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Open Source Program Reveals Diebold Bug 175

Mitch Trachtenberg writes "Ballot Browser, an open source Python program developed by Mitch Trachtenberg (yours truly) as part of the all-volunteer Humboldt County Election Transparency Project, was instrumental in revealing that Diebold counting software had dropped 197 ballots from Humboldt County, California's official election results. Despite a top-to-bottom review by the California Secretary of State's office, it appears that Diebold had not informed that office of the four-year-old bug. The Transparency Project has sites at humetp.org and http://www.humtp.com." Trachtenberg also points to his blog for the Transparency Project, and his own essay about the discovery and the process that led to it.
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Open Source Program Reveals Diebold Bug

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  • by shaitand ( 626655 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @08:51AM (#26110165) Journal

    Someone with 30 minutes of quickbasic experience can write an application that accurately counts button presses.

    The fact that we are being asked to swallow this is disgusting.

  • by Rockin'Robert ( 997471 ) <tvlvictimsNO@SPAMhotmail.com> on Sunday December 14, 2008 @08:51AM (#26110171)
    Stalin told us: "It's not who votes. It's who counts the votes," but we NEVER listen to anybody - huh? (Not that I am a fan.)
  • by eebra82 ( 907996 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @09:14AM (#26110257) Homepage

    It's usually correct to not blame on malice what can be explained by incompetence. But I do find it hard to understand how a seemingly-simple requirement (essentially, count the number of times a button has been pressed) can be so badly botched by a company whose other "secure terminal" products (eg, ATMs) seem trustworthy and reliable, without the implication of a sinister motive.

    That's because money is heavily monitored and tracked wherever it goes. Votes are registered and received, but not monitored and traced on two ends.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Sunday December 14, 2008 @09:24AM (#26110295)

    Don't be a retard. No one with 30 minutes of Quickbasic experience can write an application scanning paper ballots and perform optical recognition on them with any degree of accuracy.

  • by kvezach ( 1199717 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @09:27AM (#26110303)
    If anything is simple enough for formal verification to work, yet important enough that formal verification should be used, surely voting machines must be it. Of course, if they're really doing this out of a sinister motive, then (to them) there's no point.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Sunday December 14, 2008 @09:29AM (#26110311)

    Don't say "still" "a" "concern". *Any* percentage can shift the outcome of an election, and each single vote counts. And it's not a concern. This gotta be fixed one way or the other and possibly cleared up in detail. How something like this could happen at all, who would be to blame and should (be forced to) take responsibility.

  • Kudo's (Score:4, Insightful)

    by stabiesoft ( 733417 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @10:19AM (#26110539) Homepage

    To this guy who took it upon himself to provide this check, and kudo's to the supervisor who made it possible. The idea of providing DVD image scans so anyone can verify the vote is genius. I hope other counties start providing real verification like this.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Sunday December 14, 2008 @10:20AM (#26110543)
    Step 1) Did the Democrat win?
    No -  Step 2) Recount!
          Step 3) goto Step 1
    Yes - Step 2) "The people have spoken!"

     
  • by SleepingWaterBear ( 1152169 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @11:08AM (#26110765)

    This is a bit of an overreaction. There's no reason that a properly designed electronic voting system can't achieve greater speed and accuracy while producing a paper trail which allows full accountability. Just have the machine produce a printout which the individual voter can verify, then in case of doubt you can always resort to a manual count. Ultimately electronic voting systems should save time and increase accuracy, and we're going to switch to them.

    The problem here is that the politicians have no idea what a properly designed electronic voting system looks like, and so they just leave it all up to Diebold and the like, who have no real incentive to do things right. What we really need here is a detailed set of specifications for how voting machines ought to perform, and laws that prevent machines which don't meet those specifications from being used in an election.

  • by WindBourne ( 631190 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @11:41AM (#26110913) Journal
    Public servants CAN have all's best interest at heart. There are many. I would argue that most state politicians and most civil servants do in fact have just that. Feds are a different matter. They tend towards corruption. This is true everywhere. Heck, just look at EU. Watching the copyright/patent issues being pushed there. Many citizens object to America's INSANE IP policies, and their citizens are fighting them. But their federal politicians and employees are split. A number of their tactics have suggested that the changes have occured after at least 1 major company came in and pushed for software patents and copyrights. That was total corruption (just like here).
  • by kingduct ( 144865 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @12:32PM (#26111183)

    I have read over and over about unreliable software counting votes. Why not have each vote be counted by two programs? It seems like it would be fairly trivial to have them share the same interface, but the actual methods of counting votes and securing themselves would be completely independent. They would be written by two sources (whether free or not) and then could be used to test each other (in addition of course to humans counting the paper trail the two would print out).

