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Diebold Issues Cease and Desist to Indymedia
Posted by
michael
on Sat Oct 18, 2003 06:54 AM
from the speak-no-evil dept.
from the speak-no-evil dept.
h0mee writes "Diebold, manufacturer of election equipment, has issued a Cease and desist notice to the upstream provider of San Francisco Indymedia for having links to mirrors of a leaked internal diebold memo. More than just a case of a leak, Diebold has been raising a lot of questions about the fairness and security of elections in the United States. (Perhaps it's time for peer reviewable software like gnu.free? ;)"
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Only in America (Score:2, Insightful)
could the goverment actually convice its people that by pressing a button on an ordinary computer you have a democracy
Support Indymedia! (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:Support Indymedia! (Score:2)
It's not the "hero bashing" (Score:2)
I would like to take a bet (Score:2)
DOJ ain't THAT business friendly. (Score:2)
Seems to me a lot of companines are now coming under scrutiny from a combination of things. Public sentitment, investor anger, and a Justice department that does act.
Yes they allow some things to slip by, but do the other 3 groups.
Remember, the DOJ just isn't in Washington. Ashcroft is a favorite whipping boy because he is the most visible part. He gets credit for some
Open Sofware Not The Only Solution (Score:3, Flamebait)
DAMN! (Score:2)
Re:Open Sofware Not The Only Solution (Score:2, Insightful)
I for one would like to have a system, where I get some kind of receipt (maybe a chipcard or a code number) which I can use to verfy my vote anonymously on the internet or at a verification station.
All this is possible and can be done
Re:Open Sofware Not The Only Solution (Score:2)
We used to develop the GNU.FREE Internet Voting software and we retain a strong interest in electronic voting issues, primarily through advocating why we feel it's an undesirable advance. Apparently, they're no longer fully interested in developing internet
Re:Open Sofware Not The Only Solution (Score:5, Insightful)
Which means open-source of some sort. Anything else can be rigged, including the paper trail it produces. No part of the election process should be hidden from the electorate, whether comuterised or mechanical. Is that zealotry? It sounds like Common Sense to me.
TWW
Parent
Re:Open Sofware Not The Only Solution (Score:2, Interesting)
There is no conflict between Free Software and commercial products. In fact, it's very likely that any Free Software-based voting system would be a commercial product. The point here is that voting machines are a major component in the engine of democracy and that there is absolutely no reason why they should
Re:Open Sofware Not The Only Solution (Score:5, Insightful)
http://catb.org/~esr/jargon/html/B/back-door.ht
A "Paper Trail" is worthless with computer based voting machines unless the entire system is completely transparent to outside observers.
When it comes to elections no one, no one company and no one thing can be trusted without massive public oversight.
And most specifically the governement itself is the entity least trustable to "certify" that an election process is fair and properly conducted. I'm an American but I've lived through "democratic" elections in a third world country.
If the the press cannot hire its own experts to completely examine the system and freely publish its results there is no democracy.
KFG
KFG
KFG
Parent
Re:Open Sofware Not The Only Solution (Score:2)
Transparency is the key to this. Any hidden source code is a bad thing.
Shared Source License and Peer Review (Score:2)
Even a Microsoft-style shared source license would be better than the status quo, though it pains me to say so.
Time for an election GPL project. (Score:2)
It is not time for gnu-free (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:It is not time for gnu-free (Score:2)
Re:It is not time for gnu-free (Score:2)
So why bother with the electronic counting? If you are going to count the audit trail there's no point in the electronic count and if the audit trail isn't counted then the electronic system can happily push the vote 2 or 3 percent towards the paying candidate, while printing a fake paper trail, and no one will ever know.
TWW
E-voting is simply a bad idea. (Score:5, Insightful)
Hear, hear.
The important thing in democracy is not the voting, it's the counting.
Any technology introduced to improve the act of voting cannot make the act of counting less transparent or democracy suffers.
It is apparent that Diebold's systems (not to mention Diebold's paranoia for secrecy) render the act of counting less accountable and less transparent. Ergo, democracy suffers.
If used in a close election - where exit polling and other secondary measurements are unable to confirm the results of the counting - the wrong person might actually get elected President of the United States of America.
With no sense of responsibility to the coutry at large, this illegitimate President might launch a series of Napoleonic wars to to compensate for his own feelings of inadequacy.
I digress into fantasy... the little blue ones I washed down with all those adult beverages must be kicking in.
Parent
Re:It is not time for gnu-free (Score:2)
Re:It is not time for gnu-free (Score:2)
This matters only in theory. Apparently, the US voting system is so flawed that electronic voting is "good enough", compared to the other irregularities. Please keep in mind that the result of the last US presidental election in Florida was determined by (re)counting, but by a decision of the locall state parliament, and also that voter registration seems to introduce quite a bias in who is eligible to vote.
