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Rough Justice For Terry Childs 418

snydeq writes "Deep End's Paul Venezia sees significant negative ramifications for IT admins in the wake of yesterday's guilty verdict for Terry Childs on a count of 'denial of service.' Assuming the verdict is correct, Venezia writes, 'shouldn't the letter of the law be applied to other "denial of service" problems caused by the city while they pursued this case? In particular, to the person or persons who released hundreds of passwords in public court filings in 2008 for causing a denial of service for the city's widespread VPN services? After all, once the story broke that a large list of usernames and passwords had been released to the public, the city had to take down its VPN services for days while they reset every password and communicated those changes to the users.' Worse, if upheld on appeal, the verdict puts a vast number of IT admins at risk. 'There are suddenly thousands of IT workers all over the country that are now guilty of this crime in a vast number of ways. If the letter of the law is what convicted Terry Childs, then the law is simply wrong.'"
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Rough Justice For Terry Childs

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  • by Phrogman ( 80473 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @06:10PM (#32022744)

    I think I would want to draft up a very clear - and legally binding - agreement that I would want my superiors in management to sign on behalf of the company. It would spell out in specific details, the security policies, security review process, enforcement etc. It would absolve me from prosecution unless I violated any of the very specific rules that were listed. If my superior changed, they would have to sign the document when they took up their position etc.

    I wouldn't likely get the job, they'd hire someone who wasn't so paranoid, but I don't think I would want to take a job where if someone in management decided to break the rules, and I tried to apply those rules for the sake of ensuring I didn't violate the trust that had been placed in me, then I wasn't liable for prosecution either way, like Childs was.

    Now, he could have handled things differently I am sure, but he might have been prosecuted either way from what I have read so far. I would like more details in an objective report on the situation.

  • by andrewme ( 1562981 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @06:11PM (#32022754)
    Not trying to be a troll here, but... and maybe I'm not understanding the whole case correctly. I've followed the articles on Slashdot for a while. In my opinion: if the city hires you, you are subservient to the city. You do not give passwords to your inferiors. Ever. You do, however, give passwords to your superiors when asked. Always. They hired you, after all. They are your bosses. If I hire a security guard for my building, he'd damn well better give me the key if I decide to fire him, or if I get locked out, or both. You don't hide data from your superiors, plain and simple, however *technologically* less advanced they might be. Maybe the city is making a mountain out of a molehill; I'm really not qualified to comment on that, since I don't know as much about the case as some of the people on here will. Honestly, though, my original point: you get hired by someone, you do what they want to do, provided it isn't illegal. I highly doubt that giving someone the password or passwords to their own systems would have been the wrong thing to do.
  • by George Beech ( 870844 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @06:18PM (#32022870)
    No that's a twist on what happened to suit the ideas of slashdot. What happened was he was locked up and said "I'll only give these passwords to the Mayor" Now what he was required to do by the state policy was provide the passwords to Information Security for inclusion in the central password management database due to them being production passwords. He obviously did not do this as none of this would have happened if he did.
  • by blair1q ( 305137 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @06:19PM (#32022892) Journal

    Well, no.

    The rules made it so he could insist on giving the passwords only to the Mayor and only in a secure situation.

    He used that as an excuse.

    It's pretty clear from all I've read that he really was holding the city hostage because he was disgruntled at the changing employment situation, and in the process he prevented city personnel from accessing data they needed to do their jobs.

    The Jury was sympathetic that the city acted like idiots once it all started, but they were also cognizant that he wasn't completely blameless in what followed.

    So, in reality, when the rules say not to give the password to your boss, you don't. And when they say not to give the password out over unsecure communications, you don't. But you also don't make a pest of yourself; you take the initiative to find a way to get the password to the right person in a secure manner.

  • by Anonymous Psychopath ( 18031 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @06:26PM (#32022990) Homepage

    Prosecutors, judges and juries all consider intent. Making a mistake is not the same as malicious action. True, there are times when it's difficult to tell. This isn't one of them.

  • ugh (Score:5, Insightful)

    by nomadic ( 141991 ) <nomadicworld@@@gmail...com> on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @06:32PM (#32023076) Homepage
    'There are suddenly thousands of IT workers all over the country that are now guilty of this crime in a vast number of ways.

    Setting up and configuring system where they have sole access, locking out the actual owner of the system, arbitrarily deciding that their direct supervisors aren't "authorized users" (based not on any actual rules or policies but their own nebulous "best practices" decision and by the way anyone who thinks a network engineer should have the authority to lock whoever he wants out of the system, based entirely on his own discretion, is incompetent), and then refusing to provide system access when he was assigned other responsibilities not dealing with locked system, then repeatedly refusing to provide the information even after being imprisoned? Really? Thousands of IT workers guilty of that?
  • by SmallFurryCreature ( 593017 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @06:33PM (#32023088) Journal

    You got an upstart sysadmin who went on a powertrip and thought he was smarter then anyone else and therefor above any laws that only apply to lesser people.

