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FBI Taps Cell Phone Microphones in Mafia Case 274
cnet-declan writes "We already knew the FBI can secretly listen in to car conversations by activating microphones of systems like OnStar. A new Mafia court case suggests that the FBI can do the same thing to cell phones. The judge's opinion and some background information [pdf] are available for reading online. The most disturbing thing? According to the judge, the bug worked even if the phone appeared to be 'powered off.' Anyone up for an open-source handset already?" From the article: "This week, Judge Kaplan in the southern district of New York concluded that the 'roving bugs' were legally permitted to capture hundreds of hours of conversations because the FBI had obtained a court order and alternatives probably wouldn't work. The FBI's 'applications made a sufficient case for electronic surveillance,' Kaplan wrote. 'They indicated that alternative methods of investigation either had failed or were unlikely to produce results, in part because the subjects deliberately avoided government surveillance.'"
open-source (Score:2, Funny)
In Soviet Russia (Score:5, Funny)
oh wait
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As far as I remember, just after the collapse of the USSR, there were published some information about how KGB was able to activate the mics of "normal" old phones by activating the line from substation; so that the phone didn't ring, but the mic was getting enough current flowing through it to work.
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They then played the tapes back during interrogation, the bits where the housemates talked about each other behind their backs etc. to try and get them to tesify against each other.
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Bah, bloody thing posted when I hit Enter.
I don't really see how that's possible. When the handset is on-hook, the microphone is disconnected. This is a requirement for BABT compliance.
Re:In Soviet Russia (Score:5, Informative)
I don't really see how that's possible. When the handset is on-hook, the microphone is disconnected. This is a requirement for BABT compliance.
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Two reasons it's possible (Score:3, Interesting)
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An eastern-block agency was spying on a Russian agency with this method. They parked a car underneath the building's overhead power line, and extended a thin wooden pole that nearly touched the power line.
Also, when the US opened a new embassy in Moscow, the joke was that the flowers would a
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What's so alarming here? (Score:5, Interesting)
And an open-source cellphone will do you no good when the seperate mic runs straight off the battery inside the phone regardless if your phone is on or not. This is not much different then having the FBI tap your watch, cd-rom drive, or shaver... but I guess that would be pointless since you don't talk to any of those about your secrets right?
The real puzzle here is how they managed to swap the real phone with the one that was wired by the FBI, there must have been a mole. And since they got a court order to "monitor" the suspects, is it really that *alarming* that it worked even when the phone was off? Are there limitations as to when you can and cannot monitor dangerous suspects? For example when they sleep, or go to the bathroom, or between the hours of 9-5? Anybody know?
Re:What's so alarming here? (Score:4, Insightful)
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The alarming thing is the possibility that the bug could have been something that was not a physical modification to the phone's hardware, but a software modification. The article suggests that this may have been the case. So while it's probably not the case that the FBI could remotely turn any phone into a bug, the possibility of that being the case is alarming.
The probability that the judge and the reporter both misunderstood the technical parts of the case is certainly much higher than the probability
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History, real history, is deemed so radical that Americans don't read it anymore. This I understand is why they seem to think law=good. Law is a set of rules laid down by powerful people. Read about Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys; landowners, quite legally, stole farmers' own, purchased land and had them executed and imprisoned when they tried to resist the theft. The lawyers, j
Re:What's so alarming here? (Score:4, Insightful)
GSM networks don't have such delivery systems, and use java for applications. Most phones don't support starting Java midlets automatically to backround, or access microphone. Even when in background, running applications are visible somewhere in the menus.
Basically the java applets are sandboxed, while BREW apps are signed by the operator to be "trustable".
Re:What's so alarming here? (Score:5, Interesting)
I'm actually surprised more people here hadn't heard about it.
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Re:Soapbox much? (Score:5, Insightful)
I'd like to suggest that criticizing the U.S. government when it does bad things, is actually PRO-American, not anti-American.
...err, how? (Score:2)
Do you have any evidence (articl
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I'm sorry that I was misunderstood myself ; I was by no way implying that it's absolutely impossible to remotely bug a cell phone. But I don't think it's reasonably practical to do it, for a number of reasons, and I think anyway it makes a better headline to imply the contrary. Hence, my belief it's easier to bug conventionaly a phone (rewiring the mic or something like this) rather than fussing with the firmware, and I find it more probable the reporter exagerated the story.