Re:It is not time for gnu-free (Score:3, Insightful)
Voter registration, per se, does not introduce any bias (abuses like erroneous felon lists in Florida notwithstanding). It does cause a self-selection--that is, those who vote are those willing to take the time to register. This is why I oppose laws like "Motor Voter" and other efforts to make registration automatic. I also ve
Re:It is not time for gnu-free (Score:2)
It takes a lot of time, effort and man power to count thousands or millions of votes. eVoting would defintely speed up and cheapen that process...
but again, I agree that before e-voting takes off there must be accountability on par with or better than our current system.
Re:Paper is not infallible (Score:3, Insightful)
Where I live I can go and watch elections as they happen (I can ask to be an observer and that request must be granted). I cannot do that with electronic voting, since I cannot watch what g
Link to memo that works (Score:3, Informative)
Simple System (Score:2, Interesting)
1) User votes for who they want to and it is recorded
2) Machine prints out card with users vote
3) Card is checked by user for accuracy
4) Card is then re-inserted into machine to generate the backup tally.
If the tallies from 1 and 4 don't match, the cards are "certified" and then rerun.
Re:Simple System (Score:2)
How often do you think this actually happens? Generally, you're lucky if you can get people out to vote for Tweedledum or Tweedledee, asking them to do some work when they get there is going too far.
Even if they do check I can think of a couple of ways to rig it anyway if you just need or want a few percent onto your candidate/brother's vote.
Just get a piece of paper, put a mark on it, get a bunch of people to count the marks.
TWW
Re:Simple System (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:Simple System (Score:2)
Which is, of course, an argument for not having any electronic voting. Which is fine by me.
TWW
Re:Simple System (Score:3, Insightful)
How often do you think this actually happens? Generally, you're lucky if you can get people out to vote for Tweedledum or Tweedledee, asking them to do some work when they get there is going too far.
It doesn't matter if it's only 1% of people who are doing that - if they notice that the machine hasn't printed what they asked for, they'll kick up a stink. More than a couple of people do that and the whole system will be called into question.
It's the same basis on
Re:Simple System (Score:2)
Which is why you don't do it on every ballot and you allow a "re-try" option which is programmed to work correctly and various other methods of alaying suspicion.
TWW
Re:Simple System (Score:3, Interesting)
To make matters worse, having a card printed out allows for chain voting. This is a scheme in which one voter sneaks their card out of the polling place, shows it to someone who pays them for their vote, and hands it to the next person who drops it in after they're done voting, and brings their card to get paid, and so it goes and so it goes. The first person can s
this is the most serious threat to America (Score:2, Insightful)
No educated person can believe that these systems are anything but a predesigned plan to subvert elections. It is impossible to make computer voting secure without compromising the secret ballot. Even the most basic steps to make these systems secure have not been taken.
There's no way to fix computer voting. Diebold will "fix" their security problems and it wi
How is this for a pear review-able while anonymous (Score:2)
A hash is made based on the votes selections, voting location, vote submittal time, etc. Basically everything but the voters name (one (wo)man, one vote doesn't mean traceable).
This hash is printed and/or emailed to a voter-defined email address (which could default to a 3rd party organization if the voter has no email). This email would contain a link that when clicked would query the central database of tallied votes. If the user-passed hash string is contained within the tallied votes, all is A-OK. If i
Not anonymous (Score:5, Insightful)
If I can prove to myself my vote was counted a certain way, so too can it be proved to others. And then votes get bought.
This is a _hard_ problem, and alot of it comes from misunderstanding the nature of it.
--Dan
Parent
Re:Not anonymous (Score:4, Insightful)
That says all about the current approach that needs to be said.
Parent
Incriminating text of the memos (Score:5, Informative)
Friday, 12 September 2003 (PDT)
By Bev Harris - blackboxvoting.org
http://www.blackboxvoting.com
If certification isn't being done properly, the whole house of cards falls. Below are actual copies of internal Diebold memos which show that uncertified software is being used in elections, and that Diebold programmers intentionally end-run the system.
Quick backgrounder first, scroll down to see the memos.
BACKGROUND
Our voting system, which is part of the public commons has recently been privatized. When this happened, the counting of the votes, which must be a public process, subjected to the scrutiny of many eyes of plain old citizens, became a secret.
The computerized systems that register voters, will soon sign voters into the polling place using a digital smart card, record the vote we cast, and tally it are now so secret they are not allowed to be examined by any citizens group, or even by academics like the computer scientists at major universities.
The corporate justification for this secrecy is that these systems adhere to a list of "standards" put out by the Federal Election Commission, and that an "ITA" (Independent Testing Authority) carefully examines the voting system, which is then provided to states for their own certification.
As it turns out, the states typically do not examine the computer code at all, relying instead on a "Logic and Accuracy" test which will not catch fraud and has frequently missed software programming errors that cause the machines to miscount.
A Diebold message board has been used since 1999 to help technicians in the field interact with programmers to solve problems. The contents of this message board were quietly sent to reporters and activists around the world, most likely by a Diebold employee. In a letter to WiredNews, Diebold has acknowledged that these memos are from its own staff message boards.
