Too Many Patents as Bad as Too Few 203
NonSoftAntiCurve writes "Forbes.com has an interesting article about how too many patents are as bad as too few when it comes to incentives for innovation. 'The tension between the patent as a way to stimulate invention and the patent as a weapon against legitimate competition is inherent in the system.' There is a scary example of how this plays out in practice."
As Voltaire once said... (Score:3, Interesting)
So it is that a multitude of patents is a sign of a sick economy, IMHO.
Fat Lines patent? (Score:2, Interesting)
Does anybody have the patent number of IBM's "notorious fat lines patent", referenced in the article? I searched a bit on uspto.gov, but couldn't find it.
It is Scary (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:It is Scary (Score:3, Interesting)
If only everybody were altruistic in their motives. Then maybe the patent holder would license his/her material to your friend for a reasonable fee, and they'd both be happy. I think this is how it's SUPPOSED to work...
Re:It is Scary (Score:3, Interesting)
The only "obstacle" preventing your medical researcher from using the best material is that he doesn't want to pay the royalties.
Royalties are the means by which the inventor gets rewarded for his contribution to "the common good".
Too Many Patents, Like this one on the Wheel (Score:5, Interesting)
Last year in a show of how easy it was to disrupt and abuse the patent process by registering a common, every-day idea a Melbourne lawyer patented a "circular transportation facilitation device" [bbc.co.uk] with more info on the story here, [theage.com.au] here [ipmenu.com](pdf file), and here [harvard-magazine.com]
Obviously it's too easy to get things patented these days, especially in areas of high technology as few if any patent officer workers are well versed in the areas of technology. Most of the patent office stampers would have little inclination as to how an intigrated circuit works or if an item of software recently designed is any different or unique from any other piece of similar software.
Sure, it's nice to be able to patent and protect your inventions and innovations, but when most of today's patent holders are larger corporations, it's hardly meant to protect the garage inventor anymore.
Re:A bit more insight... (Score:2, Interesting)
Interestingly enough, you mention the _one thing_ that's genuinely difficult to patent. The USPTO has gotten so many perpetual motion machine applications over the years that it requires, for that one invention only, a working model. Anything else, paper's fine, but for perpetual motion, you gotta bring them a physical device.
Similar problems with the earloy film industry. (Score:4, Interesting)
I'm currently studying film history, and it's interesting to see how similar patent issues that effect the technology were causing problems on the technology use during the early days of cinema.
By 1907, Edison and his Vitascope (which BTW he did NOT invent, but licensed with Thomas Arnat et al) had alot of patents on movie camera & projector technology, including the crucial "latham loop" that relieved tension in the film. Since 1897, Edison had sought to force competitors out of business using these patents. One company, American Mutoscope & Biograph (AM&B) refused to cooperate, and won against Edison in 1908. Edison, refusing to give up, continued to sue AM&B based on the latham loop. The 2 parties negotiated a settlement, forming the Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC) in 1908, headed by Edison, AM&B, and a number of other smaller movie companies. The purpose of the MPPC was two-fold. First, to prevent the entry to market of new competitors to the field, and second, to limit encroachment of foreign films on the US market. It was collusive protectionism all the way -- the formation of a self-perpetuating oligopoly. With the patents the MPPC held, anyone who picked up a camera to make a film had to pay them or be sued. Ditto for exhibitors, 'cause the MPPC had patents on projectors as well.
Once they'd solidified their hold on projection & filming, they went for distribution, forming the General Film Company (GFC) in 1910. The GFC was the sole contractor for all MPPC companies' films. With this move, the only place to go for movies was the MPPC/GFC, controlled by the oligopolists.
In 1912 the US gov't finally began going after the MPPC as an illegal trust. They won in 1915 & broke it up, invalidating a number of the patents in the process, with the resulting companies devolving into the number of smaller movie studios we know from the 20's through the middle of the century. In the end, what was lost? Nothing less than all of the innovation small players could have brought to the technical end of the movie industry in its infancy. That's the problem with such tight patent restrictions in nascent technology -- the first out of the gate, not the best, tends to win.
A solution to the problem of bad patents. (Score:2, Interesting)
IBM obtained a software patent essentially covering a piece of software I had a part in writing. They obtained it several years after the product was in common use. So far, they have not attempted to exercise their patent (on us at least.) This is a common tactic by companies both large and small. [slashdot.org]
The bulk of the problem is that patent reviewers tend not to have the technical expertise to know whether an idea is obvious or not. They also tend not to be well versed in what prior art may exist and where they should look.
I work in the sciences. When I attempt to publish my work, the work is reviewed by my peers. When I request funding, my proposal ir reviewed by my peers. My work is specialized enough that the people that review my work are often my direct competitors. The flip side is that I get to review the papers and proposals of my competitors.
I propose the same method be used to approve patents. Three random reviewers should be selected from a group of people who work in the industry or associated academic fields. If two of three can agree that the work is deserving of a patent, the patent should be granted. If not, it should be rejected. Regardless, following review the application and the review statements and the identities of the reviewers should be made public.