Fixing Security Issue Isn't Always the Right Answer

Trailrunner7 writes "In a column on Threatpost, Bruce Schneier writes that the recent security breach at Newark Airport shows that fixing a given security problem isn't always the right move. 'An unidentified man breached airport security at Newark Airport on Sunday, walking into the secured area through the exit, prompting an evacuation of a terminal and flight delays that continued into the next day. This problem isn't common, but it happens regularly. The result is always the same, and it's not obvious that fixing the problem is the right solution. American airports can do more to secure against this risk, but I'm reasonably sure it's not worth it. We could double the guards to reduce the risk of inattentiveness, and redesign the airports to make this kind of thing less likely, but that's an expensive solution to an already rare problem. As much as I don't like saying it, the smartest thing is probably to live with this occasional but major inconvenience.'"

Re:Overreaction

[eudaemon]

I walked through that exit on Sunday - Continental @ Newark and there's a bored guard and a sign that reads if you pass this sign, you have to go through security again. JFK has a slightly different system where there's a huge (large enough to accommodate a person and their luggage) rotating glass door. No idea if it has a turnstile mode or if it can pushed from either side.
  Which one is really better? Not sure but the guard @ JFK seems to be paying attention anyway. Isn't a full height turnstile the easiest way to fix this?

I've got it...

[skelly33]

One of those moving walk ways that moves only in the direction of the exit and completely fills the width of the exit corridor. When someone is detected trying to walk the opposite direction, it can speed up a little and wake up the guard who is posted - because there is always already a guard posted. This would be less obstructive than a turnstile door/gate which is a pain to pass luggage, wheelchairs, children's strollers, etc. through.

Simple solution - Peoplemovers at the exits.

[bratloaf]

Although I agree the investment is probably not worth it at most airports, at places like the big 3 in NYC, O'Hare, Boston, etc, it would be fairly easy to put a "peoplemover" at the exit to the concourse. I.e. get on the moving belt, ride out of the exit door. To "accidentally" go the wrong way would be HIGHLY unlikely. They already have these things all over the airports, just install a few (side by side?) at the exits. Let the guards and cameras sit there and watch. Hell, a camera could use motion detection to flag/alarm if it detected a "person" or object going the wrong way any significant distance....

Re:Overreaction

[ravenscar]

I think there are a number of reasons a turnstyle gate isn't the right answer. For example:

1. Turnstyle gates won't work in the event of an emergency that triggers evacuation. Imagine hundreds of people trying to flee an airport terminal. Now imagine those people trying to flee said terminal through the contraption in your link. It isn't a pretty thought. Yes, they have turnstyle-like doors in other indoor buildings, but those are always accompanied by regular doors with crash bars that can be easily opened by anyone inside the building. Sure, you could add regular doors next to the turnstyle, but as soon as you have a situaion where someone on one side of a door can hold it open for someone on the other side you've lost any sense of security.

2. An emergency isn't the only case in which such doors would be an issue. Whenever I leave a terminal it seems like at least a few hundred people are leaving it with me. I can only imagine what a hinderance a turnstyle would be to such a group - especially considering luggage, disabilities, and people trying to keep groups of children together.

At the Seattle airport (SeaTac) they have what I believe are motion sensors around terminal exits (in addition to a guard(s)). These sensors can detect when someone is entering rather than exiting the terminal exit. If they detect an entrant they set off an alarm. I know that isn't a full-proof solution, but it isn't like we are really safe at an airport anyhow.

Re:How about a couple of....

[FooAtWFU]

Take away the "water" and you have a modest proposal which is just this side of plausible (and hilarious to boot). Want to leave the secure zone? Go down this slide! You can slide your luggage down the luggage chute, next to the passenger chute - no worse treatment than it would get if it were checked. For the elderly or wheelchair-bound, have a staffed elevator. (Bonus: revenue from tips!) And no one's going to run through that one when they're not supposed to.

Re:The whole thing is nuts

[bugs2squash]

Not only that, but I heard a radio phone in show today where a TSA spokesman was asked why we never hear reports of successes. The response was that the TSA had been successful thousands of times in preventing people from traveling. Is that the sole purpose of the TSA, to find plausible reasons to prevent or delay people from traveling ? If their measure of success is the number of people that they prevent from reaching their destination, then they are Al Qaeda's greatest asset.

Re:Overreaction

[Anonymous Coward]

I don't know what the answer is, but "terrorists" could have a field day with this. Imagine a group of a guys going through security the wrong way at a dozen major airports nationwide. The resulting delay due to evacuating everybody, screening the facility, and then rescreening everybody would result in millions if not billions of dollars worth of time and money lost. It is basically impossible to prevent this, the risks are low (this particular guy didn't get caught, and even if you do get caught you'll be out of jail in a short while), and the impact is potentially huge - majorly inconveniencing hundreds of thousands if not millions of people for half a day or more (not to mention all the lost time and money I spoke of earlier). I think this would be much more effective than any previous terrorist incidents, particularly if they did it regularly every couple of months or so.

Things NOT to say to security screeners

[Tisha_AH]

Back in the 80's I was working for an oil company and had to catch a flight to a different city to make a determination on a potentially contaminated batch of jet fuel. This was to a very small fuel terminal that did not necessarily have the right equipment to capture a sample of fuel. What I was dragging along with me was some sampling and analysis gear. Being in a hurry, since this was going to be a flight to an airport, to do work on airport property, catch a flight back the same day, I hand-carried my gear along.

Here is how the conversation went at security screening;

"Miss, what is this thing in the box?"

"Oh, that's a test bomb"

-- you can imagine what happened next, needless to say I was NOT catching that flight and United would not reschedule me on ANY flights for several days. ---

What I had was a "bacon test bomb" http://www.koehlerinstrument.com/products/K27700.html [koehlerinstrument.com] it was packed in a wooden crate that I was hand-carrying on-board the aircraft. It is just a shiny steel cylinder, about the size of a thermos container but has a funky plunger assembly inside and a length of coiled up line to lower it into the tank.

It is used to grab a sample off of the bottom of a storage tank so I could in turn, run flash-point tests on a 50,000 BBL tank of aviation fuel. The airline was rejecting the batch, claiming that it was contaminated with gasoline (bad, bad thing for jet aircraft).

Since then I have learned to give pause when speaking to security screeners