's budget may
have included $5 million in extraordinary expenses, meaning that this
year's number actually represents an increase.
Numbers i
Re: (Score:2)
Re:Great. (Score:2)
With $105 billion in this type of crime in 2005, I'm glad the Department of Homeland Security has had their budget cut to $16 million. That should stop those crooks!
I think that you are mistaken [dhs.gov].
Cyber Security is enhanced in the budget to augment a 24/7 cyber threat watch, warning, and response capability that would identify emerging threats and vulnerabilities and coordinate responses to major cyber security incidents. An increase of $5 million is proposed in the budget for this effort, bringing the progra
Re:Great. (Score:3, Insightful)
Is this a real budget cut, or a cut in projected increases?
Government budget cuts are the most preposterous lies I've seen in a long time. Say the next year's budget is slated to increase 8%. Let's just say that increase is reduced to 4%. Politicians, pundits and media people can then claim (or complain of) a 4% cut, despite that in reality, it was still an increase, the c
Re:Great. (Score:2)
Oh thank you thank you thank you! (Score:4, Funny)
This kind of thing keeps happening... (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:This kind of thing keeps happening... (Score:2)
Re:This kind of thing keeps happening... (Score:2, Informative)
Huh? Where in the world did you come-up with that?
That would only be true if your encryption uses CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode. That's where you XOR each block with the ciphertext of the previous block. An error in one block affects that block and every subsequent block like you describe.
When you use ECB (Electronic Code Book), the regular DES algorithm, you encrypt each 64-bit block independently. Errors only affect the data
Re:This kind of thing keeps happening... (Score:2)
I no cryptographer, but I personally have worked with encryption standards that work on 64bit blocks. If that was corrupted, the rest of the data would be fine...
Also, I would propose that the problem of key management is less of a problem than the problem of unencrypted data out in the wild. If you lose it - who cares!
Re:This kind of thing keeps happening... (Score:4, Insightful)
Hats off to Marriott (Score:3, Insightful)
Marriott has handled this correctly and deserves some credit for doing so. At least they're not trying to cover it up like some companies would.
Re:Hats off to Marriott (Score:5, Informative)
ABN Amro lost a tape with my data on it. The news was out that week. DHL found it, and even though the news agencies didn't cover it much, I got a follow-up letter from ABN Amro AND they extended the free credit tracking service from 3 months to 1 year.
Marriott on the other hand waited over a month before they even notified the Secret Service, for crying out loud.
No kudos to Marriott for this one. They're lucky that their month-long cover-up isn't criminal (yet).
fraud monitoring (Score:5, Insightful)
I'm glad to read Marriot is offering credit fraud monitoring to the affected people like how Ford offered to its employees when they recently lost 70,000 employee/retiree SSNs. [freep.com] Unless it is lifetime monitoring I fail to see the long term value.
Wait a second, why don't the credit bureaus offer free lifetime credit fraud monitoring to everyone in the first place?
Re:fraud monitoring (Score:2)
Wait a second, why don't the credit bureaus offer free lifetime credit fraud monitoring to everyone in the first place?
Because they are not not-for-profit's?
They offer self-service (Score:3)
Re:They offer self-service (Score:2)
So what ? (Score:2)
Secret Service? (Score:3, Funny)
Unless Valerie Plame had a timeshare.....
Re:Secret Service? (Score:3, Informative)
"The Secret Service also investigates violations of laws relating to counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the United States; financial crimes that include, but are not limited to, access device fraud, financial institution fraud, identity theft, computer fraud; and computer-based attacks on our nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications in
Re:Secret Service? (Score:2)
It all seems like stuff the FBI ought to be doing, but I think that's mainly an artifact of how crime has changed. Federal law enforcement was originally designed to go after the mob, and you get the mob by following the money. So it makes sense for Tre
Re:Secret Service? (Score:2)
Their mission [secretservice.gov] includes:
Conspiracy (Score:2)
Discuss.