    This is not uncommon with people who are highly intelligent but not to well versed in social skills. Not so much nerds but Mensa people. Like that reiserfs guy, thought he could get away with murder because he was smart and the police is dumb, they must be because they ain't him.

    Your assessment is 100% right and he had no call to judge the people asking for access to be unsuitable. His opinion simply did not matter at that time. It is like when a cop with a dog tells you to get down on the floor. That is not the time to start an argument. That is the time to get down on the floor and become part of how the justice system works, injustices included and part of the system, sucks to have it happen to you.

    If you ever find yourself in the same position as Childs, document EVERYTHING, in paper, print all emails and insist on written instructions, never verbal, and then do as you are told and get the fuck out of there.

    Do not argue with the system, you are not smarter. Do you know how you are not smarter then the system? If you think arguing with the system is a good idea.

    Childs is an idiot and yes, idiots go to jail. lets see him argue with Bubba about access to his ass.

  • by beakerMeep ( 716990 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @06:37PM (#32023140)
    People keep saying this but where's the proof? I haven't seen any evidence of such a policy. But I admittedly have only been partially following the case.

    From: http://www.ktvu.com/news/23283217/detail.html [ktvu.com] (emphasis mine).

    Childs reportedly had a fractious relationship with some of his coworkers, attorneys on both sides said. He testified at trial that he never intended to harm the network but said that other employees, including his supervisors, were not qualified to have the passwords. Childs claimed he was merely following established industry guidelines for password protection. "You do not ever give up your username and password," Childs said.

    That doesn't sound like you make it sound. Industry guidelines are not the same as company/government policy.

    To be honest I think the Slashdot community is wrong to defend this guy. He sounds like an ego-maniac driven not by security, but by the sys-admin God complex. However, that's just what I think, and I could be wrong. Sans the full transcript of the trial it's really hard to say what happened. I'd love for groklaw to take a look at it too. They probably need a break from SCO shenanigans. :)

  • I wouldn't likely get the job, they'd hire someone who wasn't so paranoid

    That's crazy -- who wants a system administrator who isn't paranoid?

  • by SanityInAnarchy ( 655584 ) <ninja@slaphack.com> on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @06:52PM (#32023326) Journal

    You have a boss who makes the rules, if your boss later tells you to break the rules then you do it.

    Just like Enron's accountants?

    Sorry, no. If your boss later wants to change the rules, there's likely a procedure in place to do so, but they can't simply do that by fiat. That's the whole point of having a policy in the first place.

  • by Ossifer ( 703813 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:12PM (#32023582)
    In appropriate words: don't lie about you violent past, don't harass the person employed to do your background check, don't give false passwords to keep your boss' boss off your trail, don't admit to your co-worker that you're going to screw over your employer if they fire you, and most of all don't come afterward with the lame excuse of being the only IT God on the planet such that only you could ever possess the keys to the kingdom.
  • by CPE1704TKS ( 995414 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:14PM (#32023608)

    You've got to be kidding. Do you honestly think you can go back to prior cases and use that to show how something is or isn't a crime?

    What matters is how good your lawyer is and what sort of strings they can pull. Obviously, this guy's lawyer wasn't as good as the other guy's lawyer.

    The rules that apply to us DO NOT apply to rich people. Stop believing for one second that they do. Look at some black dude that goes to jail for 3 years for stealing bread vs. the Wall Street banksters that steal billions and get multi-million dollar bonuses.

    Marc Rich was convicted of tax evasion, and fled to Switzerland. It took $250,000 in donations to Bill Clinton for him to pardon him on his last day in office.

    There is no justice, all there is is how much money you have to spend to grease the wheels of the system.

  • No kidding (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Sycraft-fu ( 314770 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:14PM (#32023610)

    Only way I see you being "at risk" is if you are an asshole, or the policies are extremely unclear. In the event of the second case, well then take it upon yourself to get them clarified.

    Personally, I'm not worried. Here our policy is that various critical information, including things like root passwords, has to be kept in a safe. My boss is responsible for all that. Also, all our IT staff has the passwords for everything (in theory, there are some I can't remember because I never use them). So, I'm not worried about a situation where I have sole access to a system an am being pressured to divulge the password. They are stored in a location per policy, and the people who can access them are specified by policy. All I need to do is look at the policy and make sure I follow it, and also make sure that should I set up a system that uses a special password for some reason, it gets documented.

