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Deep Packet Inspection and Net Neutrality

Posted by kdawson on Thu Jul 26, 2007 12:38 PM
from the freedom-vs.-the-exaflood dept.
EncryptKeeper writes "Ars Technica has an in-depth feature on deep packet inspection, and it's a disturbing read. ISPs are starting to turn to DPI to monitor their networks, and, more troubling, to look at how they can use it to shape, block, monitor, and prioritize traffic. 'The "deep" in deep packet inspection refers to the fact that these boxes don't simply look at the header information as packets pass through them. Rather, they move beyond the IP and TCP header information to look at the payload of the packet. The goal is to identify the applications being used on the network, but some of these devices can go much further; those from a company like Narus, for instance, can look inside all traffic from a specific IP address, pick out the HTTP traffic, then drill even further down to capture only traffic headed to and from Gmail, and can even reassemble emails as they are typed out by the user.'"
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  • Queue Vonage stock selloff in 3, 2, 1....

    (20,000,000th post?)
    • Re:In other words (Score:5, Interesting)

      by josquint (193951) on Thursday July 26 2007, @01:03PM (#19999849) Homepage
      I wonder about this somewhat.

      I work for a telephone coop in their internet dept. We've been drilled about the evils of Vonage/Skype, etc cutting in to our MUCH more lucrative-than-internet-or-tv-depts for a while now.

      But, as all of our customers have access to our's and other's(namely cable) broadband. I don't know that filtering out VoIP would be a good move. We've had a few customers whine that their VOiP isnt reliable(duh) on our service. (mine seems to work just fine) So the first thing they do is go to the cable company for service(not that this makes any difference in their reliability)

      So with the cable and other non-dialtone companies, filtering VoIP causes phoe co's to loose not only an internet customer but a landline costomer as well. As we require a landline for our broadband, we stil get the best of both worlds while still providing VoIP access.
    • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

      Err...

      Anyone who actually makes investment decisions based on reak information and not on slashdot line noise have made that consideration 2 years ago.

      That was roughly the time when Ellacoya, Taz, P-Cube and their like went into trials with major telcos. Unfortunately they were all private at the time, otherwise I would have been seriously tempted to buy some stock. The telcos and ISPs that intended to deploy them have already done so. The ones that have not are looking at flexible bandwidth management and
  • Perhaps this also has something to do with the article earlier today about filtering internet content?

    Cheers!
  • I read the article this morning, and considered submitting it myself. For a tech site like Ars I thought the article was really very evenhanded.

    I know this is /., but really, the article is worth reading.
  • Encryption (Score:5, Interesting)

    by s31523 (926314) on Thursday July 26 2007, @12:43PM (#19999471)

    then drill even further down to capture only traffic headed to and from Gmail, and can even reassemble emails as they are typed out by the user

    Hmm, I need some help with this one, since my networking kungfu sucks... When I login to Gmail, I am in a https mode, and this persists through my whole session. I was under the impression, perhaps naively, that this meant my session to Gmail was encrypted and that only I and the Gmail server could decipher the contents of my mail, that is until I click send, and it goes from the Gmail server to wherever I send to. So if this is true, how would someone be able to reassemble my email as I type?
    • If you know how to have an https connection to Gmail, please let me know. I've never connected to Gmail (or Google Calendar) through https, although I've always wanted to.
      • Gmail (Score:5, Informative)

        Best way to do it is just to create a bookmark to https://mail.google.com/mail/ [google.com] and then ALWAYS use that link to get your mail (don't click on any of Google's Gmail links from your homepage, etc.).

        If you use POP access, you can enable SSL both for incoming and outgoing mail, I believe.
      • Re:Encryption (Score:5, Informative)

        by CajunArson (465943) on Thursday July 26 2007, @01:44PM (#20000533) Journal
        Gmail by default only uses https for your login, not actually reading/sending mail. To get a full session via https you need to login to this URL: https://mail.google.com/ [google.com] Note: https://gmail.com/ [gmail.com] will NOT encrypt the session further than the login screen (see for yourself, look for the https connection).