Think about it for a minute : h
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Yes, the software has bugs, it is supposed to have bugs.
Re:What's so alarming here? (Score:5, Informative)
c/net says it was the internal microphone (Score:5, Interesting)
According to c/net it was the internal microphone [com.com]. They give some consideration to the possibility of a separate bug but conclude the weight of evidence points to the internal microphone being activated without the owner's knowledge.
While I'm at it I'll repeat a comment I posted on Technocrat:
Given that all mobile/cell phones are required to be locatable (its for your own safety remember?) and need to be accurately synchronised with a base station, what are the chances of forming a phased array using all microphones within a certain radius of a point? That way one could eavesdrop on a conversation well away from the nearest mobile phone.
I would guess that there is no need for a super accurate location or time. Measure the two as close as possible then record all streams from mobiles in the area. Next feed the whole lot into a super computer and do a big cross correlation with sliding windows centred about the best guess at relative phase (based on the measured location and time).
It is worth noting that the wavelength of the radio signals a mobile phone uses is comparable to the wavelength of the audio frequencies of the human voice. Thus in theory it is possible for a mobile phone base station to locate a mobile phone to within a fraction of an audio wavelength, exactly what is needed for a phased array.
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As for the phased array, does it take into account things like pockets? Not to mention you'd need very detailed weather patterns to cope with the wind carrying sound, Doppler etc.
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Actually, all new cell phones in the US are required to have internal GPS receivers so they can be located when dialing 911.
A nice idea in theory, but in practice it's largely useless. The nature of GPS is such that the receiver needs to have a fairly unobstructed view of a large sector of sky for a goodly amount of time in order to calculate position. It works passably well when someone's outdoors, not under any cover (including trees), and holding the phone up to their head. When the phone in your pocket, on your belt in a case, indoors, or in the car, GPS is not going to work.
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It's pissing me off. I'm using an older phone, and eventually it will fail. I will not purchase a tracking device, so I guess I'll be untethered to a cel
Re:What's so alarming LIAR! PHONE NOT ALTERRED! (Score:5, Interesting)
Parent poster is lying and trying to coverup the shocking truth! (parent is a fed shill?)! Parent post did not cite section three PROPERLY of wiretap judge affidavit.p1.120106.pdf. Read it yourselves folks and spot the blatant parent post lie The FBI used the blanket method "OR OTHER MEANS" as clearly specified in the document. No modification to the cell phone was made AT ALL. No mods needed. (or feasable)
There are actually a few secret goodies available to the feds in many modern cell phones.
First... Sat based GPS is NOT required in most cells phones to silently get precise location, as per FCC device regulations and as per millions of dollars in levied and honored fines to lagging noncompliant cell providers.
also part of underwraps subsections of ETSI LI spec framework for LI (Lawful Interception) hint at leveraging the E911 feature that makes a cell not be able to disconnect if a 911 operator toggles a cell phone into "stay online no matter what" mode. Heck, ive played with that mode once... had to rip out the battery! (no way to hang up). Technology was added to prevent poor signal drops during a 911 call, but then used to keep line open while victim is delirious or expiring. For docs, Just look for harvesting all spec docs starting with S3LI03 prefix on the net. Or hang around Cryptome or usual places.
Regarding the gov tracking your movements in real time (if battery not removed from your non-GPS cell : 1996 the FCC defined a fancier "E911 Phase 2" for more precise ALI information to PSAPs using latitude and longitude information, and to identify a mobile caller's location within 125 meters (410 feet) 67% of the time to the PSAP. A PSAP is one of over 6,000 Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP), some route , some deal directly with initial public calls. FCC 97-402 CC Docket No. 94-102 rules (October 1, 1996). besides the 34-bit Mobile Identification Number (MIN), being sent in Phase I of E911, the 34 bit MIN accepted a "call back' even without a valid phone number, as the 1996 regulation also stipulates that CELL PHONES WITH NO CONTRACT OR DORMANT DEVICES MUST HAVE FREE ACCESS TO 911 service, no matter what. The tracking protocol is independant of billing accept/reject.