    Always remember: They aren't your systems, it's not your network. They belong to the organization that you work for. That means said organization gets to decide who gets what access. You can, and should, have input on that policy, but you can't unilaterally declare that you are the only one.

  • by bartle ( 447377 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:15PM (#32023630) Homepage
    Exactly. Quoting from this [slashdot.org] post on Slashdot:

    As to these configuration backups, Mr. Childs kept these on a DVD he kept with him at all times. Furthermore, this DVD was encrypted and could only be decrypted using his laptop (as the encryption program required not only a password, but access to a specific file that existed on the laptop).

    Can these actions be defended as anything other than job security? Unless someone has reason to think that BengalsUF is getting the story wrong, why is there so much popular defense for this guy?

  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:19PM (#32023676)

    It's one thing to not give anyone your password. It's another to refuse to create new accounts for people who are clearly authorized to request just that, which is what he did. He didn't just refuse to provide his password, he refused to provide access.

  • by Sycraft-fu ( 314770 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:20PM (#32023692)

    Also they weren't asking for HIS username and password, they were asking for THE username and password. There is a difference as any competent sysadmin should know. I won't give up my password to any systems here at work. Policy requires that I do not. However my password is only for my accounts. There are other accounts I have the password for, that are not mine, share accounts. There would be root on the UNIX systems, the local administrator account on the Windows systems, the enable password on the switches, the SA password on the DB server, and so on. There is only one of those accounts (and in the case of things like root, can only be one). It isn't my password on them, it is a password all the IT staff share. That password isn't something I can change to one only I know and refuse to give out, I'd get in trouble for that.

    Big, big difference. Had the city said "We want your password to log in to your personal e-mail account and bank account," well ya, I'd be supporting him for saying no. However they wanted the system passwords for various devices and services that have but one master password. If those passwords were the same as his personal password that is bad security practice on his part, however there is still a solution: Change the passwords and give them the new ones (or change the password on your account).

  • by Skarecrow77 ( 1714214 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:23PM (#32023746)

    Nope, you never refused a thing. You reittereated what he already knew, or should know.

    You don't say "No I will not do that". You say "I will do that as soon as I can confirm that I am allowed to."

    Semantic difference, for sure, but the law is all about semantics and how things are worded/phrased. If it wasn't, we wouldn't need lawyers.

  • by pushf popf ( 741049 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:27PM (#32023792)
    The three cardinal rules if IT would have protected him:
    1. Remember: It's not your hardware, network or data. You just work there.
    2. When your boss asks you for the password, give it to him.
    3. Don't be a dick.

    IMO, he got what he deserved, and nobody else has anything to worry about unless they plan on breaking the above rules. (Especially #3)

  • by jafiwam ( 310805 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:30PM (#32023844) Homepage Journal

    That sure violates the "what if I get hit by a bus / win the lottery" rule.

    It's also the point at which it makes Childs a jackass that deserves jail over "just doing my job."

    A few minutes of talk and a phone call could have given him sufficient CYA and probably job security to fix what they break. He chose a power trip instead. Let him rot.

  • by Khyber ( 864651 ) <techkitsune@gmail.com> on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:31PM (#32023858) Homepage Journal

    "but it was bought and paid for by the City of San Francisco"

    Excuse me, it was bought and paid for by THE PEOPLE OF SAN FRANCISCO.

    Paid through our tax money, which also means it was paid for through *HIS* tax money.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:39PM (#32023950)

    You're breaking rule #3.

  • No, absolutely not (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Sycraft-fu ( 314770 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:41PM (#32023980)

    I mean the keeping of a backup with heavy encryption is certainly defensible. After all you might want to make sure you have the configurations in case you are away on vacation and get a panicked "Oh my god we blew up the network!" call. Of course you would want said data heavily encrypted, in case your laptop was stolen.

    However when those are the ONLY copy, other than the running config? Hell no, that is a blatant attempt to lock others out. Reliability of the service must always come first. So for one, the configs should be stored on the system flash. There's no security risk there, to get at that you either have to have enable access to the system, or be at it physically. In either case you can already do what you want. Also, I'd want other backups stored on a local configuration server somewhere, in case a switch just shit itself and you had to restore to a completely new one.

    The only result of the situation he set up was to make everything critical on him.

  • by unix_geek_512 ( 810627 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:44PM (#32024030)

    SF is criminally stupid, that's all there is to it. They've wasted taxpayer money over a case that should never have been brought.

    Their own employees and contractors caused a ton of downtime trying to get control of the network. If they'd left things alone there wouldn't have been any downtime.