            Having said all of that: Email is not an encrypted protocol by default! The method above is a good method for preventing sniffing on the last hop between you and Gmail (which is why I use it when I'm on an unsecured wifi connection to prevent easy eavesdropping). However, once the mail server sends the message on the open network... it is 100% cleartext. If you want real encryption, get PGP, this advice was true long before Slashdot got its panties in a bind over ISP's 'snooping' on your traffic.

            Oh and one more thing: I love the Slashdot doublethink: Having a large evil corporation (the ISP) possibly being able to sniff traffic to read some of my emails is a terrible invasion of my privacy!! Simultaneously: Having a large non-evil (because they said so) corporation (Google) actually store all my emails (much easier to get at them then trying to wire-sniff) and index them and use them to generate ads: SUPER!
        • Re:Encryption (Score:4, Insightful)

          by flosofl (626809) on Thursday July 26 2007, @02:27PM (#20001077) Homepage

          Oh and one more thing: I love the Slashdot doublethink: Having a large evil corporation (the ISP) possibly being able to sniff traffic to read some of my emails is a terrible invasion of my privacy!! Simultaneously: Having a large non-evil (because they said so) corporation (Google) actually store all my emails (much easier to get at them then trying to wire-sniff) and index them and use them to generate ads: SUPER!
          The doublethink is only second to the kneejerk reaction. If you thought it through for second you'd see that one is by choice and the other, well most don't have any choice. I *choose* to use Gmail and I *know* they index my stuff. However, I only have one choice for braodband (the cable co) as I was informed by the DSL companies that where I live is not wired correctly for DSL. And if they decide they want to scrutinize every bit I send over their wire, I have *no choice* but to drop trou and bend over.
          • With Gmail, I know who's reading my mail. Google is - they told me so.

            With packet inspection, anyone on the internet backbone between me and Google could be reading my email - my local ISP, plus anyone they peer with.

            Granted, this is also true of standard unencrypted email...
    • correct. if the certificates are valid (you'd know otherwise; your browser would tell you), they cant read your SSL traffic.
    • Re:Encryption (Score:5, Informative)

      by nahdude812 (88157) * on Thursday July 26 2007, @12:48PM (#19999551) Homepage
      Only Gmail's login process is https, once you get to the mail page it's standard http. However you can change the URL to https and it seems to stick.

      If you use their pop/smtp access, that access is fully encrypted.
      • Re:Encryption (Score:4, Interesting)

        by bbdd (733681) on Thursday July 26 2007, @12:59PM (#19999753)
        if you want https automatically, use the highly-recommended customizegoogle add-in.

        http://www.customizegoogle.com/ [customizegoogle.com]
      • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

        It's part of the implementation of https to maintain connection status as long as you're not redirected to another site, so if you log in to gmail using a secure connection, it will maintain as long as you're on the site, unless your session expires or something...It'd be a pretty big security problem otherwise, because every time you used a relative link (e.g metamod.pl, instead of http://slashdot.org/metamod.pl [slashdot.org]), it would redirect you to an unencrypted connection.

        The only times you'll ever get booted from
          • Re:Okay... (Score:4, Informative)

            It's more like gmail keeps track...If you go to http://gmail.com/ [gmail.com] it will redirect you to https to log in, and then back to http for your mail. However, if you go to https://gmail.com/ [gmail.com] then you will stay in https the whole time. This is exactly the way it's supposed to work, where your status is maintained, though it can be argued that they should default you to https for security.

            If you use the "Gmail notifier" plug in for Firefox, it defaults to https. There is also a "gmail customizer" app that will let you specify HTTPS as the default, but I've never used it.
            • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

              Right. But it doesn't have anything to do with relative URLs. Relative URLs are relative to everything that comes before, including the protocol (http vs https). It's not the https protocol remembering that everything you're doing should be secure.
    • Re:Encryption (Score:5, Insightful)

      by the eric conspiracy (20178) on Thursday July 26 2007, @01:05PM (#19999871)
      A. it isn't going to work on an HTTPS session.
      B. it doesn't make sense to reassemble an email because eventually the whole email will be submitted.
      C. Deep packet inspection is very expensive because it requires heinously fast hardware to inspect a 10 Gb/s data stream, and you need a lot of these at the network edges. The core networks are too fast to inspect.
      D. AFAIK DPI isn't deployed anywhere. Only a couple of manufacturers have 10 Gb/s gear and they are trying to sell it now, which is what ARS picked up on.
      E. There isn't a business case for it that I can find.
      F. A lot of the applications Ars describes don't require deep packet inspection, only header inspection.
      G. Many of these things run inline, which means there is a decrease in reliability due to insertion of the device. That means redundancy etc which drives costs up even more.