To allow the cell to be detected within 410 feet WITHOUT GPS, cell phone towers use triangulation methods automated with cellular geolocation systems involving time difference of arrival (TDOA) and angle of arrival (AOA)
As for REMOB mode of cell phone (remote observation) the details seem to be partially vender unique, but it is suspected that the table is trivially assigned via Mobile Identification Number (MIN) table lookup in REMOB snitch mode.
PLEASE NOTE that the court documents allowing the voice tapping of the MAFIA suspect stated "OR OTHER MEANS". the "OR OTHER MEANS" is the non modified NON_ALTERRED original cell phone being merely set in a VOX mode for packet burst with simple threshold to sleep unless steady VOX activation, controlled partly by other terminal point. Otherwise battery of a modern cell will last only a few hours.
I cannot believe all the fools in this thread that actually believe the FBI has ability to add devices INSIDE a modified cell phone. Yeah... like there's lots of empty space!!! The judges papers said OR OTHER MEANS and this other means is the REMOB mode. Similar to onstar silent snitch mode in Cadillacs.
If you really want to panic... the FBI buys the RFID scans of all the points on NY turnpike that record car tire RFID that the TREAD act mandates to allow gov to uniquely track movements of all cars by untamperable chips in the tires... even at 90 miles and hour adn 12 feet away (though instead of overpasses for RFID car tires as in parts of I-75, reading coils UNDER the pavement are used, as with the RFID tire impressions collected at canadian border customs booths.
sorry for all the lazy typos. I am very tired. an i know that factual anon posts stay +0 until the FBI shills squelch them to -1 rapidly with there grooming accounts they use here to stifle agitator insider posts like this one.
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http://clintjcl.wordpress.com/tag/rants/ [wordpress.com]
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They don't transmit all the time, but they do transmit "here I am" signals at regular, close intervals. And it would be trivial to use a little memory in the phone to store a stack of GPS coordinates, for use during the periodic "here I am" transmissions.
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they don't steal the phone and put in a microphone and the software to run it. They send the phone software over the cell net that activat
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This is why I've been stumping for a year for a handset that has a separate power citcuit for the e911 function. When I don't want it on, I don't want som
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FBI: "Judge, these guys are mafia and they're not falling for the typical eavesdropping routines."
Judge: "Ok, try planting bugs in their cell phones."
Not everyone trying to preserve their privacy is doing so for good reasons. The purpose of a warrant is to isolate the shitbags who are hiding something illegal before invading their personal lives. It's the 4th amendment: Reasonable suspicion that you're covering something up voids your right
Validating Warrants (Score:2)
FBI? (Score:2)
The big difference is that the NSA will use this for counter-terrorism and also for industrial espionage, while the FBI probably only really uses it for crime investigation.
The Solution (Score:5, Insightful)
Remove the battery.
Or better yet, don't have one!
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Comment removed (Score:5, Funny)
Can we use non-USA cell phones instead? (Score:2)
Even if the vendor tries to lock the cell phone to a given service provider, there should be places that unlock cell phones. My brother-in-law travels to Hong Kong from t
Thankfully, it's easy to mod your phone (Score:3, Informative)
If, for whatever reason, your phone starts transmitting (be it on a call, or because the FBI have remotely activated it), then some LEDs can be configured to light or flash - providing clear visual feedback. This could be a bit more convenient than removing the battery except when needed.
In fact, you can get the modification kits ready for use, for less than $5 - and installation, can take less than 30 seconds.
These kits are more usually sold as novelties for 'ricing' phones, but they can also be used for serious purposes:
Example kit [ebay.com]
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On occasion I've put my phone down next to an LED flashlight, and when the phone rings the flashlight turns on!
My Opinion (Score:3, Informative)
As long as there's a court order... (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:As long as there's a court order... (Score:5, Insightful)
Well, as the Bush administration has shown, it's not the job of the courts to do this. And if spying becomes as simple as pushing a bunch of buttons, you can be certain that people will do it without a court order.
This is all just a rehash of the same old story from back in the days when they were first tapping phone lines across the street from Ma Bell's switchboard.
Well, no, it isn't. That required physical access and had significant costs associated with it. Now, the costs are considerably lower, and surveillance follows the person around. That changes things considerably.