    Not to mention they violated they guy's constitutional rights over something that could have been resolved amicably within 24 to 72 hours.

    Instead, they acted like a totalitarian regime and threw the guy in jail to break his will to resist.

    It's the people in charge of SF that should be prosecuted not this guy.

    Did he act like a damn jerk? You Bettcha! Did the city act like Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili in 1936-1938? Heck yeah!

    Anyone in IT should be worried about ending up like this guy if they anger the SF city government in any way, this could be one heck of a bad precedent.

    Semper Fi Comrades

  • by Tetsujin ( 103070 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:47PM (#32024082) Homepage Journal

    "but it was bought and paid for by the City of San Francisco"

    Excuse me, it was bought and paid for by THE PEOPLE OF SAN FRANCISCO.

    Paid through our tax money, which also means it was paid for through *HIS* tax money.

    The government is supposed to serve the public trust and taxes are their main source of revenue - but I take exception to this attitude that, because someone pays taxes, government funds are somehow their money. It's not your money anymore, you gave it to the government. The fact that some of it once belonged to you (even if only on paper) does not entitle you to a stake in deciding how it is used.

    So, for instance: yes, your taxes pay the wages of the police. This doesn't mean you get to boss them around.
    Your taxes pay for the schools, but that doesn't entitle you to decide the curriculum.
    Your taxes pay for government infrastructure, but that doesn't mean you can micro-manage the government.

    That's not to say citizens in the US (or anywhere else, for that matter) have no stake in the government or its affairs - but the money paid in taxes has nothing to do with that. We have a stake in our government because the operation of the government affects our lives, in the short term and the long term. Would this stake not still exist even if the government could somehow operate without taxing its citizens? IMO bitching about "the taxpayers' money" is just a cheap way to get the attention of people who would otherwise not care.

  • Re: Initiative (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Sycraft-fu ( 314770 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @07:53PM (#32024156)

    Ummm that was way, way later in the proceedings. Read the news stories about it and BengalsUF's information. It wasn't like the came in to his office one day and arrested him. He was, repeatedly, asked for access and he wouldn't give it. He had created an extremely locked down system that only he could get in to. He refused to give others access, and gave out false passwords to try and throw people off. Finaly yes, it came down to a "You hand it over or we arrest you." He wouldn't so they did.

  • by __aasqbs9791 ( 1402899 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @08:01PM (#32024240)

    Changing the rules isn't always the same as breaking the law. If you boss tells you to never give out passwords, and then asks you for a password, and when you refuse says he's changing that rule, it is whole different thing than your boss ordering you to break a law regarding financial accounting laws. Especially if that boss was the owner of the company (which isn't the case in either your example or Childs, of course.

    Though I've seen so many different things on this case I'm not sure where I stand. It seems to depend on the specifics. If the rules were such that it actually said he couldn't release the passwords except to the Mayor himself in person then I'm probably on his side. But otherwise someone like the Mayor likely does many things by proxy, so he may have just been acting the fool (to quote Judge Joe Brown). The devil's in the details I guess.

  • by shitdrummer ( 523404 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @08:07PM (#32024308)
    I would never hire anyone for a technical role who would give a password to an unauthorised person, including their boss (assuming they're not authorised to receive it).
  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @08:13PM (#32024396)

    Just like Enron's accountants?

    If you're not comfortable doing what you're told, then quit. (Or, in the case of Enron, go to the SEC or whatever.) Even if you believe that all people have a right to a job, nobody has a right to a particular job.

    Sorry, no. If your boss later wants to change the rules, there's likely a procedure in place to do so, but they can't simply do that by fiat. That's the whole point of having a policy in the first place.

    It's a great theory, but it's also hopelessly naive. The rules don't apply equally to everyone. It sucks that the world works this way, but it does, and that's never, ever going to change. Behaving as if the rules your boss tells you apply equally to him is an exercise in frustration, and also a good recipe for getting fired. Or, as in this case, sent to jail.

    That's politics, my friend, and any time you have more than two people in a room you get politics. There is no avoiding it. Which is why policies and procedures are worthless. The people who write them can change them any time they choose. They can be enforced selectively or not at all. And you can be accused of not following a procedure, even though you did, because the person interpreting the procedure is the same person who wants to punish you for some other reason.

    Seriously, learn from my experience in corporate America. (Which, I am told, is nothing compared to the politics that goes on in public service jobs, and I'm not even talking about politicians.) This is the way the world works. The good news is that you don't have to be an active participant, and in fact taking the passive approach makes your life easier in many ways. But you do have to be aware of it, and Childs was not. Either that or he very badly overestimated his clout with the mayor (it's probably a combination of the two).

