FBI Sought Approval To Use Spyware Through FISC

An anonymous reader writes "Wired is reporting that the FBI sought approval to use its custom spyware program, CIPAV, from the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in terrorism or spying investigations. Affidavits prepared for the court are among 3,000 pages of documents gathered, but not yet released, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from Wired. The FBI hasn't answered any questions about its use of the CIPAV since the program's existence became widely known in July. The FISC is generally regarded as a rubber stamp; it approved over 4,000 surveillance requests in 2005 and 2006[PDF], rejecting none."

Not surprising

[insanechemist]

Reading up a bit: "The FISA Court did not reject a single warrant application from its beginning in 1979 through 2002. In 2003 it rejected four applications. In 2004, the number was again zero."

Re:Government Spyware

[BitterOak]

I would just like to know, what could the FBI do to make it's spy ware different from anything else out there in the wild? It would seem to me they would limited to the same techniques anyone can use on a computer, so really wouldn't it be just one more obnoxious program out there?

The difference is it is not viral and therefore doesn't escape "into the wild" and reproduce to the point where it eventually falls into the hands of the anti-virus software makers. As a result, their software won't detect it. This is a fundamental weakness with signature-based anti-virus systems. They work great on viruses, which spread indiscriminently, but are useless against a targeted attack by an adversary with the resources to create and deploy their own malware.

Re:This is a good thing.

[EaglemanBSA]

...while they mine data that could be used for anything, if the right people got their hands on it. The minute the FBI breaks into my computer to get information, benign or not, whether or not I'm innocent of any crimes, is the minute I pick up and leave. If they're that hell bent on taking my privacy for your false sense of security, they've got problems bigger than a terrorist detonating a bomb in a crowded room.

Honestly, doesn't it seem like the terrorists got what they wanted? They hate us for our freedoms and our lifestyles, and they've managed to get our government to seize damned near all of it to "fight terrorism". They're not fighting terrorism, they're becoming the purveyors of it.

Re:Gee..

[Anonymous Coward]

Gee, maybe you should get a clue before posting.

From the Interim Report on FBI Oversight in the 107th
Congress by the Senate Judiciary Committee:

FISA Implementation Failures
Senator Patrick Leahy, Senator Charles Grassley, and Senator Arlen Specter
February 2003

http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_rpt/fisa.html [fas.org]

2. General Findings.

We found that key FBI personnel involved in the FISA process were not properly trained to carry out their important duties. In addition, we found that the structural, management, and resource problems plaguing the FBI in general contributed to the intelligence failures prior to the 9/11 attacks.18 Following are some of the most salient facts supporting these conclusions.

First, key FBI personnel responsible for protecting our country against terrorism did not understand the law... ...So deficient was the FISA process that, according to at least one FBI supervisor, not only were new applications not acted upon in a timely manner, but the surveillance of existing targets of interest was often terminated, not because the facts no longer warranted surveillance, but because the application for extending FISA surveillance could not be completed in a timely manner. Thus, targets that represented a sufficient threat to national security that the Department had sought, and a FISA Court judge had approved, a FISA warrant were allowed to break free of surveillance for no reason other than the FBI and DOJ's failure to complete and submit the proper paper work. This failure is inexcusable. ...An FBI document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, which is attached to this report as Exhibit D, suggests that the errors committed were far broader. The document is a memorandum dated April 21, 2000, from the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, that details a series of inaccuracies and errors in handling FISA applications and wiretaps that have nothing whatsoever to do with the "wall." Such mistakes included videotaping a meeting when videotaping was not allowed under the relevant FISA Court order, continuing to intercept a person's email after there was no authorization to do so, and continuing a wiretap on a cell phone even after the phone number had changed to a new subscriber who spoke a different language from the target.

and on and on... There's more documentation out there if you aren't too lazy to go find it, or aren't a Bush apologist who LUVS TEH AUTHORITAH!