Overall, it's a question of balance, not black-or-white-it's-all-the-same style arguments, like you're making.
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The old 'it is legal' argument. (Score:2)
(See, it goes both ways)
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Your argument that physical access and high cost made tapping phone lines legal is just weird. Just because the costs are lower and there's new technology shouldn't change the principle behind the wiretapping
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Just because wiretapping is so easy that the President authorizes it without a warrant does not make that authorization legal.
And yet it occured anyway, and the President has not been censured in any way as a result. The precident is there, and more importantly there is no reason to think this abuse is not ongoing. We know that warrantless wiretaps have been performed, and we know that the President feels he is perfectly within his rights to order
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"It is the job of the courts to assure the public that this does not occur without probable cause."
We have a 2nd Amendment to make sure the WE can enforce the 1st.
RELYING on a court to provide for your Freedom and Liberty, when you have NO RIGHT to a Writ of Habeas Corpus is just plain dumb.
You might NEVER SEE A COURT.
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I think the issue is that the technology to monitor cell phones remotely while off, if it exists, does not just make it easier to bug cell phones. It actually constitutes bugging them. Bugging someone's home doesn't mean turning on a mic you put there earlier, it means putting the mic there in the first place
Hmmmm (Score:2)
I must then ask (Score:4, Interesting)
Which phone manufacturers did NOT sell all of its customers out to the government? Perhaps there are specific model numbers that are not compromised? Or perhaps before a certain year?
Anyhow...if I unplug the phone battery it's off for sure...right?
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Biggest Threat to Today's 3G -- Wireless LANs
Faster than 3G - 11 or 56 Mbps vs. 2 Mbps for 3G when stationary
Data experience matches the Internet with the added convenience of mobile
Same user interface (doesn't rely on small screens)
Same programs, files, applications, Websites.
Low cost, low barriers to entry
Organizations can build own networks - Like the Internet,
secrets of cell phones (Score:3, Informative)
First... Sat based GPS is NOT required in most cells phones to silently get perecise location, as per FCC device regulations and as per millions of dollars in levied and honored fines to lagging noncompliant cell providers.
also part of underwraps subsections of ETSI LI spec framework for LI (Lawful Interception) hint at leveraging the E911 feature that makes a cell not be able to disconenct if a 911 operator toggles a cell phone into "stay online no matter what" mode. Heck, ive played with that mode once... had to rip out the battery! (no way to hang up). Technology was added to prevent poor signal drops during a 911 call, but then used to keep line open while victim is delirious or expiring. For docs, Just look for havesting all spec docs starting with S3LI03 prefix on the net. Or hang around Cryptome or usual places.
Regarding the gocv tracking your movements in real time (if battery not removed from your non-GPS cell : 1996 the FCC defined a fancier "E911 Phase 2" for more precise ALI information to PSAPs using latitude and longitude information, and to identify a mobile caller's location within 125 meters (410 feet) 67% of the time to the PSAP. A PSAP is one of over 6,000 Public Safety Answering
Points (PSAP), some route , some deal directly with initial public calls. FCC 97-402 CC Docket No. 94-102 rules (i.e., by October 1, 1996). besides the 34-bit Mobile Identification Number (MIN), being sent in Phase I of E911, the 34 bit MIN accepted a "call back' even without a valid phone number, as the 1996 regulation also stipulates that CELL PHONES WITH NO CONTRACT OR DORMANT DEVICES MUST HAVE FREE ACCESS TO 911 service, no matter what. The tracking protocol is indepentdant of billing accept/reject.
To allow the cell to be detected within 410 feet WITHOUT GPS, cell phone towers use triangulation methods automated with cellular geolocation systems involving time difference of arrival (TDOA) and angle of arrival (AOA)
As for REMOB mode of cell phone (remote observation) the details seem to be partially vender unique, but it is supected that the table is trivially assined via Mobile Identification Number (MIN) table lookup in REMOB snitch mode.
PLEASE NOTE that the court documents allowing the voice tapping of the MAFIA suspect stated "OR OTHER MEANS". the "OR OTHER MEANS" is the non modified NON_ALTERRED original cell phone being merely set in a VOX mode for packet burst with simple threshold to sleep unless steady VOX activation, controlled partly by other terminal point. Otherwise battery of a modern cell will last only a few hours.