      Ultimately I don't think there is any likelihood that carriers who are already facing capital expense and return on investment problems plus increasing demands for plant expansion due to video are going to buy this story. The current wisdom is that fast-dumb is what is scalable.

      • Re:Encryption (Score:5, Informative)

        by TubeSteak (669689) on Thursday July 26 2007, @01:27PM (#20000249) Journal

        E. There isn't a business case for it that I can find.
        FTFA: Imagine a device that allows one user access only to e-mail and the Web while allowing a higher-paying user to use VoIP and BitTorrent.

        They no longer have to differentiate their product offerings based only on speed.
        It's called market segmentation [wikipedia.org]
        You see the business case yet?
      • Re:Encryption (Score:5, Insightful)

        by PopeRatzo (965947) * on Thursday July 26 2007, @01:33PM (#20000329) Homepage Journal

        Deep packet inspection is very expensive because it requires heinously fast hardware to inspect a 10 Gb/s data stream
        You don't think AT&T would already have this "heinously fast hardware" in place? I'd guess that if anybody does, they do.

        The window of opportunity for the Internet to be saved as something resembling the free and open place it's been for the past few decades is closing rapidly. If we don't get some Net Neutrality laws in place soon, it's going to be too late. Once the current model of the Internet is gone and we have what AT&T would like us to have, I'm betting that just about all of us here at Slashdot are going to be very, very sad.

        I fully expect that in about 5 years, the same people who are here today talking about how we should let the "free market" control the Internet will be whining about how much they miss the days when an individual could actually put up a web site that could compete with the "big boys" for the eyes of the World.

        If there hadn't been a de facto "net neutrality" in place back in '97, there would be no Slashdot today. Nor would there be a You Tube or Craig's List or Wikipedia or just about any of our beloved sites.

        If you want to know about what the Internet is going to be like if it's not protected with strong Net Neutrality laws, just picture AOL. Picture the entire Internet being AOL.

        Have a nice day.

        • by the eric conspiracy (20178) on Thursday July 26 2007, @03:50PM (#20002333)
          I am pretty damn sure AT&T doesn't. They are still trying to figure out how to migrate off ATM.

        • In order to keep the internet open and free we have to.....let the government regulate it? You lost me somewhere in there. I think you've fallen for Google's propaganda campaign.
          • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

            In order to keep the internet open and free we have to.....let the government regulate it? You lost me somewhere in there.

            No, you've just been sold a bill of goods by so-called "conservatives" who since Goldwater have been telling everyone that government is the worst thing in the world. That if only there was less government, we'd all be living in fields of clover, rich beyond our wildest dreams.

            Problem is, it was baloney when Goldwater said it, baloney when Reagan repeated it, and baloney today. Funny h

      • Re:Encryption (Score:5, Interesting)

        by jd (1658) <imipak@yahCOFFEEoo.com minus caffeine> on Thursday July 26 2007, @02:31PM (#20001133) Homepage Journal
        Most packet inspectors (such as Network Observer) are packet class only. Converged Access does a more sophisticated packet inspector, but even that only drills down to the specific subtype of packet for a given application, and of course only those applications they have the specifications for, or reverse-engineered. I know of no full-payload inspectors and doubt they even exist. Remember that packets cannot be guaranteed to travel on identical paths - the Internet is not a spanning tree - and that packets can fragment when there is an MTU change. Anyone sending a jumbo packet is guaranteed to see packet fragmentation, for example.