  • by rs232 ( 849320 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @12:43PM (#26111237)
    "There are a few differences between ATMs and voting machines. First of all, ATMs are used daily, and if there was a bug in an ATM, it would be caught very quickly. Second of all, ATMs can be reflashed using the same connection that they use to contact the bank"

    Firstly, voting machines should be subject to a full stress test before being deployed in a live election. Secondly ATMs can not be remotely 'reflashed', To upgrade required the replacement of the ATM module and the use of an external hand-held unit (plugged into the ATM) and the presence of two bank officials and the use of two unique PINS.
  • by db32 ( 862117 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @12:52PM (#26111301) Journal
    Your right. They would say "that's a fucking stupid idea to scan ballots and use OCR to read them and then just rely on the machine when it promises that it got the answer right, at the very least we should be counting button presses".

    Do you hold your ATM pin number up to the screen waiting for it to be scanned or do you punch the buttons...
  • by digitalunity ( 19107 ) <digitalunityNO@SPAMyahoo.com> on Sunday December 14, 2008 @01:27PM (#26111555) Homepage

    Exactly. In a lot of places, jerrymandering has made individual votes less important because the winners often win by a large margin. This is true for both major parties.

    However, for statewide elections as evidenced in Minnesota recently, individual votes can have a HUGE impact. A +/- 200 error isn't good enough when the winner's margin is only 100 votes.

  • by scribblej ( 195445 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @01:36PM (#26111601)

    I program banking systems for a living.

    It's cute that you think "electronics simply don't do [...] accountability." Believe me, I'd be out a job real fast if they didn't.

    The bottom line is, this was handled really, really poorly.

  • That's shit. I'll take the ballot I handle and allow it to be scanned. If the count is suspect then the ballots exist outside of some computer generated fantasy and real humans can count them.

  • by HornWumpus ( 783565 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @03:25PM (#26112259)

    Your union rep wants to see your voting receipt to make sure you voted 'correctly'!

    If that doesn't scare you imagine the same scenario with your boss doing the verification.

    You can't make the system 'voter auditable' without losing the secret ballot.

    Take your idea but don't print the verification number on the ballot. Store it in the voting machine then reconcile the machine records to the central databases at the end of the day as a check. Hackers would have to change multiple systems in synch to get away with steeling votes.

    Registration fraud still needs to be fixed.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Sunday December 14, 2008 @03:47PM (#26112407)

    you DO know that if they can identify the ballot to the voter thats unconstitutional, right ?
    and "they" includes any computer program with access to both databases.
    voter privacy is MUCH more important than having a fraud free voting system. this is so that "they" cant hunt you down and kill you when the "they" turns into a fascist state.

  • by hexapodium ( 1265360 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @04:22PM (#26112669)
    In this case, though, privacy of ballots is essential to an honest election, to prevent more traditional electoral fraud like vote-buying. Votes have to be entirely anonymous once you leave the booth so that your employer/union leader/other Big Bad of the month can't pressurise you into voting one way or another. The right to an honest election hinges on a vote being one individual's opinion, not that of someone else with an angle to work. All you do by making votes voter-verifiable is move the point of fraud from the system to the individual, which is probably easier to execute.
  • by shaitand ( 626655 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @06:18PM (#26113621) Journal

    'The fact that we're being asked to swallow electronic voting is disgusting. Some things electronics simply don't do well, and one such thing is accountability.'

    Paper and electronic systems are equally accountable. The solution is transparency and to combine the two. Count the votes electronically, in real time, on a large publically visible display with a serial number attached to the ballot. You watch your vote be added to the tally. Then you take the human readable, optically scannable printout, again with serial number on it and drop it into a seperate box that scans it and keeps a second tally.

    You have no proof of your serial number to show someone who wants to buy your vote. Both tallies must match. You watch your vote counted publically and if counted wrong then can raise issue right there. It doesn't matter that you have no proof you are n576898 because there will be a discrepency in the database record for n576898 and the human readable printout. And the pollsters can watch from start to finish to assure that the number of voters matches the number of votes.

  • by NotmyNick ( 1089709 ) on Sunday December 14, 2008 @06:34PM (#26113795)

    I program banking systems for a living.

    It's cute that you think "electronics simply don't do [...] accountability." Believe me, I'd be out a job real fast if they didn't.

    The bottom line is, this was handled really, really poorly

    Or really, really well...

  • by scribblej ( 195445 ) on Monday December 15, 2008 @02:13PM (#26122059)

    I would have said the same thing to the person you are replying to, but since you did, let me play devil's advocate and say you're only right if the intent was to either facilitate voting, or subvert the system directly. If the goal was to destroy faith in the system, this is a pretty good job.

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