I cannot believe all the fools in this thread that actually believe the FBI has ability to add devices INSIDE a modified cell phone. Yeah... like theres lots of empty space!!! The judges papers said OR OTHER MEANS and this other means is the REMOB mode. Similar to onstar silent snithc mode in cadillacs.
If you really want to panic... the FBI buys the RFID scans of all the points on NY turnpike taht record car tire RFID that the TREAD act mandates to allow gov to uniquely track movements of all cars by untamperable chips in the tires... even at 90 miles and hour adn 12 feet away (though instaed of overpasses for RFID car tires as in parts of I-75, reading coils UNDER the pavement are used, as with the RFID tire impressions collected at canadian border customs booths.
sorry for all the lazy typos. I am very tired. an i know that factual anon posts stay +0 until the FBI shills squelch them to -1 rapidly with there grooming accounts they use here to stifle agitatant insider posts like this one.
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Re:secrets of cell phones - WRONG! RFID tires real (Score:5, Interesting)
It is a US felony to commercially import or sell auto tires that do not have a sanctioned spy chip RFID radio transpnders in them, with a unique GUID for every tire.
A secret initiative exists to track all funnel-points on interstates and US borders for car tire ID transponders (RFID chips embedded in the tire).
Your tires have a passive coil with 64 to 128 bit serial number emitter in them! (AIAG B-11 ADC v3.0) . A particular frequency energizes it enough so that a receiver can read its little ROM. A ROM which in essence is your GUID for your TIRE. Multiple tires do not confuse the readers. Its almost identical to all "FastPass" "SpeedPass" technologies you see on gasoline keychain dongles and commuter windshield sticker-chips. The US gov has secretly started using these chips to track people as far back as 2002.
I am not making this up. Melt down a high end Firestone, or Bridgestone tire and go through the bits near the rim (sometimes at base of tread) and you will locate the transmitter (similar to 'grain of rice' pet ids and Mobile SpeedPass, but not as high tech as the tollbooth based units). Sokymat LOGI 160, and Sokymat LOGI 120 transponder buttons are just SOME of the transponders found in modern high end car tires. The AIAG B-11 Tire tracking standard is now implemented for all 3rd party transponder manufactures [covered below].
The US Customs service uses it in Canada to detect people who swap license plates on cars when doing a transport of contraband on a mule vehicle that normally has not logged enough hours across the border.
Photos of untamperable tracking chips before molded deep into tires!
http://www.sokymat.com/index.php?id=94 [sokymat.com]
the first subcontracter secretly hired for providing gear for bulk logging of tire RFID on highways in 2002 was
http://web.archive.org/web/20021014102238/telemati cs-wireless.com/divisions.html [archive.org]
ALL USA cars can be radio tracked using the tires. Refer to tire standard AIAG B-11 ADC, (B-11 is coincidentally Post Sept 11 fastrack initiative by US Gov to speed up tire chip standardization to one read-back standard for highway usage).
The AIAG is "The Automotive Industry Action Group"
The non proprietary (non-sokymat controlled) standard is the AIAG B-11 standard is the "Tire Label and Radio Frequency Identification" standard
"ADC" stands for "Automatic Data Collection"
The "AIDCW" is the US gov manipulated "Automatic Identification Data Collection Work Group"
The standard was started and finished rapidly in less than a year as a direct consequence of the Sep 11 attacks by Saudi nationals.
All tire manufacturers were forced to comply AIAG B-11 3.0 Radio Tire tracking standard by the 2004 model year.
(B-11: Tire & Wheel Label & Radio Frequency ID(RFID) Standard)
http://mows.aiag.org/source/Orders/index.cfm?task= 3&CATEGORY=AUTOIDBC&PRODUCT_TYPE=SALES&SKU=B-11 [aiag.org]
(use google cache to glance at that link if you are a hacker, all access to that page is watched by the feds, as are orders.)
A huge (28 megabyte compressed zip) video of a tire being scanned remotely was at http://mows.aiag.org/ScriptContent/videos/ [aiag.org] (the file is "video Aiagb-11.zip").