        A full reassembly by sniffing would also need to drop retransmitted packets and support all common encapsulation techniques. You're also talking about a LOT of storage and absolutely no way to sensibly organize the volume of data collected. That's the problem with data saturation - there are no database or data processing techniques capable of handling it. I was talking to one of the top Ingres software/network gurus at OSCON yesterday - apparently even just the total information awareness project is staggering under the sheer weight of information that no system yet designed can handle. If the data is unsearchable, unsortable and unprocessable, then to all practical intents and purposes, it doesn't exist.

  • by Buran (150348) on Thursday July 26 2007, @12:44PM (#19999485)
    If you use Firefox and Gmail's web UI, use this extension to make sure your Gmail session is encrypted:

    CustomizeGoogle: Improve Your Google Experience -- Firefox Extension [customizegoogle.com] ... and check the box labeled "Secure (switch to https)" in the Gmail section.

    If you are using POP3 access to Gmail, you are already using SSL.

    If I understand packet sniffing correctly (I'm no programmer), that just shows the source and destination but the contents are encrypted. Please let me know if I'm incorrect.
        • by interiot (50685) on Thursday July 26 2007, @01:20PM (#20000147) Homepage
          It doesn't matter if ISPs record the entire conversation. The initial key exchange is done under asymmetric encryption, so it's not possible for an outside sniffer to get the symmetric key (without brute-forcing or otherwise taking a long long time to break the asymmetric keys).
            • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

              TLS/SSL's main design goal was to avoid man in the middle attacks. While perfect security is impossible, TLS/SSL definitely makes MITM difficult enough that ISP's can't possibly think about routinely inspecting the contents of an SSL session. (unless end users decide to install a malicious root certificate [stanford.edu]... but only one largish organization that I know has tried that, and they stopped, and if an ISP tried to set something like that up, they'd probably be sued, as well as having their IP range blacklist
  • Personal VPN (Score:3, Interesting)

    by nahdude812 (88157) * on Thursday July 26 2007, @12:45PM (#19999513) Homepage
    I've recently started using a full-time encrypted personal VPN to one of my boxes which is 1 hop (data center's router) from several backbones. I add direct (non-vpn) routing for services which are particularly latency sensitive (gaming).

    I don't currently suspect my home ISP of doing this sort of deep analysis or otherwise interfering with my data stream, but in this way I also don't have to worry about it.

    IMHO this sort of thing will become the standard if this trend of ISPs snooping and changing our data continues.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Thursday July 26 2007, @12:46PM (#19999515)
    It really is time to start encrypting everything from everywhere/to everywhere.

    The NSA wiretapping with the collusion of the US telecom industry is just the start.

    This technology is going to be seen as a data mining opportunity. Want to bet that some of the big data aggregators are going to start installing this technology - or paying ISPs or backbone providers for the privelege.
    • by Anonymous Coward on Thursday July 26 2007, @02:47PM (#20001351)
      I worked on developing one of these boxes. Not Naurus, but a competitor (who's name starts with "P"). You are absolutely spot on. But you, and many here, are really not understanding the scale or the scope intended, or what is possible. This stuff is kept well out of the mainstream press, for good reason.

      First, it's not just ISP's and the NSA, but also Universities. U.C. Berkeley is the biggest fanboi of this stuff. Any new tech, they want. And their IT department has been all over this. Nor are they aren't the only University.

      And yes, the RIAA is promoting this stuff too. Very eagerly. And every other control freak out there.

      The next obvious step is to network these boxes across the global, to keep track of traffic in realtime. Yes, that's a jump up. But it's doable. And it will happen. That is, people will be able to keep track of what you're doing on the internet in real time.

      Also, what people aren't thinking about is the abilitiy to preserve this information. Vast storage is cheap, and getting cheaper. People are targeting saving two-years of realtime data. That's pushing things, but this is what people want. And they want to be able to preserve it longer. There's a huge amount of potential datamining there. Especially when they are able to preserve Internet traffic for longer and longer periods.

      In short, the goal is to not only be able to track your every Internet connection, and what you did, but to preserve it for years. Some folks want cradle-to-grave. While they won't get it for a while, that's the direction this stuff is headed.

