Lie Detectors to be Used for Airline Security 504
swimgeek writes "A new walk-through airport lie detector being made in Israel may prove to be the toughest challenge yet for potential hijackers or drugs smugglers. The product has been tested in Russia and should be commercialized soon. The software in the detector picks up uncontrollable tremors in the voice that give away liars or those with something to hide, say its designers. Passengers that fail the test are then required to undergo further questioning or even search."
Comment removed (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Oh goodie (Score:2, Informative)
If you're really worried, I've found that I'm pulled aside for added security checks much less frequently if my beard is well trimmed and I'm wearing a suit. Applying this test to every passenger before boarding would be a bit much, but if it's applied randomly to cut down on the number of people pulled aside for other checks, it could speed things up and would be, in my opinion, much better than spending a week trapped on a breeding ground for infectious bacteria as you seem to prefer.
Re:There is no such thing as a Lie Detector. (Score:3, Informative)
On the other hand, fMRI would be very effective at stopping terrorists who try to sneak some metal [koppdevelopment.com] somewhere on their body. Messy, but effective.
Just look at the stats (Score:2, Informative)
You sound a bit like you think the world is like a Hollywood movie - where the people flying in the cabin know everything that's going on just like the person sitting in the cinema and seeing both the control tower, the cockpit and the hero hiding on the landing gear.
Terrorist attacks do not play out so dramatically like in the movies, man.
Re:"Something to hide" (Score:4, Informative)
a little freedom for a little safety,
deserve neither freedom nor safety."
--Benjamin Franklin
It will be found an unjust and unwise jealousy
to deprive a man of his natural liberty upon
the supposition he may abuse it.
--George Washington
Re:There is no such thing as a Lie Detector. (Score:3, Informative)
Easy. Just show up 2 days early for domestic flights, 4 days for international.
From the same vendor: "Love detector" (Score:3, Informative)
Then there's the cellular phone "Love Detector" service. [thelovedetector.co.uk] You call someone via their system, and after the call, you get an SMS message with their analysis. (TV commercial here. [love-detector.com] In Hebrew, for the Israeli version.)
Moving up the product line a bit, they offer Ex-Sense [ex-sense.com], their low-end lie detector product. Only $149, including phone connector cable. Screenshots here. [ex-sense.com]
Then there's Ex-Sense Pro [nemesysco.com], at $499. Unclear what you get with the "Pro" version.
All these, NemesysCo says, use the same technology as Gatekeeper.
Re:"Something to hide" (Score:5, Informative)
So it seems that one of the questions you're asked is whether or not you've used "drugs". Makes you wonder what other personal questions it asks? The answer: Lots. The way lie detectors "work" is that the interviewer asks a long series of questions, many of which are personal, and many people are VERY likely to lie about (Have you ever stolen from an employer? for example). The interviewer is now confident that you've lied about SOMETHING in his presence, so he then proceeds to intimidate the subject by CLAIMING that he can tell whether or not he's lying. The idea is to trick the subject into making admissions.
So how does that apply here? The users of the system "know" that EVERYONE who uses the system is "lying" so they have a built in excuse to pull people aside that are "suspicious". Like Arabic people for example. In the context of American airport security it simply provides an excuse to profile people.
A Clarification (Score:2, Informative)
A subtle, yet important clarification: followers of the Sikh faith wear turbans [sikhtimes.com], not Arabs or Muslims.
Re:This fits Israel's airline security model (Score:5, Informative)
Precisely. Your description of the screening process is also dead-on accurate.
However, what works for Israel doesn't necessarily work for the USA. You're right in stating that the goal is to put some stress on the individual to evaluate the strength of their story. The security screeners aren't Einsteins in every field, however anybody (especially trained anybodys) can spot deceptive behavior when they see it. So, like you note, the screeners aren't so interested with the details so much as they are interested in the overall story and making sure it doesn't crumble under scrutiny.
Why is this the tactic that is used? Suicide attacks need somebody willing to commit suicide. Although I am sure there are individuals in this world who can be ice-cold when walking to their own deaths, the overwhelming majority require a little assistance by way of religious fervor to convince themselves that they're simply going to go somewhere "better" when they explode. Israel has a long and sad library of suicide bombers for other means of transportation, and of the few that are caught every once in a while, there is enough data to form a profile. I'll focus on Muslim extremists here, since they account for the overwhelming majority of terrorists: the ones planning the attacks are most often *not* the ones carrying out the attacks. To understand why the security model is built the way it is, it is useful to understand the terrorist food chain and who it is that goes out to perform the attacks:
For all of their talk, the planners are not the ones doing the deeds they profess to believe in. They stay home and send brainwashed teens to do the dirty work. What are the lures?