THAT LINK was still valid as recently as Feb 2004, long after my 2002 ignored warnings on slashdot. But in July 2004 died after feds saw my origianl warnings regarding T.R.E.A.D. act (RFID citizen tracking)
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- The T.R.E.A.D. act focuses on tire safety, identifying problems as soon as possible, and making manufacturers specifically responsible for safety and manufacture. It also specifies some research and standards for child safety seats. Go figure.
- The T.R.E.A.D. act doesn't specify RFID tags. It does allow for rulemaking that might.
- RFID tags in tires were probably first implemented by Michelin, to simplify inventory. They may have devised the embedded antenna to so
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PLEASE LOOK AT THAT LINK : Its the same shocking tire material I have been trying to tell people about since the spring of 2001
For credibility, please post with GPG signature (Score:3, Interesting)
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Sure you can buy the tires in cash and put them on with no paper trail to tie them back to you. However, how hard would that be to correlate?
As soon as you go through a toll booth or a detector with a camera nearby, it would be trivial to tie your tire IDs to your cars License plate. In fact, they wouldn't even need to do it en mass. All they need to do is store the data.
Then when they have an ID to look for, they can go back and see when they saw it previously, or where it has been since.
O
Re:secrets of cell phones - WRONG! RFID tires real (Score:5, Interesting)
The Article Points Out (Score:2, Insightful)
The affidavit seeking the court order lists the target's phone number his 15-digit International Mobile Subscriber Identifier, and lists Nextel as the service provider. Why would they have to disclose this information to the court if they were just planting an ordinary bug which requires none of the above informatio
Not the issue... here is the issue. (Score:2)
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Most scanners are designed to detect the special markings on currency and subsequently will not scan it accurately; most printers are designed likewise.
In addition, in both categories of products, many of them embed a unique identifier in their output. Only realistic way to determine if one's scanner and/or p
maybe they just bought a COTS phone (Score:2, Interesting)
These phones went the rounds of the blogs a while ago so I think they're real:
http://www.spyphones.com/ [spyphones.com]
Not to mention you can use a phone itself as a remote GPS tracker. See this link from cruel.com in August:
http://forums.accutracking.com/viewtopic.php?t=494 &postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=0 [accutracking.com]
Open Src? (Score:2, Insightful)
Not so new (Score:2, Informative)
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Ron
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I've found you can simulate this effect without modifying the hardware by using T-Mobile service. (argh)
Anyone up for an open-source handset already? (Score:2)
http://www.opencellphone.org/index.php?title=Main_ Page [opencellphone.org]
Or the FIC Linux phone that SlashGear talked about last month?
http://www.slashgear.com/fic-linux-cellphone-can-i t-capture-the-imagination-of-the-open-source-commu nity-072392.php [slashgear.com]
Easy countermeasure (Score:5, Interesting)
Where is "not practical?" (Score:4, Interesting)
Sounds like the judge should be impeached, because my constitution doesnt make any exemptions.
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deliberately avoided surveillance (Score:2)
Ok, so what does that mean, and when exactly is that taken as on offensive/criminal activity ? If you see a cctv camera and go around it, or if you don't take your mobile phone with you on the road, or wear sunglasses and baseball cap, or just simply don't leave your house ? Or what ? Since the wording of the short quote sounds like that avoidance is a bad thing or illegal or something. Is this yet another case of if you didn't do anything you shou
Easy countermeasure... (Score:2)
To find out if your phone is being used for eavesdropping, just keep it near your stereo.
WHY are Slashdotters of all people surprised?! (Score:5, Interesting)
Listen: you have an embedded device that in its normal state is always on-network on a packet network. It has a limited range of connectivity, but this limitation is mitigated by having a large number of serialized access points that are geographically situated so as to make connectivity seamless. The embedded devices are reasonably computationally powerful (much moreso than PCs of a few years ago) and have a digital or soft-user-interface (including the power circuitry, which is not a physical full-throw SPST that connects or disconnects power, but is rather an input that runs through the embedded software). The software itself is secured and controlled by the network administration, and software and content can be "push" downloaded to the devices by the network.
From this description, all of the following seem technically obvious:
1 - You have no control over the software in your phone; the vendors and networks do.