</Linda Richman>
Re:Conspiracy (Score:2)
That's nothing... (Score:5, Informative)
I work the front desk at a competing 4-star hotel chain. I work the night shift ($10/hr to sit there babysitting the desk and reading/fiddling on my laptop, great job for students
So many people touch the tapes, front desk staff/accounting/reservations/IT, that if one went missing it would be impossible to track back to an individual. What's more, if I just picked up my own tape and made a dupe at night in 35 minutes while I'm there alone nobody would ever know.
This is a 400 room hotel in a major U.S. city, access to literally tens of thousands of names, addresses and associating credit card numbers, all for filling out a standard job application that I may or may not have filled out accurately. Unbelievable.
Re:That's nothing... (Score:2)
After my wife and I returned from Malaysia in 2004 we started seeing charges on her credit card from resorts and shops in Japan. It took months to get our bank to accept that these charges were not legitimate.
I have no problem believing your story.
Re:That's nothing... (Score:2)
If the CC information is unencrypted and usable, I'm sure that the various CC companies would be interested in knowing about it. Various retail companies that I know have all sorts of security that they have to comply with to do business with a CC company. Some data is in the form where one person has access to the encrypted form, another has half of the key, and a third has the other half
Re:That's nothing... (Score:3, Informative)
I am REALLY starting to think (Score:5, Insightful)
Some private data loss statistics (Score:4, Insightful)
A report (with pretty graphs) from a recent financial engineering class. Data was from Feb to Sep 2005...
The 83 recorded loss events were categorized by loss event type and by industry sector. The data is relevant over 232 days. This yields a probability of a loss event occurring in any sector on any given day 35.7%. If only events affecting financial services institutions are counted, the probability is 7.5%.
http://privacydata.michaelaiello.com/paper.pdf [michaelaiello.com]
Bring forth the math corrections
I don't know... (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:I don't know... (Score:2)
Re:I don't know... (Score:2)
But it does take time, and companies do need money to invest in this. Without legislation, the road to change can be a long one and can depend as much on consumer interest than anything else...
Re:I don't know... (Score:2)
Re:I don't know... (Score:2)
If you encrypt a database backup and there is an error on the tape, the backup could easily be useless.
For this same reason, many Linux users still do not compress backups of their data. Even though there is media these days that is much
Re:I don't know... (Score:3, Informative)
If you encrypt a database backup and there is an error on the tape, the backup could easily be useless.
Only under certain modes of block cyphers. If you use an electronic code book mode of a block cipher you only lose the block with the error on it. It's not as secure of course, but it's a lot better than nothing.
Use a stream cipher (Score:3, Interesting)
With that set up, encrypt the main contents of the tape with a stream cipher (say, RC4) with the tape key.
This way, damage to a certain area of the tape will not result in a complete loss of data. Using a random key for each tape e
Re:I don't know... (Score:2)
Other possibilities (Score:2)
Re:Other possibilities (Score:2)
7. the boxes were improperly labeled when they were sent to offsite storage and are misfiled.
8. they were accidentally destroyed with other old tapes.
9. the tapes were mislabeled. (internal label doesn't match physical label)
BTW, that's Tape Ape. You're confusing that with Code Monkey.
Re:Other possibilities (Score:2)
206K dupes (Score:2)
The Marriot case study (Score:2)
It was terribly over budget, and delayed a long time.
A significant factor was the project manager lieing about timeline milestones and being within budget.
Later, once it was too late, a report slammed marriot for not reviewing the project reports, which stated time and time again that "all is well". Marriott had next to no QC or risk analysis.
What if? (Score:2)
Re:What if? (Score:2)
This "code of silence" you reference is the reason you never met any criminals that have anything to them. Street hustlers don't steal backup tapes. They run game on undergraduate writers with romanticized notions about crime.
Much more common than you think (Score:2)
All backup software should encrypt the backups. (Score:2)
Backup software should also automatically do a compare and determine if the backup is actually usable. In about 5% of our tests, Acronis TrueImage software, for example, has made a backup that it won't read.
It's simple enough to solve Marriot's problem. Pass a law that anyone storing more than 100 credit card numbers must use encryption. Provide cross-platform open source backup software that meets t
Re:All backup software should encrypt the backups. (Score:2)
I find it pretty entertaining how the same group of people (not necessarily you in person) who bitches about so many unnecessary laws, like, say, something from Indiana, starts proposing new laws whenever their personal issue is messed with.