      The bottom line is that encryption is one key defense. Necessary but not sufficient. Just be grateful that the PGP battle was won back in the 90's. If the battle for publically available strong cryptography had been lost then, you wouldn't be having this option. Connections are the other item. The support for obscuring this is lagging, and some cases broken. But it's still critical.

      Finally, everyone should be aware that all of these boxes are hackable. If you know why Ethereal/Wireshark was kicked out of OpenBSD, you understand what's going on. The development environments common in this industry are also prevalent here. Harried developers don't care about buffer overflows. That's a total afterthought with minimal risk in the commercial space.

      Or, to put it simply, you should in theory be able to not only detect when your traffic is being sniffed, but also be able hijack the sniffing as well.

      So in summary, yes, encryption is useful. But it's not sufficient. And there's a heck of a lot more going on in this field than people are aware of, or even thinking about.
  • I wouldn't do it (Score:5, Informative)

    by HomelessInLaJolla (1026842) * <lajollahomeless@hotmail.com> on Thursday July 26 2007, @12:48PM (#19999543) Journal
    It's a snowballing system. The new tech companies want to come up with new technology. The government wants to make use of new technology. The new tech companies want to come up with new technology to appease the government regulations which make use of the new (-1) technology. The government wants to make use of the new technology. The new tech companies want to come up with new technology to appease the government regulations which make use of the new (-1) and new (-2) technology. Repeat.

    I, as a private system admin, would simplify the entire problem and choose not to engage in packet inspection unless there were absolutely blatant abuses--like setting a threshold. There are ethical reasons why I wouldn't feel that it's proper to go delving through each and every packet. Once government becomes involved, though, then there's no way to turn it off. In order to receive the money for an ISP start-up, for example, one must demonstrate that they can play within the ever shrinking boundaries defined by the laws.

    The article (and summary) mentions reassembling e-mails as their being typed. Is this accurate? I have, for some time, wondered if some text entry forms in web pages are "active" in that they exchange keystrokes with the remote end at real-time intervals. Again, from an ethical point of view, I would never make use of anything but passive entry boxes where none of the user's text is transferred across the network until they actually deliberately send it. What possible reason, as an admin, could I have in wanting to watch a user as they type text into an entry form?

    I guess the argument can be made for automatically modifying forms. Pfizer uses this for their online resume submission. For example, the available options in the various locations (country, state, county, city, zip, etc.) are pared down as soon as one makes a selection in the heirarchical predecessor. While I appreciate the "wow! neat!" factor I just don't see how it's really necessary and, although I don't see that Pfizer would be using it for some uber-nefarious conspiracy scheme, I can liken it to the desensitization similar to "Click OK if you wish to allow this action" and EULAs.
    • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

      The article (and summary) mentions reassembling e-mails as their being typed. Is this accurate? I have, for some time, wondered if some text entry forms in web pages are "active" in that they exchange keystrokes with the remote end at real-time intervals. Again, from an ethical point of view, I would never make use of anything but passive entry boxes where none of the user's text is transferred across the network until they actually deliberately send it.

      The main reason it's done is so that the form auto-saves. Gmail and Google Docs both do this; as you type into the form, every few seconds it will send the data to the server, and save the document. This way, if your connection hiccups, or if your browser crashes, or if you spill that Big Gulp into your keyboard, the text you've entered doesn't disappear.

      Granted, Firefox these days is pretty good about remembering what you had typed into a form field if the browser crashes (how many of us have lost a long

  • "Ask a Ninja" about "Network Neutrality" [dailykos.com] and learn about Robin Williams
    and hotdog on a stick girl, too. The video is fun, and educational, and brought to you by your friendly neighborhood, endangered, Neutral Network.
  • Federal Mail Laws? (Score:5, Insightful)

    by apt142 (574425) on Thursday July 26 2007, @12:52PM (#19999627) Homepage Journal
    I've become more and more convinced that information sent over the internet should afford the same protections that federal mail does. Net neutrality is a step in that direction. But, it's just a step.