2 - Since said software controls the power interface and user interface, you have no control over (or reason to trust as being consistent with your expectations) these interfaces either.
3 - Your phone could thus be easily set by the network to be "always on" without having any such indications in the user interface. The user interface could continue to give the appearance that you are controlling such functions as power and connectivity when in fact the phone is doing everything opposite from what you believe it is doing. There is no technical reason why a phone can't show "no signal" when it has "full signal" or a blank screen when the rest of it is still live, or that it is not transmitting or engaged in a call when actually it is transmitting.
4 - While on-network (and as we've already established, you as a mere user have no way of knowing with real certainty whether it is on network or off network, you have only your trust in the consistency with your expectations of the embedded software) it is a simple matter to observe at any moment to which access point a given user is connected. In fact, you should know that this is recorded already, or how should they know when you are "roaming" and when you are not. The side effect of this information's recording is that (even if we assume they don't automate triangulation with tower handoffs/multiple towers, which is a silly assumption) it is always known to within a few hundred feet exactly where a given phone is, since the network can clearly see to which tower it is connected.
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I mean... duh.
A cell phone is a bug. Period. Anyone who doesn't get this has clearly not been paying attention. There is absolutely no technical reason (and in some cases it's technically unavoidable) why your cell phone isn't right now:
- Reporting your position to the network, and thus, to anyone who has access to the network's database (e.g. government)
- Altered by software "pushes" from the network to seem off when it's still on, or to transmit whatever the mic pics up anytime you happen to be in a certain part of town between the hours of 7pm-10pm, or to transmit whatever the mic pics up for the 10 minutes after you call some specific number
- Sending your complete contacts list and recent and missed calls lists to the network provider (e.g. government)
I mean, come on, people. Technically this isn't even a question. Whether this actually happens or not is just a matter of policy ("Do we want to track location and bug people?") on the part of networks and the government, certainly not a matter of technology ("Can the equipment do it?")
Of course the equipment can do it.
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Thought experiment for the dubious.
Imagine that you have been assigned by work to carry a laptop with you at all times. This "GovCorp" laptop has a solid-state hard drive so that you can't tell if it's
Bomb in a phone (Score:2)
See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahya_Ayyash [wikipedia.org]
Wirecutters (Score:2)
Then again, its MY DAMNED PHONE! Why are thy installing things without my permission/knowledge in the first place?
Re: (Score:2)
They need do neither. Simplest thing would be to make the power circuit to the mic or GPS integral to the operation of the phone. Kill either, kill the phone.
Solution? Should have been to use wireless networking and encrypted packets
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Those contracts run for pages to discourage reading. And frankly, they reserve the right to anything they desire, or will desire in the future. If you don't like it, you are free to own no phones for the rest of your life. "Competition" amongst carriers is worthless if they all are free to write open-ended wish lists, which they do.
VoIP Telephone Service... (Score:2)
Do you pay for the minutes on this? (Score:2)
Who pays for the airtime?
Back when Rudy Giuliani was a US attorney and the FBI was taking down the New York Mafia, the FBI had wiretaps put in by New York Telephone. These were all billed to the FBI as leased lines, and the FBI had a leased line bill of over a million dollars a year. This was a real budget problem for them; they weren't budgeted for that kind of thing.
One month, the FBI didn't pay one of their leased line bills. New York Telephone's billing software dealt with the problem by billing
Re:where's the news? (Score:4, Funny)
You guys must have some awfully big c-phones there in Estonia.
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What is the penalty for the government, lets say at the Federal level, [b]not[/b] getting a court order?
Ron
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When we're talking about using a new technology like this, I believe that penalty has less effect. For that to have an effect, it has to be relatively easy to get permission for the tap. When tapping in a new way, that permission is not as easy to get. Thus, the likelihood of being able to gather data usable in court by these means is very low. So, an investigator with access to this capability does not have the incentive to use it legally so that it can be used in trial. But, he still needs a way to s
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Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
That is easy to understand.
What is not so easy to understand is all the comments about cell phones transmitting even when they are "off". I have trouble believing in such magic.
Now, some cell phones perhaps cannot be fully turned off (as noted in one of TFAs). I have no trouble believing that a cell phone that is turned ON can tra
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Has the Maff guy been locked up yet.