Use error correction; encourage the right thing. (Score:2)
Companies storing sensitive data could be expected to use software that provided error correction codes (like those generated by ICE ECC [ice-graphics.com]).
Laws about this would enable companies to spend the money without worrying that they were making themselves uncompetitive because of expenses. They would know their competitors must do it also.
Top managers are generally not wise about technology; they need someone to guide them toward doing the right thing.
ENCRYPTION!!!! (Score:3, Insightful)
It's realistic to expect that there is sensitive data out there - the answer is not to say "don't store my SSN", although that should certainly be restricted.
It seems to me that the answer is ENCRYPTION! Encrypt the data and you can back it up on fucking postcards and send it to my grandmother for all I care..
Re:ENCRYPTION!!!! (Score:2)
The reason that tapes are sent offsite in the first place is to guard against disasters at the home office, e.g. fire, flood, etc.
If you encrypt the data and the encryption keys are stored at the office and that office is destroyed, then you've reduced yo
Famous Last Words (Score:4, Funny)
Marriott soon-to-be-ex SA: "Um, didn't they already come this week?"
Digital leakage of citizen data.. (Score:2)
What do you suppose the solution direction is going to be, considerning that even having some sort of unique ID won't stop worngful use of such information?
Why even have a single government-owned indentity? (Score:2)
You have permitted a government to define, control and essentially own your identity.
There is no commercial or honest need for this.
Most of us using Slashdot have multiple identities (user names) for the different boards we log into on the net. For each one we have established a reputation for good or ill that serves as our good-will or "credit" on that board.
If the government wishes to issue a Tax ID, OK. But only I and they need to know it.
If a credit company
Re:I know it is busy during the holidays, but... (Score:2)
Re:I know it is busy during the holidays, but... (Score:2)
Re:Identify theft a fad? (Score:5, Interesting)
This is a quite old crime. The difference is that now identity theft of everyday people can be lucrative, and you don't even need to look like them or deal with tricking others. And you don't have to worry about being lynched or stoned, just going to jail.
Re:Lost != Stolen (Score:4, Interesting)
Considering the time of year, no doubt some Marriott PHB who was looking for some extra X-Mas cash decided to "sell their list". While many companies have absolutely no qualms about selling customer information (AKA creating a new "profit center"),
I am more inclided to believe that the backup tapes were lost or stolen, rather than a conscious effort to create a new corporate profit center.
Then again, John Poindexter's "Total Information Awareness" project (entirely DoD databases) was morphed into "MATRIX", which was designed to make use of multiple commercial (and commercially available) databases. So, perhaps, it was was merely an "extra patriotic" Marriott employee.
Considering recent events in the news (non-FISA approved wiretapping), perhaps one possibility is just as scary as the other...
Re:Lost != Stolen (Score:3)
Basically, you pay a lot of money for some unknown amount of obscurity and reliability that has not been tested by more then a few people. Not cost e
Re:Lost != Stolen (Score:3, Funny)
In a previous job we did all our backups on nine track tape. Older backups were impossible to read because the magnetic coating would just stick to the read head.
Nobody was going to steal that data!
Re:Lost != Stolen (Score:2)
Re:Woo Hoo! (Score:2)
In that case the company has some responsibility; cutting corners on data security is something no shareholder should allow.
Re:Woo Hoo! (Score:2)
How about a law requiring them to pay for the losses they have caused?. Doing that might make companies think twice before retaining data on their customers.
Re:Marriott DID let it's customers know (Score:2)
All in all, Marriott did a good job handling this, and taking care of their timeshare owners.
I got the letter telling me my data was safe...
Re:Bah (Score:2)
Can't do it. Wouldn't be prudent. (Score:2)
There's plenty of other points (including the endless lawyer-bashing) I could pick apart, but I'll start with this one. I'm assuming you're in the US, cause you're talking about social security numbers. Well, at least in this country, you can't copyright a fact [wikipedia.org], or even a collection of facts (although you can copyright the arrangement of them, provided it's not an obvious one.)
And, no, you can't copyright your name [templetons.com] either.
And before you start ranting, no, I'