    ISP's currently have no limits that keep them from violating the privacy of their subscribers. Well, nothing short of market forces. Which in this case is laughable. Since packets can travel through a number of networks before ending up at their destinations, there is no guarantee it won't travel through an ISP the consumer doesn't support financially.
  • by markhahn (122033) on Thursday July 26 2007, @12:56PM (#19999695)
    If an isp wants to do this, I think they should simply loose any common-carrier status. that is, deep inspection means that they become responsible for content: accomplices in any crime committed via that traffic.
  • by MikeRT (947531) on Thursday July 26 2007, @12:57PM (#19999707) Homepage
    The whole point of common carrier protection should be that if they do any tampering to the content, it is assumed that they knew what was passing through their network. It should be a protection that only exists when the company is in 100% compliance. The moment they insert ads into web pages they didn't buy, rewrite an email, censor someone, etc. even if it is one group in a 100,000+ employee company, the entire company should lose common carrier status and be open to litigation from everyone who has any copyright or other type of valid complaint otherwise shielded by common carrier status.
    • by Control Group (105494) * on Thursday July 26 2007, @01:01PM (#19999793) Homepage
      ISPs don't have common carrier status. They're "information services." They've historically fought getting common carrier status, because they believe it would subject them to a different set of rules; the ones pertaining to telecommunications common carriers (as distinct from seaway common carriers, railway common carriers, etc).

      This is a questionable belief, since there isn't necessarily any equality between "common carrier" and "telecom provider," but it's the reasoning, anyway.

      Basically, AT&T (the phone company) is a common carrier. AT&T (the ISP) is not.
  • I'm rather dismayed by the number of people immediately chiming in and saying "well, fuck the ISP, I'll just encrypt everything." While that would address privacy concerns, it does nothing for the main issue, which is the traffic-shaping itself. Your encrypted packets will be unrecognized, and thus shunted to the lowest priority. Problem solved, from the ISP's perspective.
    • by jeko (179919) on Thursday July 26 2007, @01:25PM (#20000227)
      Yeah, I thought that too, until I realized that meant all commercial activity (ebay, bill pay, amazon) gets shunted to scavenger class. Somehow, I don't think "the money" is going to go along with this....
      • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

        Don't forget all the VPN activity going on for people working outside the actual physical office. Then there's SSH which is latency-sensitive when in interactive mode (bulk transfers via sftp or scp should probably be marked as such via QoS, but it's not like anyone along the way will listen to that). There are more legitimate uses for encrypted net connections than there are legitimate uses for BitTorrent, and that's saying a lot.
  • Deep packet inspection technology was developed by the likes of Cisco for the sole purpose of obtaining access to the Chinese market. The Communist Party wanted the power of the internet, but they also wanted the power to control it. With deep packet inspection and a suite of other related solutions, I think it's reasonable to say they got their wish. There are millions of Chinese internet users and the country is father from a revolution now that it was in 1989.

    It's not just China. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran are also taking advantage of this new technology, every byte of it developed by corporations right here in the "free" west.

    And now? The technology is simply being marketed here to. Exported back into the west if you will. ISP, companies, governments are all being given the power to put the internet genie back in the bottle. Time was that corporations were developing technology to help make democracy stronger. Now they're simply giving democracy the rope it needs to throughly hang itself.

    I'd like to be optimistic about our society, but frankly it's too tiring in this day and age of fear and surveillance. The worst part is the overwhelming acceptance, nay approval, of our loss of freedoms. The Net Neutrality debate is not an isolated argument. It's a symptom of the underlying shift in Western society, back into a dark age.
    • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

      The best way to ensure the that the US government do not govern your life is to seriously check at Ron Paul for next US President.
  • by isdnip (49656) on Thursday July 26 2007, @11:56PM (#20006485)
    Nate at Ars Technica is being either an ignoramus or an arse, let's be blunt. He doesn't know jack about DPI. I can tell, because I do know... What Nate did is talk to two vendors who sell sort-of-deep packet inspection. Basically, they sell traffic shaping. While that's a function that DPI can be used for, it's only the easy tip of the DPI iceberg. Traffic shaping can be done with much less "deep" inspection than many boxes can perform, and really is adequate with lower-level shaping. I don't mind selling different qualities of service, for an open fee; I object to reading the payload of packets and doing something with my private data, be it assigning bandwidth, blocking it, or saving it for their commercial or other use.