  • by Jah-Wren Ryel ( 80510 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @08:35PM (#32024600)

    No you don't. Ever. You say "Go to the safe and get them yourself. Don't forget to sign the register." When Superintendent bleats that it is needed NOW! your answer is to point them to the safe. Terry Childs did not put the passwords in the safe and deserves to go down for that.

    I disagree. The decision to put passwords in a safe in the first place is above his pay-grade.
    It seems nobody instructed him to do so, so you can't blame him for not following a procedure that didn't exist.
    If anything, the blame lies on his superior(s) who failed to adequately implement a "sysadmin gets hit by bus (or fired)" plan.

  • by turbidostato ( 878842 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @08:36PM (#32024612)

    "In fact, that's *EXACTLY* how I make backups of my important business files."

    Point being that they were not *his* important business files but San Francisco's ones.

  • by Ihmhi ( 1206036 ) <i_have_mental_health_issues@yahoo.com> on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @08:45PM (#32024718)

    The government is supposed to serve the public trust and taxes are their main source of revenue - but I take exception to this attitude that, because someone pays taxes, government funds are somehow their money. It's not your money anymore, you gave it to the government. The fact that some of it once belonged to you (even if only on paper) does not entitle you to a stake in deciding how it is used.

    You are completely wrong on this point. You are entitled to decide how it is used. How much worse would government be if they could just do whatever the fuck they wanted with tax money with absolutely no opposition whatsoever? Pessimists and/or cynics will say that that is already the case, but even now there are at least *some* people fighting things they disagree with for whatever reason.

    You do have a say in how government resources are used because it is your money. Use the boxes - soap box, ballot box, jury box, ammo box (in that order).

  • Bad Laws? (Score:3, Insightful)

    by IonOtter ( 629215 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @08:45PM (#32024722) Homepage

    "I know no method to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their stringent execution." - Ulysses S. Grant

  • by green1 ( 322787 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @08:51PM (#32024774)

    If, after you've been fired, you refuse to disclose the passwords necessary for your successor to do your job, then it is no longer something they can simply "fire" you for, (as you no longer work there) so it becomes something you need to take to court, not "theft" in this case, but "denial of service" because his action of refusing to release the passwords denied them access to administer those systems.

  • by amirulbahr ( 1216502 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @08:59PM (#32024876)
    You don't serve your boss. You serve the same stakeholders that your boss serves. It would be both morally and legally wrong to, for example, collude with your boss to defraud the company. The line is not as clear as GP makes out.
  • by green1 ( 322787 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @09:12PM (#32025010)

    maybe was too limiting to really be practical, but I don't necessarily think it equates to a matter of ensuring job security as has been claimed.

    there's a simple test for that... If he had suddenly vanished off the face of the earth one day, can the business keep on going without interruption, has he documented all necessary information for someone equally qualified to him to simply step in and maintain what he started.

    The answer here is clearly no, there was no way for someone else to get in to administer those systems because he refused to let the password be known to anyone other than himself. That is not the way ANY successful company operates.

    This was him trying to make himself indispensable, not simply him making things "secure". There always has to be some way for business to continue if any one person vanishes, as such, any essential passwords, backups, etc need to be accessible to a replacement in some way. What that way is will vary by organization, some will have a safe for this information, some will simply make sure multiple people know the information, others will find a letter sealed in an envelope in the bottom of a filling cabinet to be "good enough" but whatever method is chosen it must be followed.

    It sounds like in this case the approved method was a secure database accessible by the sysadmins and management. his refusal to document his passwords and configs in that database are where he crossed the line from "secure" to "self important"

  • by LurkerXXX ( 667952 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @09:28PM (#32025130)
    The problem is, you want someone who is paranoid AND smart. The guy was incompetent. If you are in charge of vital machines passwords, you make sure the passwords are written down and stored in a secure location (like a bank safety deposit box, etc) and available to an authorized person in case you are hit by a bus, etc. This wasn't done. If it had been done properly, he wouldn't be facing any jail time or even charges.
  • by techvet ( 918701 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @09:30PM (#32025148)
    He plays peek-a-boo with the passwords and then tries to play Lord God of the network, as if he answered to no one. This guys gives other sysadmins a bad name. He was a Class A jerk. Perhaps he got bad advice from someone, but odds are very high his arrogance brought him down. Nothing new - it happens in all venues (entertainment, sports, business, etc.). I also blame management for letting it get to this point. It should never have been to the point where only he knew the passwords. They should be reprimanded as well unless he unilaterally changed them without their knowledge. Then he definitely deserves to be punished. What a jerk.
  • by LurkerXXX ( 667952 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @09:34PM (#32025180)
    Sorry, No. It's the job of any competent admin to make sure necessary passwords are safely stored in a location where they are available to others they will be needed by in the case he is hit by a bus. It's not above his pay grade. It's a minimum common sense necessity obvious to anyone who should be allowed to run production systems and call themselves a sysadmin.
  • by Darinbob ( 1142669 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @09:34PM (#32025190)
    The defense is probably because the city did some really stupid things and told some lies (or stretched the truth at least). Further there was so little information about what actually happened to justify a criminal proceeding. After all, it's not a crime to be a jerk, not a crime to be paranoid, not a crime to be an idiot, not a crime to not divulge passwords, not a crime to try and get some job security through legal means, etc. It's pretty clear that the city was mismanaged badly and was desperately trying to cover its ass.