Without further commentary, judge for yourself whether Diebold has been following certification requirements:
From Nel Finberg, Technical Writer, Diebold Election Systems
(Note: Metamor/Ciber is the ITA assigned to certify the software)
alteration of Audit Log in Access
To: "support"
Subject: alteration of Audit Log in Access
From: "Nel Finberg"
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 23:31:30 -0700
Importance: Normal
Jennifer Price at Metamor (about to be Ciber) has indicated that she can access the GEMS Access database and alter the Audit log without entering a password. What is the position of our development staff on this issue? Can we justify this? Or should this be anathema?
Nel
Reply from Ken Clark, principal engineer for Diebold Election Systems
RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access
To:
Subject: RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access
From: "Ken Clark"
Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 09:55:02 -0700
Importance: Normal
In-reply-to:
Its a tough question, and it has a lot to do with perception. Of course everyone knows perception is reality.
Right now you can open GEMS'
Now, where the perception comes in is that its right now very *easy* to change the contents. Double click the
It is possible to put a secret password on the
All the code use the English way of spelling. (Score:2)
Don't you guys trust us Canadians?
Seriously, isnt't there something legalwise that any private citizen can do to stop or correct this sort of crap from happening?
Re: Diebold machines (Score:5, Interesting)
Oh come on! It's as if the last 30 years of cryptographic knowledge never happened. Of course it's possible to digitally sign electronic data, and nobody with a clue about electronic voting would even consider not doing it.
These people are supplying voting machines, and they don't even know how to create tamper-evident databases? They even have the gall to assume their competitors are using the same simpleton technology as they are.
I suggest that anyone involved with these systems read Peter Wayner's Translucent Databases [wayner.org] for a primer on how databases can be made secure, even against those who know the root password. [not that Diebold machines seem to have a root password]
For further reading, Diebold might want to read some of Bruce Schnier's books [amazon.com], which are an interesting read on what can be done with cryptography, and what are its limitations. They might even consider hiring a competant expert, e.g. some of Schneier's peers.
p.s. I claim the quote above as fair use, under english copyright law.
Re: Diebold machines (Score:4, Insightful)
Why bother? If you don't trust the system that does the signing, or the people who created the key it's signed with, then why bother to sign the data? It just gives a false sense of security.
Unless the system produces a human readable, physical record of votes that the voter can verify before submitting then the system is open to fraud.
Parent
Re: Diebold machines (Score:3, Interesting)
Oh really is the above aluding to
A. election-fraud.
B. just plain bad software from Diebold.
C. piss-poor administration by some local-yocal election officials
D. All of the above
Voting fraud should not be tolerated (Score:3, Insightful)
OK, the above possibly being true, why haven't voters caused an uproar over this potentially corrupt system being used? Simple - apathy. Most citizens are too worried about other things to care about the government. Most people want the government out of their lives and in exchange they will stay away from government functions. This plays right into the hands of those willing to put a system, such as this, into production. What can be done about the citizenry? Very little. A possible route is to find a way into the mass media and announce this fraud to the world. But the world already knows and can't change our system so what is your point already.
The only way to attack this system and initiate change is to use the power of government against the system. Find a politician that has power and is willing accept reason. Convince him/her to find a way to present charges of vote process fraud, and hope like hell that a committee will suspend the use of the process until a full investigation by independent panels can write an opinion. This will be time-consuming, and the result may not be what is desired, but as I see it, the only way to stop this potential fraud and abuse of the voting system.
Things to do (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Pretty effective (Score:3, Informative)
From Nel Finberg, Technical Writer, Diebold Election Systems
(Note: Metamor/Ciber is the ITA assigned to certify the software)
alteration of Audit Log in Access
To: "support"
Subject: alteration of Audit Log in Access
From: "Nel Finberg"
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 23:31:30 -0700
Importance: Normal
Jennifer Price
not sure, but... (Score:2)
magnet:?xt=urn:bitprint:NYW73XZ57R2QB2K2DPFS6NDAZ Y M2CHIW.SX3G7IQNFDENESHR4V6XEANMLH5R4FZEA5EZ7JY&dn= VOTER%20FRAUD%20-%20Electronic%20ballot%20maker%20 Diebold%20allows%20tampering%20of%20votes.%20Repro duce%20it%20yourself%20with%20this%20file%20or%20g o%20to%20equalccw.com.%20GEMSIS%20included.zip [magnet]
ed2k://|file|VOTER%20FRAUD%20-%20Electronic%20ball ot%20maker%20Diebold%20allows%20tampering%20of%20v otes.%20Reproduce%20it%20yourself%20with%20this%20 file%20or%20go%20to%20e [ed2k]
Re:Pretty effective (Score:3, Informative)
http://tinyurl.com/rej1 [tinyurl.com]
Re:GNU.FREE founder has big ego (Score:2)
Re:So do something about it (Score:2, Funny)
Hang on a sec... I think I see a problem here.
Re:Here is the link (Score:3, Informative)
. Let's see who gets a cease-and-desist first