    Nate did not, for instance, watch Rod Randall's 2005 IEC presentation, which featured the tag line http://www.iec.org/online/iforums/iec_3/choose.asp [iec.org] . Randall's portfolio includes Bytemobile, which acquired Proquent's DPI box. It does a lot more than Nate talked about. It can go deep inside the payload of the layer 7 protocol and figure out what's going on. In 2002, when I got the Pitch from them (my NDA is up), it ran at 600 Mbps. The key market was mobile players -- they were already allowed to sell "walled garden" data services, and this was a very big wall.

    For instance, one application is to monitor for email traffic (POP and SMTP). It can then log and create charging records for every email message that passes on the wire. Not that uses the ISP's server, but that goes on the wire. The pitch -- Randall makes this in his show -- is that wireless providers sell SMS for about a dime a message, and email by kilobyte is tons cheaper, so they should charge a dime for each email. VoIP competes with their phone calls, so it should be blocked or at least billed by the call.

    But it gets worse. AT&T has made noise about charging for the value of ecommerce transactions. So if you make an online purchase, they'd get a fee for using their wire. Hell, Visa already does, for using their card, so AT&T wants to get their cut too, just for using their wire.

    And it gets worse. They can decide what web sites are okay and which ones aren't. Others have already mentioned the Great Firewall of China. DPI lets its user tilt performance, so, for instance, Fox News gets better results than CNN, or Hollywood Fred's web site gets better performance than Barack's, John's, or Hillary's. This is all legal today for ISPs to do.

    And it gets worse. Since DPI detects applications, it can block any new application -- leaving innovation in the hands of the phone companies who control the wire. After all, if it doesn't recognize the application, it must go to the lowest category, either blocked or relegated to what Randall calls "hobo class". Think modem speed, on a noisy line.

    I do suggest reading Data Foundry's comments; author Scott McCollough is one of the best communications lawyers out there. He notes that the Ts and Cs of many "broadband" services give the wire owner the ownership rights on packets passing over their wire. No privacy -- so if you're a lawyer, you technically have waived your lawyer-client privilege by using their network! DPI makes this practical -- they can monitor emails for certain keywords, addresses, etc., even if it's not using their servers.

    DPI is the tool for replacing Internet access with a "broadband" data service that is more like 1982's Compuserve, which charged by the hour and surcharged by the minute based on what application you ran (CB Simulator, email, etc.). It will happen if current (as of 2006) US rules, which kick independent ISPs off of ILEC DSL networks, are retained. It cannot happen if open competition for ISP services is restored, because the public wouldn't buy such a service if there were a choice. That's why the Bells got their buddies at the FCC to remove common carrier status from the telephone company networks.
    • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

      I smell an opportunity for someone to start selling a personal VPN service, where all your communications are encrypted, and carried across the backbone encrypted to a data center as close as possible (network topology wise) to the destination before being sent plain text across the last segment.
    • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

      A) There probably isn't any way for you to see if your ISP is doing this.

      B) Even if you could, it doesn't matter. You may be able to switch your last-mile provider, but you probably can't switch their upstream provider. It's the upstream/backbone providers who will be racing to do this.

      Basically, if providers are doing this, you're hosed. It's going to be real, real difficult for you to somehow make sure your traffic doesn't route across Level3's (or Cogent's, or whomever's) network at any point.
    • If they have the ability to know this much about the individual packets why don't they start charging individuals for improved network performance?

      The average workingman is paid 5 sp/day.
      The priveleged workingman is paid 7 sp/day.
      The favored workingman is paid 10 sp/day.

      The cost of a coal shovel is 100 sp.
      The cost of a coal shovel +1 is 110 sp.
      The cost of a coal shovel +2 is 120 sp.

      A coal shovel breaks after 19 days.
      A coal shovel +1 breaks after 15 days.
      A coal shovel +2 breaks after 13 days.

      The favored workingman offers loans to the priveleged workingman in amounts of 20 sp per loan, with an interest rate which causes the total repayment to be 30 sp.