    People naturally want to see a good guy and a bad guy in cases like this, and the city did a very good job of portraying itself as the bad guy.
  • by Kenja ( 541830 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @09:43PM (#32025282)
    You do not "leave things alone" when the only person who has access to your network equipment is a disgruntled ex-employee.
  • by celle ( 906675 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @10:04PM (#32025476)

    "the owners of the equipment are asking for the password to their own gear"

    They are not the owners of the equipment, the public is or their representative -- the currently elected jackass of the week. I would guess that's the mayor. Childs called it right. Childs bosses are under the same policy as Childs and don't have the authority to change it without following standardized procedures from their higher ups and letting Childs know about it and acknowledge the change.

  • Re:ugh (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Vellmont ( 569020 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @10:20PM (#32025594) Homepage


    Childs wasn't dragged in just because he refused to give a password, he was convicted because of a series of arrogant and illegal decisions he made over a period of time.

    Please be specific. What were these illegal decisions he made over a period of time?

    Childs designed the system. He designed it to the people who actually paid for it didn't have ownership of it.

    Pure nonsense. Nobody else knew what a password was? Nobody else understood the concept of multiple people having access? Sorry, but this is just pure bullshit. It's 2010, not 1950. The systems Childs used are all well known, and well understood. Everyone understands what a password is, and what only one person knowing a critical password means. The idea that Childs is soley responsible for knowing the failures of the system is just patently ridiculous on multiple levels.

    Oh come on, the undisputed facts are pretty clear. They didn't call the law right away, they called it after they couldn't figure what else to do.

    Which doesn't make it right.

  • by Vellmont ( 569020 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @10:27PM (#32025630) Homepage


    That's crazy -- who wants a system administrator who isn't paranoid?

    I don't want system administrators who are paranoid. I want system administrators who understand what risk is, what the real risks are, and are able to weigh one risk against another. Being paranoid usually entails the inability to weigh risks, since you think "everyone is out to get me". Anyone who can't weigh risks against another is a fool.

  • by BlueBoxSW.com ( 745855 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @10:52PM (#32025814) Homepage

    I agree with you, and I'm not all read up on the case, but I have to disagree with #2.

    Your login is, in many respects, an electronic signature. This system obviously had lots of logging and checking going on. Giving his login and p/w to someone else is a bad idea, especially if you think the whole mess is going to end up in a courtroom.

    What he SHOULD have done (IMHO) is create a login with equal access, and given the credentials to his boss, the mayor, the police, etc., and then let THEM, the more qualified people decide who should get the information.

    This way he upholds his obligations to his workplace, and passes the liability to someone better qualified to make the decision.

    Pretending that HE was the most qualified person to decide who got access seems to be where he went wrong.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @10:57PM (#32025850)

    It's old hat for security types to tell you to never record your passwords anywhere, and completely unrealistic.
    I've talked to many places that had issues due to improper control of passwords.
    I'm not going to go over what happens when everybody and their dog has access to the password.
    I will mention that nobody is going to be there and available 24/7/256, so relying on one person is also going to backfire, eventually.

    My suggestion has always been to keep a mandatory password log kept in two separate physical secured locations.
    That means it's in a safe, not joes desk. That also means it's in a different building, preferable at a different site at least across town, if at all possible.
    As to the safe, there must be a limited number of personnel, minimum of 2 other than the admin, with the ability to get it.
    (You have no idea how many companies lost access to their network when a building flooded/burned/power outage/etc because their password log was stored in joes desk in the affected building and their usual head admin was on vacation skiing in prague or whatever and couldn't be reached by any communications for at least 4 days.)

    Stuff happens you never expect. If you've got appropriate contingency plans to C.Y.A. then it might not seem like a big deal to other people. But if you don't have your anti-murphy shield, it's gonna hit the fan with multiple truck loads. Guess who's going to be the fan... This kind of stuff can and does kill companies, even when they live through it somebody is whining about the nuclear reaming they just got.

