Irish Reject E-Voting, Go Back To Paper 154
Death Metal tips news that the Irish government has announced their decision to abandon e-voting and return to a paper-based system. "Ireland has already put about $67 million into building out its e-voting infrastructure, but the country has apparently decided that it would be even more expensive to keep going with the system than it would be to just scrap it altogether." John Gormley, Ireland's Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, said, "It is clear from consideration of the Report of the Commission on Electronic Voting that significant additional costs would arise to advance electronic voting in Ireland. ... the assurance of public confidence in the democratic system is of paramount importance and it is vital to bring clarity to the present situation." He added that he still thinks there is a need for electoral reform.
STV (Score:5, Informative)
Re:STV (Score:5, Informative)
Spoil votes could not be cast (Score:1, Informative)
They ran a limited trial - some people immediately complained that there was no way to spoil a vote on the machines. You had to select one candidate.
It should be pointed out that in addition to buying *all* the machines for the country before discovering this, a large part of that 67 million is for the cost of storage until they decided to scrap them!
Same (discarded) computers as in The Netherlands.. (Score:4, Informative)
We returned to paper ballots [wijvertrou...ersniet.nl] in The Netherlands about a year and a half ago. As the computers are exactly the same, it's a logical (albeit late) decision.
It's the same in Australia (Score:3, Informative)
Although we call it preferential voting. It you don't get your first preference (because no-one else likes them) then your vote counts towards your second, etc.
And it's also counted by hand. Doesn't seem to be a problem with doing that.
Re:STV (Score:5, Informative)
Arrow's impossibility theorem proves that no voting system can simultaneously satisfy all five of his requirements in a system with more than two choices *for arbitrary input*.
That does not mean that one cannot be better than the others, or even the best. For example, a simple system may satisfy all 5 criteria for 65% of possible inputs. Another system may satisfy it for 75% of all possible inputs. Note that all the votes of a single election are one single "input", not each vote. What we are looking at what fraction of possible ways of voting are "fair".
If we weigh all inputs equally (and this is an assumption, because one may choose to argue that certain combinations are more likely than others) then the second system is better. Arrow's impossiblility theorem only tells you that the goal of getting a fair election for an arbitrary election, or 100% of possible inputs, is impossible.
Re:STV (Score:1, Informative)
Utterly irrelevant. Vote counting is an embarrassingly parallel problem.
Re:STV (Score:5, Informative)
Since it features multiple candidate constituencies the amount of votes required to get elected is not a simple majority but a quota defined by the Droop formula (Total number of valid ballots/(Total number of candidates +1))+1. Ballots for candidates who exceed the quota have a surplus and that surplus gets redistributed according to the next preference on the ballot. The exact mechanism for choosing the actual votes that comprise the surplus amount is random and those randomly selected votes are then transferred as full votes to the next preference candidate. So when a candidate has 10000 votes with a quota of 8500, 1500 ballots are chosen at random and the preferences in those ballots are used to transfer them to the remaining candidates in play. For situations where a candidate gets a surplus on a second count (ie including transferred preferences from an eliminated candidate or from surplus votes from an earlier elected candidate) only the ballots transferred at the last stage are used when selecting the surplus votes to be transferred.
These shortcuts were introduced to speed up manual paper counts but they meant that the task of comparing an electronic count to a paper Voter Verified Audit Trail (VVAT) presents an interesting problem. In order to be able to fully and accurately validate the electronic count the VVAT records would have to be able to be tied exactly to the sequence of the electronic votes (so that each electronic record could be tied to each paper record and the random selections for surplus redistributions could be matched up). One solution to this would be to remove the shortcuts for electronic voting but that would have meant moving to e-Voting entirely as they could not use two different counting methods in different constituencies. So they had to implement an e-Voting STV counting mechanism that followed the same rules as a paper count would. Not hard to do but this then led to a further issue for those of us arguing for a voter verified audit trail for any e-voting system.
One of the Irish Government's least silly arguments against any VVAT for e-Voting was that such a capability might be compromised and could result in someone figuring out exactly how (some) individual voters had voted. Since the Irish constitution explicitly specifies that parliamentary voting must be secret this was something they were very much afraid of - it's notable that since the constitution does not explicitly require counting votes to be accurate (it only implies this) they were less concerned about that. Anyway that's how it seemed to me when I met them about the issue - they didn't say it as bluntly as that but they were terrified about the potential secrecy problems but only worried about the potential for "small" errors.
The real problems with the Irish e-Voting debacle had very little to do with the complexities of an STV count - they were the same as they were\are in most other counties though. The machines in question were provided by private companies, closed and not adequately tested by properly independent security professionals, the vote tabulation software was also closed, similarly unavailable for inspection by independent specialists and most worryingly it was never available any significant period of time ahead of any given election as it had to be rewritten for each count. The lack of a voter verified paper audit capability (which could have been implemented safely despite the concerns described above) meant that the systems could be attacked\compromised\fail in ways that could materially affect an election without being detected. In the end though few of those problems led to the current Government's decision to abandon the problem, they finally got fed up with the political and financial costs associated with fighting to keep the project alive and they gave up. I'm pretty sure that many of the Government Ministers and civil servants involved still think that the Nedap\Powervote e-Voting system was perfectly fine.
E-Voting done in India right now.... (Score:2, Informative)
Relating to this, India's going through elections and E-Voting is being used there. We've used a different approach alltogether towards this problem and thought readers might like to read if they're interested. :)
Here's the main article covering the devices used:
http://techaos.blogspot.com/2004/05/indian-evm-compared-with-diebold.html [blogspot.com]
Here's the /. article covering that:
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/05/14/1448230&art_pos=5 [slashdot.org]
Re:"Change Vote To Republican" not the same there (Score:5, Informative)
Actually, even though the parent may be intended as an IRA joke, Fianna FaÃl, the current ruling party (whose failed policies have made Ireland perhaps nation worst hit by the global downturn, and who were responsible for buying all these voting machines in the first place), refer to themselves as "The Republican Party."
Though yes it refers to a different political and historical movement than the G.O.P. in the US, Fianna FaÃl have been ruling long enough with terrible enough policies and arrogance that I would consider the two analogous.