    As to the whole Terry Childs thing, it's gotten really distorted by the various sides, but it does sound like somebody didn't cover their backside properly before things blew up, and other people that had no idea what they were doing stuck their size 14s in where they didn't belong. And yes, I expect my admins to be paranoid network nazis, and would want all politicians and bureaucrats to stay the hell away from IT under any circumstances.

  • by jgreco ( 1542031 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @11:03PM (#32025884)

    Which is where this gets all goofy; he's already been fired, but he's expected to do *work* for them, in the form of enumerating passwords and associating them with what systems they're for and how to use them and how to get access to the systems in order to use them, etc.? Documentation of that sort could be very lengthy and quite a bit of work to write up.

    If he had gone out binge drinking and incapacitated himself for a day after being fired, would this be considered "denial of service?"

    If the city wished to be able to have unimpeded access to their network after firing the person who apparently held the only set of electronic master keys to the system, why wasn't it their responsibility to make sure that they had those keys - before firing him?

    There are multiple failures on both sides of this issue, but in the end, the city (a large entity that presumably has many lawyers and expertise in dealing with human resources) has punished the employee (an individual who appears to be eccentric but probably harmless, and probably less-than-fully-informed about the legal aspects to it all). When considering the city vs the individual, the city had all the resources, but royally screwed the pooch, and yet it's still the individual left picking up the tab.

    His boss should be the one heading to jail.

  • by darkpixel2k ( 623900 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @11:04PM (#32025888)

    It would absolve me from prosecution unless I violated any of the very specific rules that were listed.

    The geek isn't always very good at distinguishing between civil and criminal actions. The question then becomes prosecution by who and under what set of rules.

    The computer networks that sustain the city of San Francisco belong to the city of San Francisco. No court can allow them to be held hostage to any single individual. Not the system administrator. Not the mayor. Not anyone.

    Really? What if you boss says 'setup that new server' and you say 'Yes sir'. You follow the standard practice of giving it a secure password because it's connected to the internet. Then you say to your boss "We really need a place to document the password". Your boss gives you no reply and immediately sends you out to your next assignment. There's also no formal documentation system in your organization. After a few weeks of being scheduled on assignments non-stop from 8 AM until 5 PM, you get fired. Whose fault is it that your boss doesn't know the password? Should you be required or forced to work for free for a few hours to cough up passwords because of a failing of your boss?

  • by jedidiah ( 1196 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @11:08PM (#32025910) Homepage

    > You have a boss who makes the rules, if your boss later tells you to break the rules then you do it.

    Except it isn't quite like that.

    Whenever I see one of these "Mad Max" style posts, I wonder if these people have ever been employed anywhere.

    In all likelihood, your boss doesn't create policy. He enforces it just like you do. He doesn't make the
    rules either. He also doesn't get to break them arbitrarily.

    Piss off the boss or break the rules? That's certainly a dilemma to show what kind of man you are.

  • by Vellmont ( 569020 ) on Wednesday April 28, 2010 @11:37PM (#32026092) Homepage

    I guess I don't find it funny because I know paranoid system administrators, and they do indeed suck at what they do.

  • by ImNotAtWork ( 1375933 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @12:03AM (#32026254)
    Child's may have called it right but he should have used his attorney, if he even used one, more strategically the moment he was arrested. Everything should have been proxy-ed(sp?) through his attorney. Or his attorney just grossly mismanaged access to his client. IANAL but I can see the obvious.
  • by 0WaitState ( 231806 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @12:07AM (#32026278)
    Pretty interesting interview with one of the jury members, who appears to understand the issues. Terry Childs juror explains why he voted to convict [computerworld.com]

    The juror lays out the legal issues pretty effectively, and makes a compelling case for conviction on those issues, while also discussing the incompetence of the city's IT department. Apparently he does not believe in jury nullification.

    Personaly I disagree with the outcome on the basis that I think the City of San Francisco illegitimately used its combined capabilities as employer, and owner of a court system and police force to escalate a civil employment matter into a criminal case, and then jailed a man for 2 years pre-trial on a laughable pretext. But I appreciate this juror's willingness to discuss the issues.
  • by yuna49 ( 905461 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @12:27AM (#32026376)

    It's really not that complicated... You have a boss who makes the rules, if your boss later tells you to break the rules then you do it.

    Or you resign.

  • by shitdrummer ( 523404 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @01:23AM (#32026698)

    I'm not in the US, so I can't really talk about US bank security. But there is a difference between customer security and internal security.

    I'm dealing with systems that entire banking sectors use to transfer funds between each other. Many billions of dollars passing through these systems daily.

    Compare the risk associated with those systems to the risk of a customer losing thousands (even hundreds of thousands) of dollars. Many banks choose to wear the risk of fraud to make customer interaction easier. Not saying it's right or not, but there's always a trade off.

    Look at the way some banks (particularly in the US) hand out credit cards. They know that some people aren't going to pay their bills but they calculate (correctly) that the percentage of defaults will be low enough that the overall business will be profitable. They could get tougher with their customer selection criteria so that virtually noone defaults, but they realised they can make more money this way.

  • by Eskarel ( 565631 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @02:03AM (#32026876)

    Terry Child's crime was being a borderline psychotic control freak, ensuring that no one other than himself had access to any system and that they could not easily recover the system and then refusing to turn over any of the passwords or configuration.

    This was not a system designed to resist sustained viscious attack. Apparently the switches all came back up from a power cut without any configuration and he was the only person who knew where the configurations or how to decrypt them. You could guarantee major downtime for the city just by cutting the power and hitting this guy with a crowbar.

  • by Nyder ( 754090 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @02:03AM (#32026878) Journal

    Also they weren't asking for HIS username and password, they were asking for THE username and password. There is a difference as any competent sysadmin should know. I won't give up my password to any systems here at work. Policy requires that I do not. However my password is only for my accounts. There are other accounts I have the password for, that are not mine, share accounts. There would be root on the UNIX systems, the local administrator account on the Windows systems, the enable password on the switches, the SA password on the DB server, and so on. There is only one of those accounts (and in the case of things like root, can only be one). It isn't my password on them, it is a password all the IT staff share. That password isn't something I can change to one only I know and refuse to give out, I'd get in trouble for that.

    Big, big difference. Had the city said "We want your password to log in to your personal e-mail account and bank account," well ya, I'd be supporting him for saying no. However they wanted the system passwords for various devices and services that have but one master password. If those passwords were the same as his personal password that is bad security practice on his part, however there is still a solution: Change the passwords and give them the new ones (or change the password on your account).

    You miss the point. They should of had a copy of THE password to the system somewhere safe. They didn't. they failed. And they blamed Terry Childs for their fuck up.

  • by jimicus ( 737525 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @04:08AM (#32027334)

    Agree entirely. From what little we've heard, it sounds like there was plenty of opportunity for Childs to avoid this. On several occasions he was asked to divulge the passwords and like a petulant child he just kept saying "No. Want the mayor".

    While I don't have any inside knowledge of the case, it seems to me the sensible thing to do would have been to explain to his lawyer the quandary (give the passwords : criminal offence, don't give the passwords : criminal offence) and have the lawyer whip up some sort of agreement whereby the passwords could be handed over and Childs would be let go with no further action. Hell, by all accounts he was offered almost exactly this opportunity by the police - so it's not like it never occurred to anyone.

  • Re:Lesson learned. (Score:4, Insightful)

    by jimicus ( 737525 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @04:39AM (#32027438)

    Then - there's no nice way to put this - you are an idiot.

    There are established protocols for preventing this situation for coming up in the first place. Well, actually they're there in the event of you getting run over by a bus but they'd work just as well if you got fired.

    The established protocol is that the passwords are encrypted and a brief written explanation for how to decrypt them (be it key, file or passphrase) is kept somewhere secure such as a bank deposit box or in a sealed envelope in a safe to which few others have access.

    Yes, it does open the organisation to a certain degree of risk. But the risk is substantially lower than setting things up so that if you get run over by a bus, your former employer is totally screwed.

  • by SlashDread ( 38969 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @06:58AM (#32027962)

    The paranoid ones arent neccisarily good, but the good (security) admins are paranoid.

  • by zippthorne ( 748122 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @07:26AM (#32028080) Journal

    People were asking for the passwords. People who may even have had the authority to have them. However the only person who Terry was certain legitimately represented the owners that he would be able to identify was the Mayor, to whom he gave the passwords.

    How hard is this to understand? I guess very, since it seems Terry has had a difficult time explaining it, or assuming it was obvious.

  • by flibuste ( 523578 ) on Thursday April 29, 2010 @01:34PM (#32033458)

    It's really not that complicated... You have a boss who makes the rules

    Oh yeah. With your logic, here is a small sample of what can happen and the sweet consequences that follow.

    • 1939-1945, and the extermination camps.
    • Vietnam and the killing of hundred thousands of innoncent farmers by 'enlightened people' from some political party.
    • CIA contractors and US soldiers in Guantanamo, and waterboarding.

    I reckon my examples are a little extreme, but the sheep mentality such as yours causes more troubles than it solves problems.

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